JUDGMENT Hon'ble Prakash Krishna, J.—The petitioner is the owner of House Nos. 47, 48 and 49 situate at Rail Bazar, Etawah. House Nos. 48 and 49 are small and old houses and are not directly in issue, submits the petitioner. House No. 47 which is in the occupation of Life Insurance Corporation as tenant is involved with regard to the determination of house tax 2. The petitioner now a retired Commissioner of Income Tax, by legal engineering has successfully avoided payment of any municipal tax in respect of said house for the last around 15 years by taking recourse to legal proceedings. 3. Admittedly, the said house is fetching handsome amount of rent but the petitioner inspite of various communications, on the one pretext or the other has failed to disclose its actual rate of rent. 4. The Nagar Palika Parishad, Etawah by its order dated 5th March, 1997 determined the annual letting value at Rs. 1,66,627.44. The matter was carried in appeal before the Prescribed Authority, namely, Chief Judicial Magistrate, in Appeal No. 4 of 1997. There a strange plea was put forward that annual assessment of the building in question has been wrongly determined at lesser figure than annual rent, therefore, the matter be remanded for fixing the annual value. The Prescribed Authority set aside the assessment order and restored the matter back to re-determination the annual letting value in the light of the objections raised by the petitioner. 5. In pursuance of the assessment order, the petitioner was called upon to appear and participate in the assessment proceedings. The multiple dates were fixed and he was asked to produce the annual rent receipts and lease-deed, but in vain. He sought adjournments on the ground of personal illness which were also accepted on some occasions but finally failed to appear. One of the pleas raised was that the proceedings are bad in view of the fact that order dated 19th May, 2000 passed by the C.J.M. has already been complied with, as according to him, in pursuance thereof, a fresh reassessment order dated 2nd August, 2000 has been passed. The said plea was not accepted as there is no such record of passing a fresh assessment order on 2nd August, 2000. The matter was considered on merits on the basis of the information furnished by Life Insurance Corporation. 6. The said plea was not accepted as there is no such record of passing a fresh assessment order on 2nd August, 2000. The matter was considered on merits on the basis of the information furnished by Life Insurance Corporation. 6. Originally the writ petition was filed challenging the notices for fresh assessment being notices dated 3rd September, 2003 and 26th September, 2003 issued by the Executive Officer and the writ petition was presented on 18.10.2009 before the registry of the Court. It was taken by the Court on 20.10.2003, it was prayed for that it may be taken up in due course and was taken up on 4.12.2003. In the meantime, the assessment order was passed on 3.12.2003. The annual letting value was determined at Rs. 2,66,352/-. Challenging the said order by way of amendment, the present writ petition has been filed on various grounds. 7. The respondents have filed counter-affidavit, one supplementary counter-affidavit on behalf of respondent No. 3 and another on behalf of respondent No. 5 refuting the allegations made in the writ petition. 8. Parties have filed various affidavits and counter-affidavits etc. from time to time. However, during the course of arguments, only limited documents were referred to by the learned counsel for the parties. The Court has considered only such documents which were referred by the parties. 9. The main controversy revolves around the alleged order dated 2nd August, 2000 passed by one R.S. Trivedi claiming himself as Executive Officer in compliance of the directions given by the C.J.M. who passed the remand order on 19th May, 2000. The case of the petitioner in the present petition is that the remand order passed by the C.J.M. has been culminated in the alleged fresh assessment order dated 2nd August, 2000 passed by Sri R.S. Trivedi, the subsequent proceedings giving rise to the present writ petition is null, void and uncalled for. 10. In rebuttal, the case of the respondents is that no such order dated 2nd August, 2000 alleged to have been passed by Sri R.S. Trivedi is on record nor Sri Trivedi could have pass such order as he on the relevant date was not the Executive Officer. Only it is Executive Officer who could pass any order. Sri R.S. Trivedi was not authorized to pass any such order. Only it is Executive Officer who could pass any order. Sri R.S. Trivedi was not authorized to pass any such order. When the matter was taken up earlier, the following order dated 12th September, 2012 was passed, which is self speaking. “We have heard Shri Navin Sinha, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Anil Babu for the petitioner. Shri Pradeep Kumar appears for the Nagar Palika Parishad, Etawah. There are serious allegations made in this writ petition by the petitioner against the Executive Officer, and the officials of the Nagar Palika Parishad, Etawah. In the writ petition and the amendment application it is alleged that the order dated 2.8.2000 was passed by the then Executive Officer, which was also ratified by Smt. Radha Tiwari the then Executive Officer by letter dated 11.8.2003, regarding assessment of house tax and water tax of the subject property fixing the annual value at Rs. 15, 000/-, after remand. In the order creating demand on rental value of LIC, the existence of order dated 2.8.2000, has been denied. Shri Navin Sinha has relied upon long correspondence made by the petitioner with Nagar Palika Parishad, Etawah referring to order dated 2.8.2000. In the impugned order, allegedly made in pursuance to the remand order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etawah dated 19.5.2000, fresh assessment has been made creating a huge demand. In view of the allegations made by the petitioner against the officers and officials of the Nagar Palika Parishad, Etawah, we find it appropriate to summon the original records of the house tax assessments in respect of house Nos. 47, 48 and 49, Rail Bazar, Etawah. Shri Pradeep Kumar appearing for Nagar Palika Parishad, Etawah will produce all the three original files with all the documents contained in it. He will also file an affidavit of the present Executive Officer, and Shri Ram Sewak Chauhan, Tax Superintendent, Nagar Palika Parishad, Etawah verifying the genuineness of the records produced in Court. List on 8.10.2012. “ 11. On 8th October, 2012, when the matter was taken up the following order was passed: “Counter-affidavit has been filed by Sri Pradeep Kumar. The Executive Officer is present. It is stated that the records of the case were sent to the Office of the Commissioner, and they are still in search. On his request, list on 6.11.2012. The Executive Officer will make the records available on that date. “ 12. The Executive Officer is present. It is stated that the records of the case were sent to the Office of the Commissioner, and they are still in search. On his request, list on 6.11.2012. The Executive Officer will make the records available on that date. “ 12. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the order dated 2nd August, 2000 is forged order. There is no such file with regard to it in the Office of Nagar Palika Parishad nor there is anything to show that Sri Trivedi could have pass such order. We proceeded to hear the matter, on merits. 13. The matter was placed before us on 21st February, 2013. Sri Naveen Sinha, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner raised argument that powers were delegated on Sri Trivedi to exercise the power of Executive Officer and in that capacity, he passed the order dated 2nd August, 2000. He submitted that earlier Tax Committee was no longer in existence and assessment order could be passed by Executive Officer. It was refuted by Sri Pradeep Kumar who submitted that Sri Trivedi was a tax clerk, could not pass the alleged assessment order dated 2.8.2000, at any rate. In rejoinder-affidavit, it was submitted that the power of Executive Officer was delegated on Sri Trivedi. The hearing was adjourned to 26th February, 2013. The order-sheet dated 26th February, 2013 reads as follows: “During the course of argument, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the order passed by Sri Trivedi is justified as the power was delegated to Sri Trivedi. For the effective disposal of the writ petition, it is necessary to have a look to the original record with regard to delegation of power on Sri Trivedi. Sri Pradeep Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent submits that he will produce the record. List on 11.3.2013. “ 14. In pursuance thereof, the learned counsel for the respondents produced the record relating to delegation of power of Executive Officer, if any, on Sri Trivedi who allegedly passed the order dated 2nd August, 2000. The record was shown to the learned counsel for the petitioner. Also, the copies of relevant record have been filed alongwith affidavit of Sri Birendra Singh Pal, litigation clerk of Nagar Palika Parishad. 15. The record was shown to the learned counsel for the petitioner. Also, the copies of relevant record have been filed alongwith affidavit of Sri Birendra Singh Pal, litigation clerk of Nagar Palika Parishad. 15. Record shows that by the Government Order dated 22nd July, 2000 one Sri B.K. Srivastava, Executive Officer was transferred from Nagar Palika Parishad, Ballia as Executive Officer on vacant post of Executive Officer at Nagar Palika Parishad, Etawah. He gave joining on 25th July, 2000 and received charge from Sri Har Swaroop Bisaria, officiating Executive Officer. Transfer of Sri B.K. Srivastava, Executive Officer under the Government Order dated 22nd July, 2000 could not be disputed by the petitioner. The petitioner submits how Sri Har Swaroop Bisaria was functioning as Executive Officer is not reflected from the record so produced. We are not going into the same as it is wholly irrelevant for the purposes of the present writ petition. An irresistible conclusion is that whatever may be the position, earlier, after joining of Sri B.K. Srivastava as Executive Officer, the burden to prove that how Sri R.S. Trivedi, Tax Superintendent, who allegedly passed the order in question dated 2nd August, 2000 became officiating Executive Officer is, on the petitioner. 16. There is nothing on record to show the delegation of any such power on Sri Trivedi, who was working as Tax Superintendent. The question of delegation, in view of posting of Sri B.K. Srivastava as Executive Officer, by transfer, does not arise at all. 17. Further, the affidavit of Sri Trivedi has been brought on the record. It is on page No. 104 of the amended writ petition. Even, Sri Trivedi, himself has not come out with any such case of delegation of power. He could state only this much that he passed the order on 2nd August, 2000 “while he was posted as Executive Officer, Nagar Palika Parishad, Etawah.” The theory of delegation of power of Executive Officer on Sri Trivedi has no legs to stand and cannot be accepted in view of Government Order dated 22nd July, 2000 posting of Sri B.K. Srivastava as Executive Officer and on his joining, which is not disputed. 18. 18. On the ipse dixit of the petitioner, it cannot be assumed that in the face of joining of Sri B.K. Srivastava, Executive Officer, Sri R.S. Trivedi who was working as Tax Superintending was delegated the power of Executive Officer on the relevant date i.e. 2nd August, 2000, in the absence of any positive material. 19. Then, reference was made to letter dated 30th September, 2000 written by the petitioner addressed to Sri R.S. Trivedi, Executive Officer, Nagar Palika Parishad, Etawah praying that necessary demand notice be issued to buttress the argument that the alleged order dated 2nd August, 2000 was passed as a matter of fact. Copy of said letter has been filed as Annexure-2A to the amended writ petition. The said letter is in the nature of self serving statement and appears to be written with oblique motive to provide authenticity to the alleged order dated 2nd August, 2000. In the letter, the petitioner has claimed the annual letting value of House No. 47, Rail Bazar was continued to be Rs. 15,000/- as determined by the Executive Officer and assessed by the earlier committee. It has been stated that a sum of Rs. 15,000/- deposited on 22nd February, 2000 for the period 1997 to 1999 and demand shown outstanding have to be cancelled. The reminder was given on 27th October, 2000 just to create evidence; the petitioner appears to have written letter that some of officials of Parishad have demanded illegal money and the matter should be enquired into, without naming anybody. 20. Reference was also made to letter dated 6th March, 2001 written by S.D.M. Sadar addressed to President, Nagar Palika Parishad. 21. Copies of the correspondence filed alongwith the writ petition would show that the petitioner tried his best to somehow get the alleged order dated 2nd August, 2000 implemented and accepted by the Nagar Palika Parishad. No cogent material or evidence was placed before us to take view that alleged order dated 2nd August, 2000 was legally passed by Sri R.S. Trivedi, Tax Superintendent. The municipal record do not show that in pursuance of the remand order passed by the C.J.M., any notice etc. was issued asking the petitioner before passing of the alleged order dated 2nd August, 2000, or any proceeding was drawn. 22. The municipal record do not show that in pursuance of the remand order passed by the C.J.M., any notice etc. was issued asking the petitioner before passing of the alleged order dated 2nd August, 2000, or any proceeding was drawn. 22. In reply to the notice issued by the respondents to frame fresh assessment order as directed by the C.J.M., the petitioner filed objection dated 24th September, 2003. 23. In reply, the petitioner has made following assertions. Relevant portion is reproduced below: “Your notice relates the three premises viz., house Nos. 47, 48 and 49, Rail Bazar. The reassessment in all the three cases has been done by Sri R.S. Trivedi, Executive Officer on 2.8.2000. Copies of reassessment orders are placed at Ann. 2,3 and 4 respectively. I have the originals duly by Sri R.S. Trivedi, Executive Officer in my possession and can be seen if desired.” (Reproduced as it is on page-88 of the writ petition) 24. Its bare perusal would show that according to the petitioner, he has original of the reassessment order allegedly dated 2nd August, 2000. But the petitioner for the reasons best known to him could not produce them either before the Parishad or before this Court. In the impugned order, the issue relating to alleged order dated 2nd August, 2000 has been examined. It has been found that Sri R.S. Trivedi was not competent to take the matter of reassessment and pass any such order on 2nd August, 2000. There is no such file to show that reassessment order was passed on 2nd August, 2000. The statement of fact as recorded in the order, unless proved as incorrect, has to be accepted. One important fact which has been mentioned therein is that if the decision had been taken on 2nd August, 2000, there was no occasion for the petitioner to file application dated 22nd October, 2000 for compliance of the order of C.J.M.. The said observation appears to have not been disputed by the petitioner specifically anywhere. It will not be out of place to mention here that the writ petition was got amended and the amended writ petition dated 14th July, 2008 is on the record. Even after getting the writ petition amended, the petitioner could not dare to challenge the aforesaid observation made in the impugned order. It will not be out of place to mention here that the writ petition was got amended and the amended writ petition dated 14th July, 2008 is on the record. Even after getting the writ petition amended, the petitioner could not dare to challenge the aforesaid observation made in the impugned order. This is also one of the important factors which weighs heavily against the very existence of the alleged order dated 2nd August, 2000. 25. The aforesaid objection is a long document, but it is bereft of the essential averments regarding the rent, which the petitioner was receiving from Life Insurance Corporation. It is cleverly drafted, at one place, it is whispered that notice has been issued that he was receiving rent of Rs. 1,44,893/- from Life Insurance Corporation. The actual rate of rent has not been mentioned anywhere therein. 26. Now, we may examine the legality and validity of the alleged order dated 2.8.2000 to find out as to whether it could have been passed. 27. The Nagar Palika, as the alleged order dated 2nd August, 2000 recited issued a notice under Section 145(2) on 7th September, 1995 for the purposes of revising the annual letting value as in the meantime, building in question was let out which was objected to by the petitioner. The building was let out on annual rent of Rs. 1,91,521.52. By a rigmarole and after twisting the facts that the petitioner is admittedly receiving a very high amount of rent, it proceeds to hold that the annual letting value is being fixed at Rs. 15,000/- as the letting of building is a temporary affair and Life Insurance Corporation has informed that they will vacate the property in suit. On a reading of alleged order dated 2nd August, 2000 as a whole it is obvious that it speaks many things and it is but obvious that it is a got up and fabricated order. When the property has been actually let out and the petitioner is receiving annual rent amounting to Rs. 1,91,521.52 or Rs. 3,50,200/- as mentioned at page-40 of the amended writ petition, no person of ordinary prudence could arrive at that the annual letting value of the building will remain static at Rs. 15,000/-. The said order cannot stand scrutiny by the Court even for a second. 1,91,521.52 or Rs. 3,50,200/- as mentioned at page-40 of the amended writ petition, no person of ordinary prudence could arrive at that the annual letting value of the building will remain static at Rs. 15,000/-. The said order cannot stand scrutiny by the Court even for a second. Secondly, the said alleged order is contrary to the spirit of the remand order passed by the C.J.M., therefore void, even otherwise. 28. From the record it is crystal clear that the petitioner has been taking shifting stand from time to time. The petitioner obtained remand order from C.J.M. Etawah dated 19.5.2000 on the footing that he is willing to get the annual value assessed at the actual rent receipt. The grievance before the C.J.M. was that the annual letting value has been fixed even below the actual rent receipt. For the sake of convenience the relevant portion from the remand order is reproduced below: “vihykFkhZ dh rjQ ls rdZ fd;k x;k gS fd muds edku ua0 47 fLFkr jsy cktkj bVkok dh okf"kZd dher muds }kjk okLro esa izkIr fd;s x;s okf"kZd fdjk;s ls de fcuk dkj.k crk;s dj nh xbZ gS rFkk foi{kh uxjikfydk dh rjQ ls Hkh ;g rdZ fd;k x;k gS fd ftruk okLrfod fdjk;k vihykFkhZ izkIr dj jgk gS] mlls okf"kZd dher de fu/kkZfjr dh xbZ gSA” 29. After remand, he took ‘U’ turn and appears to have pleaded that the old assessment i.e. Rs. 15,000/- may be restored back, the letting of building at higher rent notwithstanding. 30. That is the reason that the petitioner has avoided arguing out the matter on merits. 31. The petitioner is not a rustic villager. He happens to be an advocate and was earlier Commissioner of Income Tax. He very well understands the law as also importance of registered documents and effect of non filing of relevant documents, in his possession. 32. Non filing of rent agreement with the Life Insurance Corporation at any stage of proceedings inspite of demand by the Nagar Palika Parishad or in the writ petition or in course of hearing of the writ petition leads to irresistible conclusion that the petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands and is hiding material facts from the Court, which is fatal. We fail to understand what was the hitch in not filing the copy of lease agreement entered by the petitioner with his tenant, namely, Life Insurance Corporation. The argument of Sri Pradeep Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents that the assessment has been fixed after obtaining the information with regard to actual rent paid by the Life Insurance Corporation to the petitioner is unrebutted. Sri Naveen Sinha, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner meekly accepts that he is not in a position to say as to why the petitioner is not filing rent agreement entered into with the Life Insurance Corporation All the time, the petitioner in his petition has harped about the order dated 2nd August, 2000 which has been found to be a non existent order. He states that the fact that he was receiving rent of Rs. 1,44,893/- from Life Insurance Corporation as stated in his letter dated 24th September, 2003, was considered by the earlier Tax Committee on 11th February, 1988 and the proceedings were dropped. Even if, it is so, it is but obvious that the proceedings were wrongly dropped. In the absence of the order dropping the earlier proceedings as alleged by the petitioner, we are not in a position to say anything further in this regard or accept what the petitioner says except that power to amend or alter and revision of assessment list from time to time vests in Nagar Palika Parishad as provided for under Sections 145 and 147 of the Act. 33. The case of the petitioner is that in respect of the suit property i.e. House No. 47, the existing old building was demolished and new constructions were made. Its annual letting value was assessed at Rs. 15000/- earlier. It was done on the basis of the notice dated 14th March, 1987. On the objection, which was filed on 17th February, 1997 it was submitted that the said annual value could not be revised for a period of five years as provided for under Sections 140 and 145 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). For the sake of convenience, the said provisions is reproduced below: “140. On the objection, which was filed on 17th February, 1997 it was submitted that the said annual value could not be revised for a period of five years as provided for under Sections 140 and 145 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). For the sake of convenience, the said provisions is reproduced below: “140. Definition of annual value.— (1) “Annual value” means,— (a) in the case of railway Stations, hotels, colleges, schools, hospitals, factories, and other such buildings, a proportion not exceeding five per centum, to be fixed by rule made in this behalf of the sum obtained by adding the estimated present cost of erecting the building to the estimated value of the land appurtenant thereto; and (b) in the case of a building or land not falling within the provisions of clause (a), the gross annual rent for which such building, exclusive of furniture or machinery therein, or such land is actually let, or, where the building or land is not let or in the opinion of the Municipality is let for a sum less than its fair letting value, might reasonably be expected to let from year to year. (2) Provided that where the annual value of any building would, by reason of exceptional circumstances, in the opinion of the Municipality be excessive if calculated in the aforesaid manner, the Municipality may fix the annual value at any less amount which appears to it equitable. ........................................................ ........................................................ ........................................................ ........................................................ 145. Revision and duration of list.— (1) A new assessment list shall ordinarily be prepared in the manner prescribed by Sections 141 to 144, once in every five years. (2) Subject to any alteration or amendment made under Section 147 and to the result of any appeal under Section 160, every valuation and assessment entered in a valuation list shall be valid from the date on which the list takes effect in the municipality and until the first day of the April next following the completion of a new list.” 34. Section 140 defines what the “Annual Value” means. "Annual value means the gross annual letting value." 35. Section 140(1)(b) clearly provides that gross annual rent for such building, exclusive of furniture or machinery thereon is the annual value of the building. 36. Section 140 defines what the “Annual Value” means. "Annual value means the gross annual letting value." 35. Section 140(1)(b) clearly provides that gross annual rent for such building, exclusive of furniture or machinery thereon is the annual value of the building. 36. At this juncture, we may take a note of decision in the case of Shailendra Kumar Singh v. Chief Judicial Magistrate and another, 1985 AWC 240. On a careful reading of the relied upon judgment, it would be clear that the said judgment does not assist the petitioner rather it supports the action of the respondents. It was a case where after remand, the petitioner therein had let out a portion of the said house to the District Cane Officer for his office as well as residence and the tenancy has commenced on 10th January, 1977. A temporary car shed was constructed. The Executive Officer, Municipal Board has revised and determined the annual value of the house. The said action has been found to be justified. The Court after reproducing Section 140 of the Act has dealt with the matter in para-10. For the sake of convenience, para-10 is reproduced below: “[10] As regards the alternative argument made by counsel for the petitioner it may be pointed out that Section 140 of the Act defines “Annual value”. It reads: 140. (1) “Annual value” means, (a) in the case of railway Stations, hotels, colleges, schools, hospitals, factories, and other such buildings, a proportion not exceeding five per centum, to be fixed by rule made in this behalf of the sum obtained by adding the estimated present cost of erecting the building to the estimated value of the land appurtenant thereto, and (b) in the case of a building or land not falling within the provisions of clause (a), the gross annual rent for which such building, exclusive of furniture or machinery therein, or such land is actually let, or, where the building or land is not let or in the opinion of the Municipality is let for a sum less than its fair letting value, might reasonably be expected to let from year to year. (C) Provided that where the annual value of any building would, by reason of exceptional circumstances, in the opinion of the Municipality be excessive if calculated in the aforesaid manner, the Municipality may fix the annual value at any less amount which appears to it equitable. As such whenever “Annual value” is to be determined under the Act it has to be so done in accordance with Section 140. Section 145(1) contemplates preparation of assessment list in the manner prescribed by Sections 141 to 144 ordinarily once in every five years. Sub-section (2) of Section 145 provides: (2) Subject to any alteration or amendment made under Section 147 and to the result of any appeal under Section 160, every valuation and assessment entered in a valuation list shall be valid from the date on which the list takes effect in the municipality and until the first day of April next following the completion of a new list. As such it would be of no consequence whether “Annual value” is being determined at the stage of preparation of the assessment list contemplated by Section 145 or under Section 147. Unless the case falls under any of the Clauses (a) to (g) of Section 147(1) there would be no jurisdiction to alter or amend the assessment list under Section 147 whether the alteration or amendment is in regard to determination of “Annual value” or otherwise. If the matter relates to making alteration or amendment of the “Annual value” as shown in the assessment list prepared under Section 145(1) and the case falls under any of the clauses of Section 147(1) the bar of making alteration or amendment in such list created by Section 145(2) stand removed and the authority concerned gets jurisdiction to alter or amend the ‘annual value” as shown in the assessment list. Take for instance a case which falls under Clause (d) of Section 147(1) namely of a property the revaluing or reassessing the value of which has been necessitated by additions or alterations to buildings. Once making of additions or alterations to buildings having the effect of increasing the value of property is established the finality of the assessment list contemplated by Section 145(2) comes to an end and jurisdiction arises to make alteration or amendment in the assessment list on which score. Once making of additions or alterations to buildings having the effect of increasing the value of property is established the finality of the assessment list contemplated by Section 145(2) comes to an end and jurisdiction arises to make alteration or amendment in the assessment list on which score. Then for making this alteration or amendment in the assessment list the “Annual value” of the property will have to be re-determined. For making this re-determination the Act provides no criteria other than that contained in Section 140. As such this re-determination of "annual value" will have to be made in accordance with Section 140. For this the nature of the property as on the date of re-determination of its “annual value” will obviously constitute the guiding factor. The value of the addition or alteration alone in the building will on the face of it not constitute the only criterion. Take for instance a building having its opening in a conjested narrow land and having a large tract of open land behind it but having no door or window on that side. The building is let out at a rent of Rs. 600/- per annum exclusive of furniture or machine therein and the assessment list contemplated by Section 145(1) is prepared on the basis that the annual value of the building is Rs. 600/- namely the amount representing “the gross annual rent” for which the building is “actually let” as contemplated by Section 140(1)(b). Before the preparation of subsequent list contemplated by Section 145(1) the large tract of land behind the house is converted into a posh market and a wide road is taken out adjacent to the house on its back side. The tenant makes an offer to enhance the rent of the house from Rs. 600/- to Rs. 6000/- per annum in case the landlord makes an opening in the wall of a big room on the back portion of the house and fixes a shutter therein so that the room gets converted into a shop facing the newly constructed road and the posh market and the landlord accepts the offer and makes the necessary alteration and the total cost in making an opening in the wall and fixing a shutter comes to Rs. 1000/-. 1000/-. As a result of the alteration made in the building the value of the property has increased and a case for making an alteration or amendment in the assessment list under Clause (d) of Section 147(1) is made out. The question is whether while re-determining the annual value under Section 147(1) only Rs. 1000/- the costs of making the alteration in the building is to be added to its existing ‘annual value’ of Rs. 600/- or the ‘annual value’ is to be fixed at Rs. 6000/- that being the amount representing the gross rent of the building on the date of re-determination of the annual value as contemplated by Section 149(1)(b). In our opinion there seems to be no doubt that the “annual value” will have to be fixed at Rs. 6000/- because that is the only course contemplated by Section 140(1)(b). That provision does not permit the mere adding of Rs. 1000/- to the existing “annual value” of Rs. 600/-. In this view of the matter in the instant case also the re-determination of the annual value of the petitioner’s house under Clause (d) of Section 147(1) will have to be done in the light of Section 140 of the Act and not by merely adding the value of the car-shed to the value of the house as shown in the assessment list prepared in 1975.” (Emphasis supplied) 37. Then, Prakashwati v. State of U P and others, 1983 Law Suit (All) 378, was relied upon. The relied upon case has no application to the facts of the present case and is distinguishable on facts. Annual valuation was fixed on 4.1.1975. Through notice dated 26.6.1976 under Section 147(c), it was proposed to enhance and after hearing was enhanced, which has been held impermissible. Application of Section 145 was not involved therein nor it was considered. 38. Alongwith affidavit of Janardan Rai, titled as counter-affidavit on behalf of respondent No. 3 filed in the month of October, 2012 has given the details of the municipal rent received by the petitioner from his tenant and calculation of annual value, water tax, house tax etc. for the period commencing from 17th February, 1996 to 6th February, 2012. The same is reproduced below: 39. The petitioner has not raised any dispute or objection to the above chart. for the period commencing from 17th February, 1996 to 6th February, 2012. The same is reproduced below: 39. The petitioner has not raised any dispute or objection to the above chart. The rate of rent has not been disputed at anywhere or at any stage of the proceedings in any manner. To sub-serve the interest of justice, the Court had offered an option to the petitioner’s counsel that if the petitioner is ready to deposit all the arrears of taxes as demanded by the respondents within specified time, the Court will afford another opportunity by restoring the matter to the Nagar Palika Parishad to challenge quantum of the annual assessment order if the petitioner is so aggrieved or desired. Sri Sinha, stated that he will seek instructions in this regard. There is no response from the petitioner and it is reasonable to take that the petitioner has no grievance so far as the quantum part of house tax assessment is concerned. The argument of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that adequate opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the petitioner before passing of the impugned order has no merit. The impugned order shows that the number of opportunities were afforded to him but it is the petitioner who failed to avail the opportunity on one pretext or the other. All the time, he has been raising frivolous objections and hiding the material facts. Only defence which was set out was the alleged order dated 2nd August, 2000. It has been considered and rejected and rightly so, by the respondents. There appears to be no tangible objection by the petitioner with regard to actual receipt of rent of the property in dispute. The opportunity of hearing offered by us as stated herein above subject to deposit of all the arrears of taxes has been declined by the petitioner. The petitioner has not shown willingness to accept it. 40. We cannot loose sight of the fact that alongwith the writ petition, the petitioner has filed affidavit of Sri R.S. Trivedi which is dated 12th September, 2005, annexure-17 to the amended writ petition. It consists of three paragraphs. The same is reproduced below: “1. That the deponent had passed the municipal assessment orders all dated 2.8.2000 in respect of the house Nos. It consists of three paragraphs. The same is reproduced below: “1. That the deponent had passed the municipal assessment orders all dated 2.8.2000 in respect of the house Nos. 47,48 and 49, Rail Bazar, Etawah owned by Sri Dharni Dhar, while he was posted as Executive Officer, Nagar Palika Parishad, Etawah. 2. That these reassessments were made in compliance to the orders of ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etawah in appeals filed by Sri Dharni Dhar, wherein the matters were sent back to Nagarpalika for disposing of the objections of the appellant. 3. That the deponent has since retired from service and is leading retired life in his home town Jalaun.” 41. Reliance placed by the petitioner on the said affidavit is misplaced one as it is in the nature of self serving statement. The affidavit lacks particular as for what period Sri R.S. Trivedi worked as Executive Officer and who appointed him as Executive Officer. Filing of the said affidavit shows that there was some sort of collusion or agreement in between the petitioner and Sri R.S. Trivedi and the said order dated 2nd August, 2000 was manufactured collusively. The petitioner could not disclose the source from which copy of the order in question was obtained. Indisputably, copy of alleged order produced by the petitioner is neither a certified copy nor photostat copy of certified copy having no source of its origin, to say the least, is worthless paper. 42. While preparing the judgment, we have carefully gone through the entire amended writ petition word by word and found the relevant facts such as (1) the date of letting of the building to the Life Insurance Corporation, (2) payment and enhancement of monthly rent from time to time by the Life Insurance Corporation, (3) essential terms of lease, (4) the source of the alleged order dated 2nd August, 2000, where from it was obtained, are conspicuously missing. The petition lacks material facts so it is liable to be dismissed on the ground above. Even otherwise also, the petitioner’s plea, in appeal, that the assessment of house tax is towards lower side and is not commensurate to actual rent receipts, was accepted. Thereafter, the assessment having been done, accordingly, the petitioner cannot consider him as aggrieved person by the impugned order. 43. The petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands and the petition lacks material facts. Thereafter, the assessment having been done, accordingly, the petitioner cannot consider him as aggrieved person by the impugned order. 43. The petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands and the petition lacks material facts. We therefore refuse to exercise the discretion to issue any writ. The Apex Court in the case of The Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation v. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society Jaipur and others, JT 2013 (3) SC 1, has held as follows: “17. The primary purpose of the writ is to protect and establish rights, and to impose a corresponding imperative duty existing in law. It is designed to promote justice, (ex debito justiceiae) and its grant or refusal is at the discretion of the Court. The writ cannot be granted unless it is established that there is an existing legal right of the applicant, or an existing duty of the respondent. Thus, the writ does not lie to create or establish a legal right but, to enforce one that stood already established. While dealing with a writ petition, the Court must exercise discretion, taking into consideration a wide variety of circumstances, inter alia, the facts of the case, the exigency that warrants such exercise of discretion, the consequences of grant or refusal of the writ, and the nature and extent of injury that is likely to ensue by such grant or refusal.” 44. Having regard to what has been stated above, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands and has concealed the material facts and filed objections on untrue facts. The petitioner being old person, we restrain ourselves to say anything further except that such thing was not excepted from a person who had occupied the post of Commissioner of Income Tax and thereafter, joined the legal profession. He is well versed with taxation laws, fully understands importance of payment of taxes, has succeeded in not paying anything towards municipal taxes for the last around 15 years and public at large expects civic amenities. 45. Section 149 of the U.P. Municipalities Act provides that the primary liability to pay municipal tax is on the owner of the building and on his failure it can be recovered from the occupier of the building. 45. Section 149 of the U.P. Municipalities Act provides that the primary liability to pay municipal tax is on the owner of the building and on his failure it can be recovered from the occupier of the building. Having regard to the facts of the case that there is huge arrears of municipal taxes and for the period about 15 years, the tenant, namely, Life Insurance Corporation of the suit building is hereby directed to deposit henceforth all the rents and any other amount, as and when it fell due, upon the money becoming due or being held for or on account of the petitioner to the Nagar Palika Parishad, Etawah, till the full and final payment of all the dues of Nagar Palika Parishad upto the date of last payment of the amount. The outstanding dues as per the contesting respondents is Rs. 10,10,700/- presently. The payment made by Life Insurance Corporation to the contesting respondents, shall fully discharge from its liability to the petitioner to the extent of the amount so paid. Failure of Life Insurance Corporation to comply with this order would make its officer in charge personally liable to pay the dues of the contesting respondents. In effect, this is a garnishee order. The petitioner has enjoyed blanket stay order during these years and the interest of justice requires to adjust the equities. The aforesaid arrangement has been made without prejudice to the rights of contesting respondents to recover the dues by any other mode. We were not called upon to consider the question of payment of interest, if any, on arrears. We left it as it is. 46. We do not find any merit in the writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed with cost of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand) payable by the petitioner to the Nagar Palika Parishad, within one month. ——————