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2013 DIGILAW 1091 (RAJ)

Bhojraj v. Jagdish Prasad Ojha

2013-05-27

P.K.LOHRA

body2013
JUDGMENT : P.K. Lohra, J. Imploring annulment of the impugned order dated 26th July 2012 (Annex.6) passed by the learned District Judge, Bikaner (for short, 'the learned trial Court'), whereby the learned trial Court allowed the application of the respondent-plaintiff under Order 7 Rule 14 read with Section 151 CPC, the petitioner-defendant has laid the instant writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. Precisely stated the facts of the case are that the first respondent-plaintiff instituted a civil suit before the learned trial Court for eviction from the shop, which was let out to the petitioner and for arrears of rent. The civil suit was contested by the petitioner-defendant and written statement was filed denying the allegations contained in the plaint. After framing of the issues, the evidence of respondent-plaintiff commenced and statements of respondent-plaintiff, Jagdish Prasad were recorded. After conclusion of the evidence of the respondent-plaintiff, the petitioner-defendant himself appeared in the witness box as D.W.1. During his cross-examination, when the counsel for the respondent-plaintiff made endeavour to confront the petitioner with certain documents, which were certified copies of a petition laid by the petitioner under Section 19A and Section 12 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, the counsel for the petitioner-defendant objected. To meet the said objection of the petitioner-defendant, the respondent-plaintiff made endeavour to place on record the certified copies of those documents and with that intent an application under Order 7 Rule 14 CPC was submitted on his behalf before the learned trial Court. The learned trial Court after hearing the rival parties, by the impugned order allowed the application of the respondent-plaintiff and has taken on record the certified copies of the documents on payment of cost of Rs. 200/-. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. B.M. Agarwal, and perused the impugned order. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the documents on the basis of which the respondent-plaintiff wanted to cross-examine the petitioner defendant were not on record and as such being not part of the record, it was not desirable from the learned Court below to permit the respondent-plaintiff to place on record these documents. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the documents on the basis of which the respondent-plaintiff wanted to cross-examine the petitioner defendant were not on record and as such being not part of the record, it was not desirable from the learned Court below to permit the respondent-plaintiff to place on record these documents. By placing reliance on Rule 14 Order 7 CPC, the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that when the plaintiff relies on certain documents in his power and possession in support of his claim such documents are to be listed and are required to be produced along with the plaint at the time of laying of the suit. Thus, taking shelter of Order 7 Rule 14 CPC, the learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously argued that by granting indulgence to the respondent-plaintiff on his application under Order 7 Rule 14 CPC and permitting the documents to be taken on record, the learned Court below has committed jurisdictional error and as such the order impugned suffers from the vice of an error apparent on the face of record. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of Waryam Singh & Anr. v. Amarnath & anr. - AIR 1954 SC 215 . The Apex Court while examining the nature of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has made following observations in para 13 of the verdict:- 13. Re.2- The material part of Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 except that the power of superintendence has been extended by the Article also to Tribunals. That the Rent Controller and the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under the Act are Tribunals cannot and has not been controverted. The only question raised is as to the nature of the power of superintendence conferred by the Article. Reference is made to clause (2) of the Article in support of the contention that this Article only confers on the High Court administrative superintendence over the Subordinate Courts and Tribunals. We are unable to accept this contention because clause (2) is expressed to be without prejudice to the generality of the provisions in clause (1). Reference is made to clause (2) of the Article in support of the contention that this Article only confers on the High Court administrative superintendence over the Subordinate Courts and Tribunals. We are unable to accept this contention because clause (2) is expressed to be without prejudice to the generality of the provisions in clause (1). Further, the preponderance of judicial opinion in India was that section 107 which was similar in terms of section 15 of the High Courts Act, 1861, gave a power of judicial superintendence to the High Court apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisional jurisdiction on the High Court. In this connection it has to be remembered that section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 was reproduced in the Government of India Act, 1935 as section 224. Section 224 of the 1935 Act, however, introduced subsection 2. , which was new, providing that nothing in the section should be construed as giving the High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior Court which was not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. The idea presumably was to nullify the effect of the decisions of the different High Courts referred to above. Section 224 of the 1935 Act has been reproduced with certain modifications in Article 227 of the Constitution. It is significant to note that subsection 2. to section 224 of the 1935 Act has been omitted from Article 227. This significant omission has been regarded by all High Courts in India before whom this question has arisen as having restored to the High Court the power of judicial superintendence it had under section 15 of the High Courts Act, 1861 and section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915. See the cases referred to in - 'Moti Lal v. The State', AIR 1952 All 963 at p. 966 (A). Our attention has not been drawn to any case which has taken a different view and, as at present advised, we see no reason to take a different view. 5. For appreciating the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the purport of Order 7 Rule 14 CPC deserves due credence. The complete text of Order 7 Rule 14 is reproduced as infra :- 14. 5. For appreciating the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the purport of Order 7 Rule 14 CPC deserves due credence. The complete text of Order 7 Rule 14 is reproduced as infra :- 14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies.- (1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint. 2. Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is. [(3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.] 4. Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross examination of the plaintiff's witnesses, or, handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.] 6. Upon examining the impugned order on the anvil of purposeful meaning and interpretation of Order 7 Rule 14 CPC, it is crystal clear that by virtue of sub-rule (3) of Rule 14 Order 7 CPC plaintiff can seek leave of the Court for production of a document at a latter stage. The learned trial Court while passing the order impugned has examined the rigor of Order 7 Rule 14 CPC and considering the fact that the documents which were sought to be placed on record by the respondent plaintiff are relevant and necessary for adjudication of the lis involved in the matter has allowed the respondent-plaintiff to place those documents on record. In my considered opinion, the discretion exercised by the learned Court below in allowing the application of the respondent-plaintiff under Order 7 Rule 14 CPC is neither perverse, nor it has occasioned failure of justice. In my considered opinion, the discretion exercised by the learned Court below in allowing the application of the respondent-plaintiff under Order 7 Rule 14 CPC is neither perverse, nor it has occasioned failure of justice. A glance at the impugned order makes it amply clear that the learned trial Court has thoroughly examined the matter and thereafter considering the genuineness of the documents has taken those documents on record. Therefore, in my view, the learned Court below has not committed any jurisdictional error warranting interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. The Apex Court in Waryam Singh's case (supra) has laid down certain parameters for power of superintendence under Article 227 in clear and unequivocal terms in para 14 as infra :- "This power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors." 7. Applying the ratio decidendi of Wariyam Singh's case (supra) in the backdrop of the facts and circumstances of the instant case, no case is made out for exercising supervisory jurisdiction of this Court to upset the impugned order. 8. Thus, viewed from any angle, the instant writ petition of is bereft of any merit and devoid of force and the same is hereby dismissed in limine.