JUDGMENT Sujoy Paul, J. 1. By invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has called in question the legality, validity and propriety of the order (Annexure O/2) dated 14.10.2010 and the order of District Supply Officer dated 29.7.2011. By this order, by invoking M.P. Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2009 (hereinafter called as "2009 Order"), the allotment orders of petitioner's fair price shops situated in Wards No. 6, 8, 15 and 24 were cancelled. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of this matter are as under:- The petitioner is a registered society. The shops were allotted to the petitioner in different wards. At the relevant time, when allotment orders were issued regarding the shops in question, the Madhya Pradesh Public Distribution Scheme, 1991 (hereinafter called as "1991 Scheme") was in force. This is not in dispute between the parties that allotment orders of the shops were issued under 1991 Scheme. However, 1991 Scheme was repealed by State Government and in place of it, 2009 Order was introduced. The allotment of certain shops of the petitioner was cancelled by relying on Annexure-II under Clause 4 of 2009 Order. It reads as under:- (4) In the urban area, no co-operative society shall be allotted more than one fair price shop. The petitioner was served with a show cause notice dated 21.7.2011 on the strength of aforesaid rule. The petitioner submitted his reply on 28.8.2011 and contended that the shops in questions were allotted under 1991 Scheme and, therefore, as per new Order of 2009, the allotment of shops which was made in accordance with the 1991 Scheme cannot be cancelled. The petitioner took a specific stand in his reply that as per 2009 Order there exists "repeal and saving clause" because of which he has right to continue with those shops. This stand of the petitioner is reflected in the impugned order, Annexure P/1 (Para 3). The District Supply Officer did not agree with the contention on the ground that after commencement of 2009 Order, the petitioner has no right to continue with the earlier allotment made under the erstwhile Scheme of 1991. It is contended that as per the Commissioner (Food) Circular dated 30.4.2011, even if the society is running more than one shop as per the earlier Scheme, the shops beyond the number permissible as per 2009 Order needs to be cancelled. It is contended that as per the Commissioner (Food) Circular dated 30.4.2011, even if the society is running more than one shop as per the earlier Scheme, the shops beyond the number permissible as per 2009 Order needs to be cancelled. It is further opined that the shops were allotted to the petitioner in the year 1991 because at that point of time in the urban area proper number of registered cooperative societies were not available. Now, as per 2009 Order, the allotment can be made in favour of other societies. 2. The petitioner's bone of contention is based on Clause 15 of 2009 Order, whereas Shri R.P. Rathi, learned Government Advocate submits that there must be a harmonious reading of Clauses 15 and 4, quoted above. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant provisions. 4. It is apt to quote Clause 15 of 2009 Order, which reads as under:- 15. Repeal and Saving.- The Madhya Pradesh foodstuff (Distribution and Control) Order, 1960 and the Madhya Pradesh Khadyapadarth (Sarvajnik Nagrik Poorti Vitran) Scheme, 1991 are hereby repealed: Provided that the repeal shall not affect :- (a) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the order and scheme so repealed; (b) the previous operation or the order and scheme so repealed or consequences of anything already done or suffered thereunder. (Emphasis Supplied) 5. The contention of the petitioner is based on Clause 15, whereas the respondents have justified their action as per Clause 4 aforesaid. 6. A simple reading of Clause 15 makes it crystal clear that although 1991 Scheme is repealed, but by inserting a proviso it was made clear that repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, liability which is accrued or incurred under the Order or Scheme so repealed. Thus, there cannot be two opinions that a right and privilege accrued has been expressly saved while repealing the 1991 Scheme. 7. The basic test for the purpose of examining whether the repeal and saving clause comes for the rescue and protection of the claimant is whether the claimant has established that at the time of repeal he had any right. This view was taken in Chief Adjudication Officer v. Maguire (1999) 2 All ER 859 (CA). 7. The basic test for the purpose of examining whether the repeal and saving clause comes for the rescue and protection of the claimant is whether the claimant has established that at the time of repeal he had any right. This view was taken in Chief Adjudication Officer v. Maguire (1999) 2 All ER 859 (CA). In my opinion, once allotment orders have been issued and petitioner started functioning on the strength of those allotment orders, the right and privilege actually accrued in favour of the petitioner. In Hiralal v. Nagindas ( AIR 1966 SC 367 ) the Apex Court opined that a right conferred by an Act that every lease shall be deemed to be for a period of ten years, is a right acquired and will be unaffected by repeal of the Act. Thus, the intention of 2009 Order making authority is clear that it intended to save and protect a right which was there on the date of repeal. 8. Thus, the petitioner has a right to continue with the allotted shops which were admittedly allotted to him as per 1991 Scheme. Clause 4 of Annexure-II, in my opinion, is of no assistance to the respondents in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The said clause is an independent provision and gives power to the respondents for the purpose of allotment of shops in urban area. This power is prospective in nature. The language employed in the said rule makes it crystal clear that such power needs to be exercised on commencement of 2009 Order. This does not and cannot take away an accrued right which was expressly saved in Clause 15 aforesaid. There is no conflict between Clause 15 and Clause 4 aforesaid. Both operates in different situations and, therefore, there is no question of interpreting it in a harmonious manner, as suggested by learned Government Advocate. 9. Apart from this, the District Supply Officer has taken no pains to deal with the objection of the petitioner based on Clause 14 of 2009 Order, which provides saving of the earlier orders. No executive instructions issued by Food Commissioner can supersede the statutory provision of Clause 14 of 2009 Order. 10. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, in my opinion, the impugned order runs contrary to Clause 15 of 2009 Order and deserves to be set aside. No executive instructions issued by Food Commissioner can supersede the statutory provision of Clause 14 of 2009 Order. 10. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, in my opinion, the impugned order runs contrary to Clause 15 of 2009 Order and deserves to be set aside. Resultantly, the impugned orders, Annexure P/1 and P/2 are set aside. Petition is allowed. No costs.