Judgment : Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J. 1. Heard learned Senior Counsel for the appellant Kerala State Electricity Board and the learned counsel for the contesting respondents. 2. Material legal evidence on record prove that a 16 years old boy who, at that point of time, was allegedly eking livelihood by working as a labouror in a workshop came into contact with live electric line lying in the bush on the ground, when he was walking along with his friends through a paddy field. That was on 12.06.1998. He was taken to the hospital. He had lost his power of speech. He could not stand or even attend to the calls of nature without the help of by-standers. The material allegations regarding the negligence attributed to the officers of the Board, stood supported with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and the principle of strict liability, requiring the Board to discharge the burden to prove that the situation was otherwise. There was no legal evidence on the side of the Board authorities in that regard, and the testimony of DW1 with the site mahazar does not lead to any such conclusion. Coupled with this is the testimonies of the witnesses on the side of the plaintiffs, particularly PW2 Noushad, who supported the plaintiffs' case and deposed that while the first plaintiff was walking through the ground, the electric wire lying on the ground happened to touch on him and he sustained the electric shock. 3. The suit was instituted in the form of original petition in 1998 seeking leave to sue as an indigent in terms of Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. During the pendency of the suit, the victim, the first plaintiff died on 30.12.2000. The additional plaintiffs came on record and the plaint was amended seeking compensation in relation to the death as well. 4. The court below considered various materials like discharge card and other medical documents and in particular, Exhibit A6 certificate by the Assistant Surgeon of the Community Health Centre, Cherpu, on 30.11.2000 which summed up the history of treatments at various hospitals and the state of the victim, the prognosis and his end. Exhibit A6 as quoted by the court below reads as follows: “This is to certify that Binoy (Vinoy) 20 years, had an electric shock accident on 12.06.1998 following which he developed Anoxic Ischemic Encephalopathy, bilateral pneumothorax and surgical emphysema.
Exhibit A6 as quoted by the court below reads as follows: “This is to certify that Binoy (Vinoy) 20 years, had an electric shock accident on 12.06.1998 following which he developed Anoxic Ischemic Encephalopathy, bilateral pneumothorax and surgical emphysema. He received treatment from Elite Mission Hospital from 12.06.98 to 29.06.98. From there, he was referred to Surgery Unit (SI) of Medical College, Thrissur where he received treatment from 29.06.98 to 30.09.98. He has been hospitalized in community Health Centre, Cherpu from 03.08.99 to 24.08.99 (21 days); from 18.09.99 to 10.10.99 (22 days); from 02.05.2000 to 10.05.2000 (8 days); from 14.06.2000 to 19.07.2000 (35 days); from 03.08.2000 to 24.08.2000 (21 days); from 17.09.2000 to 21.11.2000 (65 days). Now he has paraplegia, mental retardation, loss of speech, contractures of all four limbs, bowel incontinence, bladder retention and incontinence with recurrent urinary tract infection with multi drug resistant organisms. For this, he requires frequent hospitalization and expensive antibiotics. He is the son of manual labourers and his family is very poor.” 5. The aforesaid certificate discloses the situation till 21.11.2000 and the fact that the victim had paraplegia, mental retardation, loss of speech, contractures of all four limbs, bowel incontinence, bladder retention and incontinence with recurrent urinary tract infection with multidrug resistant organisms and the fact that he required frequent hospitalization and expensive antibiotics. After all this, the victim died on 30.12.2000. No more material is required in the common course of human conduct to assimilate and come to the conclusion that the first plaintiff-victim's death is the proximate result of the electrocution. 6. The pain and suffering that the 16 years old male victim had undergone and the emotional trauma he went through need to be compensated. The mental agony of the parents, loss of love and affection, expenses on account of employing bystanders, travelling expenses, funeral expenses, loss of amenity, loss of care and protection, all put together was pegged at Rs.4,00,000/- by the plaintiffs. The court below has granted an amount of Rs.3,45,000/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 30.12.2000, i.e., the date of the death of the first plaintiff, till the date of decree and future interest at the rate of 6% per annum.
The court below has granted an amount of Rs.3,45,000/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 30.12.2000, i.e., the date of the death of the first plaintiff, till the date of decree and future interest at the rate of 6% per annum. With the materials on record, we do not find any ground to interfere with the said decree which is in conformity with the legal evidence, necessary inferences and legitimate conclusions on the basis of evaluation of material particulars in pleadings. 7. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails. In the result, this appeal is dismissed with costs. The direction in the impugned judgment and decree of the court below that the court fee will be leviable from the plaintiffs does not stand, having regard to the format of Article 39A read with provisions to be exercised in a social welfare State in the context of such cases of deprivement of life and property and sufferings of physical and mental pain. Hence, in exercise of authority under Order XXXIII Rule 10, it is ordered that the court fee payable in the suit shall be recoverable from the defendants and their assets. The direction in the impugned judgment and decree that such court fee shall be recovered from the plaintiffs is hereby vacated.