Hon'ble BHANSALI, J.—After having heard the learned counsel appearing for the named appellant in this intra-court appeal against the order dated 22.2.2013 as passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in CWP No. 12499/2012, we have not an iota of doubt that the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the baseless writ petition by the order impugned. This apart, we have reservations even over the attempt to prosecute this appeal with the following particulars as regards the appellant:- "Sanjay Kumar Singh (since deceased) Through his adopted son, Ranveer Singh S/o Shri Omveer Singh (nature father) Since minor, he is being represented Through his natural father Omveer Singh S/o Shri Makhan Singh aged 50 years, resident of 75, Sai Niwas Navghat Marg, Udaipur." 2. The matter arises out of the proceedings in execution of a certificate for recovery of possession issued in favour of the respondent No. 3 in relation to the premises situated at the aforesaid address 75, Sai Niwas Navghat, Udaipur. The relevant background aspects had been that the premises in question were allegedly let out by the respondent No. 3 to the respondent No. 4 for a period of about four months i.e., from 7.2.2007 to 31.5.2007 on a monthly rent of Rs. 730/-; and the respondent No. 3 and respondent No. 4 submitted a joint petition under Section 8 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 for permission to enter into limited period tenancy and for grant of certificate for recovery of possession upon expiry of the term of tenancy. The Rent Tribunal, Udaipur granted the prayer and issued the desired certificate by its order dated 22.3.2007. 3. When the respondent No. 3 levied execution of the said certificate for recovery of possession, objections were put against such execution by the named petitioner-appellant Sanjay Kumar Singh by way of an application, purportedly under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, while alleging that the certificate had been obtained by manipulation and in order to secure his ouster from the premises. The other relevant aspects had been that the named appellant Sanjay Kumar Singh (since deceased) and the respondent No. 3 Smt. Gayatri Singh were married to each other but ultimately, the marriage got dissolved by a decree of divorce. The other relevant aspects had been that the named appellant Sanjay Kumar Singh (since deceased) and the respondent No. 3 Smt. Gayatri Singh were married to each other but ultimately, the marriage got dissolved by a decree of divorce. The petitioner-appellant claimed himself to be the true owner of the property in question with the suggestion that the sale deed of the property was executed in favour of the respondent No. 3 out of love and affection existing at the relevant point of time. The objections have been put to contest by the respondent No. 3. 4. Pending disposal of the objections, the petitioner-appellant sought interim relief against dispossession. The prayer for interim relief was declined by the Rent Tribunal by its order dated 8.10.2012. This order of the Rent Tribunal was sought to be questioned in the writ petition (CWP No. 12499/2012) leading to this appeal. 5. The learned Single Judge of this Court took note of the submissions of the rival parties and particularly referred to the fact that the petitioner had taken a categorical stand before the Rent Tribunal to the effect that under the strength of a power of attorney executed by the respondent No. 3, he had sold the property in question to one Shri Omveer Singh by way of an agreement to sell dated 10.5.2010 and had handed over possession thereof to him. The learned Single Judge also took note of the fact that the said Shri Omveer Singh had also resisted the execution of certificate for recovery of possession while asserting that he had been put in possession of the property in question by way of agreement to sell and such objections were also rejected by the Rent Tribunal and an appeal preferred by Shri Omveer Singh was also dismissed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal. 6. The learned Single Judge found no case for interference while observing and holding, inter alia, as under:- "9. It is not the law that in all cases where any person has filed objections resisting the decree for the possession of the immovable property, the executing court is under an obligation to stay the execution of the decree as a matter of course. It is not the law that in all cases where any person has filed objections resisting the decree for the possession of the immovable property, the executing court is under an obligation to stay the execution of the decree as a matter of course. Unless on the basis of material on record, it is prima facie established that the objector is in possession of the disputed property, the question of protecting his possession pending disposal of the objections raised does not arise. 10. Admittedly, in the instance case, the property in question is alleged to have been purchased by the respondent No. 3- Smt. Gayatri Devi, by way of registered sale deed dated 3.9.1987, which prima facie establishes her title over the property in question. Indisputably, the petitioner was behind he bars upto March, 2010 and, therefore, the question of his being in possession of the property during the period when it was let out by the respondent No. 3 to the respondent No. 4 does not arise, it is pertinent to note that the petitioner had taken a categorical stand before the Rent Tribunal that on the strength of a power of attorney executed by the respondent No. 3 Smt.Gayatri Devi in his favour, he had sold the property in question to one Shri Om Veer Singh by way of an agreement to sell dated 10.5.2010 and handed over the possession thereof to him. Thus, in view of the admission of the petitioner, as aforesaid, the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Tribunal that the petitioner cannot be said to be in possession of the property in question, cannot be faulted with. Since the petitioner is found to be not in possession of the property, the question of granting interim relief protecting his alleged possession does not arise. In view of the finding arrived at, as aforesaid, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anwarbi's case (supra) also does not help him in any manner. 11. As noticed above, the objections raised by Shri Om Veer Singh, resisting the execution of certificate for recovery of possession, who is alleged to have been put into possession of the property in question by the petitioner by way of agreement to sell already stand rejected by the Rent Tribunal and aggrieved thereby, an appeal preferred by him also stands dismissed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal. 12. 12. Thus, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, viewed from any angle, the finding arrived at by the Rent Tribunal that the petitioner has no prima facie case in his favour cannot be said to be capricious or perverse so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 13. For the aforementioned reasons, the petition lacks merits, it is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs." 7. The order so passed by the learned Single Judge is sought to be questioned in this appeal and the learned counsel Mr. Kotwani has strenuously argued that the learned Single Judge has not considered the fundamental position of law that when an objection is raised against execution of a decree, it is not necessary that the objector should loose his possession before getting the claim adjudicated; and rather has a right to get his claim adjudicated even prior to losing possession. It is also submitted that pending adjudication of the objections, dispossession of the objector ought to have been stayed. The learned counsel has referred to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Brahmdeo Chaudhary vs. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal & Anr. : AIR 1997 SC 856 = RLW 1997(2) SC 256 and Anwarbi vs. Pramod D.A. Joshi & Ors. (2010) 10 SCC 405. 8. Neither the submissions make out a case for interference nor this appeal appears to be a bona fide prosecution of the matter in the name of the petitioner-appellant, who has admittedly expired. 9. In response to our queries, the learned counsel Mr. Kotwani has pointed out that the named petitioner-appellant Sanjay Kumar Singh has expired on 24.3.2013. No prayer for substitution of his legal representatives, if at all, has been made in this appeal. 10. Apart from the above, the significant aspect of the matter is that this appeal is being prosecuted by none other but the said Shri Omveer Singh with an assertion about his capacity as being the natural father of the alleged adopted son of the named petitioner-appellant. The alleged adoption is said to have taken placed on 30.11.2012 i.e., after rejection of the prayer for interim relief by the Rent Tribunal on 8.10.2012. The alleged adoption is said to have taken placed on 30.11.2012 i.e., after rejection of the prayer for interim relief by the Rent Tribunal on 8.10.2012. Before this, indisputably, the very same Shri Omveer Singh filed an objection petition claiming his own right in the property inquestion with reference to the alleged agreement that came to be rejected. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that according to his instructions, a writ petition preferred by the said Shri Omveer Singh is pending in this Court. 11. A copy of the alleged adoption deed has been placed on record and one could only notice with rather surprise the particulars as stated by Shri Omveer Singh therein, describing himself as `the son' of the same Shri Sanjay Kumar Singh with an assertion in the deed that he (Omveer Singh) has been residing with Shri Sanjay Kumar Singh as his son and was being taken as the adopted son of Sanjay Kumar Singh but no document in that regard was executed. Even in the assertions before the registering authority, Shri Omveer Singh stated his address as 75 Navghat Marg, Sai Niwas, Udaipur and stated his particulars as "Omveer Singh S/o Shri Sanjay Kumar Singh." 12. Interestingly, in this appeal, the said Shri Omveer Singh has stated his particulars as the son of Shri Makhan Singh. 13. The facts noticed hereinabove leave nothing to doubt or guess that with reference to the document of alleged adoption, which is replete with rather incongruous propositions and particulars, somehow the rights, as were sought to be claimed by the deceased petitioner, are now sought to be claimed by the prosecutor of the present appeal even at the cost of contradiction of his own stand in other proceedings. In the ultimate analysis, it appears that what is being attempted is only the persecution of unwarranted and unjustified obstructions against execution of the certificate for recovery of possession, existing in favour of the respondent No. 3. 14. The principles as enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision referred by the learned counsel are neither of any doubt nor of any dispute. However, such principles cannot be considered having any application to the present case where the named petitioner has been found to be not in possession of the property and even the professed rights are found to be non-existent. However, such principles cannot be considered having any application to the present case where the named petitioner has been found to be not in possession of the property and even the professed rights are found to be non-existent. It is true that in a bona fide application moved under Order XXII Rule 97 CPC, the Court may consider granting interim protection but mere moving of application cannot ipso facto result into granting of interim relief. On the contrary, on an application lacking in bona fide as the present one the Tribunal cannot be said to have erred in rejecting the prayer for interim relief. In the order impugned, the learned Single Judge has examined all the relevant aspects of the matter before dismissing the baseless writ petition. We find nothing of shortcoming or infirmity in the observations and findings recorded by the learned Single Judge. 15. Moreover on the facts and in the circumstances as noticed hereinabove, it is apparent that this appeal cannot be said to have validly been presented. In any case, prosecution of this matter by the said Shri Omveer Singh cannot be countenanced. 16. The appeal is required to be, and is, hereby dismissed. 17. The copy of this order be forwarded to the Rent Tribunal, Udaipur.