JUDGMENT S.C. Das, J. 1. By this application, filed under Article 227 of The Constitution of India, the petitioner, named above, sought for setting aside and/or revising the order, dated 28.07.2012, passed by the Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of Tripura, in Case No. Misc. Appl. 1/2011. Facts, as projected, may be summarized thus: The petitioner approached Sub-Divisional Magistrate (for shot SDM), Sadar, Agartala by filing an application under Article 187 of Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 (for short TLR & LR Act) seeking restoration of land illegally transferred to the possession of the respondent That application before the SDM was registered as Case No. 1/R/09 under Section 187 of TLR & LR Act. After hearing both side, by a details judgment & order, dated 31.03.2010, the petition for restoration was dismissed. Challenging the order, dated 31.03.2010, passed by SDM, petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 93(1)(b) of TLR & LR Act along with an application under Section 94(1)(a) of the said Act seeking condonation of delay of 76 days in filing the appeal before the Collector, West Tripura, Agartala. The prayer so made before the collector was registered as Revenue Case No. 337 of 2010 and the learned Collector, by impugned order dated 05.08.2011, refused to condone the delay on the ground that the delay in filing the appeal has not been explained to the satisfaction of the Court and accordingly, the appeal was not entertained. Challenging that order, dated 05.08.2011, passed by the Collector, the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 93(1)(c) of the TLR & LR Act before the State Government and the Secretary to the Revenue Department, Government of Tripura, after hearing both side, by impugned order dated 28.07.2012, upheld the order of the Collector, dated 05.08.2011 and accordingly, dismissed the appeal. Being unsuccessful before the SDM, appellate authority (DM & Collector) and the State Government (Secretary to the State Government) the petitioner now filed the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution seeking redress challenging the orders, passed by the Collector as well as the Secretary to the Government, as aforesaid. 2. Heard learned senior counsel, Mr. A.K. Bhowmik assisted by learned counsel, Mr. R. Datta for the petitioner and learned senior counsel, Mr. K.N. Bhattacharjee assisted by learned counsel, Mr. S. Acharjee for the respondent. 3. The following points emerged for decision in this writ petition. 2. Heard learned senior counsel, Mr. A.K. Bhowmik assisted by learned counsel, Mr. R. Datta for the petitioner and learned senior counsel, Mr. K.N. Bhattacharjee assisted by learned counsel, Mr. S. Acharjee for the respondent. 3. The following points emerged for decision in this writ petition. (i) Whether the petition, filed by the petitioner, before the Collector for condonation of delay under Section 94(1)(a) of the TLR & LR Act, can be treated as one under Section 5 of the Limitation Act? (ii) Whether the appeal, filed before the State Government under Section 93(1)(c) challenging the order, passed in Revenue Case No. 337/2010, by the Collector, West Tripura, Agartala, was maintainable? (iii) Whether the decision of the Collector in refusing the prayer for condonation of delay was perverse or beyond jurisdiction? (iv) Whether the order, passed by the Secretary to the Government of Tripura, affirming the order of Collector was perverse or beyond jurisdiction? (v) Whether the impugned judgment & order, passed by the Secretary to the Government of Tripura, affirming the order of Collector was liable to be interfered by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India? (vi) Whether the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply in a revenue appeal in view of the law of limitation prescribed in Section 94 of the TLR & LR Act? 4. Decision on Point Nos. (i) and (ii). Learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhowmik has submitted that the petitioner challenging judgment and order dated 31.03.2010, passed by the SDM, Sadar, Agartala, West Tripura, filed an appeal under Section 93(1)(b) of the TLR & LR Act along with a separate application under Section 94(1)(a) of the said Act praying for condonation of delay of 76 days in filing the appeal. According to learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhowmik, though the application for condonation of delay was made under Section 94(1)(a) of TLR & LR Act, it should be treated as a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the Collector considered the petition accordingly. Per contra, it is submitted by learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhattacharjee that there is no provision prescribed under Section 94(1)(a) of the TLR & LR Act for condonation of delay and therefore, such an application was liable to be nipped in the bud by the Collector. Per contra, it is submitted by learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhattacharjee that there is no provision prescribed under Section 94(1)(a) of the TLR & LR Act for condonation of delay and therefore, such an application was liable to be nipped in the bud by the Collector. Since there is no provision for condonation of delay under Section 94 of the TLR & LR Act and since the petitioner could not make out a case for consideration from the very inception, therefore, the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is also liable to be dismissed. Section 94 of the TLR & LR Act reads thus: 94. (1) No appeal shall lie,- (a) In the case of a first appeal, after the expiry of thirty days from the date of the order appealed against; and (b) In the case of a second appeal, after the expiry of sixty days from the date of the order appealed against. (2) In computing the above periods, the time required to obtain copies of the order appealed against shall be excluded. Admittedly, there is nothing in the above provision, prescribing there under, to present an application for condonation of delay. However, the petitioner prayed for condonation of delay before the Collector referring the above provision. The Collector considered the application, treating it as a petition for condonation of delay and rejected the same assigning reason that the petitioner failed to explain the delay. A petition should be read and understood, considering its contents and not only looking to the provisions mentioned in the title head of the petition. The Collector read the contents of the petition and recorded his decision, treating it as a petition for condonation of delay, as prescribed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and in my considered opinion, there is nothing wrong done by the inferior Revenue Court in considering such an application treating the same as one under the Limitation Act. The point as to whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply or not will be discussed later on at the time of deciding point No. (vi). I find no merit in the arguments advanced by learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhattacharjee, on this point. It has also been contended by the learned senior counsel, Mr. The point as to whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply or not will be discussed later on at the time of deciding point No. (vi). I find no merit in the arguments advanced by learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhattacharjee, on this point. It has also been contended by the learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhattacharjee that an appeal under Section 93(1)(c) of the TLR & LR Act was maintainable only against an original order. While the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 93(1)(b) along with a separate application under Section 94(1)(a) of the TLR & LR Act and that has been dismissed by the Collector, the second appeal before the State Government under Section 93(1)(c) was also not maintainable and the Secretary to the State Government was bound to dismiss it at the threshold. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhowmik, on the other hand, has submitted that the appeal filed under the Section 93(1)(b) before the Collector was not at all taken to consideration and not disposed of on merit. Simply the application filed for condonation of delay was taken to consideration and order was passed by the Collector, should be treated as an original order and so, appeal before the State Government (Secretary, Revenue Department) under Section 93(1)(c) was maintainable. Admittedly, the petitioner preferred the appeal under Section 93(1)(b), before the Collector with a separate application for condonation of delay. Order dated 5.8.2011, makes it clear that the Collector passed the order only taking into consideration, the application filed for condonation of delay and did not entertain the appeal holding that the appeal was time barred and dismissed the application for condonation of delay by the impugned order. Therefore, since the appeal was not taken into consideration after condoning the delay, learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhowmik, in my considered opinion, rightly contended that it should be treated as an original order, passed by the Collector, against which an appeal shall lie before the State Government under Section 93(1)(c) of the TLR and LR Act. 5. Decision on point Nos. (iii), (iv) and (v). 5.1. Admittedly, the original order was passed by the SDM on 31.03.2010 and appeal before the Collector was preferred on 21.07.2010 i.e. after 112 days. Section 94, as already reproduced, herein above, prescribed a period of 30 days limitation for filing an appeal. 5. Decision on point Nos. (iii), (iv) and (v). 5.1. Admittedly, the original order was passed by the SDM on 31.03.2010 and appeal before the Collector was preferred on 21.07.2010 i.e. after 112 days. Section 94, as already reproduced, herein above, prescribed a period of 30 days limitation for filing an appeal. Excluding the time of 6 days spent for obtaining the certified copy and the period of limitation prescribed for presenting the appeal i.e. 30 days, there was delay of 76 days in preferring the appeal. In his application, filed under Section 94(1)(a) seeking condonation of delay of 76 days the petitioner stated that after the order was passed by the SDM he thought that he had no other remedy. Accordingly, he passed 20 days due to passivity and thereafter, fallen ill because of fracture injury for which he was in bed rest for 42 days and thereafter, his son contacted a lawyer and then taken a decision to file the appeal. The Collector considering the petition as well as the written objection and after hearing the learned counsel of both side rejected the prayer for condonation of delay with the following order: ORDER 05.08.2011 Ld. Advocate Shri Binoy Deb Barma and Ld. Advocate Shri Debasish Saha are present for the appellant. Ld. Advocate, Shri Ranjit Deb Nath is present for the respondent. Heard the Ld. Advocates for the parties on the petition of condonation of 76 days delay in filing the case. The respondent filed written objection against the condonation prayer. Ld. Advocate for the both parties have made oral submission along with rulings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in support of their contentions. In the condonation petition the appellant has stated that there has been delay of 76 days in filing the appeal petition from the date order dated 31.03.2010 passed by the SDM Sadar in Restoration Case No. 1/8/09 U/S 187 of the TLR & LR Act 1960 due to, inter alia sustaining after expire of 20 days from the judgment fracture injury his right leg for which he had to undergo medial treatment. In support of his statement the appellant has produced medical prescription. In support of his statement the appellant has produced medical prescription. In his written objection the respondent contended that in Sub Section (1) of section 94 of the TLR & LR Act 1960, Law has created a complete bar to file an appeal after expiry of 30 days from the date of order excluding the time required for obtain certified copy of the order. It has been also contended that plea of ignorance of law is not acceptable in law. Moreover, the appellant respondent himself by his Lawyer before the SDM Sadar and conducted the case under his instruction. So the ground that the appellant is a rustic tribal people ignorance of law is not acceptable. On perusal of the documents produced by the appellant it appears that the appellant obtained certified copy of the order dated 31.03.2010 on 6.4.2010 and as such last date for filing appeal petition was 5.5.10 excluding the time required for obtaining certified copy of the order. As per medical prescription the appellant went to the Doctor for medical treatment on 28.5.10 i.e. after about two months from the order not after 20 days as stated in the condonation petition. There is no explanation for the delay for the period in between 5.5.10 to 28.5.10 and sufficient cause for such delay for this period is absent. In view of the above, condonation prayer is rejected. Consequently the appeal is not admitted. Sd/- District Collector West Tripura. 5.2. The Collector has clearly held that there is no explanation of delay for the period from 05.05.2010 to 28.05.2010. The above order of the Collector was challenged before the State Government preferring the appeal which was registered as Misc. Appeal No. 1/2011 and by the impugned judgment & order dated 28.07.2012, the Secretary to the Revenue Department, quoting the above order of the Collector upheld the same and dismissed the appeal holding that there was no ground to set aside the order passed by the Collector. 5.3. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhowmik, strenuously argued that the petitioner is a member of the Scheduled Tribe community and was not aware of the law of limitation after the judgment was passed by the SDM. He was upset and he thought that the judgment, once passed, is final and therefore, after taking certified copy of the judgment he did not immediately take step for preferring appeal. He was upset and he thought that the judgment, once passed, is final and therefore, after taking certified copy of the judgment he did not immediately take step for preferring appeal. He had fallen ill thereafter and as such, a total delay of 76 days occasioned in preferring the appeal. The Collector had taken hyper technical view in counting the days holding that delay for the period between 05.05.2010 to 28.05.2010 has not been explained at all and that the Collector would presume in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained. Learned senior counsel has also contended that it is settled law that an appeal is a statutory right of a litigant and if some explanation has been assigned regarding the delay in preferring the appeal, it should be entertained and disposed of on merit rather dismissing it on the technical ground of limitation. The Collector and the Secretary to the Government, both utterly failed to consider the true spirit and the principles followed in respect of the condonation of delay and they have taken a hyper technical view of disposing the appeal, on the technical ground of limitation, while they had the scope to dispose the same on merit. In view of such disposal of the appeal, on the ground of limitation, a valuable right of the petitioner to agitate the appeal on most cogent grounds have been nipped in the bud and therefore, to ensure ends of justice this Court exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may ensure justice to the petitioner. In support of his contention, learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhowmik relied on the following case laws: (i) (2005) 3 SCC 752 : State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok Ao & Ors. (ii) AIR 2012 Gauhati 91: Utpal Roy Barman Vs. Kiriti Roy Barman & Anr. 5.4. In contrast, appearing for the respondent, learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhattacharjee, has submitted that there is no law to distinguish a tribal person with other person in general for considering a petition, filed after expiry of the period of limitation. Lipok Ao & Ors. (ii) AIR 2012 Gauhati 91: Utpal Roy Barman Vs. Kiriti Roy Barman & Anr. 5.4. In contrast, appearing for the respondent, learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhattacharjee, has submitted that there is no law to distinguish a tribal person with other person in general for considering a petition, filed after expiry of the period of limitation. The petitioner knowing fully well about the redress prescribed under Section 187 of the Act, preferred petition before the SDM and immediately thereafter obtained certified copy of the order, but thereafter, he was sitting idle knowing fully well that he has no case at all to prefer an appeal and therefore, the petitioner in Para 4 of the petition for condonation of delay clearly stated that he was suffering from passivity and thereafter, he had fallen ill. Since the discretionary power has been exercised by the Collector which is affirmed by the State Government, there is no scope for this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, to interfere with the order passed by the subordinate Revenue Courts. Learned senior counsel further contended that the words "sufficient cause" should be considered with its true spirit. It is not a mere formality or a ritual that whatever has been stated in the petition for condonation of delay it should be entertained, even if the reason is not satisfactory or convincing to the conscience of the particular Court of law. It is submitted that the petitioner has utterly failed to assign any reason at all for the delay, during the period from 05.05.2010 to 28.05.2010 and therefore, the Collector has rightly rejected the petition applying judicious discretion. This Court is required to exercise its supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution most sparingly and while the discretionary order has been passed by the Collector and affirmed by the appellate authority, and having the order not suffering from any perversity or want of jurisdiction, learned senior counsel, has submitted that this Constitutional Court should not interfere in the order. In support of his contention, learned senior counsel has relied on the following case laws: (i) AIR 2012 Delhi 97: Sudhir kr. Anand Vs. Dr. Vijay Kr. Anand & Ors. (ii) (2001) 1 GLR 327: Union of India Vs. Wood Crafts products Ltd. & Anr. 5.5. The law of limitation is an adjective law. In support of his contention, learned senior counsel has relied on the following case laws: (i) AIR 2012 Delhi 97: Sudhir kr. Anand Vs. Dr. Vijay Kr. Anand & Ors. (ii) (2001) 1 GLR 327: Union of India Vs. Wood Crafts products Ltd. & Anr. 5.5. The law of limitation is an adjective law. It is lex fori. Rules of limitation are, prima facie, rules of procedure and do not create any right in favour of any person nor do they define or create causes of action but simply prescribes that the remedy can be exercised only up to a certain period and not subsequently. The statute of limitation, it has been said, is a statute of repose, peace and justice. It is one of repose because it extinguishes stale demands and quiets title. In the wards of John Voet, controversies are restricted to a fixed period of time least they should become immortal while men are mortal. It secures peace as it ensures security of rights; and it secures justice as by lapse of time evidence in support of rights may be destroyed. There can thus be no doubt that it rests on sound policy. The operation of law of prescription has been explained by Lord Plunket in a striking metaphor. He stated that time holds in one hand, a scythe and in the other, an hour glass. The scythe mows down the evidence of our rights, while the hour glass measures the period which renders the evidence superfluous. Commenting on this, a learned author observes that the framework of the hour glass would certainly decay, the glass be broken and the send escapes. 5.6 Annexure-3 to this writ petition is a copy of petition, filed by the petitioner before the Collector, seeking condonation of delay of 76 days. The Collector by his impugned order, dated 05.08.2011 (Annexure-5), has held that the judgment by SDM was passed on 31.03.2010 and the petitioner obtained certified copy on 06.04.2010. He was supposed to file the appeal within 30 days i.e. within 05.05.2010. He produced a medical Certificate showing his ailment from 28.05.2010 and therefore, the Collector arrived at a conclusion that there was no explanation given by he petitioner about the period from 05.05.2010 to 28.05.2010. He was supposed to file the appeal within 30 days i.e. within 05.05.2010. He produced a medical Certificate showing his ailment from 28.05.2010 and therefore, the Collector arrived at a conclusion that there was no explanation given by he petitioner about the period from 05.05.2010 to 28.05.2010. Paras 3, 4 and 5 of the petition, seeking condonation of delay, (Annexure-3), are relevant where the petitioner had tried to explain the reasons for the delay occasioned in filing the appeal which reads thus: 3. That, due to ignorance of law and misconception as the Appellant is rustic tribal person as well as he has sustained fracture injury in the right leg of fibula and undergone treatment of Doctor Pradyot Basak, M.S. (Ortho) which has prompted the appellant petitioner to file this petition as prescribed by Section 94(1)(a) of T.L.R. & L.R. Act, 1960 for an Order condoning the aforesaid delay of 76 days. 4. That, the Appellant Petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause/reasons from filing the appeal within time and that delay is not deliberate, but because of fact that being frustrated with the Judgment the Appellant Petitioner as a rustic tribal person presume that there is scope to challenge the impugned Judgment before the appropriate Court of law. Accordingly 20 days out of 76 days of delay have been occurred due to the passivity on the part of the Appellant petitioner. 5. That, after expiry of the said 20 days, the Appellant petitioner has unfortunately, sustained fracture injury on his right leg, and he has undergone treatment of Dr. Pradyot Basak, M.S. (Ortho) and his leg has been plastered and as such, as per advise of the Doctor, the Appellant Petitioner had been lying bed rest for 42 days after expiry of 20 days from the judgment. Accordingly, on that very date the Appellant petitioner had attended in the Chamber of the Doctor and after through checkup the doctor advised the appellant petitioner to attend the Chamber after the next 7(seven) days, and accordingly his plaster was removed on that date with some advise to follow-up. A bare reading of the above statements does not specify as to from which date to which date the petitioner was suffering from passivity and from which date to which date the petitioner was suffering from fracture injury. Suffering from passivity cannot be treated as a ground for condonation of delay. A bare reading of the above statements does not specify as to from which date to which date the petitioner was suffering from passivity and from which date to which date the petitioner was suffering from fracture injury. Suffering from passivity cannot be treated as a ground for condonation of delay. Ignorance of law also cannot be treated as a good ground for condonation of delay as has been rightly held by the Collector. No document placed on record before this Court in support of the contention of the petitioner, made in the petition, seeking condonation of delay. The Collector, therefore, seems to have considered the grounds assigned by the petitioner for the delay, in its right perspective and there is no perversity in the finding of the Collector. 5.7. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhowmik referring the case of Lipok Ao & Ors. (supra) contended that "sufficient cause" is no doubt a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary discretion vested in the Court and while considering the cause of delay, the Court should not only count the length of delay but the sufficiency of the causes and shortness of the delay (emphasis supplied) which should be the yardstick of consideration while exercising jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In that reported case, Government-appellant failed to file the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation for the reasons that the file was misplaced and thereafter, some time also spent in the bureaucratic process for taking decision in filing the appeal. The prayer for condonation of delay in filing the appeal was rejected by the appellate-Court and on appeal the Supreme Court has observed: Proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary discretion vested in the court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard-and-fast rules. The government decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. The government decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression 'sufficient cause' should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather then the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach injustice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorize the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal, needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while the State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. In the case of Utpal Roy Barman (supra), as referred by learned senior counsel, Mr. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while the State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. In the case of Utpal Roy Barman (supra), as referred by learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhowmik, the Division Bench of this Court, in a partition suit, where after the preliminary decree was passed, the parties spent time for an amicable settlement and while the attempt for an amicable settlement failed, appeal was preferred but after 67 days of the limitation and while condoning the delay the Court held thus: There should not be hyper technical approach while considering the condonation of delay, but while considering inordinate delay the Court must find the sufficient explanation for condoning such delay. The basic principle is to adopt a liberal approach keeping an eye to the substantive justice and not to take a pedantic approach to reject the prayer for condonation of delay for some lapses. The Court should not run after finding fault rather it should balance between the gravity of the right that would be affected for rejection of the prayer for condonation and the approach that the Court thinks to be appropriate in the given circumstances of the facts. So far explaining the delay sufficiently in concerned, the Court should not also rush for finding the mathematical precision in explaining the delay, it should be satisfied with the broader spectrum of the explanation that has been provided in the petition. Thus, where in suit for partition of joint family property after passing of preliminary decree exercise was undertaken for amicable partition outside the Court and delay of 67 days in filing appeal occasioned since there was change of lawyer for preparing of memo of appeal and the delay was not inordinate which if not condoned right of appeal available with appellant would be scuttled forever and he would be deprived of that right, it was held that delay of 67 days was sufficiently explained and it was liable to be condoned. In both the cases, referred by learned senior counsel, Mr. In both the cases, referred by learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhowmik, the facts and circumstances are different Reasons for delay were generally explained but in the present case, no explanation given for the delay, so far mentioned in the order of the Collector and therefore, the ratio of those decisions, referred by learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhowmik, cannot be applied. 5.8. As referred by learned senior counsel of the respondent, Mr. Bhattacharjee, in Union of India and Ors. (supra) the Division Bench of this Court observed in para 16 thus: The term 'sufficient cause' is not defined under Section 2 of the Limitation Act, but the same, it means and so far has been construed as beyond control of the party seeking indulgence for extension of the period of limitation. But from a fare perusal of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and its preamble, it manifests that Limitation Act is an exhaustive code governing the law of limitation in respect of matters specially dealt with by it. This is why the Law of Limitation is a panacea to prevent disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity of justice or what may have been lost by the parties or inaction/negligence of laches. The Courts are not permitted to travel beyond the provisions of the Act or to Supplement them. The court cannot grant exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship [Para-16]. In the case of Sudhir Kr. Anand (supra) the single Bench of Delhi High Court in the given facts and circumstances of that case held thus: Delay is one of the facets which controls the exercise of judicial discretion vested in the Court under the provision of S. 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The words 'sufficient cause' for not making the application within the period of limitation, no doubt, is to be applied in a reasonable manner but, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Party has to give satisfactory explanation. Unless sufficient cause is explained for condonation of delay, prayer may not be granted. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the party and its bona fide. The Court has to see whether substantial justice would be done by condoning the delay. Party has to give satisfactory explanation. Unless sufficient cause is explained for condonation of delay, prayer may not be granted. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the party and its bona fide. The Court has to see whether substantial justice would be done by condoning the delay. It cannot be overlooked that on expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for seeking legal remedy, rights accrue in favour of other side. 5.9 The words "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. In the case at hand, the petitioner himself stated in Para 4 of the petition seeking condonation of delay that after the judgment was passed by the SDM, he was suffering from passivity and therefore, immediately did not take any step for filing an appeal though certified copy was obtained which means the petitioner was negligent and did not take action immediately after obtaining the certified copy and even did not consult with his lawyer, who was engaged to conduct his case and such negligence or inaction is definitely imputable to the petitioner. True, that a liberal approach is to be given and sufficient cause must be construed in a pragmatic manner and it is not expected that the Courts are giving pedantic approach calling upon the party to explain every day's delay. The Supreme Court in the Case of G. Ramagowda Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer AIR 1988 SC 897 held- There is no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case, will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay. The Supreme Court in the Case of Ram Nath Sao Vs. The Supreme Court in the Case of Ram Nath Sao Vs. Gobardhan Sao AIR 2002 SC 1201 has held- The expression 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. Whether explanation furnished would constitute 'sufficient cause' or not will be dependant upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. However courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed, a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not lightly be defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. However by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merits. The courts should strike balance between the resultant effect of the order it was going to pass upon the parties either way. The Collector, in the case at hand, has held that the delay for a particular period has not been explained at all assigning any reason and therefore, under such circumstances, I find nothing to held that the order passed by the Collector and affirmed by the Secretary to the Government has been suffering from perversity, in any manner. They have exercised their discretionary powers assigning reason which do not call for interference by this Court in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution. 5.10. Let us now turn to the jurisdiction, vested in this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution and how far this power can be exercised and under what circumstances. They have exercised their discretionary powers assigning reason which do not call for interference by this Court in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution. 5.10. Let us now turn to the jurisdiction, vested in this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution and how far this power can be exercised and under what circumstances. Interference under Article 227, so far now has been settled cannot be resorted to merely because the High Court takes a different view on the merits. Generally, it is limited to want of jurisdiction, errors of law, perverse findings, gross violation of natural justice and so on. The power does not vest the High Court with any unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the inferior Court or Tribunal. The High Court is not required to interfere with a finding of fact within the jurisdiction of inferior Court or Tribunal except where it is perverse or not based on any material, or the conclusion arrived at is such that no reasonable court or Tribunal could passively have come to, or it resulted in manifest injustice. The exercise of power by the High Court must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. The Apex Court in the case of Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai & Ors. [ (2003) 6 SCC 675 ], while commenting on the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, has held- On the other hand, supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact of law unless the following requirements are satisfied - (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. In the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil [ (2010) 8 SCC 329 ] the Supreme Court has held- Article 227 can be invoked by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievances. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline. The object of superintendence under Article 227, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. In the case of Jai Singh & Ors. Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr. [(2010)) 9 SCC 385] the Apex Court has held: The High court, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals, exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The High Court is vested with the powers of superintendence and/or judicial revision, even in matters where no revision or appeal lies to the High Court. The jurisdiction under this Article is, in some ways, wider than the power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is, however, well to remember the well-known adage that greater the power, greater the care and caution in exercise thereof. The High Court is, therefore, expected to exercise such wide powers with great care, caution and circumspection. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognized constraints. It can not be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop' to correct all errors of judgment of a court, or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Law laid down by the Apex Court in the above noted cases makes it clear that under Article 227 of the Constitution the High Court should not ordinarily interfere in the order, passed by the inferior Court or Tribunal, which do not suffer from the error of jurisdiction, perversity or so on and since in the present case, the Collector exercised his discretionary power within the ambit of his jurisdiction and there is nothing to show perversity or violation of the fundamental principles of justice, I think, this Court shall not interfere in the decision arrived at by the inferior revenue Courts. Further, I would like to refer the case of Dinkar Sridhar Tamhankar Vs. Bhalchandra Sadashiv Kavadi reported in (2009) 7 SCC 514 ] and the case of Dipali Dey (Baxi) Vs. Mira Das reported in (2009) 11 SCC 495 , wherein the Apex Court discouraged the interference by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of the concurrent finings of two inferior Courts, on an issue challenged before High court under Article 227 of the Constitution, where perversity or want of jurisdiction of the inferior Courts could not be made out. 5.11 In view of the discussions, made above, so far the law has been settled by the Apex Court, I think, this Court is not required to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, in the given facts and circumstances of the case in hand. I would like to gainfully further refer here an observation made by the Apex Court in the case of Gurdev Kaur Vs. Kaki & Ors. reported in (2007) 1 SCC 546 and in that case, while deciding a second appeal, the Court has observed- In judicial hierarchy finality is absolutely important because that gives certainty to the law. Even in the interest of litigants themselves it may not be unreasonable to draw a line in respect of the two different categories of litigation where procedure will say at a certain stage that questions of fact have been decided by the lower courts and the matter should be allowed to rest where it lies without any further appeal. This may be somewhat harsh to an individual litigant; but, in the larger interest of the administration of justice, this view seems to us to be juristically sound and pragmatically wise. 6. Decision on point No. (VI). We have already reproduced herein above, Section 94 of TLR & LR Act which prescribes limitation for filing an appeal. Admittedly, there is no provision prescribed for condonation of delay after the expiry of the limitation so prescribed. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes thus: 29(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 is directly applicable to the suit, appeal or application for which limitation has been prescribed in the Schedule of that Act. The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 is directly applicable to the suit, appeal or application for which limitation has been prescribed in the Schedule of that Act. TLR & LR Act is a special enactment or a local law and it has prescribed limitation for filing an appeal under that Act. There is nothing in Section 94 of the TLR & LR Act, that the provisions shall apply, notwithstanding the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. The application of the Limitation Act has not been expressly excluded by the TLR & LR Act and so, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 shall apply in respect of limitation on an appeal filed under Section 94 of the TLR & LR Act. The issue has been dealt with by this court in the case of Rishi Das Sarma Vs. State of Tripura reported in AIR 2010 Guwahati 31. Relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in AIR 1989 SC 1477 : Smt. Lata Kamal Vs. Vilas and AIR 1995 SC 2272 : Mukri Gopalan Vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker this Court has held that the provision of section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable when an appeal is preferred under Section 93 of the TLR & LR Act, subject to sufficient cause of delay in preferring the appeal is explained. There is no reason for me to arrive at a different conclusion on this point, where the TLR & LR Act has simply prescribed a period of limitation and has not excluded the application of Limitation Act expressly, the provisions prescribed in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall apply in respect of an appeal under Section 93 of the TLR & LR Act. In view of the discussions, made above, I find no merit in the application, filed under Article 227 of the Constitution and it stands dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. Application dismissed