Devi Prasad Singh & Arvind Kumar Tripathi (II),JJ.:- Heard Shri Rakesh Kumar learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Shafiq Mirza learned counsel for the respondents and perused the record. 2. U.P. State Agro Industrial Corporation Limited is a corporation constituted under the Companies Act and is a government company and admittedly instrumentality of State in terms of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner was appointed in the year 1970 on the post of Accountant and on 20.7.1970 thereafter on the post of Branch Manager in the respondent corporation. His services were terminated by an order dated 23.1.1976. Feeling aggrieved with the impugned order of termination, petitioner filed a regular suit no. 29 of 1976 in the court of Civil Judge Lucknow. Later on after constitution of U.P. State Public Service Tribunal (hereinafter referred as Tribunal) the said case was transferred to the Tribunal. The Tribunal after considering the pleading on record with due opportunity to the parties to lead the evidence arrived to the conclusion that order suffers from vice of arbitrariness and declared the order void and illegal. Operative portion of the order dated 31.12.1980 passed by the tribunal is reproduced as under:- "In view of the above discussions we are of the view that the termination order was passed by way of punishment and since the claimant had not been given any opportunity, the principles of natural justice were contravened. At the sametime the malafides against Sri R.P.Singh have been established. In view of the above findings we set aside the termination order and declare that the said order is void and illegal. It will however be open to the O.Ps. to initiate an enquiry if they so desire against the claimant and thereafter deal with his case as permissible under law." 3. Feeling aggrieved with the impugned order passed by the Tribunal the respondent corporation had preferred a Writ Petition No. 1591 of 1981 in this court. The writ petition was heard by a Division Bench and allowed it by the judgement and order dated 10.12.1997, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. The Division Bench had set aside the tribunal's order with the finding that the impugned order of termination does not suffer from any impropriety or illegality nor it is violative of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. 4. The Division Bench had set aside the tribunal's order with the finding that the impugned order of termination does not suffer from any impropriety or illegality nor it is violative of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. 4. Feeling aggrieved with the aforesaid judgement, petitioner had preferred Special Leave Petition in the Hon'ble Supreme Court and leave was granted by their Lordship. The appeal was registered as Civil Appeal No. 6344 of 1998 Radhey Shyam Gupta Vs. U.P. State Agro Industrial corporation. 5. After considering rival submissions and pleadings on record, Hon'ble Supreme Court had allowed the appeal and restored the order passed by the Tribunal with the finding that order of termination was punitive in nature and could not have been passed. The case has also been reported in 1999 (2) SCC 21 Radhey Shyam Gupta Vs. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Limited and another. 6. It appears that respondent corporation being not satisfied with the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in appeal again preferred a review petition. That too was dismissed by an oder dated 3.2.1999. Before dismissal of review petition the petitioner had submitted a joining report dated 18.12.1998. In the meantime, review petition was dismissed by Hon'ble Supreme Court by an order dated 3.2.1999. The order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the review petition, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure-5 to the writ petition is reproduced as under:- "We have carefully gone through the review petition and the connected papers. We see no merit int he review petition and the same is accordingly dismissed." 7. According to petitioner's counsel in spite of the fact that the judgement of the tribunal attained finality up to Hon'ble Supreme Court respondents had not granted arrears of salary and other post retiral dues. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Rakesh Kumar is that after dismissal of appeal by Hon'ble Supreme Court it was incumbent upon the respondents corporation to pay the arrears of salary and other service benefit since, no fresh enquiry was instituted by the opposite party. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the cases reported in 2012 (12) SCALE 593, Pradip Kumar Vs. Union of India and others; Dipti Prakash Banerjee Vs. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the cases reported in 2012 (12) SCALE 593, Pradip Kumar Vs. Union of India and others; Dipti Prakash Banerjee Vs. Satvendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and others, 1999 (3) SCC 60 ; G. Chokkan and others Vs. The Assistant Engineer Coaxial Maintenance ERODE and others (Madras), 1991 (2) CAT 61 (AISLJ); Union of India and Another Vs. Sri Babu Ram Lalla, AIR 1988 SC 344 ; S.M.Saiyad Vs. Baroda Municipal Corporation, AIR 1984 SC 1829 and A.L.Kalra Vs. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. 9. On the other hand, Shri Shafiq Mirza learned counsel for the respondent corporation submits that the petitioner is not entitled for payment of arrears of salary and other service benefits since he does not fulfill requisite conditions and also had not discharged duty. 10. Shri Shafiq Mirza has relied upon the cases reported in 2005 (106) FLR 607, General Manager, Haryana Roadways and Rudhan Singh; 2007 (113) FLR 831, Haryana Urban Development Authority Vs. Om Pal; 2005 (104) FLR 863, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and another;2006 (109) FLR 159, Kunwar Heresh Saran Saxena and State of u.P. and another; 2006 (109) FLR 156, State of M.P. and others and Arjunlal Rajak; 2006(108) FLR 201, U.P. State Brassware Corporation Ltd. and another Vs. Udai Narain Pandey. 11. So far as factual matrix of the case is concerned it has not been disputed by the parties' that the order of termination was set aside and declared as null and void (supra). Accordingly, petitioner is entitled for all retiral benefits including arreas of salary. Petitioner, while approaching this Court, has claimed following reliefs:- "A. A writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the opposite party to pay full back wages iwth all consequential benefits by calculating the revised pay scale and the increments accruing thereon to the petitioner from the date of termination till date of retirement. B. To issue a Writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus to grant retiral benefits such as Employees' Provident Fund, Insurance, pension etc. C. Any other writ, direction or order as the Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. D. To award costs of the writ petition in favour of the petitioner." 12. C. Any other writ, direction or order as the Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. D. To award costs of the writ petition in favour of the petitioner." 12. Shri Shafiq Mirza learned counsel for the respondent corporation has opposed the relief claimed by the petitioner and submits that he is not entitled for any backwages on the principle of "no work no pay". He submits that there is no evidence that petitioner is not in a gainful employment. He further submits that payment of post retiral dues was rejected by an order dated 3.7.1999. He further submits that backwages may not be allowed in a mechanical way. 13. So far as argument advanced by Shri Shafiq Mirza that the petitioner has not submitted any representation indicating therein that he is not in a gainful employment is concerned, attention has been invited towards a representation dated 30.1.1999, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure-7 to the writ petition which indicates that petitioner has made a statement that for the period of almost 23 years he suffered mental pain and agony as well as financial hardship on account of non employment and pendency of matter before the different courts. In Para 12 to the writ petition there is specific pleading with regard to representation dated 30.1.1999. In response to para 12 to the writ petition, it has been stated in the counter affidavit that it has been rejected. 14. However, fact remains that while submitting representation the petitioner has stated that for 23 years he had suffered unemployment, mental pain and agony. Once the petitioner has come forward with a specific case that he is not in a gainful employment and he suffered mental pain and agony then it was incumbent to record finding with regard to gainful employment. Nothing has been brought on record while filling counter affidavit that the petitioner was in job or in gainful employment. No notice was served on the petitioner to furnish material or lead evidence with regard to his unemployment. 15. In view of above, inference may be drawn that petitioner was not in a gainful employment for the period of 23 years. 16. Now coming to the second limb of the argument with regard to arrears of salary and other post retiral dues. 15. In view of above, inference may be drawn that petitioner was not in a gainful employment for the period of 23 years. 16. Now coming to the second limb of the argument with regard to arrears of salary and other post retiral dues. A plain reading of the judgement and order passed by the tribunal reveals that the order of termination was declared void and illegal. However, Tribunal had not granted any order with regard to payment of salary. Fact remains, in case, order is declared void abinitio means no order is in existence and petitioner shall deem to be continue in service. A person who deem to be in service shall entitled for payment of salary with immediate effect i.e. from 10.12.1997 the date when tribunal had pronounced the judgement and which has been affirmed by Hon'ble Supreme Court. 17. Once the order of termination was declared null and void then not only petitioner shall deem to be in service but it shall amount to continuity in service from the date of initial appointment and the all service benefits including the post retiral dues to be calculated treating the petitioner in service. 18. In Blacks Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition by Bryan A. Garner, the word void has been defined as under:- "Void of no legal effect; null. The distinction between void and voidable is often of great practical importance. Whenever technical accuracy is required, void can be properly applied only to those provisions that are of no effect whatsoever-Those that are an absolute nullity." 19. In The Law Lexicon by P Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition the word void has been defined as under:- "Void. No valid, of no effect; invalidate. Null; ineffectual; having no legal force or binding effect; incapable of being enforced by law A thing which is void is "non-est" and it is not necessary that it be set aside though it may be sometimes convenient to do so Void and not being valid. There is no real difference between transfer being void or not being valid. Sanction obtained from the charity commission subsequent to the sale transaction is not valid." 20. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case reported in AIR 1955 SC 123 , Behram Khurshid Pesikaka Vs. There is no real difference between transfer being void or not being valid. Sanction obtained from the charity commission subsequent to the sale transaction is not valid." 20. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case reported in AIR 1955 SC 123 , Behram Khurshid Pesikaka Vs. State of Bombay, held that word void used in Article 31 of the Constitution of India does not mean that existing law shall obliterated from the statute book since it has not been given any retrospective effect. After the coming into force of the Constitution the effect of Article 13(1) on such repugnant laws is that it nullifies them and makes them ineffectual and nugatory and devoid of any legal force or binding effect. 21. Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in AIR 1994 All 298 , Nutan Kumar Vs. II Additional District Judge Band while interpreting the expression "void" in relation to a juristic act held that it means without legal force, effect or consequence; not binding; invalid; null; worthless; cipher; useless; and ineffectual. Accordingly, since the order of termination has been declared void it become ineffectual, worthless, in valid and nonest, deemed to be extinguished from petitioner's service career with continuity of service for all practical purposes. 22. The case of Pradip Kumar (supra) relied upon by the petitioner's counsel relates to the services of the employee concerned who was working as probationer. Their Lordship of Hon'ble Supreme Court had directed to restore his services with all backwages. 23. The case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra) relates to termination of services. The order of termination was set aside on the ground that it is punitive in nature. Their Lordship of Hon'ble Supreme Court while allowing the appeal against the order passed by the High Court held that since there is no evidence with regard to gainful employment the appellants shall be entitled for backwages. Relevant portion from the judgement of Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra) is reproduced as under:- "para46. Learned senior counsel for the respondent submitted on the basis of State of Haryana v. Jagdish Chander that merely because an order of termination was set aside on grounds of lack of opportunity, it was not necessary to direct reinstatement and back wages. Reliance in Jagdish Chandra's case was placed upon Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar . Learned senior counsel for the respondent submitted on the basis of State of Haryana v. Jagdish Chander that merely because an order of termination was set aside on grounds of lack of opportunity, it was not necessary to direct reinstatement and back wages. Reliance in Jagdish Chandra's case was placed upon Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar . It is true that such an order not granting reinstatement or back wages was passed in Jagdish Chander's case following Karunakar's case. But it has to be noticed that in Karunakar case, there was a regular departmental inquiry but the inquiry report was not given to the officer. This Court directed the report to be given and set aside the proceedings from that stage and stated that no order for reinstatement or backwages need be passed at that stage. But in cases like the present where no departmental inquiry whatsoever was held, Karunakar case, in our view, cannot be an authority. As to backwages, on facts, the position in the present case is that there is no material to say that the appellant has been gainfully employed. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to reinstatement and backwages till the date of reinstatement from the date of termination and to continuity of service. Point 4 is decided accordingly". 24. The case of Union of India (supra) also relates to a situation where their Lordship had granted the backwages. 25. In the case of S.M.Saiyad (supra) while allowing the appeal Hon'ble Supreme Court had set aside the order of High Court directing for payment of backwages after deducting certain amount. Relevant portion from the judgement of S.M.Saiyad (supra) is reproduced as under:- "Para 8 We, accordingly, allow this appeal and set aside the decision of the High Court refusing the back wages for the period December 12, 1969 to October 26, 1976 and directed that the appellant shall be entitled to back wages including salary and allowances and other benefits to which would be entitled as if he had continued the service. While making the payment of back wages as per this order the respondent is entitled to deduct the amount of Rs. 150/- p.m. from January 20, 1973 to October 26, 1976 from the amount which becomes payable to the appellant. While making the payment of back wages as per this order the respondent is entitled to deduct the amount of Rs. 150/- p.m. from January 20, 1973 to October 26, 1976 from the amount which becomes payable to the appellant. The respondent must compute the amount payable as herein directed and pay what becomes payable, to the appellant within a period of two months from today. 26. In the case of A.L.Kalra (supra) also the controversy before Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to punishment awarded on account of misconduct in the form of dismissal from service was in question. The appeal was allowed with the finding that every arbitrary executive action affecting public employment is violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Hon'ble Supreme Court restored the services of appellant with continuity of service. It is further held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that once order of termination is held to be bad, no other punishment in the guise of denial of backwages can be imposed. Relevant portion from the judgement of A.L.Kalra (supra) is reproduced as under:- "Para 32 and 33 32. The last question then is to what relief the appellant is entitled ? Once the order of removal from service is held to be illegal and invalid and the appellant being in public employment, the necessary declaration must follow that he continues to be in service uninterruptedly. This aspect does not present any difficult and the declaration is hereby granted. 33. When removal from service is held to be illegal and invalid, the next question is whether : the victim of such action is entitled to backwagcs. Ordinalily, it is well-settled that if termination of service is held to be bad, no other punishment in the guise of denial of back wages can be imposed and therefore, it must as a necessary corollary follow that he will be entitled to all the back wages on the footing that he has continued to be in service uninterruptedly. But it was pointed out in this case that the appellant was employed as Factory Manager by M/s. KDR Woollen Mills, A-90, Wazirpur Industrial Area, Delhi from where he resigned with effect from August 8, 1983. It was also submitted that he was drawing a salary of Rs. 2500 per month. But it was pointed out in this case that the appellant was employed as Factory Manager by M/s. KDR Woollen Mills, A-90, Wazirpur Industrial Area, Delhi from where he resigned with effect from August 8, 1983. It was also submitted that he was drawing a salary of Rs. 2500 per month. Now if the appellant had procured an alternative employment, he would not be entitled to wages and salary from the respondent. But it is equally true that an employee depending on salary for his survival when he is exposed to the vagaries of the court litigation cannot hold on to a slender distant hope of judicial process coming to his rescue and not try to survive by accepting an alternative employment, a hope which may turn out to be a mirage. Therefore, the appellant was perfectly justified in procuring an alternative employment in order to keep his body and soul together as also to bear the expenses of litigation to vindicate his honour, integrity and character". 27. On the other hand, the cases relied upon Shri Shafiq Mirza learned counsel for the respondent corporation speak otherwise. In the case of General Manager, Haryana Roadways (supra) under para 10,11 and 12, their Lordship of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when work is not done remuneration may not to be paid with the finding that employees shall not be entitled for payment of backwages. Their Lordship has granted 50 per cent of backwages to the employees concerned. 28. In the case of Haryana Urban Development Authority (supra) in lieu of backwages the lump sum amount of 25 per cent backwages by Hon'ble Supreme Court. 29. In the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (supra) also where allegation with regard to absconding from services no backwages were granted. Relevant portion from the judgement of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (supra) is reproduced as under:- "para 15 Applying the above principle, the inevitable conclusion is that the respondent was not entitled to full back wages which according to the High Court was natural consequence. That part of the High Court order is set aside. When the question of determining the entitlement of a person to back wages is concerned, the employee has to show that he was not gainfully employed. The initial burden is on him. After and if he places materials in that regard, the employer can bring on record materials to rebut the claim. When the question of determining the entitlement of a person to back wages is concerned, the employee has to show that he was not gainfully employed. The initial burden is on him. After and if he places materials in that regard, the employer can bring on record materials to rebut the claim. In the instant case, the respondent had neither pleaded nor placed any material in that regard. 30. In the case of State of M.P. Vs. Arjunlal Rajak (supra) it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that the payment of backwages should not be mechanical one and industrial court should apply mind while taking a decision with regard to backwages. 31. Similar proposition has been reiterated in the case of Udai Narain Pandey (supra) by Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the case of Udai Narain Pandey (supra), their Lordship had granted 25 per cent of the total backwages. 32. Keeping in view the different pronouncements of Hon'ble Supreme Court law emerges that for payment of backwages there can not be strait-jacket formula. All shall depend upon the facts and circumstances of the each case and court may exercise jurisdiction while passing the order for payment of backwages. 33. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that question with regard to payment of backwages and wages from the date of pronouncement of judgement may be considered by this Court. Petitioner suffered on account of pendency of litigation right from tribunal to Hon'ble Supreme Court. 34. It is well settled proposition of law that no one should put to suffer because of pendency of litigation in the part of courts vide Bharat Damodar Kale Vs. State of A.P., 2003 (8) SCC 559 ; Atma Ram Mittal Vs. Ishwar Singh Punia, 1988 (4) SCC 284 ; Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and another, 2011 (7) SCC 639 and State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Khandaka Jain Jwellers. The order passed by the Tribunal set aside by the High Court and was restored by Hon'ble Supreme Court. Accordingly, petitioner cannot be put to suffer only because of the pendency of litigation. 35. State of Madhya Pradesh and another, 2011 (7) SCC 639 and State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Khandaka Jain Jwellers. The order passed by the Tribunal set aside by the High Court and was restored by Hon'ble Supreme Court. Accordingly, petitioner cannot be put to suffer only because of the pendency of litigation. 35. Even after pronouncement of judgement by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the year 1997 the petitioner has suffered with mental pain and agony and financial hardship and respondents had declined to pay the wages and get the matter pending on unfounded ground by taking dilatory tactics. 36. In view of above, so far as payment of wages are concerned, we are of the view that the petitioner is entitled for full salary immediately after pronouncement of judgement of U.P. Public Services Tribunal i.e. from 31.12.1980 with all consequential benefits. So far as backwages are concerned, we direct the respondents to pay lump-sum amount of Rs. 1,00000/-(one lacs) in lieu of backwages for the reason that petitioner had already attained the age of superannuation and fresh proceeding under financial handbook (Rule 54 (4) Part II to IV will further cause mental pain and agony to the petitioner. 37. We further of the view that petitioner is entitled for continuity of service because of the fact that order of termination was declared void by the tribunal which was restored by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Once the order of termination was quashed by the courts then the employee shall deemed to be in service with all consequential benefits. 38. In view of above, writ petition is allowed. A writ in the nature of mandamus is issued commanding the respondents to pay backwages to the tune of Rs. 1,00000/-(one lacs) expeditiously, say within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. Respondents are further directed to pay arrears of full salary immediately after the date of pronouncement of judgement, by the tribunal i.e. from 31.12.1980 along with interest @ 8 per cent till the age of superannuation after deducting whatever amount has already been paid. A writ in the nature of mandamus is further issued directing the respondents subject to above to pay all other consequential benefits available to the petitioner in accordance to rules considering the petitioner's continuity in service from the date of appointment. A writ in the nature of mandamus is further issued directing the respondents subject to above to pay all other consequential benefits available to the petitioner in accordance to rules considering the petitioner's continuity in service from the date of appointment. Let the order be complied with by the respondents within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. Writ petition is allowed accordingly. ___________