Judgment : This second appeal is preferred by the defendant challenging the decree and judgment dated 20.12.2004 in A.S.No.109 of 2002 on the file of I Additional District Judge Court, Kurnool, confirming in appeal the decree and judgment dated 28.11.2002 in O.S.No.105 of 2000 on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge Court, Kurnool. The parties are hereinafter referred to as they arrayed in the suit. During the pendency of the suit, original plaintiff died and plaintiffs 2 to 5 came on record as her legal representatives. 2. The case of the plaintiffs is that first plaintiff purchased plaint schedule property from father of the defendant on 03.7.1978 under a registered sale deed. She erected a hut in one portion of the site and divided the remaining site into three portions. She let out two portions, marked as ‘B’ schedule property, to the defendant and his father on oral lease at monthly rent of Rs.100/-. The defendant paid rent for some time and thereafter committed default in payment of rent. The first plaintiff demanded defendant to pay the rent or to vacate ‘B’ schedule property. The defendant did not heed to the demand. Then first plaintiff filed R.C.C. No.8 of 1994 before the Rent Controller, Kurool seeking eviction of defendant and the same was dismissed on 30.6.1998 with an observation that R.C.C. was not maintainable in view of denial of title of first plaintiff by the defendant. The father of defendant sold the property to first plaintiff for his family necessities and this fact is known to defendant. Therefore the defendant is estopped to deny the title of the first plaintiff. The first plaintiff is also entitled for rents from the defendant at Rs.100/- per month with effect from February, 1997, as the claim for arrears of rent from January, 1993 to January, 1997 is barred by limitation. Even other wise, first plaintiff perfected her title by adverse possession. Hence the suit for declaration of title over ‘A’ schedule property, recovery of ‘B’ schedule property and arrears of rent from defendant. 3. The defendant filed written statement inter alia contending that the registered sale deed dated 03.7.1978 is a concocted document and was brought into existence with ulterior motive by the plaintiffs. The sale deed is void and does not convey valid title in favour of the first plaintiff. 3. The defendant filed written statement inter alia contending that the registered sale deed dated 03.7.1978 is a concocted document and was brought into existence with ulterior motive by the plaintiffs. The sale deed is void and does not convey valid title in favour of the first plaintiff. The plaint schedule property is the ancestral property of the defendant and his father and the defendant constructed hut in the open site adjacent to his father’s house. The plea taken by the first plaintiff that she acquired title by adverse possession is baseless. The suit is barred by time and there is no cause of action to file the suit. 4. In the trial court, on behalf of plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A1 to A4 were marked. On behalf of the defendant, D.W.1 was examined and Ex.B1 was marked. 5. After having thoughtful consideration to the oral, documentary evidence and other material available on record, the trial court arrived at conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of declaration, recovery of possession of ‘B’ schedule property and recovery of arrears of rent with interest. The defendant being aggrieved by the decree and judgment of the trial court filed A.S.No.109 of 2012. The first appellate court, while hearing the appeal, came to the conclusion that the material available on record is not sufficient to decide whether the suit is filed within the period of limitation. Therefore, the first appellate court remitted the matter to the trial court to give a finding on point of limitation, after giving opportunity to both parties to adduce evidence on that aspect. The trial court recorded a finding that the suit is barred by limitation, in view of Article 58 of Limitation Act. On reappraising the entire material available on record, the first appellate court dismissed the appeal while confirming the decree and judgment of the trial court, except on issue No.5 with regard to point of limitation. 6. The substantial question of law raised in this appeal is: “Whether the suit for declaration of the present nature is attracted by Article 65 of Limitation Act or Article 58 of Limitation Act?” 7. Heard Sri P.Kamalakar, learned counsel for appellant/ defendant and Sri Murali Lincoln, learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs. 8. 6. The substantial question of law raised in this appeal is: “Whether the suit for declaration of the present nature is attracted by Article 65 of Limitation Act or Article 58 of Limitation Act?” 7. Heard Sri P.Kamalakar, learned counsel for appellant/ defendant and Sri Murali Lincoln, learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs. 8. The contention of learned counsel for appellant is three fold: (1) in this case, the period of limitation starts from 17.2.1994 when defendant got issued a notice (Ex.B1) to first plaintiff denying her title; (2) in a suit for declaration and recovery of possession, period of limitation is 3 years in view of Article 58 of Limitation Act; and (3) the plaintiffs are not entitled to seek relief of declaration basing on the sale deed dated 03.7.1978 (Ex.A1), which is non-est in the eye of law. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents/plaintiffs submitted that in this suit period of limitation commenced from 30.6.1998 i.e., the date on which R.C.C., filed by the first plaintiff, was dismissed. He further contended that in a suit for declaration and recovery of possession, period of limitation is 12 years in view of Article 65 of Limitation Act. 9. The admitted facts emerge from the pleadings and evidence available on record are as follows. The defendant got issued legal notice dated 17.2.1994 (Ex.B1) stating that the father of defendant has no right whatsoever to sell the suit schedule property which is ancestral property. The first plaintiff filed R.C.C. No.8 of 1994 on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge Court, Kurnool for eviction of defendant herein and the same was dismissed on 30.6.1998. The defendant filed counter dated 29.9.1994 in the R.C.C (Ex.A4). The present suit is filed on 07.2.2000. The first plaintiff purchased the suit schedule property from father of the defendant under registered sale deed dated 03.7.1978 (Ex.A1). Point No.1: 10. When maintainability of suit itself is challenged on the ground of limitation, the court has to satisfy itself that the suit is filed within the period of limitation, before considering other aspects of the case. It is needless to say the period of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law in certain cases. 11. The crucial question that falls for consideration, in this case, is what is the starting point of limitation? It is needless to say the period of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law in certain cases. 11. The crucial question that falls for consideration, in this case, is what is the starting point of limitation? As per the contention of learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs the starting point of limitation is 30.6.1998 i.e., the date on which R.C.C. was dismissed. As per the contention of learned counsel for the appellant/defendant, the starting point of limitation is 17.2.1994, when the defendant got issued legal notice (Ex.B1) to the plaintiff denying his title. To substantiate the argument, learned counsel for respondents/ plaintiffs has drawn my attention to the decisions in Rukhmabai v Lala Laxminarayan ( AIR 1960 SC 335 )and C.Mohammad Yunus v Syed Unnissa ( AIR 1961 SC 808 ), wherein the principle enunciated is that there can be no ‘right to sue’ until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement, or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right, by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. 12. Let me consider the factual aspects of this case, in the light of the above principle. The relevant portion of the legal notice dated 17.2.1994 (Ex.B1) is extracted hereunder. “… … you have agreed to purchase of my client ancestral property from his father. If your purchase that agreement or registered may be void because of his unsound mind and he has no right to dispose of my client half share. My client several times demanded for partition of his ancestral property. But his father did not care because of mad. I, therefore, call upon you on behalf of my client you don’t purchase of my client ancestral property. If you purchase you will be loss and my client have right to get his legal share through court.” 13. A careful scanning of Ex.B1 legal notice clearly manifests that its contents do not fall within the ambit of unequivocal threat to infringe the right of the plaintiff in respect of suit schedule property. Viewed from any angle, this cannot be treated as the starting point of limitation. It is not out of place to extract paragraph 3 of Ex.A4 counter in R.C.C. No.8 of 1994. “This respondent humbly submits that the allegations in para 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 of the petition are all false. Viewed from any angle, this cannot be treated as the starting point of limitation. It is not out of place to extract paragraph 3 of Ex.A4 counter in R.C.C. No.8 of 1994. “This respondent humbly submits that the allegations in para 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 of the petition are all false. This respondent further submits petitioner is not the absolute owner of the disputed hut, this respondent’s father having ancestral property which includes a house and open site. From the childhood to till the marriage this respondent lived along with his parents in the same house and after the marriage (i.e. since 11 years back) this respondent is living separately in the present disputed hut adjacent to his father’s house by constructing a hut with his money in the open site of the house which is the ancestral property of this respondent. Hence respondent is the absolute owner of the disputed hut.” 14. A perusal of the above portion clearly reveals that the defendant in unequivocally declared himself as absolute owner of plaint schedule property. Undoubtedly, it amounts to denial of title of the first plaintiff over the suit schedule property. Such denial eventually gives right to the plaintiff to resort for necessary redressal. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and also the principle enunciated in the cases cited supra, I am of the considered view that the starting point of limitation in this case is 29.9.1994 i.e., the date of Ex.A4 counter in the R.C.C. Hence, point No.1 is accordingly answered. Point No.2: 15. Whether the subject matter of the suit is governed by Article 58 or Article 65 of the Limitation Act? The predominant contention of learned counsel for the appellant/ defendant is that the period of limitation in this case is 3 years as per Article 58 of the Limitation Act. The contention of learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs is that the period of limitation in this case is 12 years in view of Article 65 of Limitation Act. 16. To substantiate the argument, learned counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to the decision in Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla v Hargovind Jasraj ( (2013) 3 SCC 182 ). As per the principle enunciated therein, a suit for declaration, the period of limitation is 3 years. 16. To substantiate the argument, learned counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to the decision in Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla v Hargovind Jasraj ( (2013) 3 SCC 182 ). As per the principle enunciated therein, a suit for declaration, the period of limitation is 3 years. In that case, plaintiff filed the suit for declaration and consequential relief of injunction. But that is not a suit for declaration and recovery of possession, like the present suit. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant, relying upon the highlighted portion in para 13 of the decision in Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v Union of India ( (2011) 9 SCC 126 ), contended that the said decision arose out of suit for declaration and recovery of possession. For better appreciation of the contention, para–13 is extracted hereunder. 13. During the pendency of the aforementioned two suits, Appellant 1 which is said to have been incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 in 1994-1995 with Harbir Singh Khatri, another son of Lal Chand as its Managing Director and Appellant 2 Lal Chand filed third suit being Suit No. 313 of 2000 (renumbered as Suit No. 473 of 2004) for grant of a declaration that the entries made in the revenue records in respect of land comprised in Khasra Nos. 2728/1674/2 and 2728/1674/3 situated in the revenue estate of Mehrauli, Village Mehrauli, Kishangarh, Tehsil Mehrauli are wrong and illegal. The appellants further prayed for grant of a decree of mandatory injunction directing the respondents to correct the revenue record and enter their names in the columns of ownership and possession. Another prayer made by the appellants was for restraining the respondents, their servants and agents from demolishing the superstructures and sealing or interfering with their possession of the suit property or running of the restaurant. 18. A careful scanning of the above para clearly indicates that the plaintiff therein filed the suit for declaration that the entries made in the revenue records are wrong and illegal and for ‘mandatory injunction to enter their names in the columns of ownership and possession’. The above suit was filed for declaration and mandatory injunction. The above referred suit was not filed for declaration and recovery of possession, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. The principle enunciated in the cases cited supra is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. The above suit was filed for declaration and mandatory injunction. The above referred suit was not filed for declaration and recovery of possession, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. The principle enunciated in the cases cited supra is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. 19. In support of the argument, learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs has drawn my attention to the following decisions. In Angomjambam Tomba Singh v R.K. Maipaksana Singh ( AIR 1975 Gau 12 ),dealing with a suit for declaration and recovery of possession, in para 10, Gauhati High Court opined as follows. “… … The present suit is for possession and has been based on title and the plaintiffs’ title has been found. In my opinion, therefore, Article 65 of the Limitation Act, which governs the instant case, is applicable to the present case. Under Article 65, the burden is upon the defendants to prove that the suit is barred by adverse possession.” In Seshumull M. Shah v Sayed Abdul Rashid (AIR1991 Kar 273), Karnataka High Court observed in para – 7, that a suit where possession is claimed as a consequence of the declaration would be governed by Article 65 and not Article 58 of the Limitation Act. In Ashok Kumar v Gangadhar ( 2007 (2) ALD 313 ), a learned Single Judge of this Court while dealing with a suit for declaration of title and recovery possession, it was held as follows. “ … … If the contention of the defendants that Article 58 applies to the suit for possession based on title where declaration of title is also sought, is accepted, it would amount to ignoring the relief for recovery of possession and application of Article 65 to a suit for possession and taking away the right of the plaintiff to prove that the suit is within 12 years from the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. If such a suit were to be decided with reference to Article 58 on the ground that the declaration is sought for, application of Article 65 to the suit for possession would be rendered otiose. Such a construction would be opposed to all principles of interpretation of statutes. Therefore different Articles of the Limitation Act will have to be interpreted harmoniously. Such a construction would be opposed to all principles of interpretation of statutes. Therefore different Articles of the Limitation Act will have to be interpreted harmoniously. When such an interpretation is given to Articles 58 and 65 and when the suit is filed for declaration of title to the suit property with consequential relief of possession in my humble view Article 65 of the Limitation Act would apply and not Article 58 of the Limitation Act. … …”. 20. Learned counsel for both the parties have drawn my attention to the decision in Mechineni Chokka Rao v Sattu Sattamma (2006 (1) ALD 116). Relevant portions in paras 10 and 13 are extracted hereunder. “10. … … … It is obvious that Article 58 is in the nature of residuary provision among the declaratory suits. Indubitably the relief of declaration can be sought for in respect of an immovable property or movable property, or in respect of an instrument, or in respect of a decree, or in respect of an adoption. Thus, various types of declaratory reliefs can be sought for pertaining to those categories. Therefore, the relief of declaration alone appears to be not the criterion for prescribing the period of limitation but the subject-matter of the suit in respect of which the declaration is sought for, appears to be germane for consideration.” “13. The problem can be viewed in a different dimension. The right over an immovable property will get extinguished as can be seen from Section 27 of the Act only after the expiry of the period prescribed for filing the suit for possession as per Articles 64 and 65 of the Act. Therefore, if the period falls short of the requisite period of 12 years the right over an immovable property will not get extinguished. When the person has a right over an immovable property which right is not extinguished as yet, he can lay the suit in respect of an immovable property even praying for the relief of declaration at any time within the period of 12 years at the end of which, his right would get extinguished. When the person has a right over an immovable property which right is not extinguished as yet, he can lay the suit in respect of an immovable property even praying for the relief of declaration at any time within the period of 12 years at the end of which, his right would get extinguished. When we consider this clear mandate contained in Section 27 of the Act, it becomes manifest that a declaratory relief in respect of an immovable property can be sought for at any time within the period of 12 years after which the right will get automatically extinguished, notwithstanding the fact that Article 58, the residuary Article for filing declaratory suits, prescribes a period of three years limitation. … ….” In State of Maharashtra v Pravin Jethalal Kamdar (dead) by LRs ( AIR 2000 SC 1099 ), dealing with a case where possession has been taken under void documents, the Supreme Court held as follows. “6. … … … When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years. … … …”. 21. Article 58 of Limitation Act deals with relief of declaration whereas Article 65 of Limitation Act deals with recovery of possession of immovable property or interest therein, based on title. In the instant case, plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration in respect of suit ‘A’ schedule property and recovery of possession of suit ‘B’ schedule property. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and the ratio laid down in the cases referred supra, I have no hesitation to hold that the subject matter of the suit is governed by Article 65 of Limitation Act. The period of limitation in this case is 12 years from the date when the right to sue first accrued. As observed in para 14, in this case limitation starts with effect from 29.9.1994. As born out from trial court record, the present suit was filed on 07.2.2000. The plaintiffs filed the suit within 5 years 4 months and 8 days from the date when the right to sue first accrued. 22. In the light of the foregoing discussion, I am unable to countenance the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the suit is barred by limitation. The plaintiffs filed the suit within 5 years 4 months and 8 days from the date when the right to sue first accrued. 22. In the light of the foregoing discussion, I am unable to countenance the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the suit is barred by limitation. The finding of the trial court that the subject matter of the suit is governed by Article 58 of Limitation Act is not based on sound principles of law. I am agreeing with the findings of the first appellate court that the subject matter of the suit is governed by Article 65 of Limitation Act. Point No.3: 23. The predominant contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that Ex.A1 sale deed is not binding on the defendant. The contention of learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs is that the defendant is not entitled to challenge the validity of Ex.A1 sale deed. 24. There is no dispute between the parties about the execution of Ex.A1 sale deed by the father of defendant in favour of the first plaintiff, who is mother of plaintiffs 2 to 5. As per the averments in the written statement and the testimony of D.W.1, father of defendant is not competent to execute sale deed because he is an unsound-mind person. The father of the defendant was examined as P.W.2 in the trial court. As seen from the testimony of P.W.2, he executed sale deed in favour of his sister i.e., the first plaintiff. In the cross-examination, P.W.2 categorically deposed that he was terminated from service subsequent to execution of Ex.A1 sale deed. If really P.W.2 is an unsound-mind person, what prevented defendant to elicit the same. For the reasons best known, the defendant did not choose to elicit intellectual fatigue of P.W.2 at the time of execution of sale deed. The defendant did not file even a single scrap of paper to establish that P.W.2 was unsound-mind person as on the date of execution of Ex.A1 sale deed. 25. The trial court did not make any observation with regard to unsound-mind of P.W.2. If really P.W.2’s behaviour is abnormal, at the time of recording his evidence, the trial court might have observed the same in his deposition. In the absence of cogent and convincing evidence, it is unfair on the part of the court to treat an individual as an unsound-mind person. If really P.W.2’s behaviour is abnormal, at the time of recording his evidence, the trial court might have observed the same in his deposition. In the absence of cogent and convincing evidence, it is unfair on the part of the court to treat an individual as an unsound-mind person. The burden of proof lies on the defendant having taken a specific plea in the written statement that his father is an unsound-mind person. The defendant miserably failed to establish that his father is an unsound-mind person as on the date of execution of Ex.A1 sale deed. Viewed from any angle, the stand of the defendant that his father is an unsound-mind person is not legally sustainable. 26. Learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs has drawn my attention to the following decisions in Sannidhi Ratnavathi v Arava Narasimha Murthy ( 2003 (5) ALT 560 ), Dasari Anasuyamma v B.Hanumanthappa (2002 (3) ALT 778) and Agasti Karuna v Cherukuri Krishnaiah ( 1999 (5)ALT 494 ). The principle enunciated in the cases cited supra is that a minor can challenge the validity of a document executed by his natural guardian within 3 years from the date of attaining the age of majority. As per the recitals of Ex.A1 sale deed, father of the defendant sold suit schedule property to the first plaintiff for his family necessities. Being Kartha of joint family, he is entitled to sell even the ancestral property for his family necessities. At the time of recording of evidence, defendant was aged about 36 years, as per his own admission. The defendant was aged about 14 years as on the date of execution of Ex.A1 sale deed dated 03.7.1978. Even assuming, but not admitting, the defendant came to know about the execution Ex.A1 sale deed, after filing of R.C.C. by the first plaintiff in the year 1994, from then till date, he did not file a suit for declaration that Ex.A1 sale deed executed by his father is void and not binding on him. Viewed from factual or legal aspects, I am unable to accede to the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that Ex.A1 sale deed is non-est in the eye of law. 27. The courts below concurrently held that the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of declaration in respect of plaint ‘A’ schedule property, recovery of possession of suit ‘B’ schedule property and consequential relief. 27. The courts below concurrently held that the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of declaration in respect of plaint ‘A’ schedule property, recovery of possession of suit ‘B’ schedule property and consequential relief. The courts below have assigned cogent and valid reasons to its findings. It is a settled principle of law that this court cannot lightly interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below, while deciding second appeal, in view of Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure. There is no question of law much less substantial question of law in this appeal, which warrants interference of this court. 28. The second appeal is, therefore, dismissed, confirming the decree and judgment dated 20.12.2004 in A.S.No.109 of 2002 on the file of I Additional District Judge Court, Kurnool. The appellant/defendant shall vacate suit ‘B’ schedule property and deliver the same to respondents/plaintiffs within a period of three months from today. There shall be no order as to costs in this appeal. 29. The miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.