Judgment : Per: Mihir Kumar Jha, J. Both these writ applications arise out of a proceedings under Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). Two separate ceiling cases, namely, Land Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 for 341.23 acres of land in the name of Late Bishwanath Choudhary and his family members and Land Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74 in the name of eight deities installed in Sita Ram Thakur Bari, through Late Bishwanath Mishra its Shebait (Manager) for 261.85 acres land were initiated for acquisition of surplus land. The first writ petition (C.W.J.C.No. 3436 of 1994) though instituted in the name of Sri Ram Chandra Bhagwanjee the principal deity of the Thakurbari and 7 other deities and the family members of Late Bishwanath Chaudhary in reality chooses to assail an order dated 8.11.1993 of reopening of the proceedings of both the cases under Section 45B of the Act, passed by the Collector of Katihar District in Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74, whereas in the second writ petition (C.W.J.C.No. 7323 of 1996), a challenge has been thrown to an order dated 27.11.1995 passed by the Additional Collector (Ceiling), Katihar in Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74 whereby and whereunder 210.77 acres of land of the deities have been declared to be surplus for its being acquired by the State. 2. The facts, which are not in dispute, lie in a narrow compass. Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 was initiated with respect to the ancestoral land of the family of Late Bishwanath Chaudhary held by them in their individual and personal capacity. The land holder, Late Bishwanath Choudhary had submitted his return whereafter it was found that he and his family members had been in actual possession of 341.23 acres land. A draft statement accordingly issued under section 10(2) of the Act was followed by the objection of the land holder under section 10(3) of the Act and in course of hearing of such objection several purchasers led by one Durga Dutta Jha and 28 others had also intervened with a prayer for exemption of land purchased by them. A draft statement accordingly issued under section 10(2) of the Act was followed by the objection of the land holder under section 10(3) of the Act and in course of hearing of such objection several purchasers led by one Durga Dutta Jha and 28 others had also intervened with a prayer for exemption of land purchased by them. Such objections having been considered by the Collector under the Act was disposed of by his order dated 24.7.1975 but the said order could not be sustained in appeal and the Additional Collector in his appellate order dated 10.9.1975 while setting aside the order dated 24.7.1975 had directed for holding a further enquiry under section 5(1)(iii) of the Act, whereafter a fresh order dated 3.5.1976 was passed under section 10(3) of the Act by D.C.L.R. the Collector under the Act, in which it was held that all the transfers made after the appointed date, i.e. 9.9.1970 by the original land holder in the name of different persons were illegal and impermissible in terms of the provisions in the Act. The transfer made by the land holder prior to 9.9.1970, however, was recognized and accordingly, on 4.6.1976 a final publication of draft statement under section 11(1) of the Act was made. 3. Against the said order dated 4.6.1976 the appeals were filed before the Divisional Commissioner, Saharsa by the original land holder as also by the purchasers but all such appeals were dismissed by the Commissioner by his common appellate order dated 13.9.1976. These two orders were accordingly made subject matter of the two separate writ petitions, one at the instance of the land holder, and other by the purchasers being C.W.J.C.No. 4696 of 1979 and C.W.J.C.No. 654 of 1979 respectively. Both the writ petitions were again heard together by this Court and were disposed of by a common order dated 4.9.1979. This Court having set aside the appellate order of the divisional Commissioner dated 13.9.1976 had remitted the matter back to him for hearing of the appeal afresh. While the appeals on remand were pending before the Commissioner of the Division substantial changes were made in the Act by way of several amendments and insertions of several new provisions including sections 32-A and 32-B of the Act which had come into force with effect from 9.4.1981 and accordingly both the appeals pending before the Commissioner had abated. 4. While the appeals on remand were pending before the Commissioner of the Division substantial changes were made in the Act by way of several amendments and insertions of several new provisions including sections 32-A and 32-B of the Act which had come into force with effect from 9.4.1981 and accordingly both the appeals pending before the Commissioner had abated. 4. After abatement of the appeals the original records were sent by the Commissioner of the Division to the Collector to initiate a proceeding afresh under section 10 of the Act as required under Sections 32A and 32B of the Act and accordingly, a fresh gazette notification under section 10(2) of the Act was made on 1.12.1983 inviting objections from land holders. Such objections were also filed by the land holder and others and the Additional Collector Ceiling after hearing the Landholders and Purchasers had reserved his orders on 27.3.1984 which was ultimately delivered only on 17.1.1985, whereby and whereunder large area of land transferred after 9.9.1970 by the land holder to the tune of 144.42 acres of land were held to be valid transfer and thus exempted from the purview of the Ceiling case. The Additional Collector had also treated the entire land, which were earlier classified as Class III, to be of Class IV land. A final publication under section 11(1) of the Act was accordingly made on 1.12.1986 in the name of the land holder Late Bishwanath Chaudhary and his two sons separately and only 42.42 acres out of 341.23 acres land were declared as surplus. 5. The aforesaid order dated 17.1.1985 passed by Additional Collector and the consequential notifications under Section 11(1) and 15(1)of the Act amounting to release of nearly 540 acres of land in the two ceiling cases also because of another separate order dated 28.4.1990 in Ceiling Case no. 202 of 1973-74 granting 240 acres for eight deities having been brought to the notice of the Collector of the District, he had issued notice to the land holder asking him to show cause as to why proceeding of ceiling cases no. 202 of 1973-74 granting 240 acres for eight deities having been brought to the notice of the Collector of the District, he had issued notice to the land holder asking him to show cause as to why proceeding of ceiling cases no. 17 of 1973-74 and 202 of 1973-74 should not be reopened and after the petitioners had filed his show cause reply on 5.7.1993 opposing re-opening of the proceedings of the two ceiling cases, the impugned order dated 8.11.1993 had been passed by the Collector of the district reopening of both the ceiling cases i.e. Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 and Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74, after hearing both the land holder and the Government Pleader. It is this order dated 8.11.1993 passed by the Collector of the District which has been subject matter of C.W.J.C. No. 3436 of 1994 filed in this court on 8.4.1994, which was admitted on 19.12.1994 with an interim order for maintaining status quo order the land in question in both the ceiling cases. 6. At this place it would be also relevant to notice the chronological events of Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74 which, as noted above, was initiated against Sri Ram Chandra Bhagwanji and seven other deities installed in Sita Ram Thakurbari. From the materials on record it is evident that the deities were also represented by the land holder of the land ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74, namely, Late Bishwanath Chaudhary in capacity of Shebait (Mahanth), who had submitted return separately for the land held and recorded in the name of the deities, whereafter on 29.5.1975 the draft statement under Section 10(2) of the Act in the name of the deities to the tune of 232.69 acres of Class III land was made subject matter of Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74 and after allowing one unit of 25 acres of Class-III land for all the eight deities rest of 207.69 acres of Class-III land were shown as surplus. Late Bishwanath Chaudhary, the Shebait and the manager of the Thakurbari representing the eight deities thereafter had filed his objection under section 10(3) of the Act and a final order was passed by the Collector under the Act on 25.8.1975 who had rejected the claim of 8 separate units for 8 deities installed in Thakurbari and had allowed only 1 unit for all the deities. The records were thereafter sent to the District Collector for confirmation who also by his appellate order dated 27.12.1975 had come to a finding that all the eight deities were entitled to only one unit and in view of above after giving 25 acres of Class-III land, rest 207.69 acres of Class-III land were declared surplus and a notification under Section 11(i) was issued in 1976. 7. It may not be out of place to mention here that a revision application in terms of Section32 of the Act filed against the appellate order dated 27.12.1975 of the Collector of the district allowing only one unit for all the eight deities before the Board of Revenue was also dismissed, whereafter a writ application, C.W.J.C. No. 1889 of 1981 was filed before this Court by the deities represented by its Shebait late Bishwanath Chaudhary and this Court by its judgment and order dated 30.6.1986 had set aside the various orders of the revenue authorities including that of the Board of Revenue allowing only one unit for all the 8 deities and had upheld the claim of each of the eight deities being itself land holder and thus entitled to eight separate units. Thus, in terms of the judgment and order of this Court dated 30.6.1986 in C.W.J.C.No. 1889/1981 the Additional Collector, Katihar, the Collector under the Act, had passed his consequential order on 28.4.1990 granting separate units to all the eight deities to the extent of 240 acres of Class IV land and only 21.85 acres of Class-IV land was declared surplus in the second proceedings i.e. proceeding drawn as against the deities in Land Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74 and also acquired by issuance of a final publication of notification under Section 15(i) of the Act. 8. It, however, appears that when there was an amendment in section 29 of the Act by the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Amendment Ordinance, 1995 dated 8.9.1995 (which ultimately was enacted as Act 8 of 1997) the Additional Collector (Ceiling) simply by applying the amended provisions of the Ordinance dated 8.9.1995 by his order dated 27.11.1995 had reviewed his own earlier order dated 28.4.1990, by allowing 1 unit of 30.00 acres Class IV land for all the 8 deities and had declared rest of 210.77 acres out of 240 acres land as surplus. The second writ petition, C.W.J.C. No. 7323 of 1996, filed on 26.7.1996 in this court assailing the aforesaid order of the Additional Collector dated 27.11.1995, was admitted for final hearing on 11.11.1997 and was directed to be heard along with the first writ petition, C.W.J.C. No. 3436 of 1994. 9. Mr. Rajiv Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioners, while assailing the impugned orders in both the writ applications had submitted that in view of the order of this Court in the earlier two writ applications filed by the petitioners it was not permissible for the Collector of the District to reopen the already concluded ceiling proceedings. Explaining his submissions further, Mr. Sinha was of the view that once an order dated 4.9.1979 in C.W.J.C. No. 4696 of 1979 was passed by this Court remitting the matter back to the Divisional Commissioner, the appellate authority for a specific purpose in relation to land ceiling case no. 17 of 1973-74 and an order was also passed by the competent authority which led to finality in the ceiling proceedings, the same could not have been subjected to reopening of the ceiling proceedings. He had also submitted that in any event the proceedings of Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74 could not have been reopened as a whole from the stage of section 10(2) of the Act in view of order of this Court dated 30.6.1986 in C.W.J.C. No. 1883 of 1981 nor could the order concluding proceedings of this case in view of the order dated 28.4.1990 allowing eight units for eight deities could have been reviewed by impugned order dated 27.11.1995 on the ground of deletion of Section 29(2)(a)(ii) of the Act by ordinance dated 8.9.1995. In support of his submissions he had relied on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Mahanth Siyaram Das & anor. vs. State of Bihar, reported in 1985 BLJ 103 and in the case of Praveen Shankar Singh & anor. vs. the State of Bihar & ors., reported in 1987 BLJ 248 as also an order of this Court dated 26.9.2009 in C.W.J.C. No. 5256 of 2002 in the case of Mahantha Braj Bihari Das Vs. the State of Bihar and others. 10. vs. the State of Bihar & ors., reported in 1987 BLJ 248 as also an order of this Court dated 26.9.2009 in C.W.J.C. No. 5256 of 2002 in the case of Mahantha Braj Bihari Das Vs. the State of Bihar and others. 10. Per contra, learned counsel for the State while supporting the impugned order passed by the Collector of the District under section 45B of the Act had submitted that the two ceiling proceedings were completely different in nature and the order passed by this Court did not give finality to both proceedings so as to save it from the scope of Section 45B of the Ceiling Act. It was further contended on behalf of the Respondents that the order passed by Sri S.K. Kumar the then Additional Collector in Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 dated 17.1.1985 was in fact a fraudulent order vitiated by his personal malafide of having his own pecuniary interest by purchasing land from land holder in his own name and as such, the Collector of the District having examined the whole matter had found it a fit case for reopening under section 45B of the Land Ceiling Act. Learned counsel for the State in fact had also justified the impugned order passed by the Addl. Collector dated 27.11.1995 acquiring 210.77 acres of land in Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74 on the ground that there was an amendment in the Ceiling Act by virtue of which no exemption was permissible for the deities and as such, when the said amending Act was given a retrospective operation, any earlier order passed for grant of separate units to the deities was also fit to be reviewed. Reliance in this regard was also placed on an order of this Court in the case of Mahantha Ram Das Vs. State of Bihar and others reported in 2001(4) PLJR 478 . 11. These two cases were heard by us on different dates and in the light of the pleadings on record the following questions have been found to be mainly relevant for determination, namely: (i) Whether the Collector of the District after an order passed by the High Court, wherein rights have been crystallized, can reopen the same? 11. These two cases were heard by us on different dates and in the light of the pleadings on record the following questions have been found to be mainly relevant for determination, namely: (i) Whether the Collector of the District after an order passed by the High Court, wherein rights have been crystallized, can reopen the same? (ii) Whether after the matter was remanded vide Annexure 3 in respect of certain portion of land and the same was given effect to, can it be reopened at any stage by the Collector abandoning the concept of reasonable period of time? and (iii) Whether both the cases can be reopened from the stage of section 10(2) of the Act? 12. For answering these propositions when this Court had heard the matter, a direction was also given to the learned counsel for the State to produce the original records of both the ceiling cases but such records were not produced for a long time whereafter the matter was again placed under the heading ‘to be mentioned’ on 27.9.2011 and a direction was once again given to produce the original records of both the ceiling cases, namely, Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 and Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74. The records however were not produced even on next date i.e. 18.11.2011 but on assurance of the learned AAGI that such records would be produced on the next day the matter was again placed on 13.1.2012 but on that day also records of Land Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 was only produced and it was said that search was going on in the office of the Collector for tracing the records of Land Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74. The case was again adjourned giving a week’s time for production of the records of Land Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74 whereafter though the records of Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74 have not been produced, but an affidavit has been filed on 16.2.2012, on behalf of the Collector of Katihar District wherein it has been stated that the record of Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74 was handed over to the then Govt. Pleader No. II in this Court in November, 1996 and thereafter the same was never returned to the office of the Collector of Katihar District. Pleader No. II in this Court in November, 1996 and thereafter the same was never returned to the office of the Collector of Katihar District. Learned AAGI had thus also explained his inability to trace out the records in the office of the Advocate General on account of lapse of 16 years in which according to him several Law Officers have been changed making it impossible for him now to find out such records. 13. The production of original records is always helpful for adjudicating any case but its importance gets also doubly increased in deciding the ceiling cases, inasmuch as it is from them only that the steps taken at different stages can be found out and appreciated. Thus, even when the records of Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74 has not been produced we have examined the materials on record of the two writ petitions from which the basic facts, as noted above, have become clear. Production of records of Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 has infact also enabled us to go into the root of the matter relating to reopening of the ceiling proceedings under Section 45B of the Act as would also become clear from the discussions made hereinafter. 14. As noted above, the two ceiling proceedings are totally different in nature, inasmuch as in one of them, Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 it involves the personal land of the family of late Bishwanath Choudhary, whereas in the second Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74 it is the land of the eight deities, of which late Bishwanath Choudhary was the Shebait (manager). 15. By the impugned order dated 8.11.1993 the Collector of the District has reopened the proceedings of both the land ceiling cases in the backdrop of the recommendation made by the Addl. Collector in his observations recorded in his order dated 29.7.1992. From the perusal of the records of Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 it transpires that though the Addl. Collector in his order dated 29.7.1992 had basically concentrated on the facts and events of Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 including passing of the malicious and the fraudulent order dated 17.1.1985 by Sri S.K. Kumar the then Addl. From the perusal of the records of Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 it transpires that though the Addl. Collector in his order dated 29.7.1992 had basically concentrated on the facts and events of Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 including passing of the malicious and the fraudulent order dated 17.1.1985 by Sri S.K. Kumar the then Addl. Collector (Ceiling) but in the concluding portion of the same order he had also indicated that as there was a separate land ceiling case in the name of Sitaram Thakurwari, Rampur, being Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74, in which 240 acres of land had already been given to the eight deities of Thakurbari it could be beneficial for the State that the proceedings of the Land Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74 is also clubbed with the proceedings of Land Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 which in his opinion could lead to acquisition of more area of land. 16. In this background the first and foremost question would be as to whether the order passed by the Collector of the District for reopening of the ceiling proceedings under Section 45B of the Act is factually correct and legally sustainable? Section 45B of the Ceiling Act as was existing on the date of passing the impugned order dated 8.11.1993 by the Collector of Katihar District, had read as follows: “45B. State Government to call for and examine records.- The State Government or the Collector of the district, who may be authorized in this behalf may, at any time, call for and examine any record of any proceeding disposed of by a Collector under the Act and may, if it thinks fit, direct that the case be reopened and disposed of afresh in accordance with the provisions of the Act.” 17. As noted above, from the records of Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 it appears that in view of the order of Mr. S.D.Kumar, the Addl. Collector dated 17.1.1985 declaring only 42.42 acres of land out of total of 341.23 acres to be surplus, leaving the rest 298.81 acres of land with the land holders petitioners, that the proceeding were initiated for reopening after a final publication had been made in the district Gazette under section 15 of the Act. It was infact the recommendation in the order of the Addl. It was infact the recommendation in the order of the Addl. Collector dated 29.7.1992 tracing the history of 15 such cases of land holders having land of more than 200 acres in the district of Katihar including these two cases, i.e. case no. 17 of 1973-74 and case no. 202 of 1973-74 that the whole thing was re-examined and the Collector of the District had passed the impugned order after issuing notice and also extending opportunity of hearing to the petitioners as would be evident from the perusal of order sheet of ceiling case no. 17 of 1973-74. 18. From a bare reading of statutory provisions vesting power of reopening of the concluded ceiling proceedings, namely, section 45B of the Act, as quoted above, it would be clear that such provision is meant only for a concluded proceeding which has already been disposed of by the Collector under the Act. Thus, merely because a final publication under section 15(1) of the Act had already been made in Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 in view of the order passed by the Addl. Collector on 17.1.1985, that by itself cannot mean that the exercise of power of reopening under Section 45B of the Act was bad. It is in fact in respect of this concluded proceedings of Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 that the Collector of the District in the impugned order had found that after abatement of the ceiling proceedings at the appellate stage one Sri S.D.Kumar, the then Addl. Collector (Ceiling Act) had suo moto started dealing with the ceiling case without even its being entrusted to him. 19. Thus, the first reason given for reopening by the Collector of the District namely procedural infirmity committed by Mr. S.D. Kumar the then Additional Collector in dealing with the remanded proceedings by the Commissioner, does not suffer from any error of fact or law inasmuch as he has come to a specific finding that originally in the district of Katihar it was a D.C.L.R. who alone was authorized to deal with the ceiling cases as the first authority under section 10 of the Act. To that extent his findings by itself appear to be germane to the scope and prospect of section 45B of the Act, inasmuch as the Additional Collector (Ceiling) can exercise power of the original authority only if the case is entrusted to him by the Collector of the District in terms of section 31 of the Act. Admittedly the ceiling proceedings of Case No. 17/1973-74 was dealt by the D.C.L.R., Katihar whereafter the appeal was filed before the Commissioner and was disposed of by him by an order dated 13.9.1976. Thus when the said appellate order was set aside by this Court by an order dated 4.9.1979 in C.W.J.C. No. 4696 of 1979 and the appeal was remitted back to the Commissioner and after the pending appeal had abated in view of Section 32A of the Act coming into force w.e.f. 9.4.1981 the proceedings had to once again go back to the D.C.L.R. as there was no specific order of the Collector of the District requiring Sri S.D. Kumar the Additional Collector (Ceiling) to deal with the proceedings from the stage of section 10. 20. At this stage this Court must take into notice that at a point of time when in terms of the order of the Division Bench of this Court dated 4.9.1979 the appeal was remitted for rehearing by the Commissioner and such appeal had remained pending before the Commissioner as on 9.4.1981 the same stood abated in terms of section 32A of the Act, which reads as follows: “32A. Abatement of appeal, revision, review or reference.- An appeal, revision, review or reference other than those arising out of orders passed under section 8 or sub-section (3) of Section 16 pending before any authority on the date of commencement of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 1982, shall abate: provided that on such abatement, the Collector shall proceed with the case afresh in accordance with the provisions of Section 10: Provided further that such appeal, revision, review or reference arising out of order passed under section 8 or sub-section (3) of section 16 as has abated under section 13 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 1982, shall stand automatically restored before the proper authority on the commencement of this Act.” 21. The consequences of such abatement having been also provided by the legislature in section 32B reading as follows: “32B. Initiation of fresh proceeding.- All those proceedings, other than appeal, revision, review or reference referred to in Section 32-A pending on the date of commencement of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 1982, and in which final publication under sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act as it stood before the amendment by aforesaid Act, had not been made, shall be disposed of afresh in accordance with the provisions of section 10 of the Act.” would leave nothing for speculation that a fresh proceeding was to be initiated in accordance with the provisions of section 10 of the Act and under section 10 of the Act it was the D.C.L.R. in Katihar District who alone was competent to draw such proceedings unless there was a specific order by the Collector of the District in terms of section 31 of the Act authorizing the Additional Collector (Ceiling) to deal with such case. This Court, therefore, does not find any error in the impugned order of the Collector of the District holding that the ceiling proceeding was decided by an authority, namely, Additional Collector (Ceiling) who had no jurisdiction to act as an original authority and to that extent his following finding:- “From record it appears that from 9.9.1983 the learned Additional Collector (Ceiling) Katihar, Sri S.D.Kumar suo moto started dealing with this case without any apparent endorsement of record by the learned Collector, Katihar, under section 31 of the Bihar Land Ceiling Act the Collector of the district has powers to make distribution of work and to withdraw or transfer cases. Thus the learned Addl. Collector (Ceiling) unfortunately has usurped the power to look into the case which originally belongs to the court of the D.C.L.R. Katihar and was transferred to the court of the Addl. Collector, Katihar without obtaining any express order of the Collector, Katihar. In the whole procedural matter there appears to be a mistake that the learned Addl. Collector (Ceiling), Katihar took upon himself the case without jurisdiction.” needs no interference of this Court. 22. Collector, Katihar without obtaining any express order of the Collector, Katihar. In the whole procedural matter there appears to be a mistake that the learned Addl. Collector (Ceiling), Katihar took upon himself the case without jurisdiction.” needs no interference of this Court. 22. The effect of section 32A and 32B in fact was also considered by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Harendra Prasad Singh vs. the State of Bihar, reported in 1984 PLJR 908 , wherein it was held that Section 32B is mandatory in nature and it obliterates and wipes of whatever has been done earlier in the ceiling proceedings. The Full Bench of this Court in fact had also gone to hold that there was a clear intendment of Legislature behind sections 32A and 32B to bring about changes in the substantive law and to effectuate them by directing a re-determination of the surplus area in accordance therewith. It is in this context that this Court in the case of Harendra Prasad Singh (supra) had also held that on reading both sections 32A and 32B together it would be clear that the legislature had in mind the identical result to follow, namely, a re-determination or disposal afresh in accordance with the amended law. Thus in the light of statutory provisions contained in Section 32A and 32B of the Act as also the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Harendra Prasad Singh (supra) it has to be held that even the proceeding reopened under Section 45B of the Act on account of earlier proceedings having been decided by Mr. S.D. Kumar, the then Additional Collector having no jurisdiction to conduct the proceedings after its abatement, had to be started denovo from the stage of Section 10 of the Act. 23. S.D. Kumar, the then Additional Collector having no jurisdiction to conduct the proceedings after its abatement, had to be started denovo from the stage of Section 10 of the Act. 23. Not only that the Collector of the District had noted in the impugned order that the act of the Additional Collector in dealing with the ceiling case after abatement of appeal was without jurisdiction but he had also found that the whole proceeding was dealt in a perfunctory manner and that too without allowing the State to be represented and heard and in this context the reliance placed by him on the order of the Additional Collector dated 27.3.1984 noticing only the presence of the land holder and hearing the submission of the counsel of the land holder alone was good enough to show that the Additional Collector had also decided the objection under Section 10(3) of the Act without giving opportunity of hearing to the functionaries of the State and its counsel. Thus when this court on verification from the records of ceiling case no. 17 of 1973-74 has also found that after filing of the objection by the landholder petitioners dated 16.1.1984 to revised draft notification under Section 10(1) of the Act published in district gazette on 1.12.1983, only the counsel for landholders and purchasers were heard on 13.2.1984, 24.2.1984, 9.3.1994 and 27.3.1984 and orders were reserved on 27.3.1984 fixing 12.4.1984 for orders and such orders were not passed on 17.4.1984 and on next two days i.e. 17.4.1984 and 24.4.1984 neither the Additional Collector had even signed the order sheet nor even passed the orders, it actually becomes mysterious as to how the case records directed to be placed on 11.5.1984 was suddenly placed before him after a lapse of eight months only on 8.1.1985. The plea recorded by the Additional Collector on 8.1.1985 in the order sheet of Ceiling Case no. The plea recorded by the Additional Collector on 8.1.1985 in the order sheet of Ceiling Case no. 17 of 1973-74 that he had remained busy in election work for last seven months would literally pose a big question mark on the entire properity of the whole land ceiling proceedings specially when it has been discovered from the records of the Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 that the order dated 17.1.1985 passed by the Additional Collector under Section 10(3) of the Act was also in complete violation of the mandatory provisions under Section 10(3) of the Act as well as in total breach of principles of natural justice i.e. without hearing the counsel for the State. As a matter of fact Section 10 of the Act itself mandates hearing of both the parties and not only Landholders and/or objectors, which for sake of clarity is quoted hereinbelow:- "10. As a matter of fact Section 10 of the Act itself mandates hearing of both the parties and not only Landholders and/or objectors, which for sake of clarity is quoted hereinbelow:- "10. Preparation of draft statement - (1) On the basis of the information given by or on behalf of the landholder under section 6, 8, 9 or the information obtained by the Collector under section 7, checked in the prescribed manner, the Collector shall cause a draft statement to be prepared showing the following particulars: (a) the area and description of (i) each class of land held by the land-holder and the land selected by him which he desires to be included within his ceiling area; (ii) orchards held by him and the orchards in compact blocks which he desires to retain; (iii) homestead land and the pucca structures including land necessary for the use and enjoyment of such structures, held by him on the date of commencement of this Act; and such land, pucca structures including land necessary for the use and enjoyment of pucca structures which he desires to retain; (b) area and description of land of each of the categories in clause (a) which is allowed by the Collector to be held and retained by the land-holder under Section 5; (c) the area and description of the land which is in excess of the limit permissible under section 5 and which the land-holder is entitled to hold or retain under this Act (hereinafter to be called the 'surplus land'); [(c1)the area and description of land transferred by the land-holder in accordance with or in contravention of the provisions of clause(ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 5; (c2) the substance of findings of the Collector under clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of Section 5; (c3) the substance of the recommendation and order regarding exemption under section 29; and] (d) any other particular which may be prescribed. [(2) The draft statement shall be published in the Official Gazette of the district and of such places, and in such manner, as may be prescribed: Provided that a copy of the draft statement shall be served on the land-holder or land-holders concerned or on their guardians, as the case may be, by registered post with acknowledgement due which shall be conclusive evidence of the service of such notice.] [(3) Any objection to the draft statement in respect of the matters specified in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of sub-section (1) received within 30 days of publication of the draft statement or service thereof under sub-section(2), whichever is later , preferred by any person having any claim or interest in said matters shall be reconsidered by the Collector who shall, after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard and adducing evidence, pass such orders as he thinks fit: Provided that the Collector may on an application made by the land-holder or person having claim or interest in the land, extend the period of filing objection by another fifteen days] (underlining for emphasis) 24. Thus in view of the aforesaid underlined provisions of Section 10(3) of the Act read with Section 10(2) thereof it becomes clear that the State, being a party to the proceedings, is required to be afforded opportunity to lead its evidence in support of draft statement made under Section 10(1) of the Act and heard before passing of the order by the Collector. Thus when it is an admitted fact that the Additional Collector had passed his order dated 17.1.1985 even without hearing the counsel for the State and thus in breach of mandatory requirement under Section 10(3) of the Act, no error can be said to have been committed by the Collector of the district in passing the impugned order under Section 45B for reopening the Ceiling Case in order to afford opportunity to the State to lead evidence and hearing on the plea of the petitioner landholders and others objectors claiming release of entire 341 acres of land. 25. The detailed impugned order passed by the Collector of the District for reopening the ceiling proceeding also noticing change of classification of the entire Class III land to Class IV by the Addl. 25. The detailed impugned order passed by the Collector of the District for reopening the ceiling proceeding also noticing change of classification of the entire Class III land to Class IV by the Addl. Collector without there being any fresh enquiry in the proceedings yet again is a good and valid ground for reopening as was held by this Court in the case of Sk. Samiur Rahman & ors. vs. the State of Bihar & ors., reported in 1993(2) PLJR 322 , laying down law that where the State finds that an error has been committed in a concluded ceiling proceeding because of wrong verification report on the part of the concerned revenue authority, the proceeding can justifiably be ordered to be reopened under section 45B of the Act. The very fact that the same land which was earlier classified a Class III land in the earlier order of the Collector under the Act dated 3.5.1976 and that was reclassified as Class IV land and led to ultimate result of the declaration of only 42.42 acres of surplus land in place of earlier 265.81 acres of being surplus land was definitely another valid reason for exercise of the power under section 45B of the Act. 26. It has to be also noted that the Additional Collector (Ceiling), in his order dated 17.1.1985, had allowed the transfer effected by Late Bishwanath Chaudhary and his two sons, namely, Ramesh Chaudhary and Keshav Chaudhary to the tune of 171.26 acres which were made after 9.9.1970. Such transfer were earlier not allowed when the ceiling proceedings had earlier been conducted and in fact the appeal of the petitioner- land holder before the Commissioner was specifically against this issue. In that view of the matter if the Collector of the District in the impugned order had found that such transfer made after 9.9.1970 ought to have not been allowed as it was in teeth of the provisions made under section 5 of the Act, that by itself was also a good ground for reopening of the ceiling proceedings. 27. That in fact is not the end of the matter. 27. That in fact is not the end of the matter. The Collector of the District in the impugned order has been able to also unearth the personal pecuniary interest of Sri S.D. Kumar, the Additional Collector, who had passed the order dated 17.1.1985 in favour of the petitioners, inasmuch as it was found by him that out of exempted and/or transferred land of landholder petitioners Mr. Kumar the Additional Collector himself had purchased a piece of land in his own name and to that extent his following finding: “Further he allowed one acre of land of Mouza Dalan appertaining to Khata No. 236 and Plot No. 2208/2212. It was pointed out from the side of the State and it was alleged that Bishwanath Choudhary vide Kewala No. 621 dated 9.1.85 transferred 17 dec. and five Karis of land appertaining to Mouza Dalan of Khata no. 236 and plot no. 2208 being subject matter of the proceeding in favour of one Raj Bahadur Singh of village Huntarganj, district Hazaribagh. It is further alleged by the State that Sri S.D.Kumar the learned Addl. Collector (Ceiling) presented deed of worth Rs. five thousand before District Sub-Registrar, Katihar in which the said Raj Bahadur Singh has executed a deed dated 10.5.93 in favour of Sri Dev Kumar, S/o Sri Bishnu Dayal who is reported to be the learned Addl. Collector (Ceiling) himself. It is also interesting to find the analysis from the side of the State that Bishwanath Choudhary executed the transfer of the town land referred above to Raj Bahadur Singh on 9.1.85 which incidently falls between the periods of posting of order in the relevant ceiling case i.e. 27.3.89 to final order in the case dated 17.1.85.” would go to show that the order passed by Mr. Kumar the Additional Collector (Ceiling) on 17.1.1985 after getting land registered in his name on 9.1.1985, declaring only 42.42 acres of land as surplus out of total land of 345.67 acres was actuated by personal malice of Mr. Kumar the Additional Collector and that is why he had kept the case pending and had delayed in passing his final order, from 12.4.1984 to 17.1.1985, and did so when he had got a piece of land involved in the proceedings transferred in his name by a registered sale deed dated 9.1.1985. 28. Kumar the Additional Collector and that is why he had kept the case pending and had delayed in passing his final order, from 12.4.1984 to 17.1.1985, and did so when he had got a piece of land involved in the proceedings transferred in his name by a registered sale deed dated 9.1.1985. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioners in fact had not questioned the aforementioned finding of personal pecuniary bias of the Additional Collector (Ceiling) nor there is any pleading to this effect in the entire writ petition. As a matter of fact the following specific relevant assertion in paragraph no. 30 of counter affidavit of the State, reading as follows:- "......... It has further been found that in between 27.3.84 when the final order was reserved by tyhe Additional Collector, Ceiling and 17.1.85 when the final order was passed under Section 10(3) of the Act by aforesaid Shri S.D. Kumasr 17 decimals and 5 karis of valuable lands were transferred to one Raj Bahadur Singh of Hanterganj in the district of Hazaribagh by the aforesaid original land-holder Bishwanath Choudhary. Subsequently aforesaid Raj Bahadur Singh transferred the aforesaid land to Shri S.D. Kumar the Additional collector, Ceiling, Katihar. This also shows that there was some extraneous considerations on the part of Shri S.D. Kumar Additional Collector, Ceiling, Katihar, who had passed the different orders contrary to the mandatory provisions of the Act and without any authorization in the eye of law." has also not been at all controverted in the reply to the counter affidavit filed by the petitioners. Therefore, once this Court would find that such order dated 17.1.1985 passed by Sri S.D. Kumar Additional Collector (Ceiling), which came to be questioned in course of reopening of the ceiling proceeding, was actuated by his personal pecuniary bias it will have no hesitation in holding that such malicious order, in favour of the petitioners being vitiated by fraud arising out of own personal interest of Mr. Kumar, the Additional Collector, could not have been sustained by the Collector of the district in exercise of his power under Section 45B of the Act. 29. It is well settled by now that even the least of pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the litigation will disqualify any person from acting as a judge. Kumar, the Additional Collector, could not have been sustained by the Collector of the district in exercise of his power under Section 45B of the Act. 29. It is well settled by now that even the least of pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the litigation will disqualify any person from acting as a judge. Griffith and Street in their treatise “Principles Of Administrative Law” have opined that a pecuniary interest of a Judge, howsoever slight, will disqualify him to decide the matter, even though it may not be proved that the decision way in any way affected by bias of Judge. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol.1, Para 68, it has been stated, “There is a presumption that any financial interest, however small, in the matter in dispute disqualifies a person from adjudicating.” It thus stands well settled that even the least pecuniary interest in the cause disqualifies a judge, inasmuch as this principle should be observed to clear away everything which might engender suspicion and distrust of the tribunal and to promote the feeling of confidence in the administration of justice. The same principle has also been accepted in India. In Manak Lal vs. Dr. Premchand, reported in AIR 1957 SC 425 , the Apex Court had held “It is obvious that pecuniary interest, however small it may be in a subject matter of the proceedings, would wholly disqualify a member from acting as a judge.” In the case of J. Mohapatra & Co. v. State of Orissa, reported in A.I.R. 1984 SC 1572, when it was found by the Apex Court that some of the members of the committee set up for selecting books for educational institutions were themselves authors, whose books were also to be considered for selection, it was held that the possibility of bias cannot be ruled out. 30. Thus, once this Court would find that the Collector of the District was able to find out both personal and pecuniary interest of Mr. S.D.Kumar, the Additional Collector in allowing the claim of the petitioners which led to favourable order of exemption of 221.939 acres of land in favour of the petitioners, inasmuch as in the earlier proceedings the total declared surplus land of the petitioners was 265.81 acres whereas the same got reduced to 42.42 acres in the subsequent order dated 17.11.1985 passed by Mr. S.D.Kumar, Additional Collector (Ceiling), there would no difficulty in holding that the same for the reasons indicated above was actually a fraudulent order. This Court also as with regard to such fraudulent order in a concluded ceiling proceeding under the Act has found it to be a good ground for reopening under section 45B of the Act. Reference in this connection may be made to the judgment of this Court in the case of Thakur Shaligram Singh vs. State of Bihar, reported in 1993(2) PLJR 327, holding that the Collector in exercise of power under section 45B can reopen concluded proceeding if he comes to the conclusion that fraud had been practiced and/or if he comes to the conclusion that mandatory procedures had not been followed by Revenue Authority. 31. This Court has accordingly critically analyzed the impugned order with the help of original records of Ceiling Case no. 17 of 1973-74 which in fact categorizes six grounds and circumstances for reopening of the concluded ceiling proceeding of the petitioners, namely: (a) Intent and content of legislation. (b) Death of the land holders. (c) Acquisition of surplus land. (d) Examination of land transfers. (e) Disposal of record and (f) Equity and natural justice. Each of aforesaid ground dealt exhaustively in the impugned order, individually or collectively, as is also fully supported from the perusal of original records of Ceiling Case no. 17 of 1973-74, is a cogent and valid circumstance for reopening of the ceiling proceedings of Ceiling Case No. 17/1973-74 in terms of Section 45B of the Act. 32. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Mahanth Siyaram Das (supra) in this regard so far it relates to the facts of Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 is also wholly misplaced inasmuch as what was held in paragraph 8 of the aforesaid judgment of the Full Bench was that the Collector of the District will have no power to direct reopening and disposal afresh with regard to the matters which may have been finalized by his superior authority like the Commissioner or Board of Revenue or for that matter by the High Court. The crucial question in this regard would however be, as to how this proposition of law can be made applicable to the ceiling case of the land holder Late Bishwanath Choudhary and his two sons i.e. Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74? As noted above, the matter relating to Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 had come to this Court only once before abatement of the proceedings, in C.W.J.C.No. 4696 of 1979, wherein the order of the Divisional Commissioner in appeal was set aside and the appeal was remitted back to the Divisional Commissioner to reconsider the question of transfer of land made by the land holders. The Division Bench in its order dated 4.9.1979 in fact had held as follows: “2. Learned counsel for the petitioners raised several points but it is only necessary to mention one of them. It was contended that the learned Commissioner erred in law in confining the option of the petitioners to the lands which had been transferred by them. Learned counsel pointed out that the decision of the High Court in Hiralal Sah vs. State of Bihar (1977 B.B.C.J. 717) has not been correctly appreciated. The aforesaid decision is only applicable where the transfers have been held to be bonafide. In the instant case neither of the two authorities have come to the conclusion that the case of the transferees that they were bonafide transferees in possession of the lands in question has been accepted. The contention appears to have substance. The law has been explained in the aforesaid decision. If the authorities find that the transfers are benami transfers or for the purpose of defeating the provisions of ceiling law or otherwise fit to be annulled there is no question of land holder being directed to retain those lands while exercising his option. It was observed in that case that no opinion was being expressed in relation to cases where option had been exercised strictly in conformity with the provisions of section 9 of the Act. It was in relation to the other cases that it was explained that since the option was being permitted to be exercised at the discretion of the authorities it was open to the authorities to put some restriction on the exercise of the power of option. It was in relation to the other cases that it was explained that since the option was being permitted to be exercised at the discretion of the authorities it was open to the authorities to put some restriction on the exercise of the power of option. As to whether any restriction should be put or not, and as to what should be the nature of restriction, if any, would vary from case to case. No uniform rule can be laid down. 3. In the circumstances, we are of the view that it is a fit case in which there should be a remand to the learned Commissioner so that he may rehear the appeal of the parties and dispose of the same in accordance with law. We accordingly quash Annexures 3 and 3/1 and direct the decision of the appeal in the light of the observations made in this judgment.” 33. From the aforesaid extracted passages of the earlier order of this Court it would become clear that nothing conclusively was decided by this Court in the earlier case filed by the petitioners as with regard to Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74. Thus in view of the findings recorded in the impugned order, the ceiling proceedings upon abatement of proceeding had to start afresh from the stage of Section 10 in view of legislative mandate of section sections 32A and 32B of the Act. It is, therefore, not possible for this Court to hold that the impugned order of reopening in any way has questioned any concluded issue as with regard to Ceiling Case No. 17/1973-74. The Collector of the District in fact having also discovered several materials omitted from consideration by the Addl. Collector which could satisfactorily lead to a different conclusion had rightly exercised the power under section 45B of the Act and to that extent the law on the subject stands settled by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Yamuna Rai vs. State of Bihar, reported in 1984 PLJR 480 , and its reaffirmed by the Full Bench in the case of Praveen Shankar Singh (supra). 34. 34. Section 45B of the Act in fact is a special provision conferring wide powers to the State Government and earlier also to the Collector of the district and in fact it has been enacted specifically to do away with any challenge on the ground of res-judicata. There can also be no dispute that the legislature has powers to nullify the effect of principles of res-judicata. It is true that a final order of concluded ceiling proceedings can be reopened only if it has not been in accordance with the provision of the Act but then instances of order being not passed in accordance with the provisions of the Act may be innumerable and they cannot be limited only to procedural defects. If the previous order disposing of the objections under the Act was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act, as has been found in the impugned order, the proceeding could very well be reopened in exercise of power under section 45B of the Act. 35. This Court in fact having analyzed the impugned order dated 8.11.1993 which is not only a well reasoned order but also contains new materials going to the root of the matter, such as pecuniary and personal bias of the Additional Collector (Ceiling), his dealing with the case without having any jurisdiction, his converting the classification of land without there being any material, his allowing transfer of 171.26 acres of land effected after 9.9.1970, his discovery of there being another Ceiling Case No. 176 of 1973-74 pending in the district of Purnea in the name of same landholder and his wife, both independently and collectively are valid and germane grounds on which such reopening under section 45B of the Act could have been allowed. The petitioners in fact cannot complain in this regard because they were also given notice and opportunity of hearing and therefore, this Court would not find any error to have been committed by the Collector of the District who had the power of reopening such proceedings till 7.9.1995, inasmuch as the power of the Collector of the District of reopening under section 45B was taken away by the Collector of the District only by 1995 Ordinance dated 8.9.1995. 36. 36. This Court, however, would clarify that the impugned order dated 8.11.1993 would only lead to reopening of the ceiling proceedings of Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74, inasmuch as the ceiling proceedings of Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74 was not the subject matter of either the order passed by Sri S.D.Kumar, Additional Collector dated 17.1.1985 which was the basis for passing the impugned order by the Collector of the District on 8.11.1993 and therefore, whatever has been said in the said order of reopening the order dated 8.11.1993 will remain confined to Ceiling Case No. 17/1973-74. 37. The aforesaid clarification in fact would by itself go to show that neither the Collector of the District had actually examined the records for reopening of Ceiling Case No. 202/1973-74 nor the same is even otherwise permissible in law. In this regard one has only to take note of the fact that a separate ceiling proceeding was started against the deities for 253.21 acres of Class III land and in this ceiling proceeding, after all the eight deities were allowed only one unit by the authorities, was made subject matter of C.W.J.C.No. 1889/1981, wherein this Court in its judgment dated 30.6.1986 had held that the eight deities being separate juristic persons in whose favour such transfer of land, in the name of such deities itself were allowed way back in the year 1934, were entitled to be given eight units. The following finding, therefore, of this Court in the order dated 30.6.1986: “The deities are the petitioners here through the Shebait. Board of Revenue had thought fit to deprive the petitioners of their units under the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961, holding that the entire trust is governed by the original deed of trust brought in the existence on 4.10.1934. 2. After traveling through various courts and authorities the last pre-Board of Revenue order is in favour of the petitioners. The matter came before the Board of Revenue where the claim of the petitioners that the original deed of 1934 was altered by the trustees and that different properties were separately allotted to each deities for the purpose specified in the original deed. The matter came before the Board of Revenue where the claim of the petitioners that the original deed of 1934 was altered by the trustees and that different properties were separately allotted to each deities for the purpose specified in the original deed. In other words, in the common man parlance the single trust was bifurcated into eight trust by registered deeds which ultimately also received the approbation of the Bihar State Hindi Religious Trust Board. The Board of Revenue, refusing to accept the case of the petitioners brought to his use two grounds which, to say the least, were entirely spacious. One that the bifurcation of the trust into eight trusts amounted to a transfer which was hit by the provisions of the Ceiling Act requiring permission for transfer of property; secondly that the registration by the Religious Hindu Trust was some time in the year 1974 that is well after 9.9.1970. Taking up the first question first he has not been able to state beyond a mere assertion of law how the transaction amounted to a transfer to a deity when the property already stated to be dedicated to a deity by the original deed of trust. He has also not stated clearly how he came to this conclusion without stating the extent of the actual land transferred. Bifurcation of property already dedicated and transferred to several deities cannot amount to a transfer within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act because the deities, the transferees, were actual owner of the property. Another aspect is that if it was a transaction meant to defeat the ceiling Act then perhaps something would have been raid but there is transaction before 9.9.1970; so even if it was a transfer it could only be hit if the transfer was found to be for the reasons specified in that section and for no other reason. 3. Splitting up of the trust and its subsequent acceptance by the Hindu Religious Trust Board induced the right to the deity to claim one unit for each of them. In regard to the second point even if the property has been registered belatedly it does not do away with the character that the transaction has endowed to the property. 3. Splitting up of the trust and its subsequent acceptance by the Hindu Religious Trust Board induced the right to the deity to claim one unit for each of them. In regard to the second point even if the property has been registered belatedly it does not do away with the character that the transaction has endowed to the property. There may be instances of belated registration or no registration at all at the instance of recalcitrant Shebait of dedicated property but the property does not lose its trust character by that. 4. The order of Board of Revenue is, therefore, set aside and the impugned Annexure-6 is quashed. The application is allowed accordingly.” had, therefore, conclusively decided the issue of grant of eight units to the eight deities. The order of the Board of Revenue holding that the eight deities were entitled for only one unit was also quashed while allowing the prayer of the eight deities petitioners to be entitled to separate units. The order of this Court infact became final and was also acted upon by the Additional Collector (Ceiling) in his subsequent order dated 28.4.1990 while allowing 240 acres of land by way of eight units for eight deities declaring only 21.85 acres of land as surplus which was also acquired by the State pursuant to notification issued and published under Section 15(1) of the Act as is apparent from Annexure-2 to C.W.J.C. No. 7323 of 1996. Such concluded proceedings in view of the aforesaid quoted order of this Court in the judgment dated 30.6.1986 in C.W.J.C. No. 1889 of 1981 could not be reopened under section 45B of the Act and to that extent reliance placed by the learned counsel on the judgment of the Full Bench in the case of Mahanth Siyaram Das (supra) seems to be apt and appropriate, wherein it was held as follows: “8. It then calls for pointed notice that the power under section 45B has been given in very widely couched terms to the State Government or the Collector of the district authorized in this behalf to direct the re-opening and disposal afresh of any proceeding disposed of by a Collector under the Act, if it thinks fit. The discretion has thus been conferred in wide ranging terms. No express or statutory limitations are prescribed. The discretion has thus been conferred in wide ranging terms. No express or statutory limitations are prescribed. It is plain that though the power here is a quasi-judicial one, it has been conferred with the widest amplitude. Yet this power cannot be construed as altogether unbounded. The language of the section plainly points to one basic limitation on the power of re-opening of the earlier proceedings. It was argued before us that this power can be exercised dehors the hierarchy of the authority deciding the matter earlier. As an extreme case it was suggested that even if the matter may have been decided by a superior authority like the Board of Revenue or, for that matter, may have gone up to the High Court or the Supreme Court, it would still be possible under section 45B to re-open the matter by the authorized Collector of the district. I am unable to subscribe to this extreme proposition. On principle itself, it appears incongruous, if not absurd, that the authorized Collector should have the power to direct re-opening and decision afresh with regard to the matters which may have been finalized by his superior authorities, like the Commissioner or the Board of Revenue or, for that matter, by the High Court and even when the lis may have been carried to the final Court itself. This apart, reading section 45B in sequence would show that the power is first given to call for and examine any record of any proceeding. If one may say so, the use of the phraseology ‘to call for’ in a way implies the summoning or a direction by a superior authority to an inferior one to produce or forward the record. It is not easy to subscribe to the theory that a subordinate would call for the records from its superior. Consequently, the very use and employment of these would indicate that the calling of the record by the State Government or the authorized Collector is only from authorities subordinate in rank. There is even a further limitation or qualification with regard to such a proceeding. It is not any and every record that is to be called for but only of a proceeding disposed of by a Collector under the Act. There is even a further limitation or qualification with regard to such a proceeding. It is not any and every record that is to be called for but only of a proceeding disposed of by a Collector under the Act. The power, therefore, to call for and examine and, obviously, the consequential action of reopening and disposal afresh is limited to the records of proceedings disposed of by a Collector under the Act only. It is not the power to call for and examine the records of proceedings disposed of by superior authorities. I am firmly inclined to the view that the wide ranging power under section 45B to direct re-opening and disposal afresh is plainly limited to proceedings disposed of by the authorities up to the level of the Collector under the Act and no higher. To hold otherwise would, in a way, be doing violence to the plain language of the statute and also would be contrary to principle.” (underlining for emphasis) 38. Learned counsel for the State, however, had tried to seek support from the amended provision of section 29 which came into force on 8.9.1995 to justify the possible view of the Collector of the District in his impugned order dated 8.11.1993 for also reopening the ceiling proceedings of Case No. 202 of 1973-74 as also the subsequent order of the Additional Collector dated 27.11.1995. It is, however, difficult for this Court to accept the said submission of the learned counsel for the State for more than one reason. First of all the Collector’s order nowhere is referable to the facts of the case of Ceiling Case No. 202/1973-74 which as noted above became final in view of the order of this Court dated 30.6.1986 in C.W.J.C.No. 1889/1981 and its compliance by the authorities by allowing 240 acres for eight deities on 28.4.1990 and its notified in gazette under Section 15(1) of the Act leading to acquisition of 21.85 acres of land of the deities. 39. 39. Secondly, the amendment in the Act under section 29 in no way could have affected the vested right in the eight deities to hold 240 acres of land which as noted above was allowed in terms of Section 4 and 5 of the Act and also duly acted upon by the Additional Collector on 28.4.1990 (Annexure-2) to C.W.J.C. No. 7323 of 1996 by way of strict compliance of the order of this Court dated 30.6.1986. At that point of time either on 28.4.1990 or even on 8.11.1993 when the Collector of the district had passed the impugned order of reopening also the Ceiling Case no. 202 of 1973-74 section 29 did contemplate exemption of religious institution as would be evident from the reading of section 29 as it stood prior to 1995 Ordinance, providing interalia:- “29. Exemptions. 202 of 1973-74 section 29 did contemplate exemption of religious institution as would be evident from the reading of section 29 as it stood prior to 1995 Ordinance, providing interalia:- “29. Exemptions. – (1)(a) The provisions of this Act shall not apply to – (i) land in possession of the Central Government or State Government; (ii) land in possession of local authorities or of Gram Panchayats Established under the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (Bihar Act VII of 1948); (iii) land vested in the Bhoodan Yagna Committee established under the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1954 (Bihar Act XXII of 1954); (b) The provisions of section 5 and Section 28, shall not apply to - (i) lac-brood farms operated by the Indian Lac Cess Committee constituted under Section 4 of the Indian Lac Cess Act, 1930 (24 of 1930); (ii) 1[****] (iii) 2[****] (iv) such extent of land held on the date of commencement of this Act, by educational institutions, Universities, Research Councils or Research Institutes recognized by the State hospitals, maternity homes and Orphanages, as may be notified by the State Government in this behalf, so long as they continue as such;] [(v) such extent of land held on the date of commencement of this Act by such public or charitable bodies or religious institutions of public nature, running educational institutions, hospitals, maternity homes and Orphanages, as may be notified by the State Government in this behalf, so long as they continue as such; [(vi) land required in connection with any other nonagricultural or Industrial purpose, to the extent approved by Government, so long as they continue as such; (vii) any land awarded for gallantry in the First World War or in the Second World War or subsequently: Provided that the exemption under this clause shall remain in force only for the life time of the pension to whom the award is made. [(viii) Land held by (a) banking companies as defined in Section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. (b) The State Bank of India constituted under the State Bank of India Act, 1955. (c) Subsidiary Banks as defined in the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Bank)Act, 1959. (d) Corresponding new Banks constituted under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1970. (e) the Co-operative Banks. (b) The State Bank of India constituted under the State Bank of India Act, 1955. (c) Subsidiary Banks as defined in the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Bank)Act, 1959. (d) Corresponding new Banks constituted under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1970. (e) the Co-operative Banks. (f) any other financial institution notified by the State Government as bank for the purposes of this Act.] (2)(a) The State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, exempt from the operation of Section 5- (i) sugarcane farms owned and operated on the date of commencement of the Act, by sugar factories holding a licence under any law relating to Sugar factories for the time being in force to such extent as may be determined in the prescribed manner to be necessary for the production of sugarcane seeds but in no case exceeding one hundred acres; (ii) So much of land not exceeding fifteen acres of Class I land or equivalent area of other classes owned and held under personal cultivation by any religious institution of a public nature on the date of the commencement of the Act as may be determined by the Collector in the prescribed manner to be necessary for the purposes of performing religious rites and maintenance of the religious institutions”.] (b) The exemption under this sub-section shall be valid only so long as the purpose mentioned therein continue to be carried out.” (Underling for emphasis) 40. It has to be noted that the said provision which were in the Act for allowing exemption in favour of the religious institution came to be wiped of for the first time by the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1995 (First Ordinance) published in the Bihar Gazette on 8th September, 1995. For the sake of clarity and inconvenience the same is quoted hereinbelow: “To amend the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. For the sake of clarity and inconvenience the same is quoted hereinbelow: “To amend the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. Whereas, the Legislature of the State of Bihar is not in session; And, whereas, the Governor of Bihar is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action to amend the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (Bihar Act XII of 1962) in the manner hereinafter appearing; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of article 213 of the Constitution of India, the Governor is pleased to promulgate the following Ordinance:- 1. Short title, commencement and extent.-(1) This ordinance may be called the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1995. (2) It shall come into force at once except section 2 of the Ordinance, which shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from the appointed date. (3) It extends to the whole of the State of Bihar. 2. Amendment of section 29 of the Bihar Act 12, 1962.- In the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (Bihar Act 12,1962) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section 2 of section 29 shall be deleted and shall always be deemed to have been deleted. 3. Deletion of section 37 of Bihar Act 12, 1962.- In the said Act Section 37 shall be deleted. 4. Amendment of Section 45B of Bihar Act 12, 1962.- In Section 45B, after the words “The State Government” the words “or the Collector of the district, who may be authorized in this behalf” shall be deleted.” (underlining for emphasis) 41. By the Amending Act(Bihar Act 8 of 1997) which came into force after receiving assent of the President of India on 2.3.1997 and published in the Bihar Gazette on 27.3.1997, the aforementioned provisions of the First Ordinance kept alive through Second Ordinance (Bihar Ordinance No. 27 of 1995) were reiterated and Section 29 of the Act was amended by way of deletion of sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 29 along with deletion of Section 37 altogether and also deletion of certain portion of Section 45-B in the following terms:- “1. Short title and commencement and extent- (1) This Act may be called the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land (Amendment) Act, 1995. (2) It shall come into force at once except Section 2 of the Act, which shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from appointed date. (3) It extends to the whole of the State of Bihar. 2. Amendment of Section 29 of the Bihar Act 12, 1962 In the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus) Act, 1961 (Bihar Act 12, 1962) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 29 shall be deleted and shall always be deemed to have been deleted. 3. Deletion of Section 37 of Bihar Act 12, 1962 – In the said Act, Section 37 shall be deleted. 4. Amendment of Section 45-B of Bihar Act 12, 1962- In the said Act in Section 45-B, after the words “The State Government ”the words or the Collector of the district, who may be authorized in this behalf” shall be deleted. 5. Repeal and Savings- (1) The Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 1995 (Bihar Ordinance No.27, 1995) is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal anything done or any action taken in exercise of any power conferred by or under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken in exercise of the powers conferred by or under this Ordinance as if this Ordinance were in force on the date which such thing was done or action taken.” (underlining for emphasis) 42. From the reading of the underlined portions of the original and the amended provisions of Section 29(2)(a)(ii) of the Act, it would be clear that originally 15 acres of class-1 land or equivalent area of other class, owned and held under the personal cultivation by any religious institution of a public cause on the date of commencement of the Act as could be determined by the Collector in the prescribed manner to be necessary for the purposes of performing religious rites and maintenance of the religious institutions could be exempted by the State Government but such concept was altogether abolished in view of the aforesaid 1995 Amendment Act. The crucial question, however, would still be as to whether those religious institutions which had already been exempted land found to be necessary for the purposes of performing religious rites and maintenance of religious institutions under the order of the State Government followed by publication in official gazette could be subjected to automatic effect of wiping out of the earlier exemption only because in the amending act, such deletion in sub-cause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section 2 of section 29 was deleted by giving it retrospective operation i.e. with effect from the appointed day under section 2(a) of the original act i.e. 9th September, 1970? In other words, could the Collector of the district, or for that purpose even the Additional Collector, taking advantage of the amended provisions of Section 29(2)(a)(ii) of the Act, have wiped out the effect of the earlier order dated 28.4.1990 passed by the Addl. Collector under the Act allowing exemption of 240 acres of land for the eight deities in compliance of order of this Court dated 30.6.1986 in C.W.J.C.No. 1889 of 1991? 43. If the literal interpretation of the aforementioned provisions of amending Act is given effect to, it would be evident that each and every exemption allowed in favour of the religious institutions/deities from 9.9.1970 to 7.9.1995 would stand wiped off, making religious institutions to also surrender such exempted land. That in effect would mean that a vested right under which the religious institutions after getting exemption even if it had alienated such land in the interest of religious institutions, would still become liable to surrender an equivalent area of land for its being acquired by the State. 44. The question, therefore, would be can such interpretation be given to the amended provision which would not only lead to absurdity or incongruity if grammatical or ordinary sense of the words is applied to the intent of the amended provision of Section 29(2)(a)(ii) of the Act. It is, however, a well-known principle of interpretation of statute that a construction should not be put upon a statutory provision which would lead to manifest absurdity or futility or palpable injustice or absurd inconvenience or anomaly as was held by the Apex Court in the case of American Home Products Corporation Vs. Mac Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. It is, however, a well-known principle of interpretation of statute that a construction should not be put upon a statutory provision which would lead to manifest absurdity or futility or palpable injustice or absurd inconvenience or anomaly as was held by the Apex Court in the case of American Home Products Corporation Vs. Mac Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. reported in AIR 1986 SC 137 and also reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Narashimaha Murthy Vs. Susheelabai reported in 1996(3) SCC 644 laying down that the purpose of law is to prevent brooding sense of injustice and that it is not the words of law but the spirit and eternal sense of it that makes the law meaningful. 45. Judged in this background, when it is found that vested rights for the purposes of performing religious rites and maintenance of the religious institutions arising out of an order of exemption passed by the State Government on the recommendation of the Collector and acted upon by issuance of a notification in office gazette were sought to be taken away, that could only be made applicable in case of a religious institution whose ceiling proceedings had still remained pending or that a fresh prayer for exemption of land had been being made by such religious institutions. This aspect of the matter as with regard to taking away the vested accrued right in view of the retrospectivity given to the amending statute was gone into by the Apex Court in the case of Bihar State Council of Aurvedic & Ynani Medicines Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in (2007) 12 SCC 728 wherein it had been held that the retrospective provisions of Section 13B of the amended provision of Indian Medicines Central Council Act, 2003 could not be made applicable whereby the qualification acquired by the students of medical college would not be deemed to be derecognized medical qualification and that when such a degree was legally conferred on the students prior to the commencement of the Amending Act, 2003 under the existing law, it shall be treated as a recognized degree although the medical college had not sought permission of the Central Government within a period of three years from the commencement of the Amending Act, 2003. In this context, it would be useful to also quote the following passages of the aforementioned judgment of the Apex Court:- “23. The provisions of Section 13A, 13B and 13C of the 1970 Act as introduced by the Amending Act of 2003, if given retrospective operation, the medical qualification acquired from the study in the medical colleges which have been opened prior to the commencement of the Amending Act of 2003 and conferred medical qualification of the students who studied in such medical colleges, the degrees so conferred in the absence of the permission of the Central Government would be non est though there is no fault on the part of the students who have studied in the institutions which are recognized and affiliated to the Faculty under the 1951 Act. 24. In our opinion, where the legislature has used words in an Act which if generally construed, must lead to palpable injustice and consequences revolting to the mind of any reasonable man, the court will always endeavour to place on such words a reasonable limitation, on the ground that the legislature could not have intended such consequence to ensue, unless the express language in the Act or binding authority prevents such limitation being interpolated into the Act. In construing an Act, a construction ought not be put that would work injustice, or even hardship or inconvenience, unless it is clear that such was the intention of the legislature. It is also settled that where the language of the legislature admits of two constructions and if construction in one way would lead to obvious injustice, the courts act upon the view that such a result could not have been intended, unless the intention had been manifested in express words. Out of the two interpretations, that language of the statute should be preferred to that interpretation which would frustrate it. It is a cardinal rule governing the interpretation of the statutes that when the language of the legislature admits of two constructions, the court should not adopt the construction which would lead to an absurdity or obvious injustice. It is equally well settled that within two constructions that alternative is to be chosen which would be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purported to be regulating and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion with the working of the system. It is equally well settled that within two constructions that alternative is to be chosen which would be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purported to be regulating and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion with the working of the system. [See Collector of Customs v. Digvijaysinhji Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. (1962) 1SCR 896, at page 899 and His Holiness Kesvananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 ]. 25. The court must always lean to the interpretation which is a reasonable one, and discard the literal interpretation which does not fit in with the scheme of the Act under consideration.” 46. In the opinion of this Court, the ratio of the aforementioned judgment would be also applicable to the exemption already granted under Section 29 of the Act inasmuch as, the vested right of the religious institutions under the earlier provisions of the Act is sought to be affected adversely on the strength of the amending Act, having been given its retrospective operation from 9.9.1970. This Court in fact dealing with a similar case under the Act in the case of Braj Bihari Das (supra) had held as follows:- "Thus on an overall analysis, this Court is in respectful disagreement with the submission of learned AAG-3, who had made a valiant effort to justify the impugned order only on the strength of the amended provision of Section 29(2)(a)(ii) of the Act. This Court must hold that if an exemption under Section 29 had already been allowed and such order of exemption in the ceiling proceeding and become final and binding in terms of the Ceiling Act by publication of Gazette Notification under Section 11 and Section 15 of the Act, such exemption already allowed in a concluded proceeding cannot be recalled by directing the landholder/religious institutions/deities to surrender the exempted portion of land." 47. Reliance placed by learned AAG-1 on the judgment of this Court in the case of Mahanth Ramdas (supra) seems to be wholly misplaced and distinguishable on facts alone, inasmuch as, in that case, only a prospective right of being granted exemption to the religious institution was under consideration and in that context, it was held that such exemption was not permissible to the petitioner, religious institution, in view of the deletion of the very provision of exemption under Section 29 (2)(a)(ii) of the Act. It has to be noted that unlike the facts of the present writ application, there was no concluded proceedings in the case of Mahanth Ramdas (supra). 48. Thus in view of aforesaid settled position in law this Court would reject the submission of learned counsel for the State that the impugned order of reopening could also in its wide sweep cover the ceiling proceedings of Case No. 202 of 1973-74 only on the strength of the amended provision of Section 29(2)(a)(ii) of the Act by reiterating the law laid down in the case of Braj Bihari Das (supra) that if an exemption under Section 29 had already been allowed in favour of religious institution by the State Government by publication of notification under section 29(2)(a)(ii) of the Act prior to introduction of 1997 Amending Act, i.e. w.e.f. 8.9.1995, such exemption cannot be questioned much less reopened under section 45B of the Act for directing the landholder/religious institutions to also surrender the exempted portion of land. This Court while laying down the law to the aforementioned effect is also mindful of the situation that if the interpretation of the amended provision of Section 29(2)(a)(ii) of the Act is given retrospective effect in respect of all the earlier concluded proceedings where the exemption had already allowed and acted upon the same would play havoc and would lead to a manifestly absurd result as also palpable injustice to the religious institutions. 49. 49. Having thus repelled the submission of learned counsel for the State that the amendment in the provisions of Section 29 of the Act could not and infact did not adversely affect the concluded proceedings under the Act as against the deities this Court must immediately clarify that the entire discussion in this regard was only intended to explain the position in law in answer to the submissions of learned Counsel for the State as with regard to exemption already allowed under Section 29(2)(a)(ii) of the Act in favour religious institutions but so far the facts of the present case is concerned, it cannot be even remotely suggested that in the concluded proceeding in Ceiling Case no. 202 of 1973-74 any exemption under Section 29 of the Act was given earlier at any point of time by the State Government to the eight deities or to the Thakurbari in which these eight deities had been installed. From the factual narration of the events relating to Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74 as discussed earlier it would be clear that a separate land ceiling proceeding was initiated against the deities installed in the Thakurbari and ultimately, eight units were granted to the eight deities. This was not done by way of exemption in exercise of power under Section 29(2)(a)(ii) of the Act rather it was purely in terms of Section 4 and 5 of the Act. Allocation of unit to the permissible extent of land to be retained by a land holder in terms of Section 4 and 5 being altogether different in concept than exemption under Section 29 of the Act, it can be safely said that in the facts of the present case, the change in law, namely, amendment in Section 29 of the Act as explained above, even otherwise could have made no difference in view of the fact that in the concluded proceedings, no benefit of exemption under Section 29 was ever given to the eight deities, the petitioners. 50. There is also no dispute that this Court in its earlier judgment dated 30.6.1986 had also held the eight deities to be entitled for eight separate units in capacity of landholders as defined under Section 2(ee) of the Act by going into the question of dedication directly made to them in the deeds of the year 1934. 50. There is also no dispute that this Court in its earlier judgment dated 30.6.1986 had also held the eight deities to be entitled for eight separate units in capacity of landholders as defined under Section 2(ee) of the Act by going into the question of dedication directly made to them in the deeds of the year 1934. There can also be no quarrel as with regard to the settled position in law that deities are juristic entity vested with the capacity of receiving gift and holding the property as was held way back in the case of Sri Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal Vs. Baluswami Ayyar & Ors. reported AIR 1922 Privy Council, 123. The same view was also reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Jogendra Nath Vs. I.T. Commissioner reported in AIR 1969 SC 1089 wherein it was held that Hindu Deity is a legal person and that a Hindu idol has a juristic entity capable of holding property. According to Mayne's Hindu Law, 12th Edition at page 1132, under the Hindu Law, also the image of a deity of the Hindu pantheon has juristic entity. In fact the question of deities being allowed separate units under the Act was directly gone into by this Court in the case of Shri Lakshmi Narain & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 1978 PLJR 544 wherein while allowing separate units to the deities under the Act, it was held as follows:- "9. On consideration of the fats of this case and the relevant position in point of law, I come to the conclusion that all the four petitioners are separate juristic entities properties being endowed to them just like any other human being. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents rightly conceded that had it been a gift to four individuals, they were entitled to four units separately, each of them being a 'land-holder' within the meaning of clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act and entitled to separate unit. If that be so, I do not see any reason for taking a view that the position should be different as the beneficiaries in this case are idols. It could not be contended that all one 'family' within the meaning of Section 2(ee) of the Act. If that be so, I do not see any reason for taking a view that the position should be different as the beneficiaries in this case are idols. It could not be contended that all one 'family' within the meaning of Section 2(ee) of the Act. The definition of 'family' in Section 2(ee) is as follows:- "'Family' means and includes a person, his or her spouse and minor children." Even applying the above rigid test laid down in the Act, the first two petitioners, namely, Shri Lakshmi Narayan and Shri Mahabirji must be treated as separate units. And even assuming that the fourth petitioner, namely, Shri Parbatiji is considered to be a spouse of the third petitioner, namely, Shri Shivajee, even then both these petitioners were entitled to one unit. In that view of the matter, the petitioners were entitled to at least three units, being in the same position of Hindu co-parceners and, therefore, separate 'land holder' or families" in the eye of law.----" 51. The same view was also reiterated by another Division Bench in the case of Narbdeshwar Mahadev Mandir through its Manager & Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 1994(1)PLJR 832 while allowing separate units to the deities. 52. Thus it would be clear that amendment in Section 29(2) of the Act in the year 1995 deleting the provision of grant of exemption to the religious institutions in no way could have adversely affected the grant of eight units to the eight deities, the petitioners. In the present case, grant of such unit was not in exercise of power under Section 29 of the Act rather only under Section 4 and 5 of the Act. The determination as against eight deities made under Section 4 and 5 of the Act having become final by grant of eight units, its being reversed on the basis of change in law under Section 29 relating to exemption by no stretch of imagination could not have been made applicable for acquiring 210.77 acres of land, as has been done by the impugned order dated 27.11.1995. The impugned order dated 27.11.1995 passed by the Additional Collector (Ceiling), Katihar in Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74 is thus wholly misconceived both on fact and in law. 53. The impugned order dated 27.11.1995 passed by the Additional Collector (Ceiling), Katihar in Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74 is thus wholly misconceived both on fact and in law. 53. In view of the above discussion this Court would not find any justification in the impugned order passed by the Additional Collector in once again reviewing his order dated 28.4.1990 allowing 240 acres of land for eight deities and declaring 21.85 acres of land as surplus especially when it is not in doubt that gazette notification published under section 15(1) of the Act was already made in the month of April, 1990, thus, brining curtains to the ceiling case No. 202 of 1973-74. In any event, the change in law by deletion of section 29(2)(a)(ii) of the Act for the reasons elaborately discussed above could not have been made a ground to declare the land of the deities to the extent of 210.77 acres to be surplus for its being acquired by the State. 54. The earlier order of the Additional Collector dated 28.4.1990 followed by gazette publication of notification under Section 15(1) concluding the proceedings of Ceiling Case no. 202 of 1973-74 in fact could not have been reviewed by the same authority by his order dated 27.11.1995 especially when the Act also does not confer power on the Additional Collector to review his own order. It is also important to bear in mind that as on 27.11.1995 neither the Additional Collector of the District nor even the Collector of the District had even the power of reopening a concluded proceeding under section 45B because the First Ordinance dated 8.9.1995 followed by the Second Ordinance and culminating into the Amending Act 1995 had also taken away the power of the Collector of the district for reopening a concluded land ceiling proceeding by vesting such power of reopening under section 45B of the Act only in the State Government. In that view of the matter as well this Court is of the firm opinion that the Additional Collector of Katihar District was not at all justified in passing the impugned order dated 27.11.1995, which is the subject matter of C.W.J.C. No. 7323/1996. 55. In the result, C.W.J.C. No. 7323/1996 is allowed and the impugned order dated 27.11.1995 (Annexure 4) is hereby quashed. The respondents shall have no liberty to reopen the concluded proceedings of Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74. 55. In the result, C.W.J.C. No. 7323/1996 is allowed and the impugned order dated 27.11.1995 (Annexure 4) is hereby quashed. The respondents shall have no liberty to reopen the concluded proceedings of Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74. 56. C.W.J.C. No. 3436/1994, however, is dismissed and the impugned order of reopening dated 8.11.1993 so far it relates to Land Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 is hereby approved. Since the proceeding had remained stayed under the interim order of this Court dated 19.12.1994, the same is hereby vacated with a direction to the respondents to hold and conclude the proceeding of Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 afresh in accordance with law. There would be, however, no order as to costs. (Mihir Kumar Jha,J.) Per: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE Re. Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 3436 of 1994. 57. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is filed by the land holders. The disputed parcels of land Khata no. 123 of Village - Rampur, District – Katihar admeasuring more than 240 acres (hereinafter referred to as “the Land”) were subjected to the proceedings under Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Land Ceiling Act”) in Ceiling Case No. 17/73-74. The order made in the said Ceiling Case No. 17/73-74 was sought to be reopened under the notice dated 22nd January 1993 issued by the In-charge Deputy Collector Land Reforms, District – Katihar. After hearing the land holders, under order dated 8th November 1993 made by the Collector, Land Reforms, in exercise of power conferred by Section 45B of the Land Ceiling Act, the case has been reopened. It is the said order dated 8th November 1993 which is the subject matter of challenge in the present proceeding. 58. I have the benefit of elaborate judgment delivered by my learned Brother Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mihir Kumar Jha. Brother Mr. Justice Mihir Kumar Jha has devoted first 36 paragraphs to the above referred Ceiling Case no. 17/73-74. I need not reiterate the facts elaborately stated by Brother Mihir Kumar Jha. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mihir Kumar Jha has held – “56. C.W.J.C. No. 3436/1994, however, is dismissed and the impugned order of reopening dated 8.11.1993 so far it relates to Land Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 is hereby approved. 17/73-74. I need not reiterate the facts elaborately stated by Brother Mihir Kumar Jha. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mihir Kumar Jha has held – “56. C.W.J.C. No. 3436/1994, however, is dismissed and the impugned order of reopening dated 8.11.1993 so far it relates to Land Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 is hereby approved. Since the proceeding had remained stayed under the interim order of this Court dated 19.12.1994, the same is hereby vacated with a direction to the respondents to hold and conclude the proceeding of Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1973-74 afresh in accordance with law. There would be, however, no order as to costs.” 59. I agree with Brother Mihir Kumar Jha. The Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Katihar has recorded cogent reasons for exercise of power conferred by Section 45B of the Land Ceiling Act. Re. Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 7323 of 1996. 60. This petition also relates to reopening of the ceiling case finalized under Ceiling Case no. 202 of 1973-74 in respect of the Land. 61. It appears that Shri Ram Chandra Bhagwanji temple is situated at Village - Rampur, District - Katihar and owned certain lands. The holding of the temple was made the subject matter of the Land Ceiling Act in Ceiling Case no. 202 of 1973-74. After a long drawn litigation finalized on 16th July 1986 in CWJC No. 1889 of 1981, each of the eight deities in the said Shri Ram Chandra Bhagwanji temple was allowed to retain 30 acres of Class III land totaling to 240 acres of land. The remaining 20.85 acres of land out of the holding of Shri Ram Chandra Bhagwanji temple was declared surplus and was acquired by the State Government. 62. By the amendment to Section 29(2) of the Land Ceiling Act under the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 1995 (Bihar Ordinance No. 27 of 1995), the said Land Ceiling case was reopened by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms. Under order dated 27th November 1995 made by the Collector, Land Reforms, Katihar. Shri Ram Chandra Bhagwanji temple has been allowed a single unit of land admeasuring 30 acres. The remaining 210 acres of land has been held to be surplus. Under order dated 27th November 1995 made by the Collector, Land Reforms, Katihar. Shri Ram Chandra Bhagwanji temple has been allowed a single unit of land admeasuring 30 acres. The remaining 210 acres of land has been held to be surplus. Feeling aggrieved the deity Shri Ram Chandra Bhagwanji and seven other deities preferred this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution through Shree Shebait Ramesh Prasad Choudhary. 63. My learned Brother Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mihir Kumar Jha has extensively dealt with the facts. I need not repeat the same. Brother Mr. Justice Mihir Kumar Jha has allowed the Writ Petition for two-fold reasons. First, it is held that the amendment to Section 29 of the Land Ceiling Act does not empower the Deputy Collector Land Reforms to reopen the concluded cases. Second, it is held that irrespective of the exemption allowed under Section 29(2)(a)(ii) of the Land Ceiling Act, the deity Shri Ram Chandra Bhagwanji and seven other deities were allowed to retain one unit of land in their own capacity, i.e. Shri Ram Chandra Bhagwanji and seven other deities were not extended the benefit of exemption under the then existing Section 29(2)(a)(ii) of the Land Ceiling Act. Section 29(2)(a)(ii), prior to its amendment under the Bihar Act 8 of 1997, provided that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt from the operation of Section 5 so much of land not exceeding fifteen acres of Class I land or equivalent area of other classes owned and held under personal cultivation by any religious institution of a public nature on the date of the commencement of the Act as may be determined by the Collector in the prescribed manner to be necessary for the purposes of performing religious rites and maintenance of the religious institutions. 64. Under the above referred Ordinance No. 27 of 1995, the above referred sub clause (ii) of sub section 2(a) of Section 29 of the Land Ceiling Act has been deleted from the inception. The relevant provisions have been reproduced by Brother Mr. Justice Mihir Kumar Jha in extenso. I, therefore, do not reiterate the same. However, I am not in agreement with Brother Mr. Justice Mihir Kumar Jha in respect of the cases concluded under Section 29(2)(a)(ii) of the Land Ceiling Act as it stood then. Ordinarily, an amendment made to a statute would have prospective effect. Justice Mihir Kumar Jha in extenso. I, therefore, do not reiterate the same. However, I am not in agreement with Brother Mr. Justice Mihir Kumar Jha in respect of the cases concluded under Section 29(2)(a)(ii) of the Land Ceiling Act as it stood then. Ordinarily, an amendment made to a statute would have prospective effect. However, in the present case, the aforesaid amendment has been given retrospective effect in express words. Besides, the actions already taken under the erstwhile provision have not been saved. The intention of the Legislature to reopen all cases which have received benefit of exemption under the then existing Section 29(2)(a)(ii) of the Land Ceiling Act is evident. The very nature of the amendment would call for re-examination of such cases. Therefore, there cannot be a bar against reopening of the concluded cases by the concerned authority. 65. In the instant case, as recorded by Brother Mr. Justice Mihir Kumar Jha, Shri Ram Chandra Bhagwanji and seven other deities did not receive the benefit of exemption provided under the then Section 29(2)(a)(ii) of the Land Ceiling Act. The amendment to Section 29 of the Land Ceiling Act and the deletion of sub clause (ii) of sub section 2(a) of Section 29 of the Land Ceiling Act with retrospective effect, therefore, had no consequence insofar as the petitioners Shri Ram Chandra Bhagwanji and seven other deities are concerned. Thus, on facts, the Collector, Land Reforms was not justified in reopening the concluded Land Ceiling Case No. 202 of 1973-74. 66. I agree with Brother Mr. Justice Mihir Kumar Jha to the above extent. Impugned order dated 27th November 1995 made by the Collector, Land Reforms, Katihar is quashed and set aside. 67. The original records be returned to learned Principal Additional Advocate General Mr. Lalit Kishore.