Judgment :- (1) Vijayanagara Sri Krishnadevaraya University and its Vice Chancellor are the petitioners, who have raised the challenge to the order, dated 08.08.2013 (Annexure-A), directing the Vice Chancellor to continue the first respondent's services as the Registrar of the said University until further orders. (2) Sri S. R. Hegde Hudlamane, the learned counsel appearing for Sri Anant Hegde for the petitioners submits that the first respondent has been leaking the confidential information and that the first respondent is already warned by the University's Syndicate. What the first respondent has been doing is brought to the notice of the State Government and the Chancellor of the University with the request that the powers be withdrawn from the first respondent. (3) He submits that the second petitioner has already issued the notification, dated 03.08.2013 (Annexure-X) relieving the first respondent from the post of the Registrar. He further submits that the same is only after taking the approval of the University's Syndicate. He submits that if the first respondent were aggrieved by the order relieving him from service, his remedy is only to prefer an appeal before the Chancellor. In this context, he brought to my notice the second proviso to Section 15(5) of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 2000 ('the said Act' for short), which reads as follows: "15. Powers of the Vice-Chancellor.- "Provided further that any person in the service of the University affected by the decision of the Authority or body based on the report of the Vice-Chancellor under this sub-section may prefer an appeal to the Chancellor within thirty days from the date on which the decision was communicated to him and the decision of the Chancellor on such appeal shall be final." (4) He submits that the Government has no authority to annul the University's order relieving the first respondent from service by passing the order for his reinstatement. He submits that the provisions contained in Section 15(5) of the said Act empowers the Vice Chancellor to take such action as he deems necessary in case of an emergency. He submits that, in view of the emergency situation, the Vice Chancellor himself representing the University has filed this writ petition. He read out the provisions contained in Section 15(5) of the said Act, which are extracted herein above. "15. He submits that, in view of the emergency situation, the Vice Chancellor himself representing the University has filed this writ petition. He read out the provisions contained in Section 15(5) of the said Act, which are extracted herein above. "15. Powers of the Vice-Chancellor.- (5) In case of emergency which, in his opinion, requires immediate action, the Vice- Chancellor shall take such action as he deems necessary and shall at the earliest opportunity thereafter report the action taken to such authority or body which in the ordinary course would have dealt with the matter:" (5) Nextly, he brings to my notice the provisions contained in Section 15(1) of the said Act, which states that the Vice Chancellor shall be the principal executive and academic officer of the University and shall exercise general control over the affairs of the University. He further states that the Vice Chancellor shall exercise all the powers necessary for the maintenance of discipline in the University. To maintain discipline and peace on the University campus, the second petitioner Vice Chancellor has relieved the first respondent from University's services with the approval of the Syndicate. When the Government has tried to undo what the University has done, the Vice Chancellor along with the University has rightly filed this writ petition for assailing the Government order in question. (6) The learned counsel submits that the State Government cannot even fall back on the provisions contained in Section 10(1) of the said Act and contend that the University's order is annulled by the State Government, because if the State Government has to annul any order or the proceedings of the University, it has to be only after affording an opportunity to the University. In the instant case, no such opportunity is ever given by the Government to the University. Without prejudice to this submission, he reiterates that the Chancellor alone has the power to annul the orders of the University. (7) Sri K.S.Patil, the learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the respondent Nos.2 and 3 submits that the appointment of the Registrar is the prerogative of the Government. The say of the Vice Chancellor in the appointment of the Registrar is not contemplated in the said Act. He submits that neither the Vice Chancellor nor the Syndicate can annul the decision of the Government appointing the first respondent as the Registrar. The say of the Vice Chancellor in the appointment of the Registrar is not contemplated in the said Act. He submits that neither the Vice Chancellor nor the Syndicate can annul the decision of the Government appointing the first respondent as the Registrar. (8) He submits that the exercise of emergency powers by the Vice Chancellor invoking Section 15(5) of the said Act can only be in the context of the internal administration. The Vice Chancellor is not clothed with the powers to remove the Registrar appointed by the Government. He submits that the Registrar's Office is a statutory office. When the Government makes the statutory appointment, the Vice Chancellor has no power to remove such an appointee. The power of the Government to appoint the Registrar cannot be curtailed. (9) He submits that the quarrel between the Vice Chancellor and the Registrar cannot be equated with the emergency-like situation. He submits that the Vice Chancellor has created an unsavory situation instead of sorting out the issues. (10) He submits that the Vice Chancellor has no locus standi to challenge the appointment of the first respondent to the Office of the Registrar. (11) Sri Kashinath, the learned counsel appearing for Sri Javed for the first respondent has raised certain preliminary objections. He submits that there is no due authorization for the very filing of these petitions. He submits that Section 3(5) of the said Act states that in all the legal proceedings, the University has to be represented by the Registrar. The said provisions read as follows: "3. Establishment and Incorporation of Universities.- (1) X X X X (2) X X X X (3) X X X X (4) X X X X (5) In all suits and other legal proceedings by or against the University, the pleading shall be signed and verified by, and all processes in such suits and proceedings shall be issued to and be served on the Registrar." (12) Sri Kashinath brings to my notice the provisions contained in Section 29(2)(p) of the said Act, which state that the Syndicate shall have the power to arrange for the conduct of litigation by or against the University. In the instant case, the Syndicate has not authorized the Vice Chancellor to file this petition and/or to represent the University. In the instant case, the Syndicate has not authorized the Vice Chancellor to file this petition and/or to represent the University. Without prejudice to this submission, the learned counsel submits that if there is no full-fledged Registrar, there would be an in-charge or officiating Registrar, who alone is competent to institute the writ petition. He submits that these petitions are actuated by bias and malafides, as the first respondent has filed the complaint against the second petitioner Vice Chancellor under the Schedule Castes and Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. (13) The learned counsel submits that neither the Vice Chancellor nor the Syndicate can arrogate to himself/itself the powers of the Government. The order, dated 04.02.2013 passed by the Government, appointing the first respondent as the Registrar cannot be annulled by the Vice Chancellor. As the Vice Chancellor's notification, dated 03.08.2013 (Annexure-Q), relieving the first respondent from the post of the Registrar is a nullity, the petitioners cannot make an issue of the first respondent not challenging the Vice Chancellor's notification before the Chancellor. As the Vice Chancellor is neither an appointing authority nor the removing authority for the Registrar, his act of relieving the first respondent is absolutely without the authority of law. When the Government alone has the power to appoint the Registrar, it alone can remove him. He has relied on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of DR.BOOL CHAND v. CHANCELLOR, KURUKSHETRA UNIVERSITY reported in AIR 1968 SC 292 , wherein it is held that the power to appoint implies the power to terminate. (14) The learned counsel submits that the petitioner No.2 has been issuing the notifications in his name, making the appointments, etc., though under the said Act, they have to be done only by the Registrar. (15) The learned counsel complains of the violation of the principles of natural justice, as the second petitioner has removed the first respondent from the post of the Registrar on making allegations like leaking the confidential information. Without prejudice to this submission, he has denied the allegations levelled by the petitioners against the respondent No.1. (16) The submissions of the learned counsel have received my thoughtful consideration. The following questions fall for my consideration: i) Whether the first petitioner Vijayanagara Sri Krishnadevaraya University can be represented by the Vice Chancellor in these petitions? Without prejudice to this submission, he has denied the allegations levelled by the petitioners against the respondent No.1. (16) The submissions of the learned counsel have received my thoughtful consideration. The following questions fall for my consideration: i) Whether the first petitioner Vijayanagara Sri Krishnadevaraya University can be represented by the Vice Chancellor in these petitions? ii) Whether the second petitioner Vice Chancellor has the locus standi to maintain these petitions? iii) Whether the impugned order is liable to be quashed? IN RE: QUESTION NO.1 (17) To answer this question, it is necessary to refer to certain provisions of the said Act. Section 3(5) of the said Act states that in all the suits and other legal proceedings by or against the University, the pleadings shall be signed and verified by, and all processes in such suits and proceedings shall be issued to and be served on the Registrar. A perusal of the said provisions unequivocally indicates that it is the Registrar, who can represent the University in all the legal proceedings. (18) In the instant case, the Registrar himself is the respondent by name. There is no question of the first respondent acting in his official capacity and instituting a petition against himself in his private capacity. The question therefore would be who can institute the writ petition on behalf of the University? (19) At this juncture, it is interesting to note that the first respondent is shown as the Ex-Registrar in the cause title of the petition. Further, it is to be noticed that the enclosure to item No.5, which is produced as Annexure-Z to the petitioners' rejoinder states that Dr.Rangaraj, Registrar (Evaluation) is appointed as an interim Registrar (Administration). In the fitness of the things, the first petitioner ought to have been represented by the interim Registrar, Dr.Rangaraj. (20) Section 29(2)(p) of the said Act reads as follows: "29. Powers of the Syndicate: (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the forgoing, the Syndicate shall have the following powers, namely:- (p) to arrange for the conduct of litigation by or against the University. (21) In the instant case, the Syndicate has not authorised the Vice Chancellor to challenge the impugned order, much less to file these petitions on behalf of the University. (22) This Court finds it difficult to accept the version of the petitioners that an emergency-like situation is created. (21) In the instant case, the Syndicate has not authorised the Vice Chancellor to challenge the impugned order, much less to file these petitions on behalf of the University. (22) This Court finds it difficult to accept the version of the petitioners that an emergency-like situation is created. The Government order reiterating the first respondent's appointment as the Registrar does not create an emergency-like situation. Even assuming that an emergency-like situation was created, there is a gap of eleven days between 08.08.2013, the date on which the impugned order was issued and 19.08.2013, the date on which the writ petition was filed. The interlude of 11 days is not used for convening the meeting of the Syndicate for taking its approval for the filing these petitions by the Vice Chancellor. Considering all these aspects of the matter, the question No.1 is answered in the negative. IN RE: QUESTION NO.2: (23) It is trite that a person seeking a remedy should have suffered an injury by the reason of violation of a legal right. It cannot be said that the second petitioner is a person, who has suffered the legal grievance by the appointment of the first respondent as the Registrar of the University. (24) The question of who would be an aggrieved person has to be determined with reference to the existence or availability of a legal right and the infringement of such a right and the ascertainment of the person, who has suffered such an infringement. Applying these yardsticks, it cannot be held that the petitioner No.2 has substantial grievance of his own. On the nature of the issues and concerns raised, it is difficult to hold that the second petitioner has the litigational competence. The appointment of the first respondent has not affected the second petitioner's right to anything. He cannot claim that he is entitled to object to and be heard by the Government before it took the impugned decision of continuing the first respondent as the Registrar of the first petitioner- University. I therefore hold that the second respondent has no locus standi to bring the action in his own name for the purpose of undoing the first respondent's appointment. I therefore hold that the second respondent has no locus standi to bring the action in his own name for the purpose of undoing the first respondent's appointment. (25) As held by the Apex Court in the case of MANI SUBRAT JAIN v. STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1977 SC 276 , a person can be said to be aggrieved only when he is deprived or denied of a legal right by someone, who has a legal duty to do something or to abstain from doing something. Existence of the right is implicit for the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If an authority is required for this proposition, it can be found in the laudable decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of D. NAGARAJ v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS reported in AIR1977 SC 876. (26) Even the permission to sue in espousal of public interest is not blanket. As held by the Apex Court in the case of MALIK BROTHERS v. NARENDRA DADHICH AND OTHERS reported in (1999) 6 SCC 552 , the litigational competence may have to meet some threshold requirement. Overly broad claims of abstract and speculative injuries to the general public will not suffice. IN RE: QUESTION NO.3: (27) Strictly speaking, this Court is not required to answer the third question in view of answering the question Nos.1 and 2 against the petitioners. But in view of the serious questions of law raised, I propose to examine the third question, as if these petitions are maintainable. (28) To answer this question, the advertence to Section 17(1) of the said Act is a must. It reads as follows: 17. Registrar: (1) The Registrar shall be a whole time officer of the University. The State Government may appoint an officer not below the rank of Group-A officer of the super time scale or a member of the faculty of any university working as a Professor for atleast five years, to be a Registrar of a University. (29) The State Government has passed the impugned order in exercise of the power conferred by Section 17(1) of the said Act. It is trite that the appointing authority alone has the power to remove the incumbent from the office. (29) The State Government has passed the impugned order in exercise of the power conferred by Section 17(1) of the said Act. It is trite that the appointing authority alone has the power to remove the incumbent from the office. (30) There is no provision in the said Act for the removal of the Registrar either by the Vice Chancellor or by the Syndicate or by both of them acting together. Further, the enclosure to item No.5 (Annexure-Z) reads like a charge-sheet against the first respondent. It accuses him of leaking the confidential information, passing the clandestine orders, committing flagrant breach of the provisions of the said Act, exhibiting extreme insubordination, frequently going to the press and media unauthorisedly, etc. If somebody is removed on such allegations, then it attaches stigma to him. Therefore, removing him without holding an enquiry into the allegations is not only violative of the principles of natural justice but has serious civil consequences for the concerned person. (31) Be that as it may, whether there is any substance in the allegations made by the Vice Chancellor against the Registrar may have to be examined by the Government. It is for the Government to look into the allegations made by the second petitioner against the first respondent. The imperative need is to ensure the smooth administration of the affairs of the University. On the ground that the first respondent is a persona non grata to the second petitioner, the impugned order continuing the services of the first respondent as the Registrar cannot be challenged with any rate of success. As the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity, its quashing is not warranted. The third question is answered accordingly. (32) In the result, I dismiss these petitions. No order as to costs.