Judgment : Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J. 1. We have heard learned Sr. Adv. V.P.Seemandini, for the petitioners yesterday and today further, following the submissions made by her earlier on 29.11.2013. On that day, on the basis of the submissions made by the learned senior counsel and the queries raised by the Bench, the following order was minuted: “1. This Original Petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging, among other things, Ext.P20, an order rendered by the Kerala Administrative Tribunal. The petitioners before us were not parties to that Original Application. The litigation relates to the police service in Pathanamthitta district. The crux of the issues raised relates to the appointment in the District Armed Reserve and Armed Police Battalion. 2. Exts.P4, P5, P6 and P7 are four judgments issued by the Division Bench of this Court at different points of time. Ext.P10 is yet another judgment issued by the Division Bench in 2010. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners points out that Ext.P10 is grossly contrary to the rules governing the field and runs counter to the binding precedents as contained in Exts.P4 to P7. She also argued that Ext.P10 did not approach the questions appropriately and, though many of the answers were rendered during the earlier judgments, they were treated in Ext.P10 as either not deciding the issues or not binding as precedents. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that drastic civil consequences will flow out of the enforcement of Ext.P10 and the doctrine of sit back and other recognized principles of the service of jurisprudence stand to stare if the settled position as per the four Division Bench judgments, i.e., Exts.P4 to P7, is permitted to be upset after a long period of time either through Ext.P10 or the present Ext.P20 order of the Tribunal. 3. With all the aforesaid, we think that before we proceed to consider any of those aspects and also the very persuasive submission that the conflict between Ext.P10 on the one hand, and Exts.P4, P5, P6 and P7 on the other, deserves to be referred to a larger quorum, the question whether the petitioners could invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the first go, needs to be addressed primarily. We say this, more particularly, in the light of the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Rajeev Kumar v. Hemraj Singh Chauhan ( AIR 2010 SC 1679 ). We may note that, in one of the matters, an attempt was made to distinguish the said judgment before the Division Bench of this Court and in the decision reported in Gireesh Babu v. Pavithran [2013 (3) KLT 453], this Court had held that Rajeev Kumar (supra) was rendered pointedly referring to the law laid by the Constitutional Bench in Chandrakumar v. Union of India [ 1997 (3) SCC 261 ] and pointed out the finding in Rajeev Kumar (supra) that the High Court could not treat itself as a court of first instance in respect to service matter of employees who fall within the purview of the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. In Gireesh Babu (supra), Shama Prashant Raje v. Ganpatrao & Ors. [ 2000 (7) SCC 522 ] was also referred to, to argue that the aforesaid position notwithstanding, the sweep and content of Articles 226 and 227 would enable this Court to step out further, in given cases, as if it is not a court of appeal and if a perusal of the order of inferior Tribunal leads to the conclusion that it deserves to be interfered with on grounds enumerated in that precedent, interference could be made. Having bestowed consideration on that aspect as well, Gireesh Babu (supra) was decided holding that Shama Prashant Raje (supra) does not apply in preference to Rajeev Kumar (supra). 4. With the aforesaid, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners sought for some time to further examine the question of jurisdiction.” 2. In an attempt to show that this original petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is to be entertained by this Court, the learned senior counsel, today argued that the quality of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is wide enough and the High Court is empowered to deal with extraordinary situations without insisting on the petitioners taking recourse to the alternate statutory remedy, including under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. For this, dilating on the nature of reasoning in L.Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Others [ (1997) 3 SCC 261 ], she argued that the scope of jurisdiction of the Tribunals is, essentially, supplementary and not substitutory to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. Further, reference was made to T.K.Rangarajan v. Government of T.N. and Others [ (2003) 6 SCC 581 ] to point out that the High Court is empowered to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to meet unprecedented extraordinary situation having no parallel. Making pointed reference to the contents of paragraph No.5 of the judgment in T.K.Rangarajan (supra) as reported in SCC, it was further pointed out that, while it is true that extraordinary powers are required to be sparingly used, the facts of a given case, when reveal that it is a most extraordinary one which calls for interference by the High Court, the jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution could be invoked, notwithstanding the provisions in the Administrative Tribunals Act. She further argued that the crux of the issues is as to the correctness of Ext.P10 judgment rendered by the Division Bench in 2010. According to her, it runs contrary to the contents of Exts.P4 to P7 judgments, however that, the Tribunal, being an inferior authority, would be obliged in the hierarchy of judicial institutions to follow Ext.P10 judgment and therefore, no useful purpose will be served by the petitioners litigating before the Tribunal. Another submission made on behalf of the petitioners is that the findings in Ext.P10 judgment on the interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions are contrary to the well settled principles of interpretation of statutes and therefore, there is fair room within the framework of the law laid by the Apex Court in L.Chandra Kumar (supra) and T.K.Rangarajan (supra) to intervene. With this, she further submitted that on a rough estimate, above 40,000 employees through out the State would get entangled in litigations at different spheres on the question of seniority, reversion etc. on the basis of district-wise seniority lists that would be prepared or have already been prepared following the directions of the Tribunal to give effect to Ext.P10 judgment. 3. We have looked into the contents of Exts.P4 to P7 judgments visa- vis, the contents of Ext.P10 judgment. on the basis of district-wise seniority lists that would be prepared or have already been prepared following the directions of the Tribunal to give effect to Ext.P10 judgment. 3. We have looked into the contents of Exts.P4 to P7 judgments visa- vis, the contents of Ext.P10 judgment. On an anxious and deeper consideration, we deem it appropriate to dissuade ourselves, from stating anything further on the findings in those judgments vis-a-vis the arguments raised on the basis of the availability, efficacy and interpretation of the relevant Rules, including the question as to whether a particular Rule or substitution of a Rule was made with retrospective effect or not. We say so because, we would further proceed to consider the question whether we would entertain this original petition, notwithstanding the precedents noted in the order dated 29.11.2013 quoted above. 4. T.K.Rangarajan (supra) was a case, where there was en mass dismissal of employees in the Tamilnadu Government following strike. Above two lakhs Government employees were dismissed for going on strike. All those dismissal orders were without enquiry. Employees approached the High Court without moving the State Administrative Tribunal. The learned single Judge had granted interlocutory orders, inter alia, directing the State Government that the suspension and dismissal of employees without conducting any enquiry be kept in abeyance until further orders and such employees be directed to resume duty. In the meanwhile, the Government employees also filed writ petitions challenging the validity of the Tamilnadu Essential Services Maintenance Act, 2002 and also the Ordinance issued by the Tamilnadu Government. The State Government carried appeals to the Division Bench against the interim orders. The Division Bench held that the learned single Judge of the High Court could not have entertained the writ petitions letting the writ petitioners seek remedy from the High Court bypassing the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act. That led to appeals to the Supreme Court. Some applications under Article 32 of the Constitution of India were also filed before the Apex Court. The Honourable Supreme Court considered those matters and held that within the province of L.Chandra Kumar (supra), there was room for the writ court to entertain the applications, which were filed before it, since it was an unprecedented extraordinary situation having no parallel. It affected above two lakhs Government employees. That stultified the administration of a State. The Honourable Supreme Court considered those matters and held that within the province of L.Chandra Kumar (supra), there was room for the writ court to entertain the applications, which were filed before it, since it was an unprecedented extraordinary situation having no parallel. It affected above two lakhs Government employees. That stultified the administration of a State. The Apex Court also critically indicated the requirement to have sufficient number of members in the State Administrative Tribunal and held that when thousands of employees were directed to approach the Administrative Tribunal, the Tribunal would not be in a position to render justice to the cause. Their Lordships held in T.K.Rangarajan (supra) that because of very very exceptional circumstances that arose in that case, there was no justifiable reason for the High Court not to entertain the writ petitions on ground of alternate remedy under the Statute. 5. Here, in this case, Exts.P4 to P7 judgments were rendered at different points of time. Ext.P10 judgment was rendered in 2010. All that the Tribunal had done at one point of time was to direct the State Government to give effect to Ext.P10 judgment. Resultantly, seniority lists came into being. The correctness or otherwise of those are matters to be decided on different contentions that would arise inter partes, including as between employees staking rival claims to particular seniority positions. This calls for adjudication on questions of law, and more importantly, adjudication on questions of facts and material particulars as regards the employees involved in these litigations. It is not a case where all are affected by the same issue though Ext.P10 judgment may be cardinal in those litigations. 6. If we are to accept the submissions on behalf of the petitioners, we have to entertain the original petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, essentially as if it is against Ext.P10 judgment rendered by the Division Bench, and then, to proceed to consider any incongruity of Exts.P4 to P7 judgments on the one hand and Ext.P10 judgment on the other, to consider further whether such incongruity results in either conflict of decisions or that the findings in Ext.P10 judgment are to be visited at the hands of larger quorum. This exercise is to be carried out, going by the submissions, to consider the correctness of the seniority lists. This exercise is to be carried out, going by the submissions, to consider the correctness of the seniority lists. We think that this process, if resorted to, would necessarily be akin to saying that in the light of a binding precedent or decision of a superior court, a litigant can bypass the subordinate court and go to the superior court or tribunal. The situation created by the efficacy or binding nature of Ext.P10 judgment does not by itself make this an extraordinary one having no parallel, that could be taken to bring this litigation within the canopy of T.K.Rangarajan (supra). For the aforesaid reasons, we decline jurisdiction and this original petition is dismissed, preserving all other contentions on merits.