Judgment : 1. All these appeals are filed under Section 10-F of the Companies Act against the interlocutory order of the Company Law Board (CLB), Northern Region Bench, New Delhi dated 10.04.2013 in CP 133(ND)/2012. 2. The company petition was filed by the first respondent herein under Sections 397, 398, 399 as well as 111 (A), 235, 402 and 403 of the Companies Act, 1956 (for short ‘the Act’) alleging oppression, mismanagement and acts and omissions in the management of second respondent company herein which is the holding company of the appellant companies. It was an admitted case in the said company petition that respondent Nos.4 and 5 therein are special purpose vehicles, which are under the management of the first respondent herein. The interlocutory order passed by CLB dated 10.04.2013, which is impugned herein, permitted the petitioner in the company petition to take audit of the first respondent therein as well as financial statements and accounts of respondent Nos.4 and 5 therein. Only operative order was passed on 10.04.2013 by CLB and detailed reasons in support of the said order are contained in the further order of CLB dated 10.05.2013.? Respondent No.4 in the company petition, thus, preferred CA.Nos.8 and 9 against both the said respective orders. Similarly, respondent No.5 in the company petition has preferred CA.Nos.10 and 11 against both the said respective orders.3. Though the appellants are different in these appeals, the orders impugned are common in all these appeals and the grievance of the appellants in CA.Nos.8 and 9 on the one hand and CA.Nos.10 and 11, on the other hand, is identical and common. All the appeals are, therefore, being disposed of by this common judgment.For the sake of convenience the parties herein are referred to as they are arrayed in the company petition before CLB. 4. The brief facts, which are pleaded in the company petition, are as under: (a) In April 2008, the Government of Karnataka, with a view to develop the Gulbarga and Shimoga Airports, as Green Field Airports, entered into a public and private partnership by executing development agreements with respondent Nos.4 and 5 (respective appellants herein). Respondents 4 and 5 were then under the management of respondent Nos.2 and 3 (who are respondent Nos.2 and 4 herein).? Respondents 4 and 5 were then under the management of respondent Nos.2 and 3 (who are respondent Nos.2 and 4 herein).? Since respondent No.3, through respondent No.2, was in need of required investments to execute the said development agreements approached the petitioner, which agreed to invest and participate in the projects and investment ratio was fixed between the petitioner and respondent No.2 in the proportion of 40:60.? Respondent No.1 company was, therefore, incorporated as a special purpose vehicle for making investment in respondent Nos.4 and 5.? Accordingly, respondent No.1 acquired shareholding to the tune of 22% each in respondent Nos.4 and 5. (b) In March 2010, the shareholders’ agreement was entered into between the petitioner, respondent No.2 and respondent No.1 whereunder the petitioner agreed to invest Rs.20 crores in equity to acquire 40% stake in respondent No.1 company. Similarly, respondent No.2 company was to make its investment of Rs.30 crores to acquire 60% of equity in respondent No.1 company. Accordingly, the petitioner contributed Rs.20 crores to its equity but the allotment of shares was not made to the petitioner, though the books of account of the respondent No.1 company acknowledge the payment by the petitioner towards Share Application Money. Petitioner, further, arranged and furnished necessary bank guarantees in favour of the Government of Karnataka for respondent Nos.4 and 5 and in turn secured several concessions and incentives from the Government of Karnataka for respondent Nos.4 and 5.? While it is stated that respondent No.4 has achieved financial closure, the financial closure of respondent No.5 is not yet achieved. (c) It was also an agreed arrangement that respondent No.3 being the Chairman of respondent No.1 would enjoy the managerial control of respondent Nos.4 and 5 companies as well. It is alleged that though the petitioner has invested about Rs.20 crores for acquiring shares of respondent No.1 and while it had given bank guarantees to the Government of Karnataka on behalf of respondent Nos.4 and 5 to a tune of Rs.9.69 crores and Rs.12.37 crores respectively, the financial dealings of respondent No.1 as well as respondent Nos.4 and 5, under management of respondent No.3 was, allegedly, wholly dissatisfactory.? Petitioner alleged that there was large scale siphoning of the funds by respondent No.3 by making huge payments to relatives and nominees resulting in erosion of availability of funds for development of projects undertaken by respondent Nos.4 and 5. Petitioner alleged that there was large scale siphoning of the funds by respondent No.3 by making huge payments to relatives and nominees resulting in erosion of availability of funds for development of projects undertaken by respondent Nos.4 and 5. It is, further, alleged that respondent No.1 demanded further funds from the petitioner to the tune of about Rs.15 crores in order to meet the development expenditure whereupon the petitioner requested respondent Nos.2 and 3 to explain the application of existing funds but the same was not furnished, ultimately, leading to the petitioner filing the aforesaid company petition before CLB to seek interim relief. CLB has granted interim relief on 10.04.2013, operative portion of the said order is as follows: “This Bench has passed an order on 10-4-2013 directing the respondent-1 to provide audit at the cost of the petitioner with an auditor of its choice, the petitioner is at liberty to take the audit of R-1 Company.? The Respondent- 1 to 3 shall allow audit to the petitioner within 10 days from the day the petitioner makes request. R-1 is further directed to provide inspection of the financial statements and accounts of R-4 and R-5, for the reason R-1 has been in the management of the affairs of R-4 & R-5.? The reasons will follow later.” As mentioned above, the reasons in support of the said order are contained in the further order of CLB dated 10.05.2013, which is produced along with CA.No.9 of 2013. Aggrieved by the said orders, these appeals are preferred by respondent Nos.4 and 5 respectively. 5. It may also be mentioned, at this stage, that the first respondent in the company petition was incorporated and registered with the Registrar of Companies, New Delhi. Hence, the aforesaid company petition was filed before the CLB, New Delhi. While so, the respondent Nos.4 and 5 are incorporated and registered with the Registrar of Companies, Hyderabad in the State of Andhra Pradesh. 6. Respondent No.1 in the company petition also appealed against the said impugned orders before the High Court of Delhi. During the hearing of this appeal, the parties have informed this Court that the said appeal has since been heard and dismissed and one of the contentions in these appeals is based upon the said judgment. Hence, a detailed reference to the said order would be made hereinafter at appropriate place. 7. In these appeals, Mr. During the hearing of this appeal, the parties have informed this Court that the said appeal has since been heard and dismissed and one of the contentions in these appeals is based upon the said judgment. Hence, a detailed reference to the said order would be made hereinafter at appropriate place. 7. In these appeals, Mr. S. Ravi, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants had raised the contentions, as detailed below, challenging the very jurisdiction of CLB in entertaining the company petition and passing the aforesaid interim order. Learned senior counsel points out that the admitted case of the petitioner before the CLB is that the petitioner is not a shareholder of the first respondent company. Thus, according to the learned senior counsel, the petitioner could not have maintained a petition under Section 397 and 398 of the Companies Act when it is not even a shareholder of the first respondent nor could have asked for an interim order, impugned herein.? Learned senior counsel submits that entertaining the company petition and passing of drastic interim order, impugned herein, at the instance of the petitioner, who holds no share in the first respondent company was wholly erroneous. Learned senior counsel, further, submits that so far as respondents 4 and 5 i.e. appellant herein are concerned, the allegation in the company petition does not show any right of the petitioner being enforceable against respondents 4 and 5.? Learned senior counsel submits that though respondents 4 and 5 are subsidiaries of the first respondent company, sub-section2 of Section 214 of the Act gives a limited right with regard to the inspection of accounts, as provided under Section 214(1) of the Act. Thus, the said right according to the learned senior counsel cannot extent beyond the limited permissibility under sub-section (2) of Section 214 of the Act.? The restricted portion of the said provision, therefore, does not authorize the petitioner to initiate any action to seek relief against respondents 4 and 5. 8. Learned senior counsel further contended that even under Section 235 of the Act investigation into the affairs of a company cane made by the Central Government and even if the CLB is satisfied on necessity to investigate the affairs, appropriate direction may at best be made to the Central Government in terms of Section 235(2) of the Act.? 8. Learned senior counsel further contended that even under Section 235 of the Act investigation into the affairs of a company cane made by the Central Government and even if the CLB is satisfied on necessity to investigate the affairs, appropriate direction may at best be made to the Central Government in terms of Section 235(2) of the Act.? Thus, according to the learned senior counsel, CLB could not have ordered for audit of respondents 4 and 5 to be taken out at the instance of the petitioner, that too at the interlocutory stage. 9. Learned senior counsel also points out that, admittedly, respondents 4 and 5 are registered with ROC, Hyderabad and as such, no proceedings could have been taken against respondents 4 and 5 before CLB at New Delhi, as the jurisdictional CLB is only the Southern Bench at Chennai. Learned senior counsel, therefore, justifies the maintainability of the present appeals in view of the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in STRIDEWELL LEATHERS (P) LTD. v. BHANKERPUR SIMBHAOLI BEVERAGES (P) LTD (1994) 1 SCC 34 )and contends that an appeal under Section 10-F of the Act can be preferred only to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the company is registered.? Learned senior counsel placed reliance upon a decision of the Madras High Court in AMALGAMATIONS LIMITED v. SHANKAR SUNDARAM (2011) 168 CompCas 68 (Mad)wherein the Division Bench considered the provisions of Section 214 (2) as well as 235 (2) of the Act with reference to control over holding company. For the sake of convenience, it is appropriate to extract paras 28 and 29 of the aforesaid decision, which are strongly relied upon by the learned senior counsel. “28. Section 235 of the Act contemplates seeking for investigation into the affairs of the company. Therefore, when a share holder is given a right under Section 214(2) of the Act, even to seek for investigation into the affairs of the subsidiary company under Section 235, it is deemed that this provision will entitle a share holder in the holding company to seek for a remedy under Section 235 of the Act, but the legislature did not thought it fit to give the same interpretation in so far as it relates to Section 397 and 398 of the Act. Therefore, an application under Section 397 and 398 of the Act cannot be filed by a share holder of a holding company even though he could be a holder of 10% share to seek remedy under Section 397 and 398 of the Act in so far as the holding company is concerned and not against the subsidiary company. S. No Remedial Provision of Companies Act Mandatory requirements of share holding 1 Section-235(2), Investigation of the affairs of the company Either 200 members or members holding not less than one-tenth (1/10th) of total voting power 2 Section 399(4), Right to apply under Section 397 & 398 Either 100 members of the company or members holding not less than one tenth (1/10th) of total members whichever is less (or) Members holding not less than one tenth (1/10th) of issued share capital. 29. Therefore, a reading of Section 214 and 235 of the Act will make it clear that if subsidiary companies are separately incorporated entities and having their own assets and liabilities, it would be wrong to construe the word 'affairs of the company' to mean and include the 'affairs of the subsidiary company' as well. As rightly pointed out by the Company Law Board, if an inspector is appointed under Section 235 or 237 of the Act, it is for him to decide whether investigation is necessary in respect of the subsidiary companies also and the Court cannot give any direction in this regard.” 10.? Mr. S. Niranjan Reddy, learned counsel, appearing for the first respondent in CA.Nos.8 and 9 of 2013 and Mr. D. Prakash Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing for the first respondent in CA.Nos.10 and 11 of 2013, on the contrary, have contended that the appeal against the order of CLB, New Delhi, ought to have been preferred before the High Court of Delhi and not before this Court. Learned counsel contended that though respondents 4 and 5 were registered with ROC, Hyderabad, they were arrayed in the company petition before CLB, New Delhi and notices were served and counsel appeared for both respondents 4 and 5 but have not raised any objection with regard to jurisdiction nor raised any other contention on merits. Therefore, it is not open for respondent Nos.4 and 5 to contend in this appeal or raise any question of jurisdiction of CLB, New Delhi. Therefore, it is not open for respondent Nos.4 and 5 to contend in this appeal or raise any question of jurisdiction of CLB, New Delhi. Consequently, therefore, the High Court of Delhi was the appropriate appellate forum and urged that these appeals ought to be dismissed, as the jurisdiction of this Court is affected on the principle of Forum Non-Conveniens. Learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of the Delhi High Court in STERLING AGRO INDUSTRIES LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA (AIR 2011 DELHI 174) ?(paras 32 and 33) and a decision of the Supreme Court in KUSUM INGOTS AND ALLOYS LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA (2004) 6 SCC 254 )(para 30). 11.? Learned counsel would also submit that even under Section 10-F of the Act, which is invoked for filing these appeals, are devoid of any question of law inasmuch as no issue was raised by respondents 4 and 5 before CLB, New Delhi. Consequently, in view of the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court in CIT v. SCINDIA STEAM NAVIGATION( AIR 1961 SC 1633 ) (para 31); COMMISSIONER OF GIFT TAX v. KUSUMBEN D. MAHADEVIA (1980) 2 SCC 238 ) ?(para 8) it is submitted that no question of law arises in these appeal for adjudication under Section 10-F of the Act. 12.? To the extent of maintainability of the company petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act is concerned, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the High Court of Allahabad in LIFE INSURANCE COPRPORATION OF ALLAHABAD v. HARI DAS MUNDHRA (1996) 36 CompCas 371 (All)and also relied upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court in BAJRANG PRASAD JALAN v. NAHABIR PRASAD JALAN (AIR 1999 CALCUTTA 156)and it is contended that the allegation of oppression and mismanagement is against the holding company. Hence, the claim is sustainable even against the subsidiary company. It is contended that though respondents 4 and 5 are trying to take advantage of the petitioner having not been allotted any shares of the first respondent company, the investment of Rs.20 crores by the petitioner in the first respondent company, as share application money, is not in dispute. Hence, the claim is sustainable even against the subsidiary company. It is contended that though respondents 4 and 5 are trying to take advantage of the petitioner having not been allotted any shares of the first respondent company, the investment of Rs.20 crores by the petitioner in the first respondent company, as share application money, is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner has given huge guarantees running into crores of rupees to the Government of Karnataka in favour of respondents 4 and 5 and has in turn acquired substantial concessions and benefits for respondents 4 and 5. It is also admitted that the petitioner’s nominee was on the board of the first respondent company, which clearly establishes that the petitioner had necessary capacity to maintain action for mismanagement and oppression against the first respondent and consequently, against it’s subsidiary companies i.e. respondents 4 and 5.? Learned counsel would also submit that the holding company can always direct inspection of accounts and records of subsidiary company and the said power is now exercised by CLB.? The objection of the learned senior counsel for the appellants that the impugned order is contrary to the provisions of Section 235 is answered by contending that the impugned order merely directs inspection of books of account of respondents 4 and 5 and no investigation, as contemplated under Section 235 is ordered and since the audit of the holding company was directed, as a consequence thereof, the subsidiary companies i.e. respondents 4 and 5 were also directed to provide inspection of their books. 13.? In addition to the contentions, as above, learned counsel would also urge that the dismissal of the first respondent’s appeal against the same impugned order by the Delhi High Court, being CO.A(SB) 30/2013 and Co.Appl.1051/2013 dated 30.09.2012, clearly affects the maintainability of these appeals on the principle of res judicata. Strong reliance is placed upon a decision of the Supreme Court in FERRO ALLOYS CORPN. LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA (1994) 4 SCC 149 )wherein it is held that the principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata also operate between respondents inter se. 14.? In the light of these rival contentions, the following points emerge for consideration: 1. On the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in FERRO ALLOYS CORPN. LTD.’s case (9 supra) whether the appellants can maintain these appeals? 2. 14.? In the light of these rival contentions, the following points emerge for consideration: 1. On the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in FERRO ALLOYS CORPN. LTD.’s case (9 supra) whether the appellants can maintain these appeals? 2. Whether these appeals are maintainable under Section 10-F of the Companies Act, in view of the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in SCINDIA STEAM NAVIGATION’s case (5 supra) and KUSUMBEN D. MAHADEVIA’s case (6 supra). 1. Whether the petitioner in the company petition can maintain company petition against the holding company, first respondent, as well as the subsidiary companies i.e. respondents 4 and 5, though no shares are allotted to the petitioner company. 2. Whether these appeals are maintainable before this Court against the orders of the Company Law Board, New Delhi Bench? POINT No.1: 15.? In the company petition before the CLB, New Delhi, the respondents 4 and 5 (respective appellants herein), though were impleaded and were represented by the respective counsel, no counter appears to have filed on their behalf nor any contention is raised on jurisdictional or other issues. The contest appears to be only by the first respondent. It is also admitted that in both the special purpose vehicles i.e. respondents 4 and 5, the first respondent had 22% shareholding and the first respondent was in the effective managerial control of respondents 4 and 5. Respondent No.3 and his group, who had majority shareholding in the first respondent, therefore, completely and effectively controlled respondents 4 and 5. After CLB passed orders dated 10.04.2013 and 10.05.2013, the first respondent appealed before the Delhi High Court and respondents 4 and 5 in the company petition (who are respective appellants herein) were also impleaded as respondents 2 and 3 before the Delhi High Court. The order passed by the Delhi High Court dated 30.09.2013 upheld the impugned orders of the CLB and dismissed the appeals. 16.? Respondents 4 and 5 i.e. appellants herein do not seem to have appeared and participated in the said appeal. The order of the Delhi High Court dismissing the said appeals and upholding the orders impugned passed by CLB, therefore, binds on all the respondents before the Delhi High Court, which includes the appellants herein. The Supreme Court in FERRO ALLOYS CORPN. LTD.’s case (9 supra) held in para 28 as under: 28. The order of the Delhi High Court dismissing the said appeals and upholding the orders impugned passed by CLB, therefore, binds on all the respondents before the Delhi High Court, which includes the appellants herein. The Supreme Court in FERRO ALLOYS CORPN. LTD.’s case (9 supra) held in para 28 as under: 28. It is no doubt true that principle of constructive res judicata can be invoked even inter se Respondents, but it is well settled that before any plea by contesting Respondents could be said to be barred by constructive res judicata in future proceedings inter se such contesting Respondents, it must be shown that such a plea was required to be raised by the contesting Respondents to meet the claim of the appellant in such proceedings. If such a plea is not required to be raised by the contesting Respondents with a view to successfully meet the case of the appellant, then such a plea inter se contesting Respondents would remain in the domain of an independent proceedings giving an entirely different cause of action inter se the contesting Respondents with which the appellants would not be concerned. Such pleas based on independent causes of action inter se Respondents cannot be said to be barred by constructive res judicata in the earlier proceedings where the lis is between the appellants on the one hand and all the contesting Respondents on the other. In other words, when the appellants are not concerned with the inter se disputes between the contesting Respondents such inter se disputes amongst Respondents would not give rise to a situation wherein it can be said that such contesting Respondents might and ought to have raised such a ground of defence or attack for decision of the Court. In this connection, it would be profitable to refer to a decision of this Court in the case of Iftikhar Ahmed and Ors. v. Syed Meharban Ali? [1974] 2 SCC 151, dealing with the principle of res judicata which obviously would include also the question of constructive res judicata between the co-defendants. K.K. Mathew J., speaking for the Court in that case made the following pertinent observations: “13. v. Syed Meharban Ali? [1974] 2 SCC 151, dealing with the principle of res judicata which obviously would include also the question of constructive res judicata between the co-defendants. K.K. Mathew J., speaking for the Court in that case made the following pertinent observations: “13. Now it is settled by a large number of decisions that for a judgment to operate as res judicata between or among co-defendants, it is necessary to establish that (1) there was a conflict of interest between co-defendants (2) that it was necessary to decide the conflict in order to give the relief which the plaintiff claimed in the suit and (3) that the Court actually decided the question.” 14. In Chandu Lal Agarwalla v. Khalilur Rahaman [AIR 1950 PC 17], Lord Simonds said: ‘It may be added that the doctrine may apply even though the party, against whom it is sought to enforce it, did not in the previous suit think fit to enter an appearance and contest the question. But to this the qualification must be added that, if such a party is to be bound by a previous judgment, it must be proved clearly that he had or must be deemed to have had notice that the relevant question was in issue and would have to be decided.’ 15. We see no reason why a previous decision should not operate as res judicata between co-plaintiffs if all these conditions are mutatis mutandis satisfied. In considering any question of res judicata we have to bear in mind the statement of the Board in Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan Prasad Narayan Singh [AIR 1916 PC 78] that the rule of res judicata while founded on ancient precedent is dictated by a wisdom which is for all time' and that the application of the rule by the Courts 'should be influenced by no technical considerations of form, but by matter of substance within the limits allowed by law. ‘The raison d'etre of the rule is to confer finality on decisions arrived at by competent Courts between interested parties after genuine contest: and to allow persons who had deliberately chosen a position to reprobate it and to blow hot now when they were blowing cold before would be completely to ignore the whole foundation of the rule.’ (see Ram Bhaj v. Ahmed Said Akhtar Khan AIR (1938) Lah 571). The aforesaid principle would squarely get attracted while considering the question of constructive res judicata between the appellant on the one hand and the contesting Respondents on the other who were all co-Respondents before this Court in TISCO and IDCOL's appeals. Considering the basic requirements of the principle of constructive res judicata amongst co-Respondents in TISCO and IDCOL's appeals, it has to be found out whether inter se those co-respondents the question of correct assessments of present appellant's need for chrome ore was necessary to be agitated by the present appellant for enabling the Court to give appropriate relief to TISCO and IDCOL in their appeals before this Court. It becomes absolutely clear on the facts of the present case that the grievance of the appellant in the present proceedings regarding the alleged error in the assessment of its requirement for chrome ore and the question whether such assessment was required to be revised upwards, which may be relevant for deciding the appellant's independent claim against the Central Government as well as the State of Orissa and also vis-a-vis other contesting claimants being three other Respondents had nothing to do with the question of granting relief to the appellants TISCO and IDCOL in the said earlier proceedings. As this important condition was not satisfied for attracting the bar of constructive res judicata against the appellant, it is not possible to agree with the contention of learned Counsel for the Respondents that the appellant's grievance in the present proceedings was also barred on the ground of constructive res judicata, in the light of the earlier decision of this Court in TISCO's case [ (1996) 9 SCC 709 ]. 17.? The aforesaid decision, in my view, would squarely apply in the present case, as the impugned orders, having been upheld by the Delhi High Court and which binds the appellants herein in the appeals, against the same impugned orders the appellants cannot seek to upset the same impugned orders. Obviously, if these appeals are to be entertained and allowed on merits that would directly result in two contradictory judgments i.e. one upholding the impugned orders and the other upsetting the same and both the said orders would be binding on the appellants. This is precisely the principle under res judicata and constructive res judicata so as to avoid conflict of decisions. This is precisely the principle under res judicata and constructive res judicata so as to avoid conflict of decisions. In my view, therefore, point No.1 deserves to be answered against the appellants and is accordingly answered against the appellants. POINT No.2: 18.? The maintainability of appeals under Section 10-F of the Act is clearly a question of law, as a corollary, as such, the question must arise for consideration in appeal on the basis of the order impugned. As mentioned in the earlier paragraph, even the appellants, who are respondents 4 and 5 in the company petition, did not participate in the proceedings before CLB nor have raised any contention. The Supreme Court in SCINDIA STEAM NAVIGATION’s case (5 supra) and KUSUMBEN D. MAHADEVIA’s case (6 supra) has held that ‘a question of law can be said to arise out of the order of the Tribunal only if it is dealt with by the Tribunal or is raised before though not decided by the Tribunal and a question of law not raised before the Tribunal and not dealt with by it in its order cannot be said to arise out of its order, even if on the facts of the case stated in the order the question fairly arises … There was no argument addressed to the Tribunal that the breakup method should be adopted because that was the primary method prescribed by Rule 10 Sub-rule (2) and the Tribunal had, therefore, no occasion to deal with such argument.This question obviously, therefore, does not arise out of the orders of the Tribunal and it cannot be required to be referred to the High Court. Applying the ratio of the said decision, in the absence of respondents 4 and 5 raising any contention for adjudication before CLB, it cannot be said that any question of law arises for consideration in these appeals at their instance, though the argument of the learned senior counsel raises the questions. Point No.2 is answered against the appellants. POINT No.3: 19.? The undisputed facts noted above clearly show that Rs.20 crores of share application money of the petitioner is already in the books of the first respondent company.? In addition to that, the petitioner has given bank guarantees to the tune of Rs.9.69 crores in respect of respondent No.4 and Rs.12.3 crores in respect of respondent No.5 to the Government of Karnataka. In addition to that, the petitioner has given bank guarantees to the tune of Rs.9.69 crores in respect of respondent No.4 and Rs.12.3 crores in respect of respondent No.5 to the Government of Karnataka. The participation of the petitioner in board of the first respondent also is not disputed. Hence, as held by CLB and upheld by the Delhi High Court, it cannot be said that the petitioner has no locus to maintain the company petition.? Thus, as the petitioner is already treated as a shareholder and a member of the board of the first respondent company, it cannot be said that the petitioner cannot maintain the company petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act.? Apart from that, factually as well, the present petition is not only under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act but also under Sections 111(A), 235, 399, 402 and 403 of the Companies Act.? On the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to maintain the company petition. Point No.3 is accordingly answered against the appellants. POINT No.4: 20.? There is no controversy that respondents 4 and 5, appellants herein, are registered within the jurisdiction of this Court.? Consequently, as held by the Supreme Court in STRIDEWELL LEATHERS (P) LTD.’s case (1 supra), this Court has the jurisdiction for the purpose of appeal under Section 10-F of the Act. For the sake of convenience, para 18 of the said decision is extracted hereunder: “18. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the expression "the High Court" in Section 10F of the Companies Act means the High Court having jurisdiction in relation to the place at which the registered office of the company concerned is situate as indicated by Section 2(11) read with Section 10(1)(a) of the Act. Accordingly, in the present case, the appeal against the order of the Company Law Board would lie in the Madras High Court which has jurisdiction in relation to the place at which the registered office of the company concerned is situate and not the Delhi High Court merely because the order was made by the Company Law Board at Delhi. This appeal is allowed and the impugned order made by the Delhi High Court is set aside resulting in acceptance of the preliminary objection raised by the appellants in the Delhi High Court. This appeal is allowed and the impugned order made by the Delhi High Court is set aside resulting in acceptance of the preliminary objection raised by the appellants in the Delhi High Court. The Delhi High Court will now make the consequential order. No costs.” 21.? Since this Court is the jurisdictional High Court for presentation of appeal under Section 10-F of the Act, these appeals cannot be rejected on the principle of Forum Non-Conveniens. Point No.4 is accordingly answered in favour of the appellants. In view of the answers to the points, particularly, point No.1, as above, the company appeals are accordingly dismissed. As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand disposed of as infructuous. There shall be no order as to costs.