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2013 DIGILAW 1075 (PAT)

Manoj Mankar v. State of Bihar through Vigilance

2013-09-02

SHIVAJI PANDEY

body2013
ORDER 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the Vigilance. 2. This application has been filed for quashing the order dated 5.8.2013 passed in Special Case No.7 of 2012 by the Additional Sessions Judge-X, Patna the Authorized Officer under Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) by which the point raised by the petitioners that the application has not been filed in a proper way and in proper manner but de hors to the Act or Rule framed under the Act. 3. It appears from the record that Special Case No.7 of 2012 has been instituted on the basis of an application made under the signatures of Special Public Prosecutor and Inspector of Police, Vigilance. It has been stated that First Information Report vide Vigilance P.S. Case No.77 of 2009 was instituted under Sections 7, 8, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d)(c) and (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against petitioner no.1 Allegation has been made that petitioner no.1 has acquired properties beyond the known source of income and simultaneously an application vide Special Case No.7 of 2012 has been filed under Act where Manoj Mankar and others have been made opposite parties showing, the properties standing in the name of the family members are properties earned and acquired by Manoj Mankar through illegal manner and means, for giving a cover different properties have been shown in the name of different members of family claiming to be earned by respective family members. 4. This Court is not required to deal with the matter on merit. In pursuance of institution of case, notices were issued to the petitioners, they appeared before the court and raised the objection that the application which has been filed by a person not authorised under the Act or Rule framed thereunder and as such the application is completely not sustainable and maintainable in law. As per terms of Section 13(1) of the Act Special Public Prosecutor has been appointed on the advice of the Advocate General is only authorized to institute and conduct the case. Here the case has not been instituted by the Special Public Prosecutor as has been appointed by the State Government rather an application has been filed by the Inspector of Police of Vigilance Department which is not permissible in law. Here the case has not been instituted by the Special Public Prosecutor as has been appointed by the State Government rather an application has been filed by the Inspector of Police of Vigilance Department which is not permissible in law. Further point has been raised, notices as per Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Act have not been issued to the delinquent and other persons rather notices have been issued in Form II. It has been submitted that Confiscating Act is penal act and is onerous one required strict construction of provision and any deviation made in filing the application, should be treated to non-filing of the case on the principle when an act is to be done in particular manner that act should be done in that manner alone. It has further been submitted that Section 13(1) and (2) of the Act provides a particular mode of filing of the application and that application should be filed in manner prescribed under those provisions. It has further been submitted that the application has not been filed in the manner as provided under Section 13(1) and (2) of the Act as affidavit attached to petition has not been sworn by Authorised person and as such filing of the case and subsequent initiation of proceeding is nonest and it requires declaration as void. He further submits Inspector of Police, Vigilance signed the application, though every page of the petition bears initial of Special Public Prosecutor will not be treated the application has been filed as manner prescribed, whereas it is required to be signed by the Special Public Prosecutor alone. He has further submitted that mere putting the signature and giving initial will not give an inference, that petition has been filed by the Special Public Prosecutor. In support of his contention he has relied on the following judgments: (i) Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill(P) Ltd. and others, reported in 2003(2) SCC 111 paragraph 40 (ii) A.I.R. 1997 (7) SC 614, Paragraph 11 (iii) Hukum Chand Shyam Lal Vs. Union of India and others, reported in A.I.R.1976 SC 789, paragraph 18 (iv) Sanjay Kumar Vs. The state of Bihar through Vigilance the Chief Secretary, Bihar, Patna and others, reported in 2011(1) PLJR 1168 , paragraph 38 (v) Sarju alias Ramu Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 2009 (13) SCC 698 paragraph 13 5. Union of India and others, reported in A.I.R.1976 SC 789, paragraph 18 (iv) Sanjay Kumar Vs. The state of Bihar through Vigilance the Chief Secretary, Bihar, Patna and others, reported in 2011(1) PLJR 1168 , paragraph 38 (v) Sarju alias Ramu Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 2009 (13) SCC 698 paragraph 13 5. In contra, learned counsel for the Vigilance submits that petition has been filed in terms of Section 13 (1) and (2) of the Act as on every page there is initial of Special Public Prosecutor and he has also signed at the end of prayer of petition with full designation. Sri Arun Kumar, Inspector of Police, Vigilance Investigation Bureau, Patna has put his signature at the end of petition side by side of Special Public Prosecutor. With regard to affidavit he has submitted that the affidavit has been sworn by the person who has knowledge about the facts of the case, claimed that this application has been filed under Section 13(1) and (2) of the Act as there cannot be other mode of filing of the petition. Even presuming there are some deviations unless it goes to the root of the case and cause prejudice, only in that circumstances he can raise a grievance otherwise the initiation of proceeding on that basis cannot be said to be bad. He has further submitted that vires of the Act was challenged in the case of Sanjay Kumar (supra) where the court has considered sections and with certain suggestion of modification, declared the provision of the Act as intra vires. It has been submitted that this Act came into consideration before the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Shiva Shankar Verma Vs. The State of Bihar through Vigilance and others, reported in 2011(3) PLJR 813 where the provisions of the Act was considered. He has further submitted that only Form II is attached to the Rule for purpose of notice and as such, notices have been served upon petitioners through Form II. He has further submitted that in the order sheet it has been particularized under what provision notices have been issued to petitioner no.1 and other petitioners as the Presiding Officer has directed to issue notice to petitioner no.1 under Section 14(1) and others to be issued under Section 14 (2) of the Act. 6. He has further submitted that in the order sheet it has been particularized under what provision notices have been issued to petitioner no.1 and other petitioners as the Presiding Officer has directed to issue notice to petitioner no.1 under Section 14(1) and others to be issued under Section 14 (2) of the Act. 6. In reply learned counsel for the petitioners submits that filing of the application by the Inspector of Police as well as affidavit sworn by the Inspector of Police will cause prejudice to the petitioners as it is apparent from paragraph 33 of the judgment of Sanjay Kumar (supra). 7. In this case the primary question that has been raised by the petitioners, the application before the Authorised Officer has not been filed in terms of Sections 13(1) and 13(2) of the Act read with Rule 8(1) and Rule 9(3) and Rule 14 of the of the Bihar Special Courts Rules, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”). It has primarily been raised the manner the application has been filed is not conform to Section 13(1) and 13(2) of the Act as the application should not bear the signature of the Inspector of Police and notices have not been issued in proper form. 8. For coming to the right conclusion this Court will have to examine the provisions of the Act, but before dealing with the Central issue, it will be appropriate to decide ancillary issue as has been claimed, the Act is penal in nature and it requires strict interpretation. Another ancillary issue has been raised that the application should have been filed in the manner prescribed under the Act in the Rules and any deviation will make the application as nullity. On the strength of consistent precedent, if a thing has to be done in a particular manner that thing should be done in the manner alone. 9. The first issue this Court is to decide as to nature of the Act, as to whether as it is penal in nature or it is otherwise. The vires of the act was challenged before this Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar (supra) where in the course of discussion the Court in paragraph nos. 26 and 27 the issue was raised about awarding the penalty to the delinquent byway of confiscating the money or the property. The vires of the act was challenged before this Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar (supra) where in the course of discussion the Court in paragraph nos. 26 and 27 the issue was raised about awarding the penalty to the delinquent byway of confiscating the money or the property. The Court has posed the question as to whether the confiscation under the Act would amount to penalty or punishment under the Act. In paragraph 27 the Court has held that confiscation of money or property as provided under the Act cannot be held to be a punishment to the delinquent as confiscation of property as contemplated under the Act is based on different concept, as in confiscation under the Act deprivation of money or property is on the hypothesis that it does not legally belong to the accused because it is ill-gotten property procured by means of the offence which in the case of a public servant amounts to breach of trust by him to his employer i.e. State of Bihar. Once this hypothesis is carried to its logical end by proving the necessary ingredients so as to show that the property or money in question was procured by means of offence then confiscation of such property or money cannot amount to depriving the accused or the concerned public servant either of his personal liberty or of any property lawfully belonging to him. It will be appropriate to quote paragraph 26 and 27 of the aforesaid judgment: “26. The issue as to whether confiscation of property provided under the Act would amount to a penalty for the offence or not appears to be a complex issue because the Act of 1988 or the Indian Penal Code prescribing punishments have not been amended by the Act. Those Acts use the expression "punishment" for prescribed offence and not the word "penalty" but in the context in which the word penalty has been used in Article 20(1) of the Constitution, it must be treated as analogous to the word "punishment" prescribed for an offence which shall cover punishment of imprisonment as well as fine prescribed for any offence. The question as to whether confiscation under the Act would amount to punishment for the offence or not, now becomes simple to be answered. 27. The word penalty or punishment in context of a criminal offence is a well understood concept. The question as to whether confiscation under the Act would amount to punishment for the offence or not, now becomes simple to be answered. 27. The word penalty or punishment in context of a criminal offence is a well understood concept. Once an accused is found to be guilty, he is punished either by depriving him of his personal liberty by way of imprisonment which puts restriction upon his freedom to move around freely or else he is put to monetary loss by imposition of fine. Monetary loss by way of punishment would happen only in a case where money legally belonging to the accused or his estate is to be paid to the State. The concept of confiscation proceeds on an entirely different footing. In confiscation as contemplated under the Act the deprivation of money or property is on the hypothesis that it does not legally belong to the accused because it is ill-gotten property procured by means of the offence which in the case of a public servant amounts to breach of trust by him qua his employer, the State. Once this hypothesis is carried to its logical corollary by proving the necessary ingredients so as to show that the property or money in question was procured by means of offence then confiscation of such property or money cannot amount to depriving the accused or the concerned public servant either of his personal liberty or of any property lawfully belonging to him. Hence, confiscation of money or property as provided under the Act cannot be held to be a punishment to the delinquent.” 10. If this is the view of this Court of Division Bench then the points that has been raised about the strict interpretation as treating the Act is penal in nature falls to the ground. 11. Even presuming that the Act is penal in nature and it requires strict interpretation has been discussed in Bennion on Statutory Interpretation of 4th Addition Supp. 2005. The strict narrow construction has been considered by Bennion in Code S 182. The writer has said if the enactment is coercive, the strict construction reduces the extent of its coercive effect. If the enactment is relieving, a liberal construction widens its relieving effect. 2005. The strict narrow construction has been considered by Bennion in Code S 182. The writer has said if the enactment is coercive, the strict construction reduces the extent of its coercive effect. If the enactment is relieving, a liberal construction widens its relieving effect. Principles of legal policy such as the principle against doubtful penalization and that in favour of the public good tend to indicate that the court should be ready to narrow the effect of a coercive enactment and widen that a relieving enactment. The writer has said if the language of the statute is equivocal and there are two reasonable meanings of that language, the interpretation which will avoid the penalty is to be adopted. But it has further been said, though the lip-service is from time to time paid to the principle that a penal statute must be construed strictly in favour of the accused, in practice, that approach is out of fashion. It has further been said, the true principle has never been that “a penal statute must be construed strictly” (though it is often stated in such terms). The correct formulation is that a penal statute must be construed with due regard to the principle against doubtful penalization, along with all other relevant criteria. Furthermore penal needs to be given a meaning which includes any form of detriment. It has been said that Judges today often find it necessary to give great weight to counter principles such as the need to protest the public against vicious criminals. On the other hand, additional factors may reinforce the principle against doubtful penalization. 12. Justice G.P. Singh, Former Chief Justice, M.P. High Court in his book Principles of Statutory Interpretation 4th Edition 1988 has also considered the applicability of principle penal statute. The writer has also stated that a remedial statute receives a liberal construction, whereas a penal statute is strictly construed. Further said as now understood, the distinction between liberal and strict construction has very much narrowed down and is only important in resolving a doubt which other canons of construction fail to solve when two or more constructions are equally open. In case of remedial statutes the doubt is resolved in favour of the class of persons for whose benefit the statute is enacted; whereas in case of penal statutes the doubt is resolved in favour of the alleged offender. In case of remedial statutes the doubt is resolved in favour of the class of persons for whose benefit the statute is enacted; whereas in case of penal statutes the doubt is resolved in favour of the alleged offender. The writer has classified what are the nature of statute to fall under category of penal statute and said that if the statute which provides for penalties for disobedience of the law and are directed against the offender in relation to the State by making him liable to imprisonment, fine, forfeiture or any other ground. If the statute enforces obedience to the command of the law by punishing the offender and not by merely redressing an individual who may have suffered, it will be classified as a penal statute. 13. On reading of the aforesaid passage it is apparent if statute is clear it has to be given its full effect but it is depending on the nature of legislation and its application. If statute is penal in nature its applicability will be strictly construed in case of doubt, it will be construed in favour of accused, but a statute which is relieving in nature its applicability will be construed liberally but not de horse to the Act. The Division Bench is of view, the confiscation of property is not in penal in nature but it is measure of taking away the ill-gotten property which he has acquired during his service period. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in consideration of the penal statute while interpreting the case of the N.D.P.S. Act in the case Sarju alias Ramu Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2009) 13 SCC 698 where the following the judgment of State of Punjab Vs. Baldev Singh, reported in (1999) 6 SCC 172 taken the view, the procedural safeguard contained under the N.D.P.S. Act must scrupulously be complied with. 15. Here in the present case the petitioner is not challenging the applicability of the Act but confined its argument raising objection of procedural violation. The present Act has substantive part as well as procedural part. Baldev Singh, reported in (1999) 6 SCC 172 taken the view, the procedural safeguard contained under the N.D.P.S. Act must scrupulously be complied with. 15. Here in the present case the petitioner is not challenging the applicability of the Act but confined its argument raising objection of procedural violation. The present Act has substantive part as well as procedural part. This Court is not required to consider the substantive part of the statute but has to be confined consideration to its procedural part, safeguard provided under the Act, though the Division Bench has held that confiscation of ill-gotten property is not a penal in nature but accepting the plea of petitioners of being penal in nature and it should be construed strictly but has to be seen in that context whether the application has been filed in terms of Sections 13(1) and 13(2) of the Act and notices have been issued in terms of Rule framed there under. It will be appropriate to quite Sections 13(1) and 13(2) of the Act and Rule 8 and Rule 9 framed there under: “13. Confiscation of property.- (1) Where the State Government, on the basis of prima facie evidence, have reasons to believe that any person, who has held or is holding public office and is or has been a public servant, has committed the offence, the State Government may, whether or not the Special Court has taken cognizance of the offence, authorize the Public Prosecutor for making an application to the authorized officer for confiscation under this Act of the money and other property, which the State Government believe the said person to have procured by means of the offence. (2) An application under sub-section (1)- (a) shall be accompanied by one or more affidavits, stating the grounds on which the belief, that the said person has committed the offence, is founded and the amount of money and estimated value of other property believed to have been procured by means of the offence; and (b) shall also contain any information available as to the location for the time being of any such money and other property, and shall, if necessary, give other particulars considered relevant to the context. “Rule 8.Appointment of Public Prosecutors and their fees.- (1) One or more Special Public Prosecutors may be appointed by the State Government on the recommendation of Advocate General, Bihar to institute and conduct cases in the Special Court. Tenure of special public prosecutors shall ordinarily be of three years. (2) Government may appoint one or more Additional or Associate Public Prosecutors on the recommendation of Special Public Prosecutors to assist the Special Public Prosecutor. The Special Public Prosecutors and Additional or Associate Public Prosecutors shall be paid such fees and allowances at such rates as may be decided by the State Government from time to time. 9. Authorized Officer.- (10) The State Government, in consultation with the High Court, shall nominate an officer belonging to the cadre of the Bihar Superior Judicial Service (Senior Branch) who is or has been a Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge to act as the authorized officer for the purpose of the Act. (2) The office of the authorized officer shall function at such place as the State Government may notify and shall be assisted by such staff as may be decided by the State Government. (3) The State Government may appoint one or more Special Public Prosecutors on the recommendation of Advocate General on such terms and conditions to make applications to the authorized officer and conduct cases before the said officer for confiscation of the money and other property under the Act. Tenure of Special Public Prosecutor shall ordinarily be of three years.” 16. On reading of Sections 13(1) and 13(2) of the Act as per the petitioners that application has not been filed in terms of the aforesaid provisions as it provides that the State Government authorises the Public Prosecutor for making application to the Authorized Officer for confiscation. Sub section (2) of the Act provides, the application shall be accompanied by one or more affidavits, stating the grounds on which the belief that the said person has committed offence, is founded and the money and estimated value of other property believed to have been procured by means of offence. 17. Rule 8(1) provides that one or more Special Public Prosecutors may be appointed by the State Government on behalf of the Government “to institute and conduct cases in the Special Court”. 17. Rule 8(1) provides that one or more Special Public Prosecutors may be appointed by the State Government on behalf of the Government “to institute and conduct cases in the Special Court”. Rule 9(3) construes the State Government may appoint one or more Special Public Prosecutors on the recommendation of Advocate General “on such terms and conditions to make applications to the authorized officer and conduct cases”. Section 13(1) of the Act construes that the Government would appoint Special Public Prosecutor for making an application to the Authorized Officer. Here in this section it has been used the clause, for making an application to the Authorised Officer , the Rule 8(1) of the Rules used a clause, the State Government would appoint Public Prosecutor to institute and conduct cases. Here the clause has been used, to institute and conduct the cases, under Rule 9(3) the clause has been used the Public Prosecutor has been appointed on such terms and conditions “to make applications to the authorized officer”. As it is apparent that two clauses have used, as in Section 13(1) of the Act and Rule 9(3) of the Rule the word has been used of making application whereas Rule 8 of the Rules the word has been used to institute and conduct the cases. When two different clauses have been used in the same Act and Rule it is well known principle of law the clause that has been used in the Act will prevail over the Rule and as such the institution of the case be read down as making an application to the Authorised Officer. Making of an application is that the person who is appointed to produce the application before the Authorised Officer. Making an application is synonymous to the filing of the application. Even presuming, the institution of case as used under Rule 8(1) is different to making of application it is also well known principle of interpretation of statute the words used in Rule be interpreted in such way to avoid conflict with words used in the Act, it should read down in the terms the words used in the statute and it should not be interpreted in that way which may result in absurdity. It is also a principle the court should avoid construction which is unworkable and may lead to impractical result. It is also a principle the court should avoid construction which is unworkable and may lead to impractical result. It will be appropriate to quote paragraph 26 to 28 of the judgment in the case reported in 2005(4) SCC 370 : “26. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the Courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give an interpretation which leads to a situation where a person alleged to have committed an offence of the type enumerated in clause (b)(ii) is either not placed for trial on account of non-filing of a complaint or if a complaint is filed, the same does not come to its logical end. Judging from such an angle will be in consonance with the principle that an unworkable or impracticable result should be avoided. In Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion (Third ed.) para 313, the principle has been stated in the following manner: “The court seeks to avoid a construction of an enactment that produces an unworkable or impracticable result, since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. Sometimes however, there are overriding reasons for applying such a construction, for example where it appears that Parliament really intended it or the literal meaning is too strong.” 27. The learned author has referred to Sheffield City Council v. Yorkshire Water Ser-vices Ltd. (1991) 1 WLR 58 at 71, where it was held as under: “Parliament is taken not to intend the carrying out of its enactments to be unworkable or impracticable, so the court will be slow to find in favour of a construction that leads to these consequences. This follows the path taken by judges in developing the common law. `...the common law of England has not always developed on strictly logical lines, and where the logic leads down a path that is beset with practical difficulties the courts have not been frightened to turn aside and seek the pragmatic solution that will best serve the needs of society.” 28. In S.J. Grange Ltd. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners (1979) 2 All ER 91, while interpreting a provision in the Finance Act, 1972, Lord Denning observed that if the literal construction leads to impracticable results, it would be necessary to do little adjustment so as to make the section workable. In S.J. Grange Ltd. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners (1979) 2 All ER 91, while interpreting a provision in the Finance Act, 1972, Lord Denning observed that if the literal construction leads to impracticable results, it would be necessary to do little adjustment so as to make the section workable. Therefore, in order that a victim of a crime of forgery, namely, the person aggrieved is able to exercise his right conferred by law to initiate prosecution of the offender, it is necessary to place a restrictive interpretation on clause (b)(ii).” 18. On consideration of the Act and Rule this Court holds the view that the application has to be filed by Special Public Prosecutor appointed by the State Government on the recommendation of the Advocate General and no other Public Prosecutor is authorised to file the application. 19. The status of the Special Public Prosecutor cannot be brought at par with the State Government, and the Special Public Prosecutor is an agent of State cannot be treated to be synonymous as the State Government and cannot be construed that Special Public Prosecutor is prosecuting, rather Special Public Prosecutor works on behalf of the State as in certain situation State may change any Special Public Prosecutor in the middle of the trial. If the interpretation suggested by the petitioners is accepted it will lead to absurdity. On giving purposive construction Section 13(1) and (2) of the Act and Rule 8(1), 9(3) in the matter of appointment of Special Public Prosecutor it means whosoever is appointed as Special Public Prosecutor for the purposes of the Act, is an authorised agent of the State Government to file the case before the Court. 20. In view of the aforesaid interpretation let us examine the factual aspect of state of affair, as it appears that every page of the application bears the initial of the Public Prosecutor and at the end of the prayer he has put his full signature with details. The grievance has been raised that the Inspector of Police Vigilance can not put his signature in addition to the Special Public Prosecutor, Vigilance. There is no any dispute that the Advocate who has put the signature has been appointed as Special Public Prosecutor by State of Bihar under the Act. The grievance has been raised that the Inspector of Police Vigilance can not put his signature in addition to the Special Public Prosecutor, Vigilance. There is no any dispute that the Advocate who has put the signature has been appointed as Special Public Prosecutor by State of Bihar under the Act. Any additional signature by an Inspector of Police will not make the application incomplete or dehors to the provision of the statute. This Court holds that the application has been filed in terms of the Act and Rule there under and there is no procedural illegality in filing of the application. 21. Objection has been raised the affidavit is of Vigilance Inspector which is not in terms of Section 13(2) of the Act is not acceptable as Section 13(2) of the Act merely states that the application should be accompanied by one or more affidavits stating the grounds on which he beliefs. The Act does not provide as which class or category of the Officer will have to swear the affidavit. Admittedly the person having the knowledge and attached with the investigation will be competent person to swear the affidavit. This Court finds that there is no error in swearing affidavit of the application. 22. The other point has been raised by the petitioners that the notices have not been given in the proper form as Section 14(1) of the Act deals with the issuance of notice to the delinquent and Section 14(2) of the Act provides that notices to the associates other then the delinquent. Rule 14(2) of the Rules provides that notice to be issued under Section 14 of the Act shall be in form II. There is no separate notice provided under Rule 14(1) and 14(2) but only one form II has been prescribed under the Rule to the delinquent as well as his associates. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the notices have not been given in the proper form though it has been argued by the learned counsel for the Vigilance that in the order sheet the Court concerned has differentiated the facts as for delinquent, direction has been given to issue notice under Section 14(1) of the act for other associates under Section 14(2) of the act. In this view of the matter, this Court is of the view that the application has been filed and notices have been issued in terms of prescribed under the Act and the Rule and it is in conform to the principle, manner it has been prescribed in that manner the application filed as well as notices have been issued. 23. Before parting with the judgment it is appropriate to relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Shiva Shankar Verma Vs. The State of Bihar through Vigilance and others, reported in 2011(3) PLJR 813 where this Court has considered the scope and parameter of different sections and has dealt with the legislative history of the Prevention of Corruption Act framed from time to time with a view to eradicate the corruption. It will be appropriate to quote paragraphs 26 and 27 of the aforesaid judgment: “26. Corruption is a phenomenon which could not be confined to any particular period of time; it is known to exist from time immemorial, maybe that it had existed in different forms due to the mode of indulgence into it by persons being various. So far as the recent history of origin of corruption and attempt of tackling it is concerned, it was not as enormous as we find today prior to the Second World War. In fact, our attempt through legislation for tackling the menace existing at different places took the legislative shape during the Second World War. It was detected that there was corruption in ferrying the war supplies during World War II by the railways and, as such, an executive order was promulgated sometimes in 1941 establishing Special Police Establishment with a Deputy Inspector General- rank- Police Officer as its head to investigate instances of corruption in war and supply departments. The activities of the Special Police Establishment were extended to corruption in railways as they were deeply found in corruption as regards the war supplies. The Govt. of India promulgated an Ordinance in 1942 creating Special Police Force vesting in it the powers to investigate the instances of corruption in Govt. departments throughout India. Another Ordinance was promulgated in 1943, which was to expire on 30th September, 1946. Therefore, in the same year a full-fledged Act known as Delhi Special Police Establishment Act was enacted. The Govt. of India promulgated an Ordinance in 1942 creating Special Police Force vesting in it the powers to investigate the instances of corruption in Govt. departments throughout India. Another Ordinance was promulgated in 1943, which was to expire on 30th September, 1946. Therefore, in the same year a full-fledged Act known as Delhi Special Police Establishment Act was enacted. Corruption at its initial stage was confined mainly to the bureaucracy which had the opportunity of dealing with a variety of such largesse in the form of contracts, licenses and grants. Even after the War and efforts as above, corruption continued amongst the Govt. servants. War-supply-surpluses were required to be disposed of by them. A shortage of goods during the war necessitated imposition of control. Some schemes were formulated which involved the disbursement of huge sums of money which lay in the control of the public servants giving them a wide discretion in spending those grants meant to carry out reconstruction works after the War. These aspects of public functions lured them to glitter of wealth. These were the reasons that Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was enacted by which the provisions of Sections 161 to 165A of the Indian Penal Code were deleted. Higher sentences were prescribed and special forum both of trial and investigation was prescribed. 27. If we could go back further into the history, we could find that the Central Bureau of Investigation was created to investigate corruption cases by virtue of being vested with the powers to investigate the cases as per Sections 5 and 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. With democracy being established and political ambitions and conflicting political or other interests getting a rise, instances of commission of serious offences, like murder or even kidnapping, etc., surfaced, which had some political overtures. Some of the offences were found committed by professional gang of criminals making it extremely difficult for the general police force of a State to investigate such complex offences. In the above background, the provision was made that on proposals being submitted by any State Government and Central government having accepted such proposals, investigation of such complex cases might be made by the Central Bureau of Investigation. This is how the offences other than of corruption were also added up into the kitty of the Central Bureau of Investigation for its investigation (Please see Lalan Prasad Singh Vs. This is how the offences other than of corruption were also added up into the kitty of the Central Bureau of Investigation for its investigation (Please see Lalan Prasad Singh Vs. Union of India reported in 2011(1) B.B.C.J. 41 ).” 24. Before 1947 we the people of India struggled for independence from the tyranny of the British, achieved the same on 15th August, 1947. The tyranny of British is over but corruption has taken demon size, bent upon swallow real result of independence. We will achieve the real independence when the menace of corruption is eradicated completely as the achievement of independence by the span of time have been proved to be futile as every sphere of public life the corruption has gone to the bottom. Once late Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India had stated, out of one rupee only 25 paise of Government of India goes to the real beneficiary but by the span of time it has reduced marginally, everywhere there is cry against corruption but it is moving like demon, as killing of one demon hundred demons spring up. Unless we will be able to control the demon of corruption we will not be able to get the real freedom of this Country and requires the corruption cases should be handled with iron hand so that it may be a lesson to others. The Court should not forget the Latin maxim Salus populi suprema lex (the safety of the people is the supreme law) and salus republicae suprema lex (safety of the State is the supreme law). Unless it is achieved it will be very difficult to protect our independence which we have received as a gift from our forefather. 25. With the aforesaid words this Court holds that there is no illegality in filing of the application and there is no error in the impugned order passed by the court below. The court below should proceed with the matter without unnecessary adjournments. However, if the petitioners have not filed their defence due to pendency of the case, this Court extends the time for a week from today to enable him to file their defence. If such a defence is filed by the petitioners within aforesaid extended time the court below will take into consideration and proceed with the case. 26. Accordingly this application is dismissed.