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2013 DIGILAW 11 (PAT)

Nawal Singh @ Nawal Kishor Singh v. State of Bihar

2013-01-07

HEMANT KUMAR SRIVASTAVA

body2013
ORAL JUDGMENT Hemant Kumar Srivastava, J. 1. This Criminal Appeal has been preferred against the judgment of conviction and sentence order dated 22-12-2000 passed by Sri Rakeshwar Dayal, Additional Sessions Judge-Ist, Barh in Sessions Trial No. 532 of 1990 by which and whereunder, he convicted the appellant u/S 376 of the Indian Penal Code and ordered him to go rigourous imprisonment for five years for the offence punishable under Section-376 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The brief fact, which lies to file this Criminal Appeal, is that prosecution witness No. 2, namely, Mangli Devi gave written report to Officer-in-charge of Athmalgola, Barh on 03-05-1988 stating therein that on 02-05-1988 at about 6.00 p.m., while she was preparing meal in her house, the appellant entered her house and removed the two children, who were sitting there and, bolted the door of the room from inside and, caught her waist and breast and tried to outrage her modesty whereupon, she raised alarm and similarly, the children also raised alarm from outside the room. The alarm raised by her as well as children attracted the witnesses who came there running and after that, the appellant fled away from there. 3. On the basis of aforesaid written report, Barh (Athmalgola) P.S. Case No. 179 of 1988 was registered against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections-450, 376 read with Section-511 of the Indian Penal Code. The matter was investigated by the I.O. (P.W.4) and after completion of investigation, he submitted charge sheet for the offences punishable under Sections-376 & 450 of the Indian Penal Code. The cognizance of the offence was taken and the case was committed to the court of Sessions as usual. 4. The appellant was put on trial and in course of trial, altogether four prosecution witnesses were examined. The prosecution got exhibited fardbeyan (Ext 1), Seizure list (Ext. 2), Carbon copy of letter No. 107 dated 08-08-1988 (Ext. 3), Injury Report of P.W. 2 ( Ext. 4), Endorsement (Ext. 5) and formal FIR (Ext. 6). The statement of appellant was recorded u/S 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which, he completely denied the prosecution story. No evidence was adduced by the appellant in support of his defence. 2), Carbon copy of letter No. 107 dated 08-08-1988 (Ext. 3), Injury Report of P.W. 2 ( Ext. 4), Endorsement (Ext. 5) and formal FIR (Ext. 6). The statement of appellant was recorded u/S 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which, he completely denied the prosecution story. No evidence was adduced by the appellant in support of his defence. The learned trial court, having heard the parties and considered the materials available on the record, passed the impugned judgment convicting the appellant u/S 376 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him as stated above. It is not out of place to mention here that the appellant was charged for the offences punishable under Section-450 & 376 of the Indian Penal Code but the learned trial court did not give any finding in respect of charge framed under Section-450 of the Indian Penal Code. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant challenged the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence order arguing that except the deposition of prosecutrix (P.W. 2), there was no material on record to convict the appellant for the offence punishable u/S 376 of the Indian Penal Code and so far as the deposition of prosecutrix is concerned, the same is full of contradictions. Continuing his submission, he pointed out that originally, prosecutrix lodged the case for the offence punishable under Section-376 read with 511 of the Indian Penal Code but in course of investigation, she developed her story and stated that she was raped by the appellant. It is further contended by him that no doubt, in course of investigation, torn blouse and petticoat containing so-called semen were seized by the I.O. and the aforesaid petticoat containing semen was sent for chemical examination but admittedly, no report of chemical examiner was received before the trial court and, therefore, in absence of any report of chemical examiner, it was very difficult to say that the semen contained on the petticoat of the prosecutrix, was of the appellant. It is further contended by him that the prosecutrix was, allegedly, examined by a doctor but the aforesaid doctor was not examined by the prosecution on the pretext that the aforesaid doctor had already died and the injury report of prosecutrix was proved by a formal witness (P.W. 3). It is further contended by him that the prosecutrix was, allegedly, examined by a doctor but the aforesaid doctor was not examined by the prosecution on the pretext that the aforesaid doctor had already died and the injury report of prosecutrix was proved by a formal witness (P.W. 3). It is contended by him that P.W. 3 was not a medical expert, and he was not competent to say anything on the contents of aforesaid medical report. Moreover, it is an admitted position that the prosecutrix was married at the time of alleged occurrence, so, even if, the medical evidence revealed that sexual assault had been done on her, then also, it could not have said that the aforesaid sexual assault had been done by the appellant. It is further contended by him that P.W. 4 (I.O. of the case) has specifically admitted in his deposition that the prosecutrix had mentioned in her written report that the appellant had only tried to outrage her modesty and therefore, the story of rape is nothing but only a development on later stage. So, the aforesaid development by the prosecution creates doubts about the genuineness of the prosecution story. It is further contended by him that as a matter of fact, one, Sidhi Singh, who happened to be Mukhiya of the village, had inimical term with the appellant and the aforesaid fact has been admitted by the prosecutrix in her deposition. It is further contended by him that the aforesaid Mukhiya Sidhi Singh set up the prosecutrix and got instituted the present case against the appellant. Moreover, when the prosecutrix realized her fault, she entered into compromise which is evident from order sheet dated 07-08-2000 of the learned trial court. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that no doubt, the sole statement of prosecutrix is sufficient to convict an accused of rape but it is well settled principle of law that unless and until, the sole statement of prosecutrix does not inspire confidence to the court, it is unsafe to convict the accused of rape on solitary statement of prosecutrix and, therefore, it is apparent from the materials available on the lower court record that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case beyond all shadow of reasonable doubts. 6. 6. On the otherhand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the state supported the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence order arguing that the victim has specifically stated in her deposition that she was raped by the appellant on the alleged date of occurrence and initially, she did not divulge the story of rape because she was under impression that after disclosure of the factum of rape, her husband would leave her but when her husband consoled her, she disclosed the factum of rape before the I.O. So, there is genuine explanation on behalf of the prosecutrix in respect of non-disclosure of the story of rape at the time of giving written report to police. It is further contended by him that it is well settled principle of law that judgment of conviction can be pronounced even only on the basis of sole statement of victim without getting for any corroboration of the statement of victim. 7. As stated above, altogether four prosecution witnesses have been examined and out of whom; only prosecutrix (P.W. 2) is a witness on the factum of rape. So far as prosecution witness No. 1 who happens to be husband of the prosecutrix is concerned, he is not an eye witness of the alleged occurrence and stated that in the night of the alleged occurrence, when he came to his house, his wife narrated the entire incident to him. Similarly, P.W. 3 is a formal witness who has proved fardbeyan, seizure list, medical report etc. and he has stated nothing in respect of the alleged occurrence. P.W. 4 is the I.O. of the case. 8. According to prosecution case, the alleged occurrence took place at about 6.00 p.m. on 02-05-1988 and the written report was given on 03-05-1988. It is apparent from perusal of deposition of P.W. 1 that he returned to his home in the night of 02-05-1988 and after that, his wife narrated the entire incident to him and, then he consulted with Mukhiya and other persons and on 03-05-1988, he persuaded his wife to lodge the case and then, the P.W. 2 (prosecutrix) gave written report to Officer-in-charge of Athmalgola (Barh) on 03-05-1988. So, it is clear from the aforesaid facts that the written report was given in presence of the husband of the prosecutrix and the prosecutrix had already disclosed the entire fact to P.W. 1 and after that, the written report was given. So, it is very difficult to believe the deposition of the P.W. 2 that earlier, she had not disclosed the factum of rape before the police because she was under fear that her husband would leave her, if, she discloses the factum of rape to him. It appears to me that the story of rape has been developed by the prosecutrix in course of investigation as well as trial. So, the deposition of the P.W. 2 does not fully inspire confidence to this court and it is well settled principle of law that if the statement of the victim does not inspire confidence to the court, the corroboration of the statement of victim, is essential by other evidences. In the present case, no doubt, there is medical report of P.W. 2 but admittedly, the doctor, who prepared the medical report of the P.W. 2 was not examined by the prosecution. Although the aforesaid doctor had already died but no competent witness came on behalf of the prosecution to prove the aforesaid medical report and the said medical report was proved by an advocate clerk and, therefore, defence could not get opportunity to challenge the veracity of contents of aforesaid medical report. Furthermore, admittedly, the petticoat of the P.W. 2 had been sent to Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical examination but no report of Forensic Science Laboratory has been received by the trial court and, therefore, it is very difficult to come to the conclusion that alleged semen found on the petticoat of the prosecutrix, was of the appellant. Therefore, in my view, the prosecution could not succeed to prove his case beyond all shadow of reasonable doubts and learned trial court has committed an error in convicting the appellant under Section-376 of the Indian Penal Code and at best, the appellant can be convicted under Section-354 of the Indian Penal Code. 9. Therefore, in my view, the prosecution could not succeed to prove his case beyond all shadow of reasonable doubts and learned trial court has committed an error in convicting the appellant under Section-376 of the Indian Penal Code and at best, the appellant can be convicted under Section-354 of the Indian Penal Code. 9. On the basis of aforesaid discussions, the appellant is convicted under Section-354 of the Indian Penal Code, instead of Section-376 of the Indian Penal Code and, accordingly, the sentence is modified and it is held that the period already undergone by the appellant in course of trial and during pendency of this appeal is sufficient to meet the end of justice. 10. In the aforesaid manner, this appeal stands dismissed with aforesaid modification in judgment of conviction and sentence order. Appeal dismissed.