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2013 DIGILAW 1106 (AP)

Kuppala Sivasankar v. Kuppala Venkatamma

2013-12-04

L.NARASIMHA REDDY, M.S.K.JAISWAL

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Judgment : L. Narasimha Reddy, J. Claimant No.1 in O.P.No.35 of 1995 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Kadiri, filed this appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘the Act’). An extent of Ac.1.00 of land in survey No.1356/2 of Kamathampalli Village, Kadiri Mandal, was acquired by the Government for providing house sites to the weaker sections. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published, on 21.04.1994. In the award enquiry, the appellant submitted a claim stating that an extent of Ac.0.51 cents of the acquired land has fallen to his share in the partition with his father and brothers, respondents 2 and 3, and in respect of the remaining extent of Ac.0.49 cents, his father executed a Will (Ex.A.1) creating life interest in favour of his mother and vested remainder in him. He has also stated that since the title over the land of Ac.0.49 cents has vested in the Government, he alone is entitled to receive compensation for that also. The 1st respondent, on the other hand, pleaded that though a limited right was created under Ex.A.1, dated 06.12.1986, executed by her husband, in respect of Ac.0.49 cents, by operation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short ‘the Succession Act’), it has enlarged into an absolute right and she is entitled to be paid compensation for that piece of land. Respondents 2 and 3, brothers of the appellant, did not make any claim for compensation. In view of the rival claims before him, the 4th respondent referred the matter to the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Kadiri, under Section 30 of the Act. Through its order, dated 30.06.2000, the trial Court held that the appellant is not entitled to receive compensation in respect of Ac.0.49 cents of land. Hence, this appeal. Sri S.Srinivas Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that under Ex.A.1, only life estate was created in favour of the 1st respondent, mother of the appellant, and that she was not entitled to claim absolute rights over the property. Hence, this appeal. Sri S.Srinivas Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that under Ex.A.1, only life estate was created in favour of the 1st respondent, mother of the appellant, and that she was not entitled to claim absolute rights over the property. He has placed reliance upon several judgments rendered by the Supreme Court as well as this Court in support of his contention that sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Succession Act, does not have its application in respect of the dispositions in favour of the Hindu women subsequent to the enactment of the Succession Act. On merits also, he contends that the disposition under Ex.A.1 was not in recognition of any pre-existing right, vis-à-vis the property. During the pendency of the appeal, the 1st respondent died. Her estate is already represented by the appellant as well as respondents 2 and 3. The appellant filed a memo to that effect. Sri M.V.Suresh, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, has reiterated the contention of his client that was made before the trial Court. The dispute in the O.P. was only in respect of Ac.0.49 cents of land. The claim of the appellant in respect of Ac.0.51 cents was not contested by anyone, and in fact, compensation was paid to him. The appellant, on the one hand, and his mother, the 1st respondent, on the other hand, are the beneficiaries under Ex.A.1. While for the respondents it is only a life interest, in respect of the appellant it was vested remainder. Even as regards the contents and recitals in Ex.A.1, there is no dispute. The whole controversy was as to whether the life interest created under Ex.A.1 has enlarged into an absolute right by operation of Section 14(1) of the Succession Act. Before the trial Court, the appellant deposed as PW.1 and the 2nd respondent as PW.2. The appellant filed Ex.A.1, and on behalf of the respondents, Exs.B1 and B.2 were filed. The trial Court repelled the contention of the appellant. The only question that arises for consideration before us is as to, Whether the 1st respondent is entitled to the benefit under Section 14(1) of the Succession Act? The appellant filed Ex.A.1, and on behalf of the respondents, Exs.B1 and B.2 were filed. The trial Court repelled the contention of the appellant. The only question that arises for consideration before us is as to, Whether the 1st respondent is entitled to the benefit under Section 14(1) of the Succession Act? Strictly speaking, no discussion as such is necessary, in view of the fact that the 1st respondent is no more and respondents 2 and 3, who also happen to be legal representatives of the 1st respondent, did not lay any independent claim, nor they have exhibited any interest to pursue the line of their mother. The discussion virtually becomes academic in nature. The objective underlying Section 14 of the Succession Act was to enlarge the scope of the limited rights, which the Hindu women were enjoying by the time the Succession Act came into force, be it by operation of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, or other codified and customary law. By and large, the Hindu women were not conferred with absolute rights. Section 14(1) of the Succession Act directed that any limited rights that were being enjoyed by Hindu women vis-à-vis any item of immovable property would stand enlarged to absolute right. To this general proposition, exceptions are carved out under sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Succession Act. The Supreme Court explained the purport of Section 14 in its entirety in V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy (1977) 3 SCC 99 ). Thereafter, the principle was explained in several other judgments by the Supreme Court as well as this Court. It is not necessary to deal with them in detail. In Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike ( (2006) 8 SCC 75 ), the Supreme Court dealt with it extensively and the judgment in Tulasamma’s case (1 supra) was also discussed. After referring to the following passage from Mayne on Hindu law, “On a reading of sub-section (1) with Explanation, it is clear that wherever the property was possessed by a female Hindu as a limited estate, it would become on and from the date of commencement of the Act her absolute property. However, if she acquires property after the Act with a restricted estate, sub-section (2) applies. However, if she acquires property after the Act with a restricted estate, sub-section (2) applies. Such acquisition may be under the terms of a gift, will or other instrument or a decree or order or award.” Their Lordships took the view that the benefit under Section 14(1) of the Succession Act would be for only to cases where a Hindu woman was possessed of a property with limited rights by the time the Succession Act came into force. In other words, it was held that such benefit is not available for dispositions that are made subsequent to the Succession Act. Apart from that, if the instrument, which came into existence after the Act came into force, makes an arrangement, whereunder limited rights are conferred upon a Hindu woman, they do not enlarge into absolute rights, if one goes by the language employed in sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Succession Act. We therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the decree passed by the trial Court. In its place, a decree is passed to the effect that the appellant alone shall be entitled to receive the compensation for the land in question i.e. Ac.0.49 cents in survey No.1356 of Kamathampalli Village, Kadiri Mandal. There shall be no order as to costs. The miscellaneous petition filed in this appeal shall also stand disposed of.