Research › Search › Judgment

Karnataka High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 1090 (KAR)

Mulchand v. State Through The Market Police Station

2013-09-12

ANAND BYRAREDDY

body2013
JUDGMENT Anand Byrareddy, J. 1. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor. The appellant was the accused, in the following circumstances: That on 7-6-2005 at about 10.00 a.m., the Police Inspector, Market Police Station, Belgaum, received credible information that a person aged about 55 was carrying counterfeit notes from Hubli to Mumbai via Belgaum through bus. On receiving such information, the Inspector had secured two panchas in the police station and proceeded to the Central Bus Stand, Belgaum which is immediately opposite to the Market Police Station, and kept watch at the bus stand. He noticed that there was a black colour rexine bag which was kept by the side of the Row of seats. The bus going towards Kolhapur and Bombay had stopped at Platform No. 2 of the bus stand. Since the Inspector had also received information about the manner in which the suspect was dressed, he immediately spotted him and apprehended him. On searching the black rexine bag, there was another red colour small rexine bag, some cloths, Pan Card, Driving Licence of the accused. When the red bag was opened, 452 notes of Rs. 100/- denomination was found. The Inspector compared those notes with genuine notes and immediately noticed the difference in colour, quality of paper, absence of the water mark, etc. The Inspector secured the currency checking machine from Pai Hotel nearby and examined the currency notes found with the accused and with the aid of the said machine, found that all the 452 currency notes were fake. Thereafter, he immediately arrested the accused and seized the currency notes and other articles found in his possession under a panchanama and thereafter, took him to the police station along with the seized articles. His photograph was taken along with the fake currency notes and he prepared a suo motu complaint and on the basis of that, registered a case against the accused for offences punishable under Sections 489-A, 489-B and 489-C of Indian Penal Code, 1860, submitted the same to the Jurisdictional Court. The appellant was remanded to judicial custody. The statement of his staff were recorded and the seized currency notes were sent to the Treasurer, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore, for further examination, which were examined and which were reported that the same were fake. The appellant was remanded to judicial custody. The statement of his staff were recorded and the seized currency notes were sent to the Treasurer, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore, for further examination, which were examined and which were reported that the same were fake. On 8-6-2005, the statements of other witnesses were recorded and a charge-sheet was filed. The Magistrate thereafter committed the matter to the Court of Sessions Judge for trial. The Sessions Court registered the case as Sessions Case No. 237 of 2005 and on perusal of the record and after hearing the statements of the Public Prosecutor and the Counsel for the accused, the Sessions Court framed charges. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution tendered evidence through Exs. P.W. 1 to P.W. 10 and marked Exhibits P. 1 to P. 11(a) and M.Os. 1 to 11 and after hearing the parties and recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to 'Cr.P.C.' for brevity), and after hearing the parties at length, the Court below framed the following points for consideration: 1. Whether the prosecution has proved beyond all reasonable doubt that, on 7-6-2005 at 10.30 a.m., at KSRTC Bus Stand, Belgaum, the accused was found trafficking in or using as genuine 452 counterfeit currency notes of Rs. 100/- denomination, knowing or having reason to believe the same to be counterfeit notes? 2. Whether the prosecution has proved beyond all reasonable doubts that, the accused was found in possession of 452 counterfeit currency notes of Rs. 100/- denomination knowing or having reason to believe the same to be counterfeit and intending to use the same as genuine or that it may be used as genuine? The Court below answered Point No. 1 in the negative and Point No. 2 in the affirmative and acquitted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 489-B and convicted him under Section 489-C, and sentenced him to imprisonment for three years and imposed a fine of Rs. 20,000/-. It is that which is under challenge in the present appeal. 2. The learned Counsel for the appellant takes this Court through the record at length and would urge that the findings and conclusions drawn in convicting the accused are erroneous and opposed to oral and documentary evidence. 20,000/-. It is that which is under challenge in the present appeal. 2. The learned Counsel for the appellant takes this Court through the record at length and would urge that the findings and conclusions drawn in convicting the accused are erroneous and opposed to oral and documentary evidence. The Court below having found that there was no substance in the charges insofar as the offences punishable under Section 489-B of IPC is concerned, the same reasoning ought to have extended insofar as the charges pertaining to the offence punishable under Section 489-C. But however, the Court below has chosen to seemingly segregate the evidence in respect of these two offences and therefore, there is no rationale in the reasoning of the Court below. The Court below has proceeded to rely on the evidence of the raiding party, namely P.W. 3, who was a Head Constable, P.W. 8 who was the complainant, who has also acted as the Investigating Officer in the case and P.W. 10 who was a Police Constable and accepting the depositions of these three witnesses, has convicted the accused. There is no other independent evidence to corroborate the same. As such, the appellant has clearly been falsely implicated and the evidence has been direct, merely to implicate and persecute the appellant. P.Ws. 3 and 10 who are susceptible to suggestion by the complainant who is their superior, have merely parroted the evidence that was tendered and there is hence no substance in the case of the prosecution. In this regard, the learned Counsel would take this Court through the testimony of the said witnesses and would also seek to point out inconsistencies in the evidence of the said witnesses. In that, whereas one witness has stated that the rexine bag which was seized in which the currency notes were found, was said to be kept on the seat at the bus stand, whereas the other witness has stated that the accused was holding the same. This inconsistency is not explained and therefore, the veracity of the testimony is doubtful. It is also pointed out that P.W. 8, the Police Inspector, could not also act as the Investigating Officer. In this regard, the law is well-settled that, any such circumstance would totally vitiate the proceedings. This inconsistency is not explained and therefore, the veracity of the testimony is doubtful. It is also pointed out that P.W. 8, the Police Inspector, could not also act as the Investigating Officer. In this regard, the law is well-settled that, any such circumstance would totally vitiate the proceedings. The first principle of criminal jurisprudence requires that there is impartial inquiry and if the complainant himself acts as the Investigating Officer, it is bound to be biased and leads to a miscarriage of justice. There is no denial of this circumstance in the present case on hand. The complainant himself has investigated the case and a charge-sheet has been filed. Therefore, the proceedings would be vitiated on that ground alone. It is further contended that the finding of the Court below to the effect that the appellant had admitted the seizure of the articles, namely M.Os. 7 to 11 form his possession by P.W. 8 and not the fake currencies. The finding of the Court below that the offending currency notes were seized from the appellant, was admitted, is an incorrect conclusion, since what was admitted by the appellant was seizure of M.Os. 7 to 11 from his possession by P.W. 8 and not the fake currency and in his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the appellant had asserted that M.Os. 1 to 6, namely the counterfeit notes, were not seized from his possession and the police had forcibly taken his photographs after forcibly thrusting those fake notes in his hand. As such, it was incumbent on the prosecution to prove that not only that the appellant was in possession of the currency notes, but that he knew or had reason to believe that the same were counterfeit and he intended to use the same as genuine or that he had knowledge that it may be used as genuine. In this regard, he would place reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in State by Upparpet Police Station v. Sampangi and Others 2004 (2) KCCR 920, wherein this Court, in identical circumstance, has held that mere possession of counterfeit currency notes by itself, would not bring home the guilt of the accused. Possession could be of two kinds, namely 'innocent possession' and guilty possession', and it was incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the possession of the accused was 'guilty possession'. Possession could be of two kinds, namely 'innocent possession' and guilty possession', and it was incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the possession of the accused was 'guilty possession'. Having regard to the fact that such 'guilty possession' was not proved, it cannot be said that mere possession amounted to an offence punishable under Section 489-C. The learned Counsel would further contend that the finding of the Court below as to the case of the prosecution being supported by independent panch witnesses, is not tenable, as the panchas and the hotel owners have not supported the case of the prosecution. On the other hand, they have stated that no seizure was conducted in their presence and nothing has been seized from the possession of the accused, in their presence. But, that they were asked to put their signatures on the panchanama and they did so to oblige the police. Inspite of this clear and unequivocal admission on their part, and no other prosecution witnesses, the Trial Court has proceeded to convict the appellant, which is a travesty of justice. It is further contended that it is indeed strange that the seizure having taken place in a public place, there are no independent witnesses who are cited by the prosecution when there were innumerable people available at the place where the seizure had taken place and this is a significant circumstance which the Trial Court has overlooked. Hence, except the evidence of P.Ws. 3, 8 and 10, there is no other independent witness to support the case of the prosecution. The Court below, while taking note of the fact that the Serial numbers of the seized counterfeit currency notes and the serial numbers of the notes that were sent for inspection to the Reserve Bank of India, did not tally, has glossed over, holding that there may have been a typographical error in the numbers being mentioned and that it was not a matter of much significance. Whereas, the prosecution was relying on the very report to establish that the notes in question were counterfeit notes and in the face of such discrepancy, it could not be said that the prosecution has established its case beyond all reasonable doubt. Whereas, the prosecution was relying on the very report to establish that the notes in question were counterfeit notes and in the face of such discrepancy, it could not be said that the prosecution has established its case beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, the learned Counsel would submit that when there was inconsistency in the evidence of the panch witnesses and the evidence of the seizure having taken place, it could not be said that the seizure was proved to the satisfaction of the Court. In this regard, he would place reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Megha Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 1995 SC 2339 : (1996) 11 SCC 709 : 1997 SCC (Cri.) 267 : 1995 Cri. L.J. 3988 (SC), and would submit that, in view of all these infirmities which the Trial Court has overlooked and as the judgment of the Court below is bad in law, the same be set aside and the appellant acquitted. 3. While on the other hand, the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor would seek to justify the conviction. The primary contention that the case of the prosecution rests on the evidence of P.Ws. 3, 8 and 10 and that it is not supported by the panch witnesses, by itself would not render the prosecution case a nullity. For the proposition that since the evidence of the prosecution is not supported by the panch witnesses, the prosecution should fail, the learned Counsel for the appellant has not produced any authority. It is sufficient if the Court has been satisfied by the veracity of the witnesses of the prosecution. There is no allegation of mala fides or want of bona fides insofar as the investigation and the complaint is concerned, except the self-serving allegations raised as grounds in the present appeal. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the Trial Court having accepted the veracity of the witnesses in holding that the prosecution had established its case beyond all reasonable doubt. Insofar as the further contention that the Police Inspector having lodged the complaint and also having investigated the case, in that, the recoveries were made by the very Police Inspector and he had thereafter lodged the suo motu complaint against the appellant and therefore, the proceedings would stand vitiated on account of the same, is not tenable and this aspect is no longer res integra. In support of this, he would draw attention to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of S. Jeevanantham v. State through Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu AIR 2004 SC 4608 : (2004) 5 SCC 230 : 2004 SCC (Cri.) 1584 : 2004 Cri. L.J. 3834 (SC). Further, the so-called inconsistencies sought to be pointed out as between the evidence of P.W. 3 and P.W. 8, who have spoken to the seizure of the rexine bags from the possession of the appellant is concerned, more different in the testimony that the accused appellant was holding the bag as stated by one witness and that it was kept by the seat beside him, by itself would not be such an inconsistency as would require the Court to discard the testimony. It is quite possible that the appellant was holding the bag at one moment and had put it down on the seat next to him on the other. This by itself, would not be a serious discrepancy which would indicate a false testimony. Both witnesses could have stated the true circumstance and that by itself would not vitiate the proceedings. Insofar as the contention that the counterfeit currency notes were thrust on the appellant and then photographed, is a self-serving statement. There is no allegation of mala fides or any personal vendetta carried out by the prosecution against the appellant in the absence of which, merely claiming that the appellant has been falsely implicated in the case not at the instance of any private complaint but Police Officers who were carrying out their duty, cannot be readily accepted, in the absence of cogent evidence in this regard. Insofar as the report received from the Reserve Bank of India as to the notes in question being counterfeit notes, the prosecution has examined the Officer of the Reserve Bank of India who has spoken to the report and insofar as the discrepancy in the serial numbers, pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant, the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor would point out that, as rightly held by the Court below, there was apparently typographical error which need not result in the proceedings being nullified on that account. This discrepancy may be classified as a doubt, but not a reasonable doubt. This discrepancy may be classified as a doubt, but not a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it cannot be said that the prosecution had not established its case beyond all reasonable doubt and hence, seeks to justify the conviction. On a consideration of the rival contentions vis-a-vis the material on record and the reasoning of the Court below, the points canvassed before this Court as to there being insufficient evidence and that the evidence of P.Ws. 3, 8 and 10 alone being in support of the prosecution case and therefore, it ought to be rejected, is not a contention that can be accepted. There is no ground to disbelieve the evidence of those witnesses. They are official witnesses and it is not shown that they carried any personal grudge or animosity in order to implicate the appellant who was not even a resident of Belgaum, as admitted by him. Therefore, the possible contact between the police and the appellant is totally absent and therefore, the allegations in the complaint cannot be negated. Insofar as the primary ground urged that the complainant could not also act as the Investigating Officer and that the proceedings would stand vitiated on that account, is answered by the Apex Court with reference to a decision which did support the proposition as reported. In the case of S. Jeevanantham, the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the appellants in those appeals were guilty of offences under Section 8(c) read with Section 20(b)(ii) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 'the NDPS Act', for brevity). The Sub-Inspector involved, had got information that narcotic drugs were being sold at some places and he recorded information and sent the same to the superior officer and he, along with P.W. 8, went to the place and searched the appellants and on such search, each one of them was found to possess hashish' of one kilogram each. On the basis of the information furnished by them, the police had also taken further action and found further narcotic drugs. The appellants were found guilty by the Special Judge and an appeal was filed. The High Court dismissed the two appeals and there were appeals by way of special leave. It was contended that the complainant had himself conducted the investigation in the case and therefore, it was illegal and the entire investigation was vitiated. The appellants were found guilty by the Special Judge and an appeal was filed. The High Court dismissed the two appeals and there were appeals by way of special leave. It was contended that the complainant had himself conducted the investigation in the case and therefore, it was illegal and the entire investigation was vitiated. Reliance was placed on Megha Singh's case, which is the very judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant in the present case on hand, wherein the Apex Court had observed that the Constable who was the de facto complainant, had himself investigated the case and this affected the impartial investigation. The Apex Court had then held that the Head Constable who arrested the accused conducted the search and recovered the pistol and on his complaint, F.I.R. was lodged and case was registered and he himself recorded the statement of the witnesses, as part of the investigation and such practice may not be resorted to, as it would affect the fair and impartial investigation. That decision was later referred to by the Apex Court in the case of State v. V. Jayapaul (2004) 5 SCC 223 : 2004 (3) Scale 507 , wherein it was observed thus: We find no principle or binding authority to hold that the moment the Competent Police Officer, on the basis of information received, makes out an FIR incorporation his name as the informant, he forfeits his right to investigate. If at all, such investigation could only be assailed on the ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the part of the Investigating Officer. The question of bias would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and it is not proper to lay down a broad and unqualified proposition in the manner in which it has been done. Therefore, the Apex Court in S. Jeevanantham's case held that, P.W. 8 having conducted the search and recovered contraband articles and having registered the case and the article seized from the appellant being narcotic drug, and the Counsel for the appellant could not point out any circumstances by which the investigation caused prejudice or was biased as against the appellant. P.W. 8 had in his official capacity, given the information, registered the case as part of his official duty and later, investigated the case and filed charge-sheet. P.W. 8 had in his official capacity, given the information, registered the case as part of his official duty and later, investigated the case and filed charge-sheet. He was not in any way personally interested in the case and therefore, the Court held that it was unable to find any sort of bias in the process of investigation. A similar reasoning can be assigned in the present case on hand. Therefore, there is no infirmity, which would vitiate the proceedings by virtue of the Police Inspector himself having lodged the complaint and having investigated the case. The reasoning in cases of V. Jayapaul and S. Jeevanantham would squarely apply to the facts of this case. Therefore, the contention cannot be accepted. Insofar as the further contention that though even if the appellant was in possession of the counterfeit notes, it could not be said that it was 'guilty possession', as stated in the case of Sampangi is concerned, the Division Bench of this Court, seeking to make out a distinction between 'innocent possession' and 'guilty possession', is not contemplated under Section 489. The observations and the findings therein would be authority for the said judgment, in the facts and circumstances of that case and cannot be made a broad rule that shall apply in all given cases. In the present case on hand, the possession of the counterfeit notes is established beyond all reasonable doubt and therefore, going by the letter of Section 489-C, it cannot be said that the prosecution has made out a case beyond all reasonable doubt insofar as the offences punishable under the said section. Hence, the appellant cannot draw any sustenance from the observations of the Division Bench in Sampangi's case. Hence, in view of this Court being of the opinion that the findings and reasoning of the Court below cannot be faulted, the appeal lacks merit and is accordingly, dismissed.