ORDER : 1. The appellant seeks to assail the impugned order dated 04.04.2013 confirming the ex parte ad interim order dated 06.04.2010 passed against them on a suit filed by R-1 and R-2 for infringement of copyright qua the film Sholay and any other films referred to in prayer clause 3(i) of the interim application. It may be stated that the appellant/original defendant No. 1 claims rights through an agreement with Sh. Ajit Sippy which rights in turn have been assigned to Moser Baer India Limited (original defendant No. 2) and Moser Baer Entertainment Limited (original defendant No. 3). However, the entity impleaded as R-3 apparently does not exist and it is stated that Moser Baer India Limited has been incorrectly arrayed as a private limited company as R-3. Learned counsel for R-1 and R-2 in fact points out that the agreement of the appellant is really with Moser Baer Entertainment Limited, which has not even been arrayed as a respondent in the present appeal. 2. We may also notice another aspect that the appellant has itself been a licensee under R-1 and R-2 in pursuance to a licence deed dated 16.06.2004 and 16.08.2004. Learned counsel for the appellant does not dispute that there is no termination of this licence agreement and even the licence charges were paid. It is, however, sought to be pleaded before us that the appellant later on came to know that the rights did not vest with R-1 and R-2 and therefore entered into an agreement with late Sh. Vijay Sippy on the basis that he was entitled to assign the rights. The said original defendant Nos. 2 and 3 to whom the rights were in turn assigned by the appellant have already had their defence struck off and the right to file the written statement closed. The following aspects, in our view, have rightly weighed with the learned single Judge in confirming the injunction order: i) The appellant really did not have any subsisting rights as he admittedly had assigned the rights in favour of original defendant Nos. 2 and 3 who in turn were not contesting the suit. ii) The appellant was claimed to have derived rights from Sh. Ajit Sippy against whom interim orders were passed in a separate proceeding on a suit instituted by R-1 and R-2 restraining Sh. Ajit Sippy from exercising any rights of copyright qua the film. 2 and 3 who in turn were not contesting the suit. ii) The appellant was claimed to have derived rights from Sh. Ajit Sippy against whom interim orders were passed in a separate proceeding on a suit instituted by R-1 and R-2 restraining Sh. Ajit Sippy from exercising any rights of copyright qua the film. This interim order was never vacated though the suit now stands disposed of maintaining the interim injunction. iii) The appellant itself had taken a licence from R-1 and R-2 which licence was never terminated and yet chose to enter into an agreement with Sh. Ajit Sippy through the currency of the licence agreement. 3. We are unimpressed by the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant that despite the aforesaid facts, R-1 and R-2 have not been able to establish the triple criteria for grant of interim injunction. Merely because R-1 and R-2 have claimed damages does not imply, as pleaded by learned counsel for the appellant, that there is no irretrievable injury or that damages would be the adequate compensation. 4. While exercising our appellate jurisdiction, we have to keep in mind the principles to examine such an interim order in appeal. In Wander Ltd. and Another Vs. Antox India P. Ltd., (1990) 2 ARBLR 399, it has been unequivocally held that the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. The aforesaid principles apply on all fours. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. The aforesaid principles apply on all fours. It is not as if the court would think of taking a different view in the facts of the case as the order passed by the learned single Judge would have been the very order to be passed even by this Court. It appears that the appellant is carrying on a proxy battle having assigned the rights in favour of original defendant Nos. 2 and 3. The appeal being completely devoid of merit is dismissed with costs of Rs. 10,000/-.