ORDER Ram Mohan Reddy, J. 1. Petitioner-Public Road Transport Corporation, aggrieved by the order dated 3.2.2010 Annexure-A, of the second respondent-Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and the order dated 7.2.2013 Annexure-B of the Appellate Authority, has presented this petition. By a memo dated 30.7.2013, petitioner-Corporation did not press the first relief to quash the order dated 3.2.10 Annexure - 'A' of the Controlling Authority. 2. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. Perused the pleadings and examined the order Annexure-B. 3. The Controlling Authority by order dated 3.2.2010 declined to condone the delay of 14 years in filing the application by the third respondent to re-determine gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972 for short 'Act', on the premise that the explanation offered is far from satisfactory and accordingly, rejected the application. That order when carried in an appeal to the Appellate Authority, exercised discretion and condoned the delay of 14 years, set aside the order of the Controlling Authority and remitted the proceeding for a fresh consideration over the claim for re-determination of gratuity. 4. Facts not in dispute are that the third respondent-Depot Manager in the petitioner-Corporation attained the age of superannuation on 31.1.1994 and received the gratuity of Rs. 1,09,487/-. On the assertion that, the Government Order dated 13.9.2006 and the retrospective operation of Rule 293-C of the Karnataka Civil Service Rules, with effect from 1.7.1993, coupled with Clause-5 of the Memorandum of Settlement signed on 17th July 1989, issued notice dated 11.2.2008 to the petitioner-Corporation to re-determine the gratuity by merging Dearness Allowance calculated at 90% of the basic pay which, when not favourably considered led to filing a petition before the Controlling Authority to re-determine gratuity, together with an application under Rule 10(i) of the Payment of Gratuity Rules (Central) 1972 for short Rules, to condone the delay of 2 years and 3 months. In the affidavit accompanying the application, the third respondent stated that the cause of action arose on 13.9.2006 when the State Government issued the order to merge 90% of the basic pay as Dearness Allowance and to calculate gratuity in respect of employees, who retired or died on or after 1.7.1993. The application was opposed by filing statement of objection, of the petitioner arraigned as respondent therein, inter alia, contending that the delay of 13 years was inordinate and was a stale claim. The application was opposed by filing statement of objection, of the petitioner arraigned as respondent therein, inter alia, contending that the delay of 13 years was inordinate and was a stale claim. The Controlling Authority, in the premise of pleadings of parties, framed points for consideration and by order dated 3.2.2010 Annexure-A rejected the application to condone the delay and the petition to re-determine gratuity. 5. A bare perusal of the affidavit accompanying the application is a clear indicator of the fact that the third respondent did not seek condonation of delay from 1.3.1994 (since he retired on 31.1.1994) upto the date of filing of the petition, but sought to condone the delay for a period of two years and three months. Suffice it to state that in the absence of an explanation much less plausible over the inordinate delay, the Controlling Authority, in my considered opinion, justifiably rejected the application and sequentially dismissed the petition. 6. The Appellate Authority without noticing the fact that there was no explanation forthcoming for the delay from 1.3.1994 onwards, adopted a perverse approach to condone the delay, though the third respondent did not seek such a condonation of delay. That order of the Appellate Authority, in my considered opinion, is illegal and unsustainable. It is elsewhere said that the discretion to condone delay like any other judicial discretion must be exercised with vigilance and circumspection according to justice, common sense and sound judgment. The word "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction so as to advance the cause of substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bonafides is imputable to the applicant. 7. Even assuming that it was the government order dated 13.09.2006 that prompted the third respondent to claim Dearness Allowance of 90% of the basic pay to be merged, in view of Rule 293-C brought into the statute book w.e.f. 1.7.1993, but a perusal of Rule 293-C does not mention anything about Dearness Allowance. However, Rule 293-D deals with Dearness Allowance, the benefit of which is available to persons, who retire or died while in service on or after 28.11.1995 and before 1.4.1998. Admittedly, the third respondent retired on 31.1.1994 and therefore, the benefit of Rule 293-D is inapplicable. 8. However, Rule 293-D deals with Dearness Allowance, the benefit of which is available to persons, who retire or died while in service on or after 28.11.1995 and before 1.4.1998. Admittedly, the third respondent retired on 31.1.1994 and therefore, the benefit of Rule 293-D is inapplicable. 8. Similar such argument when advanced by the learned Counsel for the third respondent, was rejected by this Court in the order dated 9th December 2011, in W.P. No. 23306/2011, in Sri. T. Narayanaswamy -vs- The Divisional Controller, KSRTC & Others. That order when carried in W.A. NO. 437/2012, a Division Bench by order dated 2nd January 2013 confirmed the order in writ petition and dismissed the appeal. 9. Thus, the third respondent did not have any right to the benefit of either Rule 293-C or Rule 293-D in the matter of merging 90% of the Basic pay as Dearness Allowance into the basic pay, for the purpose of determining Gratuity payable under the Act and Rules. In the circumstances, the Appellate Authority was not justified in exercising discretion to condone the inordinate delay of 14 years and remitting the proceeding for a fresh adjudication on the merit of the claim. In the result, writ petition is allowed, the order dated 7.2.2013 Annexure-B of the Appellate Authority is quashed and the appeal dismissed.