Judgment : A. Hariprasad, J. 1. Appellants/petitioners approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a writ petition claiming the reliefs mentioned hereunder: “I. Issue a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to demolish the illegal construction made by the fifth respondent violating the provisions of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 and the Kerala Panchayath Building Rules, 2011 as provided under Section 235W of the Kerala Panchayath Raj Act, 1994; II. Issue a writ of mandamus directing the second and third respondents to implement Exhibit P5 stop memo issued by the second respondent to the fifth respondent not to proceed with the illegal construction carried out by him; III. Issue a writ of mandamus directing the third respondent to take appropriate legal action against the fifth respondent based on Exhibit P7 complaint filed by the second respondent;” 2. Facts, in brief, are the following: The appellants/petitioners are the absolute owners of 3.875 cents of land comprised in old Survey No.8984 of Vadakkumthala Village in Karunagappally Taluk of Kollam District and a 60 years old building thereon. The appellants are conducting business therein. Recently, when the shop rooms were closed during the month of Ramzan, the 5th respondent, who is the owner of a building on the eastern side of the appellants' building, demolished his old building and started construction of a new one without any proper basement. The appellants came to know about the construction on the eastern wall of their building only when the new building rose upto the level of the appellants' building. Immediately the appellants preferred a complaint before the 2nd respondent and he issued Ext.P5 stop memo to the 5th respondent and directed him to show cause why action should not be taken against the illegal construction made by him. The 5th respondent ignoring Ext.P5 proceeded with the construction which led to Ext.P6 complaint and accordingly the 2nd respondent sought the assistance of the 3rd respondent Sub Inspector under Section 252(b) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (the Act, for short) to prohibit the illegal construction. Although the 3rd respondent received Ext.P7 complaint, no action was taken against the 5th respondent which, according to the 2nd respondent, was done in violation of the provisions of Section 220B of the Act and Rule 64 of the Kerala Panchayat Building Rules, 2011 (in short, the Rules). Although the 3rd respondent received Ext.P7 complaint, no action was taken against the 5th respondent which, according to the 2nd respondent, was done in violation of the provisions of Section 220B of the Act and Rule 64 of the Kerala Panchayat Building Rules, 2011 (in short, the Rules). It is evident from Ext.P8, contended the appellants. Respondents 2 and 3 are not taking any action against the 5th respondent to demolish his illegal building under Section 235W of the Act. The appellants' building is severely damaged on account of the illegal construction made by the 5th respondent and the adjoining building owners also apprehend that on any day the illegal construction made by the 5th respondent may collapse on account of not having sufficiently strong basement. Moreover, construction in the entire area has been freezed by the 4th respondent as the acquisition proceedings has been started for widening NH-47. Aggrieved by the illegal construction made by the 5th respondent, causing damages to the appellants' building, and also in violation of the Act and the Rules, the appellants preferred the petition. It was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. Challenging the dismissal of the petition, they have preferred this appeal. 3. Per contra, the contesting respondent (5th respondent) in the counter statement mainly raised the following legal question, inter alia other contentions: Appellants have deliberately suppressed relevant and material facts pertaining to the subject matter. They have approached this Court with unclean hands. No right, either legal or constitutional, of the appellants has been infringed. Hence they are not entitled to any relief. Contesting respondent submitted that the appellants have approached a competent civil court (Munsiff's Court, Karunagappally) by filing O.S.No.236 of 2013 for identical reliefs. The suit was filed before filing this petition. The said suit is still pending consideration. The appellants have not stated anything about the said suit in this proceedings and intentionally the material fact was withheld from this Court. In the suit, the appellants have sought for a permanent injunction restraining the 5th respondent from effecting any construction activity contrary to the Rules and also from causing damage to or demolition of the appellants' building. They have also sought for a mandatory injunction to remove the portion allegedly protruding into their property. Along with the suit, the appellants have filed an application for temporary injunction also. They have also sought for a mandatory injunction to remove the portion allegedly protruding into their property. Along with the suit, the appellants have filed an application for temporary injunction also. Withholding the existence of earlier proceeding between the parties is a malafide act on the part of the appellants, which disentitle them from claiming any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Further more, the contesting respondent submitted that the allegations in the petition are totally untrue and his construction is perfectly in accordance with the Act and the Rules. The contention raised by the appellants that the 5th respondent violated the provisions of the Act and the Rules are strongly denied by the latter. 4. Learned Single Judge considered the matter in detail and dismissed the writ petition, finding that the reliefs sought for in Ext.R5(a) plaint, pending before the Munsiff's Court, and that in the petition are similar and therefore the petition is not maintainable. 5. We heard the learned counsel for the appellants Shri Santhosh Mathew, learned Government Pleader and the learned counsel for the 5th respondent Shri Subash Chand. 6. Shri Santhosh Mathew, the learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that the learned Single Judge went wrong in finding that the reliefs sought for in the writ petition are similar to that in Ext.R5(a) plaint. It is also contended that the learned Single Judge should have considered the pleadings urged in the writ petition in its entirety and should not have dismissed the writ petition on an erroneous finding of suppression of material facts. 7. It is the definite contention of Shri Subash Chand, learned counsel for the contesting respondent (5th respondent), that the reliefs in the writ petition as well as that in the suit pending before a competent civil court (Ext.R5(a)) are the same and filing of the suit by the appellants was intentionally suppressed with a malafide object in mind. 8. We shall at the outset examine the legal contention raised by the contesting respondent (5th respondent) regarding suppression of material fact. We have already excerpted above the reliefs sought for in the petition by the appellants. Ext.R5(a) plaint is filed by the appellants before Munsiff's Court, Karunagappally against the 5th respondent. In the body of the plaint, specific allegations regarding the alleged violation of the Act and Rules have been mentioned. Reliefs sought in Ext.R5(a) are two fold. We have already excerpted above the reliefs sought for in the petition by the appellants. Ext.R5(a) plaint is filed by the appellants before Munsiff's Court, Karunagappally against the 5th respondent. In the body of the plaint, specific allegations regarding the alleged violation of the Act and Rules have been mentioned. Reliefs sought in Ext.R5(a) are two fold. Appellants seek permanent prohibitory injunction against the sole defendant therein (5th respondent) that he shall not make any construction in violation of the Rules and also that he shall not cause any destruction or damage to the building situated in the property of the appellants (plaint schedule property). Further relief sought is that the portions constructed by the 5th respondent in violation of the Rules encroaching into the plaint schedule property should be directed to be demolished. This is in the nature of a mandatory injunction. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that in the suit respondents 1 to 4 herein are not made parties and, therefore, there is a substantial difference between these proceedings. This contention cannot be countenanced as it is trite that the pleadings and substantive reliefs asked for in the proceedings are to be considered for determining whether the proceedings are mutually exclusive. 9. On going through the reliefs claimed in Ext.R5(a) plaint and that in the writ petition, it can be vividly seen that to a great extent they overlap. In other words, the reliefs sought for in the writ petition as well as those claimed in Ext.R5(a) plaint are akin to one another and granting the same in one of the proceedings will have a direct impact on the other. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on a decision pronounced by the Supreme Court in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others ((2004) 7 SCC 166). Based on that decision, it was argued that suppression of any and every fact cannot be termed as fatal to a party in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Our attention was drawn to the statement of law in paragraph 13 of the decision, which reads as follows: “As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. Our attention was drawn to the statement of law in paragraph 13 of the decision, which reads as follows: “As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the Court, whatever view the court may have taken. ...............” 11. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that nonmentioning of the institution of the suit against the 5th respondent is not a material fact. It has no significance in the consideration of the writ petition, contended on behalf of the appellants. Learned counsel for the appellants further argued that mere suppression of any fact cannot entail in the dismissal of the writ petition as there can be facts which are relevant, irrelevant or material for deciding the lis. Only suppression of those facts which are material for the decision of the case alone can be considered to be a fault on the part of the appellants. In this context, clear understanding of the meaning of the terms “material facts” become relevant. 12. Meaning of the words “material facts” would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. A fact which is material in one litigation may not be material in another. For eg., in the context of insurance law, “material fact” means any fact which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium or determining whether he will take the risk (Mac Gillivray & Parkington : Insurance Law, 6th Edition, Page 286). But the same fact may not be that much relevant in another context. Nature of the case, therefore, is very important in deciding whether a fact is material or not. In the context of election petition, interpreting Section 83 of the Representation of People Act, the Supreme Court held that “material fact” under Section 83 of the Act would be the grounds of corrupt practice and the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action (see Raj Narain v. Indira Nehru Gandhi (AIR 1972 SC 1302). In the context of election petition, interpreting Section 83 of the Representation of People Act, the Supreme Court held that “material fact” under Section 83 of the Act would be the grounds of corrupt practice and the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action (see Raj Narain v. Indira Nehru Gandhi (AIR 1972 SC 1302). Again, in Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi (AIR 1986 SC 1253) the Supreme Court, in the field of election law, held that material facts are facts which, if established, would give the relief asked for by the petitioner; test is whether the court could have given a direct verdict in favour of the election petitioner, on the grounds pleaded in the petition. The Supreme Court in V.Narayanaswamy v. C.P. Thirunavukkarsu ((2000) 2 SCC 294) held that “material facts” mean the entire bundle of facts which would constitute a complete cause of action. 13. Apex Court in Mahadeorao Sukaji Shivankar v. Ramaratan Bapu ((2004) 7 SCC 181) held that the expression “material facts” has not been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It may be stated that material facts are those facts upon which a party relies on for his claim or defence. What particulars could be said to be “material facts” would depend upon the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down. The expression “material fact” is also known as integral facts (see Ambica Industries v. CCE ((2007) 6 SCC 769). 14. Words and Phrases - Permanent Edition (Vol.26A at page 252) shows that “material facts” of an issue of fact are such as are necessary to determine the issue. In criminal case, “material facts” are final essential elements of crime, being ultimate conclusions of fact from every variety of evidence tending to establish them. It is also stated therein, in the context of insurance law, that a fact is material to the insurance risk, when it naturally and substantially increases the probability of the event upon which the policy is to become payable. Materiality of a fact in insurance law is subjective. 15. Black's Law Dictionary mentions that “material fact” is a fact that is significant or essential to the issue or matter at hand. 16. Materiality of a fact in insurance law is subjective. 15. Black's Law Dictionary mentions that “material fact” is a fact that is significant or essential to the issue or matter at hand. 16. The Supreme Court in Arunima Baruah v. Union of India and others ((2007) 6 SCC 120) considered the meaning of the term “material fact” and held the following proposition: “12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. .............” Recently, the Supreme Court in Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav and others v. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society and others (AIR 2013 SC 523) held as follows: “46. It is not for a litigant to decide what fact is material for adjudicating a case and what is not material. It is the obligation of a litigant to disclose all the facts of a case and leave the decision making to the Court. .....................” 17. The upshot of the discussion is that the term “material fact” is not susceptible of a precise definition. It is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it can be stated that a material fact is an essential fact which would influence the court in granting or refusing a relief. There is a clear distinction between facts of a case understood in the ordinary sense and material facts. It goes without saying that a material fact will always be a relevant fact. Suppression of facts, which will have a direct bearing on the reliefs claimed in the proceeding, can be said to be a material fact. Whether a fact is material or not is to be decided by the court in the context of the facts and circumstances of each case and the party cannot have a say on that matter. 18. Suppression of facts, which will have a direct bearing on the reliefs claimed in the proceeding, can be said to be a material fact. Whether a fact is material or not is to be decided by the court in the context of the facts and circumstances of each case and the party cannot have a say on that matter. 18. As mentioned above, the reliefs sought for in the petition as well as those in Ext.R5 (a) plaint are similar in nature and to a considerable extent they overlap on each other. Therefore, we are of the considered view that non-mentioning of the pendency of the suit in the writ petition will amount to suppression of a material fact. It is axiomatic that the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary and a person approaching the court with unclean hands is not entitled to get any discretionary relief. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent argued, on the basis of a Bench decision of this Court in Lakshmanan v. Roy Alexander (1992 KHC 413), that it is the bounden duty of the appellants to establish that the decision of the learned Single Judge is arbitrary or perverse. In this case, by no stretch of reasoning, it can be said that the learned Single Judge took a wrong view in finding that the appellants/petitioners have suppressed material facts for unjust gain. 19. It is trite law that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands (see Arunima Baruah's case (supra)). We are of the considered view that the appellants suppressed the fact of filing a suit for similar reliefs before a competent civil court and certainly that will amount to suppression of a material fact. This point was rightly decided by the learned Single Judge against the appellants. 20. Learned counsel for the 5th respondent contended that the complaint raised in the writ petition that the 5th respondent violated the Act and the Rules is also totally incorrect. Appellants' contention based on Ext.P2 that the entire area is entangled in land acquisition proceedings for widening NH 47 is not disputed by the 5th respondent. On the basis of Ext.P4 complaint, 2nd respondent issued Ext.P5 show cause notice to 5th respondent. Appellants' contention based on Ext.P2 that the entire area is entangled in land acquisition proceedings for widening NH 47 is not disputed by the 5th respondent. On the basis of Ext.P4 complaint, 2nd respondent issued Ext.P5 show cause notice to 5th respondent. It is the allegation of the appellants that in spite of Ext.P5, he continued with his illegal construction. Hence Ext.P6 was filed to which Exts.P7 and P8 notices were issued by the 2nd respondent. According to the 5th respondent, all these notices have been properly replied by him vide Ext.R5(d). Definite case pleaded by the contesting respondent is that by virtue of Rules 132 and 133 of the Rules, no permit is necessary for effecting constructions in his land. According to the 5th respondent, he is conducting a tailoring shop, which is covered by the provisions in Rule 132 of the Rules. It is also contended by the 5th respondent that he submitted requisite intimation to carry out modification/construction of building to the 2nd respondent as required under Rule 133(1) of the Rules. Ext.R5(c) is the document produced to substantiate this contention. It is pertinent to note that these contentions raised by the 5th respondent are not at all controverted in the reply affidavit filed by the appellants. Moreover, these are vexed questions of fact which can be resolved in the pending suit. On this score also, we find that the appellants are not entitled to get any relief claimed in the petition. 21. For the above said reasons, we find that the writ petition was rightly dismissed by the learned Single Judge and no interference is warranted in this matter. However we make it clear that the civil court will be free to consider the suit untrammelled by any observation in this judgment. In the result, appeal is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.