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2013 DIGILAW 1060 (AP)

Sallepalli Narasimha Reddy v. Yerram Pedda Subba Reddy

2013-11-22

T.SUNIL CHOWDARY

body2013
Judgment : This appeal is preferred by the defendant challenging the decree and judgment dated 11.10.2004 in A.S.No.5 of 2003 on the file of Senior Civil Judge Court, Allagadda, reversing the decree and judgment dated 10.4.2003 in O.S.No.174 of 1999 on the file of Junior Civil Judge Court, Allagadda. The parties are hereinafter referred to as they arrayed in the suit. The case of the plaintiff is that the defendant borrowed an amount of Rs.50,000/- from him on 30.3.1997 and executed a promissory note agreeing to repay the same with interest at 24% per annum. In spite of repeated demands, the defendant did not choose to repay the amount. On 21.4.1998, the plaintiff got issued notice directing the defendant to repay the amount. The defendant issued a reply notice stating that the promissory note is a forged one. Hence, the suit. The defendant filed written statement inter alia contending that he did not borrow any amount from the plaintiff and the suit promissory note might have been forged and fabricated by the plaintiff keeping in mind the land dispute between them. The defendant also issued reply to the legal notice got issued by the plaintiff. In the trial court, on behalf of the plaintiff, P.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.A1 to A3 were marked. On behalf of the defendant, D.W.1 and C.W.1 were examined and Exs.X1 to X4 were marked. On the analysis of oral, documentary evidence and other material available on record, the trial court arrived at a conclusion that the suit promissory note is forged one and dismissed the suit. Being aggrieved by the decree and judgment of the trial court, the unsuccessful plaintiff filed A.S. No.5 of 2003 on the file of Senior Civil Judge Court, Allagadda. The first appellate court, after reappraising the oral and documentary evidence, arrived at a conclusion that the suit promissory note is a valid one and the plaintiff is entitled to recover the suit amount from the defendant. The defendant, being aggrieved by the decree and judgment of the first appellate court, preferred the present appeal. The substantial questions that are pleaded in this appeal are: (1) Whether the lower appellate court is justified in reversing the judgment of the trial court by placing reliance on the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 who are interested witnesses? The defendant, being aggrieved by the decree and judgment of the first appellate court, preferred the present appeal. The substantial questions that are pleaded in this appeal are: (1) Whether the lower appellate court is justified in reversing the judgment of the trial court by placing reliance on the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 who are interested witnesses? (2) Whether the lower appellate court is justified in discarding the Ex.X1 along with Exs.X2 to X4 supported by the evidence of C.W.1? (3) Whether the lower appellate court is justified in applying the principle laid down in the judgments reported in AIR 1982 Allahabad 323 and AIR 1964 SC 529 to the facts of the present case? (4) Whether the lower appellate court properly framed the points for determination and answered the same properly in reversing the judgment of the trial court? To substantiate his case, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and got marked Exs.A1 to A3. P.Ws.2 and 3 are the attestors and P.W.4 is the scribe of Ex.A1 promissory note. To dislodge the case of the plaintiff, defendant examined himself as D.W.1. C.W.1 is the expert through whom Exs.X1 to X4 were marked. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant and learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff. Point No.4: A perusal of the record reveals that the first appellate court has framed the following two points for determination. (i) Whether the evidence of the expert is conclusive and falsifies the direct evidence of the attesting witnesses? (ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree for recovery of suit amount? It is needless to say that the appeal is continuation of the suit. A legal obligation is cast on the part of the first appellate court to answer all the issues framed by the trial court or should frame the points of law and facts covering the issues framed by trial court and answer them properly. The trial court had framed only one issue i.e., whether the suit promissory note is forged document. The second point framed by the first appellate court covers the issue framed by the trial court. In point No.1, the first appellate court elaborately considered the oral, documentary evidence and other material available on record, before arriving at such conclusion. The manner in which the first appellate court framed the points for determination would not cause any prejudice to the rights of the defendant. In point No.1, the first appellate court elaborately considered the oral, documentary evidence and other material available on record, before arriving at such conclusion. The manner in which the first appellate court framed the points for determination would not cause any prejudice to the rights of the defendant. The first appellate court has addressed both the points by following due procedure. Point Nos.1, 2 and 3: These three points are interrelated with each other and hence I am inclined to address these points simultaneously in order to avoid repetition and confusion. In this appeal, the predominant contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant is that the first appellate court decreed the suit basing on the testimony of interested witnesses while discarding the expert opinion. To substantiate his contention, he relied upon the decisions in State (through CBI/New Delhi) v S.J.Choudhary (1996) 2 SCC 428 ), the principle enunciated is that the opinion of the typewriter expert is admissible under Section 45 of the Evidence Act; Praveen Kumar v Suresh Chand (2000) 8 SCC 491 ), the principle enunciated is that the court can place reliance on the opinion of the expert in respect of fake signature made on process; and Tatipamula Naga Raju v Pattem Padmavathi ( (2011) 4 SCC 726 ), the principle enunciated is that the court can place reliance on the opinion of the handwriting expert confirming interpolations in the promissory note. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff is that the decree and judgment of the trial court is not legally sustainable as its findings are based on expert opinion which is a weak piece of evidence. The following principles can be deduced from the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. The evidence of the expert being opinion evidence, cannot falsify the convincing direct evidence ( 2003(1) ALD 260 (Nallabothu Purnaiah v Garre Mallikarjuna Rao (ied) by LRs). The opinion of the experts cannot outweigh the direct evidence ( AIR 1982 All 323 (Brij Basi v Moti Ram)). Before acting on expert evidence, it is usual to see if it is corroborated either by oral evidence or by circumstantial evidence ( AIR 1964 SC 529 (Shashi Kumar Banerjee v Subodh Kumar Banerjee)). The opinion of expert is not infallible (AIR 1921 Lah 126 (Hari Singh v Sardarni Lachhmi Devi)). Before acting on expert evidence, it is usual to see if it is corroborated either by oral evidence or by circumstantial evidence ( AIR 1964 SC 529 (Shashi Kumar Banerjee v Subodh Kumar Banerjee)). The opinion of expert is not infallible (AIR 1921 Lah 126 (Hari Singh v Sardarni Lachhmi Devi)). The evidence given by an expert of handwriting can never a conclusive proof ( AIR 1963 SC 1728 (1) (Ishwari Prasad Misra v Mohammad Isa)). The handwriting expert must compare the disputed signatures on promissory note with the admitted signature and not the signatures on the pleading and vakalat ( AIR 2000 Mad 239 (Somasundaram v Palani)). Let me consider the facts of the case on hand, in the light of the principles enunciated in the cases cited supra. In the instant case, the plaintiff has to establish that Ex.A1 promissory note is executed by the defendant. Once the plaintiff establishes the execution of promissory note the onus shifts on the defendant to establish the suit promissory note is forged one. As per the testimony of P.W.1, the defendant borrowed an amount of Rs.50,000/- from him on 30.3.1997 and executed Ex.A1 promissory note. As per the testimony of D.W.1, he neither borrowed any amount from the plaintiff nor executed Ex.A1 promissory note and it is a forged one. As seen from the testimony of P.Ws.2 and 3, they attested the promissory note in the presence of the plaintiff and defendant. As per the testimony of P.W.4, he scribed Ex.A1 promissory note and P.Ws.2 and 3 are the attestors. As per the averments in the written statement, the plaintiff fabricated Ex.A1 promissory note due to land disputes. In the cross-examination, D.W.1 deposed that he has no disputes with the plaintiff. He further deposed he mentioned in the written statement that the suit promissory note might have been forged keeping in mind the disputes between him and the plaintiff with regard to purchasing of pesticides. The defendant has taken one stand in the written statement and deposed different version with regard to alleged motive for fabrication of Ex.A1 promissory note by the plaintiff. As per the testimony of D.W.1, P.Ws.2 to 4 belong to Congress party and he belongs to Telugu Desam Party. In the cross-examination, no suggestion was put to P.Ws.2 and 4 that they belong to Congress party. As per the testimony of D.W.1, P.Ws.2 to 4 belong to Congress party and he belongs to Telugu Desam Party. In the cross-examination, no suggestion was put to P.Ws.2 and 4 that they belong to Congress party. In the cross-examination, P.W.3 denied the suggestion that he belongs to Congress party. The version putforth by the defendant, so far as fabrication of Ex.A1 promissory note, is not specifically elicited from the testimony of P.Ws.1 to 4. In the cross-examination of P.Ws.1 to 4, nothing is elicited to shake their testimony regarding receiving of consideration and execution of Ex.A1 promissory note by the defendant on 30.3.1997. In the cross-examination P.W.2 categorically deposed that he has been working as a clerk in the shop of P.W.1. Even if the testimony of P.W.2 is discarded in toto, still the oral testimony of P.Ws.3 and 4 is fully supporting the version of the plaintiff. The testimony of D.W.1 clearly reveals that he has been purchasing pesticides and fertilizers from the plaintiff’s shop. It clearly indicates acquaintance between them prior to Ex.A1 transaction. By examining P.Ws.2 to 4 and marking Ex.A1, the plaintiff clearly established that the defendant received an amount of Rs.50,000/- and executed Ex.A1 promissory note. P.W.1 being a party to the proceedings is entitled to depose evidence and therefore he cannot be treated as interested witness. Simply because P.W.2 is working in the shop of P.W.1, that itself is not sufficient ground to treat him as interested witness. P.W.2 will not gain or lose anything if the suit is decreed or dismissed. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I am unable to countenance the argument of learned counsel for the appellant/defendant that P.W.2 is an interested witness. To prove the stand of the defendant, he mainly relied on the expert evidence. As seen from the testimony of C.W.1, after careful examination and comparison of the disputed and standard signatures in the original documents she gave opinion that questioned signatures marked as Q1 and Q2 are traced forgery. As per the testimony of C.W.1, questioned documents exhibitinherent signs of forgery such as slow and drawn movement, detective line quality, poor skill, slow speed, hesitations, unnatural breaks and consciousness in writing. She issued Ex.X4 two diapositives containing the questioned signatures. As per the testimony of C.W.1, questioned documents exhibitinherent signs of forgery such as slow and drawn movement, detective line quality, poor skill, slow speed, hesitations, unnatural breaks and consciousness in writing. She issued Ex.X4 two diapositives containing the questioned signatures. Ex.X1 is the opinion given by C.W.1 along with file No.DCV/309, dated 25.1.2002, Ex.X2 is the photo chart containing questioned and standard signatures as Q1 and Q2 and S1 to S4, and Ex.X3 is two negatives of Ex.X4 dia positives. The rule of prudence requires the court to send the admitted and contemporary signatures of the person to the expert to compare the same with his disputed signatures on the document. According to Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary “Contemporary” means belonging to the same or a stated period in the past. It is needless to say that admitted signatures means the signatures on the documents maintained by any authority in course of its business such as signatures on a passport, income-tax returns, bank passbook or registered sale deed. Let me consider the facts of the case on hand, in the light of the above principles. The suit promissory note is dated 30.3.1997. The signatures of the defendant were taken in open court on 07.11.2001 to send the same for comparison with his disputed signature on Ex.A1 promissory note dated 30.3.1997. This factual aspect clearly manifest that the contemporary signatures of the defendant were not sent to the expert for comparison. It is not in dispute that the signatures of the defendant on the bank passbook or passport or sale deed were not sent to the expert for comparison. The court shall not lose sight of the relevant facts, in order to appreciate the rival contentions. Prior to 07.11.2001, the defendant was very much aware that he has taken a specific plea in the written statement that Ex.A1 does not bear his signature. Therefore, the court has to take into consideration the tendency of a human being in getting over the situation adverse to him. In such circumstances, the possibility of changing pattern and style of the signature by the defendant, while putting his signature in open court, to distinguish his usual signature cannot be ruled out completely, so as to substantiate his stand in the written statement. In such circumstances, the possibility of changing pattern and style of the signature by the defendant, while putting his signature in open court, to distinguish his usual signature cannot be ruled out completely, so as to substantiate his stand in the written statement. Even as per the testimony of C.W.1, the questioned signatures were signed with a ball-point pen whereas the admitted signatures S2 to S4 were signed with a sketch pen. There is every possibility for variation if the same person puts his signature with a sketch pen and a ball-point pen. C.W.1 did not mention the age of the questioned signatures on Ex.A1. She further admitted that she has not mentioned the design of the letters in her reasons. In the cross-examination, she has categorically deposed that she obtained Post Graduation in Zoology in the year 1978. She further deposed that she is not having diploma in examination of questioned documents. As per the expert opinion the disputes signatures are traced forgery. The person who traced the signature of another person must be in possession of the signatures of that person. The defendant has not placed any material much less cogent and convincing material, to establish that the plaintiff is having signatures of the defendant with him, which enabled him to trace his signature on Ex.A1 promissory note. Therefore the opinion of the expert that the disputes signatures are traced forgery is not supported by any corroborative evidence. A perusal of the testimony of C.W.1 reveals that out of experience she learnt comparison of the handwriting. The fact remains that C.W.1 is not having any diploma or degree in handwriting comparison. All these facts create doubt in the mind of the court whether the opinion expressed by C.W.1 is infallible. In such circumstances, it is not safe to dismiss the suit, basing on uncorroborated opinion of the expert (C.W.1). In the instant case, there is convincing and legally admissible direct evidence so far as execution of Ex.A1 promissory note by the defendant. When there is a conflict between the direct evidence and the expert opinion, the court ought to have placed reliance on the direct evidence. The decisions cited by the defendant are no way helpful to substantiate his case. On the other hand, the decisions cited by the plaintiff’s counsel squarely apply to the facts of the case on hand. When there is a conflict between the direct evidence and the expert opinion, the court ought to have placed reliance on the direct evidence. The decisions cited by the defendant are no way helpful to substantiate his case. On the other hand, the decisions cited by the plaintiff’s counsel squarely apply to the facts of the case on hand. The trial court dismissed the suit on the premise that the court can place reliance on uncorroborated opinion of the expert by discarding the direct evidence. The trial court has not given a specific finding that the testimony of P.Ws.1 to 4 is not trustworthy for consideration. On the other hand, the first appellate court in para–14 of its judgment, made an observation that there are no discrepancies in the testimony of P.Ws.1 to 4 with regard to date, time and place of execution of Ex.A1 promissory note and their evidence was not at all shaken during their cross-examination. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I have no hesitation to hold that the testimony of P.Ws.1 to 4 inspires confidence of the court so far as Ex.A1 transaction is concerned. The first appellate court has rightly applied the principles enunciated in Brij Basi case(5 supra) and Shashi Kumar Banerjee case (6 supra) and held that opinion of expert cannot outweigh the direct evidence, if the direct evidence available on record is convincing. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the findings recorded by the trial court as the same are not based on sound principles of law. In the light of the foregoing reasons, there is no question of law much less substantial question of law in this case, which warrants interference of this court, to set aside the decree and judgment of the first appellate court. The second appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No costs. The miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.