JUDGMENT : G.D. Saxena, J. This appeal u/s 96 of the CPC 1908 has been preferred by the defendant/appellant against a judgment and decree dated 18th August 2010 rendered in Civil Suit No. 14B/2008 by the District Judge Shivpuri (M.P.) thereby decreeing the suit against him for recovery of Rs. 60,870/- with 6% simple interest as well as costs of the suit proceedings. Brief facts of the case are that on 26th April 2007, the plaintiff/respondent advanced loan of Rs. 51,500/- with monthly interest @ 1% to the defendant/appellant for his agricultural and personal use. For satisfaction of the debts, the defendant executed a promissory note in the presence of the two witnesses in favour of the plaintiff/creditor. It is stated that after repeated oral demands/requests and even on notice when the debtor/defendant did not return the advanced loan amount and accrued interest, the creditor/plaintiff instituted a suit against him for recovery. The defendant/appellant by submitting the written-statement denied the averments of the plaint. He further denied of taking the amount of Rs. 51,500/- against loan for his agricultural and personal use for which the alleged promissory note was executed by him in presence of the witnesses. He pleaded that the promissory note does not bear his signature and so was forged and fabricated one. He further pleaded that the attesting witnesses are paid employees of the plaintiff who after connivance prepared a forged document. Taking the aforesaid grounds, the defendant/appellant prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs. The learned trial Judge after framing the issues and after considering the evidence on record decreed the suit for recovery as mentioned above, hence this appeal. 2. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiff in this case failed to prove the factum of execution of the disputed document i.e. the alleged promissory note by supporting cogent evidence and therefore the learned trial court erred in recording the findings and decreeing the suit against him. It is further submitted that there are material contradictions/omissions in the statements of the plaintiff and his witnesses with respect to the questioned document which gave suspicion about existence of the same and therefore the learned trial court ought to have focused on this aspect of the matter and considered the statement of the Handwriting Expert in proper way. It is further submitted that there are material contradictions/omissions in the statements of the plaintiff and his witnesses with respect to the questioned document which gave suspicion about existence of the same and therefore the learned trial court ought to have focused on this aspect of the matter and considered the statement of the Handwriting Expert in proper way. On this basis, it is prayed that by allowing the appeal, the judgment and decree may be dismissed with costs. 3. Per contra, the respondent/plaintiff well supported the findings of the learned court-below and submitted that the trial court after considering the issue involved and taking into consideration the evidence rightly found established the fact of the execution of the document by the defendant/appellant and consequently decreed the suit in his favour. Therefore, it is prayed that the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. Also perused the record of the trial court. 5. In view of the aforesaid submissions, the question which raises for consideration of this appeal is whether the findings recorded by the trial court are vitiated on facts and the evidence on record and same are liable to be set aside ? 6. To prove the execution of the promissory note by the appellant/defendant, the plaintiff deposed that on previous terms with the appellant and looking to his genuine need, on 26th April 2007 he advanced the loan and after receiving the consideration amount of Rs. 51,500/- the defendant executed promissory note (Ex.P/1) as well as the receipt of money (Ex.P/2) in presence of the two witnesses, namely, Akhayraj Rawat and Raghuveer Bairagi in favour of the plaintiff. In cross-examination, the plaintiff admitted that at the relevant time, he used to lend debts to near about 50-100 persons but he did not possess any money lender licence as required u/s 11-B of the Madhya Pradesh Money Lenders Act, 1934. Witnesses Akhayraj Rawat and Raghuveer Beragi in their depositions supported the statement of the plaintiff that after receiving consideration amount, the defendant by signing executed the promissory note (Ex.P/1) and the receipt (Ex.P/2) about consideration of the sum in favour of the plaintiff in their presence. On the contrary, the defendant denied his signature on the disputed document (Ex.P/1) and receipt of consideration amount (Ex.P/2). On the contrary, the defendant denied his signature on the disputed document (Ex.P/1) and receipt of consideration amount (Ex.P/2). He further pointed out that there were interpolations/overwriting made on the dates of execution of the above-mentioned documents which tend to show that they were forged. To support his statement and his signatures on the disputed documents with admitted signatures, Anil Agrawal (DW-2) the Handwriting Expert was produced by the defence and examined. From perusal of the evidence of the Handwriting Expert, it is found that when the disputed signatures on the questioned documents were compared by the Handwriting Expert, after receiving sample writing of the appellant/defendant and admitted signatures, he concluded that the disputed signatures were not tallied with the admitted and specimen signatures of the defendant. It also appeared from his evidence that the date on the documents Ex.P/1 and Ex.P/2 were manipulated by changing the years from 26/4/2008 to 24/4/2007. 7. To consider the legal aspect involved in the matter, it would be appropriate to go by the relevant provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments. 118. It also appeared from his evidence that the date on the documents Ex.P/1 and Ex.P/2 were manipulated by changing the years from 26/4/2008 to 24/4/2007. 7. To consider the legal aspect involved in the matter, it would be appropriate to go by the relevant provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments. 118. Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made: (a) of consideration: that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument when it has been accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration; (b) as to date: that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date; (c) as to time of acceptance: that every accepted bill of exchange was accepted within a reasonable time after its date and before its maturity; (d) as to time of transfer: that every transfer of negotiable instrument was made before its maturity; (e) as to order of endorsement: that the endorsements appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in the order in which they appear thereon; (f) as to stamp: that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque was duly stamped; (g) that holder is a holder in due course: that the holder of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course: Provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud or for unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in due course lies upon him. Section 119. Presumption on proof of protest 119. In a suit upon an instrument which has been dishonoured, the court shall on proof of the protest, presume the fact of dishonour, unless and until such fact is disproved. In the case of Rangappa Vs. Sri Mohan, AIR 2010 SC 1898 the Hon. Apex Court observed as follows:- 12. The respondent-claimant has also referred to the decision reported as Mallavarapu Kasivisweswara Rao Vs. In the case of Rangappa Vs. Sri Mohan, AIR 2010 SC 1898 the Hon. Apex Court observed as follows:- 12. The respondent-claimant has also referred to the decision reported as Mallavarapu Kasivisweswara Rao Vs. Thadikonda Ramulu Firm and Others, AIR 2008 SC 2898 ), wherein it was observed: Under Section 118(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the court is obliged to presume, until the contrary is proved, that the promissory note was made for consideration. It is also a settled position that the initial burden in this regard lies on the defendant to prove the non-existence of consideration by bringing on record such facts and circumstances which would lead the Court to believe the non-existence of the consideration either by direct evidence or by preponderance of probabilities showing that the existence of consideration was improbable, doubtful or illegal.... This decision then proceeded to cite an extract from the earlier decision in Bharat Barrel and Drum Manufacturing Company Vs. Amin Chand Payrelal, AIR 1999 SC 1008 . Upon consideration of various judgments as noted hereinabove, the position of law which emerges is that once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the presumption u/s 118(a) would arise that it is supported by a consideration. Such a presumption is rebuttable. The defendant can prove the non-existence of a consideration by raising a probable defence. If the defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration was improbably or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would disentitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable instrument. The burden upon the defendant of proving the non-existence of the consideration can be either direct or by bringing on record the preponderance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. In such an event, the plaintiff is entitled under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case including that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the non-existence of the consideration, the plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising u/s 118(a) in his favour. In case, where the defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the non-existence of the consideration, the plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising u/s 118(a) in his favour. The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated and even if led, is to be seen with a doubt. The bare denial of the passing of the consideration apparently does not appear to be any defence. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the benefit of shifting the onus of proving to the plaintiff. To disprove the presumption, the defendant has to bring on record such facts and circumstances upon consideration of which the court may either believe that the consideration did not exist or its non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that it did not exist. Interestingly, the very same extract has also been approvingly cited in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra). 8. There is no doubt that the provision of Section 73 of the Evidence Act empowers the court to see for itself whether on a comparison of the two sets of writing signature, it can safely be concluded with the assistance of the expert opinion that the disputed writings are in the handwriting of the person as alleged. Although the section specifically empowers the court to compare the disputed writings with the specimen/admitted writings shown to be genuine, prudence demands that the Court should be extremely slow in venturing an opinion on the basis of mere comparison, more so, when the quality of evidence in respect of specimen/admitted writings is not of high standard. As a matter of extreme caution and judicial sobriety, the Court should not normally take upon itself the responsibility of comparing the disputed signature with that of the admitted signature or handwriting and in the event of slightest doubt, leave the matter to the wisdom of experts. As a matter of extreme caution and judicial sobriety, the Court should not normally take upon itself the responsibility of comparing the disputed signature with that of the admitted signature or handwriting and in the event of slightest doubt, leave the matter to the wisdom of experts. On coming to the facts of the present appeal, the defendant by examining himself and the Handwriting Expert Anil Agrawal (DW-2) proved that the documents promissory note (Ex.P/1) and receipt of the consideration (Ex.P/2) do not bear the signature of the executor and further that interpolations in the dates of execution of the documents were made. So, it is a case where the defendant/appellant has successfully discharged his initial burden and proved by the evidence that the existence of consideration was throughout doubtful. u/s 118 of the Act, there is a presumption that until the contrary is proved, every negotiable instrument is drawn for consideration. Hence in case of successful rebuttal by the defendant against the presumption as arose in favour of plaintiff, now the burden lies upon the plaintiff to prove his case by adducing cogent evidence that on the date as mentioned above, the said documents were executed by the executor. But as mentioned above, after rebutting the presumption by the defendant in this case, the plaintiff utterly failed to prove by adducing other cogent evidence on record that the promissory note and receipt of consideration were executed on 26th April 2007 and not on 27th April 2008. Certainly, said failure on the part of the plaintiff makes him disentitled to the grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable instrument. Consequently, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The judgment and decree under appeal stands hereby set aside. The cost of this appeal shall be borne by the respondent. Counsel fee Rs. 1,000/-, if certified.