Research › Search › Judgment

Patna High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 1080 (PAT)

Sudama Devi v. Lakhiya Devi

2013-09-03

MUNGESHWAR SAHOO

body2013
C.A.V. JUDGMENT The original plaintiffs-respondents-appellants have filed this Second Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 20.09.1991 passed by learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Nalanda, Biharsharif in Title Appeal No.93 of 1990 whereby the lower appellate court allowed the appeal and reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court dated 23.08.1990 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge-5, Biharsharif in Title Suit No.10 of 1987/25 of 1990. 2. The plaintiffs-appellants filed the aforesaid suit praying for declaration of title and confirmation of possession and in the alternative for recovery of possession and further for injunction. 3. The plaintiffs claimed the aforesaid relief alleging that the suit property belonged to Kokil Sao, who had only one son, namely, Chowa Sao. Chowa Sao had two sons, namely, Shivnandan Sao and Munshi Sao. Plaintiff nos.2 and 3 are the sons of Munshi Sao. The family of Kokil Sao possessed 1 acre 31 decimals land besides the house on 7 decimals. After the death of Kokil Sao, the land came in possession of Chowa Sao. Some land was acquired by Chowa Sao as a result of which he came in possession over 2 acres 58½ decimals in addition to the house. Munshi Sao separated during the lifetime of his father taking his share 1 acre 29¼ decimals. Remaining 1 acre 29¼ decimals was in possession of Chowa Sao and Shivnandan Sao. After the death of Chowa Sao, Shivnandan Sao came in possession of 1 acre 29¼ decimals and on his death plaintiffs came in possession. 10 decimals land was sold by Chowa Sao and 10 decimals land was sold by the plaintiff nos.2 and 3. 4. The further case of the plaintiffs is that Chowa Sao had no brother named Bhageran Sao. The wife, daughter and son of Bhageran have got no concern with the family of the plaintiffs. Defendant no.1 claiming to be the maternal grandson of Bhageran applied for mutation in the year 1971 which was rejected. Subsequently in 1985 again an application for mutation was filed which was allowed. The said defendant no.1 sold the property by registered sale deed in favour of defendant nos.2 and 3. Since Bhageran was not the son of Kokil Sao, the defendant no.1 has no right and title to sell the property. Therefore, the sale deeds executed by him are fictitious, illegal, void, inoperative and not binding on the plaintiffs. 5. The said defendant no.1 sold the property by registered sale deed in favour of defendant nos.2 and 3. Since Bhageran was not the son of Kokil Sao, the defendant no.1 has no right and title to sell the property. Therefore, the sale deeds executed by him are fictitious, illegal, void, inoperative and not binding on the plaintiffs. 5. The defendants filed contesting written statement in two sets. The defendant no.1 filed separate written statement and defendant nos.2 and 3, who are brothers, filed separate written statement. Their main case of defence is that Kokil Sao had three sons, namely, Chowa Sao, Bhageran Sao @ Bhageru Sao and Sukhdev Sao. Sukhdev Sao died unmarried in the state of jointness. After death of Kokil Sao there was a private partition between two brothers with respect to all the properties and each of them got 1 acre 29¼ decimals in agricultural land and 3½ decimals in the homestead land including the house. After partition, Bhageran died leaving behind widow Laxmi Devi @ Laxminia @ Laxo Kunwar and a daughter Smt. Rameshwari Devi. Rameshwari Devi was married with Mahavir Prasad and defendant no.1 Srikant is the son of Rameshwari Devi. Rameshwari Devi died during the lifetime of Laxminia Devi, therefore, Laximinia Devi executed a registered gift deed on 01.10.1970 in favour of defendant no.1. His name is mutated and is paying rent to the State of Bihar and subsequently he sold the property. The other allegations of the plaintiffs were denied. 6. The trial court framed various issues and came to the conclusion that Kokil Sao had only one son Chowa Sao and not three sons as alleged by the defendants. Bhageran Sao was a stranger to the family of Kokil Sao and had no right and title. The gift deed executed by widow of Bhageran, namely, Laximinia in favour of defendant no.1 is illegal, void and not binding on the plaintiffs. On these findings the trial court decreed the plaintiffs’ suit. 7. The defendants filed appeal before the lower appellate court. The gift deed executed by widow of Bhageran, namely, Laximinia in favour of defendant no.1 is illegal, void and not binding on the plaintiffs. On these findings the trial court decreed the plaintiffs’ suit. 7. The defendants filed appeal before the lower appellate court. The lower appellate court after considering the evidences reversed the finding and came to the conclusion that Bhageran was the son of Kokil Sao and on his death the property was inherited by his widow, who has gifted the property to Srikant and Srikant had right and title, therefore the sale deeds in favour of defendant nos.2 and 3 are valid and legal documents. Accordingly, the trial court judgment was set aside and the plaintiffs’ suit was dismissed. 8. At the time of admission of this Second Appeal on 21.12.1992, the following four substantial questions of law were formulated:- (i) Whether the learned appellate court is justified in reversing the judgment of the trial court on the basis of Mutation Case No.116 of 1985-86 and rent receipts granted thereafter which has no value in the eye of law in view of the earlier mutation petition rejected by the Anchal Adhikari in the year 1971 and directed the defendants to approach the Civil Court? (ii) Whether the appellate court is justified in holding that the filing of Commutation Case No.1260 of 1939 by Chowa Sao for commuting the rent from vouli to nagadi and preparation of rent schedule in the name of Chowa Sao under section 40 of the B.T. Act is not material because after the death of Bhageran, Chowa was managing the property of Lakshminia because she was a village lady but from rent schedule Ext.5 it appears that the case of commutation of rent was filed in the year 1939 and according to the defendants witnesses Bhageran died in the year 1945? (iii) Whether the appellate court is justified in relying upon the death certificate of Lakshminia which is not admissible in evidence or which is not relevant at all to prove that Bhageran was the son of Kokil Sao? (iv) Whether the court below is justified in relying the deed of gift Ext.C which clearly shows that no partition took place between Chowa and Bhageran because half share in each plot has been mentioned in the deed of gift and boundary of entire plot has been given in the deed of gift? 9. (iv) Whether the court below is justified in relying the deed of gift Ext.C which clearly shows that no partition took place between Chowa and Bhageran because half share in each plot has been mentioned in the deed of gift and boundary of entire plot has been given in the deed of gift? 9. The learned counsel Mr. Jashbir Singh Arora submitted that in 1971 Srikant had applied for mutation of his name with respect to the property which was rejected and Circle Officer directed him to approach Civil Court for appropriate relief but defendant no.1 did not file any suit nor approached the Civil Court for his declaration of title. However, subsequently suppressing this fact Mutation Case No.116 of 1985-1986 was initiated which was allowed ex-parte without notice to the plaintiffs. The lower appellate court on the basis of this mutation order reversed the finding of the trial court. 10. So far the second substantial question of law is concerned, Chowa Sao had filed an application under section 40 of the Bihar Tenancy Act for commutation of rent from vouli to nagadi being Commutation Case No.1260 of 1939 but the lower appellate court had discarded this evidence holding that this is not material as such the judgment of the lower appellate court is vitiated. According to the learned counsel, if Bhageran was the son of Kokil Sao, he should have joined as applicant with Chowa Sao but Chowa Sao alone had filed the application for commutation which clearly indicate that Bhageran was not the son of Kokil Sao. So far the third substantial question of law is concerned, learned counsel submitted that the lower appellate court has wrongly relied upon the death certificate of Laxminia which is not admissible in evidence and moreover the document is not at all relevant for the purpose of deciding the question as to whether Bhageran was the son of Kokil or not. So far the fourth substantial question of law is concerned, learned counsel submitted that Ext.C (gift deed) could not have been relied upon by the lower appellate court which shows that no partition took place between Chowa Sao and Bhageran which clearly proves that the defendants failed to prove their case regarding partition between the two brothers Chowa Sao and Bhageran. During the course of hearing on these substantial questions of law the learned counsel Mr. During the course of hearing on these substantial questions of law the learned counsel Mr. Jashbir Singh Arora placed all the evidences of the witnesses examined by the parties and submitted that the evidences produced by the defendants-respondents regarding parentage of Bhageran with Kokil Sao was not reliable and the lower appellate court has not considered the evidences in their right perspective. On these grounds the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the judgment of the lower appellate court is liable to be set aside. 11. On the other hand, learned senior counsel Mr. Dhruv Narayan appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that none of the substantial questions of law formulated are in fact substantial questions of law. The only question which was in controversy between the parties was whether Bhageran was the son of Kokil Sao or not. This question is pure question of fact. On the basis of the evidences adduced by the defendants the lower appellate court found that the evidences are admissible under section 50 of the Evidence Act and, therefore, relying on the evidence recorded clear finding that Bhageran was the son of Kokil Sao. Now, therefore, this finding is pure finding of fact as such unless it is shown that it is perverse being based on no evidence, the same cannot be interfered with. The learned counsel submitted that a death certificate was produced to show that Laxminia was residing in the village where the plaintiffs are residing. This document i.e. death certificate was not relevant for the purpose of deciding as to whether Bhageran was the son of Kokil Sao or not but only to show that grandmother of defendant no.1 was the resident of the same village and the lower appellate court has relied this document. This is certified copy of the public document, therefore, it was admissible in evidence. Although the defendant no.1 was claiming to be the grandson of Bhageran and filed mutation case as far back as in the year 1971 but the plaintiffs never sought for declaration that Bhageran was not the son of Kokil Sao. According to the learned counsel, mere denial of parentage by the plaintiffs will not prove their case. Adverse inference has to be drawn against the plaintiffs because they have not given the name of the father of Bhageran and only stated that he is not the son of Kokil Sao. According to the learned counsel, mere denial of parentage by the plaintiffs will not prove their case. Adverse inference has to be drawn against the plaintiffs because they have not given the name of the father of Bhageran and only stated that he is not the son of Kokil Sao. 12. So far the first substantial question of law is concerned, it is not the fact that the lower appellate court has reversed the finding only on the basis of mutation order of the year 1985. The finding regarding parentage of Bhageran has been recorded on the basis of re-appreciation of the evidences, documentary as well as oral. The second substantial question of law is also not involved in the case because by that commutation case no conclusive finding can be recorded that Bhageran was not the son of Kokil Sao. At best it shows that commutation case was only filed by Chowa Sao and nothing more. Rightly, therefore, the lower appellate court has stated that it is not material for decision on the question of controversy between the parties, as such, that substantial question of law is also not a substantial question of law. 13. So far the third and fourth substantial questions of law are concerned, those are consequential to the question as to whether Bhageran was the son of Kokil Sao or not. If it is decided in favour of the plaintiffs then plaintiffs’ suit is to be decreed and if it is held that Bhageran was not the son of Kokil Sao then defendants will have no leg to stand because the gift deed has been executed with regard to the property of Bhageran. 14. 1st Substantial Question of Law :- From perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court, it appears that the lower appellate court has not only considered the rent receipts and order passed in Mutation Case No.116 of 1985-1986 but also considered the oral evidences and documentary evidences on the point of parentage of Bhageran. From perusal of paragraph-20 to 24 of the lower appellate court judgment, it appears that the lower appellate court has also considered the oral evidences regarding parentage of Bhageran. At paragraph-25, the lower appellate court also considered Ext.C (registered gift deed). From perusal of paragraph-20 to 24 of the lower appellate court judgment, it appears that the lower appellate court has also considered the oral evidences regarding parentage of Bhageran. At paragraph-25, the lower appellate court also considered Ext.C (registered gift deed). In addition to the consideration of these evidences the lower appellate court also considered the fact of mutation case in the year 1985 and thereafter recorded the finding that Bhageran is the son of Kokil Sao. Therefore, the first substantial question of law does not arise for consideration in this Second Appeal. The submission of the learned counsel is that when the mutation case of the year 1971 was rejected, Mutation Case No.116 of 1985-1986 could not have been allowed by the Circle Officer. So far this question is concerned, it is not relevant for the decision in the present case. However, it is admitted fact that since after gift deed in the year 1970 the defendants are claiming title to the property alleging that Bhageran was the son of Kokil Sao and defendant Srikant is the maternal grandson of Bhagenran. In view of the above facts, the first substantial question of law is not at all substantial question of law involved in this Second Appeal for consideration as the lower appellate court has not reversed the finding of the trial court on the basis of mutation order or the rent receipt. 15. 2nd Substantial Question of Law:- Main submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that Chowa Sao was the only son of Kokil Sao, therefore, he filed Commutation Case No.1260 of 1939 under Section 40 of the Bihar Tenancy Act. The learned counsel submitted that in support of this fact Ext.5 was filed but the lower appellate court discarded this evidence on the ground that it is not material. The learned counsel submitted that if Bhageran was also the son, he would have joined with Chowa Sao in the said commutation case. Since he was not the son of Kokil Sao or brother of Chowa Sao, therefore, he did not join. So far this submission is concerned, in my opinion, on the basis of this fact that commutation case was filed only by Chowa Sao, there cannot be any presumption that Chowa Sao was the only son or that Kokil Sao had no other son named Bhageran. So far this submission is concerned, in my opinion, on the basis of this fact that commutation case was filed only by Chowa Sao, there cannot be any presumption that Chowa Sao was the only son or that Kokil Sao had no other son named Bhageran. Here, both the parties have adduced evidences in support of their respective cases. Considering the evidences of the parties, the lower appellate court categorically recorded the finding that Bhageran is also the son of Kokil Sao. So far this finding is concerned, it is pure finding of fact and this finding of fact cannot be said to be wrong because Chowa Sao only filed the commutation case. Further, in the Bihar Tenancy Act there is no provision that if out of many tenants only one tenant filed commutation case then the right of other tenants will be extinguished. Therefore, this evidence is a piece of evidence and the submission of learned counsel for the appellants relates to appreciation of evidence. According to the plaintiffs-appellants, this document was filed to prove the fact that Chowa Sao was the only son. The lower appellate court held that on the basis of this document the controversy between the parties i.e. parentage of Bhageran cannot be decided. In my opinion, therefore, it has rightly been held by the lower appellate court that on the basis of this document no finding can be recorded that Bhageran was not the son of Kokil Sao. 16. 3rd Substantial Question of Law :- This question relates to the death certificate. A death certificate was produced by the defendants to show that Laxminia was also the resident of the village where the plaintiffs were residing. Even if this document does not reflect any light on the question of parentage of Bhageran but then it proves the fact that Laxminia was residing in the said village. It may be mentioned here that in the plaint, the plaintiffs have only stated that Kokil Sao had only one son Chowa Sao and Bhageran is not the son of Chowa Sao. The plaintiffs only adduced negative evidence. Since the plaintiffs were claiming title on the non-existence of a fact i.e. non-existence of relationship of Bhageran with Kokil Sao, it was their duty to establish the negative facts as it would be of proving positive facts, if their rights were to depend on the existence of the fact. The plaintiffs only adduced negative evidence. Since the plaintiffs were claiming title on the non-existence of a fact i.e. non-existence of relationship of Bhageran with Kokil Sao, it was their duty to establish the negative facts as it would be of proving positive facts, if their rights were to depend on the existence of the fact. In the case of M. Krishnaswami Naidu vs. Secretary of State, reported in A.I.R.(30) 1943 Madras 15, a Division Bench of Madras High Court held that if a party wishes the Court to believe in the non-existence of certain facts and the existence of the rights asserted by him depends on the non-existence of such facts, it is as much his duty to establish those negative facts as it would be of proving positive facts, if his rights were to depend on their existence. The distinctions between the denial of an affirmative allegation and the assertion of a negative fact and between the proof of the existence or non-existence of a fact and disproof of its existence or non-existence are obvious and should not be lost sight of. 17. As stated above, the plaintiffs have only alleged that Bhageran is not the son of Kokil Sao. A Division Bench of this court in the case of Toral Mahto Vs. Chandeshwar Mahto, reported in A.I.R. 1972 Patna 13 has held that the defendant only alleged in the written statement that the plaintiff’s father Gopi Mahto was not the son of Man Singh. He never stated in his written statement about parentage of Gopi Mahto. In these circumstances of the case defendant no.1 should have alleged that Gopi Mahto was the son of a particular person and was not the son of Man Singh. The court below, therefore, was right in drawing adverse inference from this omission on the part of the defendant no.1 (vide paragraph 5). In the present case from perusal of the lower appellate court judgment, it appears that the widow Laxminia was the resident of village where the plaintiffs are residing, therefore, she was known to the plaintiffs but the plaintiffs only said that Bhageran was not the son of Kokil Sao. No statement has been made regarding as to whose son Bhageran was. It was expected from the plaintiffs to have disclosed the name of the father of Bhageran but simply denied the parentage. No statement has been made regarding as to whose son Bhageran was. It was expected from the plaintiffs to have disclosed the name of the father of Bhageran but simply denied the parentage. On the contrary, positive assertion has been made by the defendants that Bhageran is the son of Kokil Sao. It appears that the lower appellate court has considered the death certificate regarding the question as to whether the grandmother of defendant no.1, namely Laxminia was resident of the village of the plaintiffs or not. The lower appellate court has not relied upon this document with regard to the question as to whether Bhageran was the son of Kokil Sao or not. Even if it is held that this document is inadmissible for any purpose then also the judgment of the lower appellate court cannot be said to be vitiated because on this evidence only the parentage of Bhageran has not been decided by the lower appellate court. Therefore, this substantial question of law is answered in favour the of defendants-respondents and against the appellants. 18. 4th Substantial Question of Law :- So far this question is concerned, the courts below have relied upon a registered gift deed (Ext.C). It is settled principles of law that there is presumption of genuineness of a registered document, therefore, the lower appellate court has rightly relied upon Ext.C. So far the submission of learned counsel that in Ext.C. (deed of gift) there is no mention about the partition between Chowa Sao and Bhageran and half share in each plot has been mentioned is concerned, it can be simply stated that this question does not relate to the main question regarding parentage of Bhageran. As stated above, once it is held that Bhageran is the son of Kokil Sao then the property of Bhageran will never go to the plaintiffs. 19. Much has been argued by learned counsel for the appellants regarding the consideration of evidence by the lower appellate court. At the time of hearing of the Second Appeal, the learned counsel Mr. Jashbir Singh Arora placed the evidences of witnesses. However, since this court is exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and substitute finding of fact unless it is shown that the judgment is perverse being based on no evidence. Jashbir Singh Arora placed the evidences of witnesses. However, since this court is exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and substitute finding of fact unless it is shown that the judgment is perverse being based on no evidence. The line of argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that the lower appellate court should not have relied upon the evidences of witnesses examined by the defendants. In my opinion, this submission relates to appreciation of evidence and not perversity of the judgment. 20. In the case of Gurvachan Kaur and others Vs. Salikram, reported in (2010) 15 Supreme Court Cases 530, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. It appears that in that case there was finding of relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendants and default which was reversed by the High Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that unless the High Court comes to the conclusion that the judgment is perverse, the finding of fact cannot be reversed in Second Appeal. The said view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the case of Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur Vs. Punjab State Electricity Board, reported in (2010) 13 Supreme Court Cases 216 at paragraph 28, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the law. In the present case as discussed above on the basis of the oral evidence, the lower appellate court recorded the finding that Bhageran is the son of Kokil Sao. In such circumstances it cannot be said that the judgment is perverse. In the present case as discussed above on the basis of the oral evidence, the lower appellate court recorded the finding that Bhageran is the son of Kokil Sao. In such circumstances it cannot be said that the judgment is perverse. So far the question that the evidence of the witnesses should have been relied upon or rejected is concerned, it may be mentioned here that the manner of consideration of evidences is not a substantial question of law. 21. In the above discussion, I find that the main controversy between the parties regarding parentage of Bhageran as to whether he is the son of Kokil Sao or not has already been concluded by finding of fact by lower appellate court which is based on appreciation of evidence. Therefore, in second appellate jurisdiction the said finding cannot be interfered with. So far the substantial questions of law formulated in the Second Appeal at the time of admission are concerned, those substantial questions of law are not substantial questions of law involved in this Second Appeal for decision because those are related to the appreciation of evidence, which have already been answered against the plaintiffs-appellants. 22. In the result, I find no merit in this Second Appeal and accordingly this Second Appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.