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2013 DIGILAW 11 (GUJ)

Rameshbhai Jayendrabhai Modi v. State of Gujarat

2013-01-10

N.V.ANJARIA

body2013
ORDER : 1. Rule. In the facts and circumstances of the case and with consent of learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, the Revision Application is taken up for its final hearing and disposal today. 1.1 Learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. L.R. Pujari waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of respondent-State. The record including the order dated 07th November, 2012 shows that though served, non-appears for respondent No.2. Even after 07th November, 2012, the matter was thrice adjourned and was on board. 2. The applicant herein is aggrieved by the order dated 01st March, 2012 passed below application Exhibit 11 by learned 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Nadiad in the proceedings of Criminal Appeal No.04 of 2010. The Exhibit 11 was an application under Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 whereby the applicant-accused sought permission to lead further evidence. 3. The relevant facts may be summarised first. Respondent No.2-original complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereafter referred to as `the Act'), whose case was that he and the accused were close in relation, and since the accused was in need of money, upon demand by him, the applicant gave cheque of Rs.2,00,000/- dated 17th August, 2007 drawn on Bank of Baroda, Santhpipali Branch, Nadiad, which was returned dishonoured when deposited with the Bank on the ground of "insufficient funds". The respondent No.2 stated in his complaint that therefore, he issued notice to the applicant-accused dated 22nd August, 2007 through advocate by Registered A.D. Post as well as Under Certificate of Posting and the notice sent as UPC was served. The learned 4th Additional Senior Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate (First Class), Nadiad by his judgment and order dated 24th December, 2009 convicted the applicant for the offence under Section 138 of the Act and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for six months and to pay fine of Rs.2,000/- and to undergo further one month's simple imprisonment in default of payment of fine. The applicant-accused thereafter filed Criminal Appeal No.04 of 2010 before the Court of learned District and Sessions Judge, Kheda at Nadiad against the said judgment and order of conviction and sentence. 3.1 In the said proceedings of Criminal Appeal, the applicant moved an application under Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as `the Code'). The applicant-accused thereafter filed Criminal Appeal No.04 of 2010 before the Court of learned District and Sessions Judge, Kheda at Nadiad against the said judgment and order of conviction and sentence. 3.1 In the said proceedings of Criminal Appeal, the applicant moved an application under Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as `the Code'). It is the case of the accused that due to ignorance, he failed to supply all the documents to his lawyer and he wants to lead evidence on the point that the notice upon dishonour of cheque issued under Section 138 of the Act by the complainant was not served on him. It was stated that at the relevant time he was not staying at the address where it was sent and as per his information, the postal endorsements are also there on the envelope. He prayed that he wanted to produce the documentary proof about the place of his service at that time, the ration card and also wanted to examine the responsible officer of the firm where he was serving. 3.2 The learned 6th Additional Sessions Judge by the impugned order dismissed the said application Exhibit 11, resting on the ground that sufficient opportunity were given to the applicant-accused and in the proceedings of the Criminal Case, his testimony was recorded and thereafter the evidence was closed. The learned Sessions Judge took the view that the application was filed with an intention to prolong the proceedings for one or another excuse and thus, was not liable to be entertained. 4. Learned advocate Mr. K. H. Bakshi for the applicant submitted that Section 391 of the Code gives discretion to the Appellate Court to take further evidence, if it thinks fit that additional evidence is necessary. It was submitted that the accused wanted to lead evidence on the material aspect, whether the notice was served on him or not. He submitted that notice sent by UPC alone was stated to have been served and therefore, it is not clear that whether it actually reached the applicant. It was submitted that at the relevant time of sending of notice, the applicant was not staying at the address of notice and had left the house. It was submitted that in dismissing the application, the learned Judge did not exercise his discretion judiciously. 5. It was submitted that at the relevant time of sending of notice, the applicant was not staying at the address of notice and had left the house. It was submitted that in dismissing the application, the learned Judge did not exercise his discretion judiciously. 5. On consideration of facts emerging from record and on going through the judgment and order of the learned Judicial Magistrate, it appears that the notice dated 22nd August, 2007 was sent by Registered A.D. Post which returned unserved. It was the case of the accused that from July, 2007 onwards all members of his family had left the house and came back after one year. Learned Magistrate records from the evidence of the complainant that in his cross-examination he has accepted about he having quarrel with the accused in July, 2007 and at that time since the accused was heavily indebted, he left the town of Nadiad. In his evidence, the accused also stated about creditors coming to his house and office and in an incident, he had to lodge a police complaint as the creditors had abused and had beaten up his wife and out of fear, they had thereafter left. 5.1 When the applicant was asked whether he wanted to examine any witnesses in his further statement under Section 313 of the Code, he replied in the affirmative that he wanted to examine witnesses. Thus the contention of the applicant-accused was that he wanted to lead further evidence about service of notice, and the same was in the background of above-mentioned facts on record. The observation and finding regarding service of notice was that the notice sent by UPC had not returned but one sent by Registered Post A.D. Returned with endorsement "not found". The proper service of notice in the proceedings for offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is an important requirement of law, which is emphasised by Courts. The decision in Harman Electronics Private Limited and another v. National Panasonic India Private Limited [ (2009) 1 SCC 720 ] highlights importance of service of notice in proceedings under section 138 of the Act. The decision in Harman Electronics Private Limited and another v. National Panasonic India Private Limited [ (2009) 1 SCC 720 ] highlights importance of service of notice in proceedings under section 138 of the Act. It is held and observed that it is one thing to say that presumption is raised where notice is served, but it is another thing to say that service of notice may not be held to be of any significance or may be held to be wholly unnecessary. 5.2 It is further observed that presumption raised in support of service of notice would depend upon facts of each case and that presumption has to be raised on the facts and not on mere hypothesis or surmises. It is emphasised that sending of notice is one of the ingredients for maintaining the complaint under Section 138 of the Act. At the same time it is another thing to say that dishonour of cheque by itself constitutes an offence. In order to prove offence under Section 138 of the Act, ingredients and conditions of the provision are required to be proved. It the notice given by the complainant in accordance with the provisions upon dishonour of cheque and duly served on accused would give rise to cause of action. It is also observed that issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action, but communication of notice would. 5.3 In Gautambhai Bababhai alias Shantibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and another [ 2012(2) GLR 1073 ], this Court held that additional evidence under Section 391 of the Code in appeal has to be allowed in a case where the fact if proved, goes to the root of the matter, or it affects conviction of a person. The said case also arose from the proceedings under Section 138 of the Act and the applicant of that case wanted to lead additional evidence in the appeal by examining Manager of the Bank to prove that the cheques which were dishonoured were not signed by him, nor were drawn from the bank account maintained by him. In that case too the Court below taking view that at the time of trial, the applicant was given opportunity to lead evidence. In that case too the Court below taking view that at the time of trial, the applicant was given opportunity to lead evidence. 5.4 It was inter alia observed in Gautambhai Patel (supra), that since the contention of the accused was that the cheques in question did not belong to him and the same were not drawn from his bank account, if such fact is proved, it may end up with a situation where the accused may not be convicted. It was, therefore, reasoned that when the accused wanted to bring such important aspect by leading further evidence, the same was required to be granted. In that case also, it was specific case of the applicant-accused in his further statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code that cheques did not belong to him. 6. The prayer of the applicant-accused for permitting him to lead further evidence on the point of service of notice is required to be appreciated in light of the above legal position and the importance of service of notice. It is an important aspect in the proceedings, which the applicant wants to prove and for that, he wants to lead further evidence. The ultimate criteria for invoking provision of Section 391 of the Code is to accord fair opportunity to the accused in a trial and to see that hands of justice are properly served. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, application ought not to have been dismissed by the Court below. It is also trite that application under Section 391 of the Code for additional evidence can be considered at a later stage where the facts sought to be proved have their bearing on the ultimate result. In [ (2001) 4 SCC 759 ], it is said by the Apex Court that it is the concept of justice which ought to prevail and in the ultimate analysis, the same would dictate the exercise of powers under Section 391 of the Code. The reasons supplied by the trial Court in rejecting the application that the accused had opportunity during the trial or that application is filed to delay the proceedings do not hold good in light of the facts of the case and in view of the discussion made above. 7. The reasons supplied by the trial Court in rejecting the application that the accused had opportunity during the trial or that application is filed to delay the proceedings do not hold good in light of the facts of the case and in view of the discussion made above. 7. In the result, the impugned order dated 01st March, 2012 is hereby quashed and set aside and the applicant-accused is permitted to lead evidence as brought for in his application (Exhibit 11). The learned Sessions Court shall permit such exercise and permit the applicant to lead evidence as prayed for, and shall complete such exercise within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt this order. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Order accordingly.