Judgment : K.T. Sankaran, J. 1. The appellant is accused No.6 in S.C.No.2 of 2011(NIA) on the file of the Special Court for Trial of NIA Cases, Ernakulam. The appellant is one among the 43 accused in the case. He moved an application for bail as Crl.M.P.No.426 of 2013, which was dismissed by the court below by the order dated 11.11.2013. The court below held, with reference to the materials on record, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant had played a key role in the alleged offence and that the bar under the proviso to subsection (5) of Section 43D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 would apply. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is the following: The accused persons conducted and participated in a training camp at Thangalpara in Wagamon with an intention to bring hatred and contempt against the Government of India, to conduct 'jihad', to commit acts prejudicial to the communal harmony and to incite the commission of unlawful activities. It is alleged that the accused committed offences under Sections 122, 124A, 153A and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 3, 5, 10 and 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act. It is alleged that on 26.11.2007 the appellant purchased two air guns and two packets of pellets, each packet containing 500 pellets, from Cochin Armoury, as evidenced by the cash bill book. The camp was conducted at Wagamon from 10.12.2007 to 12.12.2007. The accused collected arms and explosives. It is alleged that the appellant stayed at Wagamon in Lekha Lodge, along with three others in the second week of December, 2007. The appellant was identified by the person who runs the Lodge. It is alleged that several leaders of Students Islamic Movement of India ('SIMI' for short), which is a banned organisation, attended the training camp. Training was imparted to the participants in mountaineering, swimming, two wheeler racing, rock climbing, jumping up and down from two wheeler, firing etc. The participants who attended the training camp included persons hailing from Kerala, Gujarat, Utter Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand etc. Apart from physical training, lectures were made on the subject 'jihad in India' with an object of waging war against the Government of India. The participants who attended the training camp included persons hailing from Kerala, Gujarat, Utter Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand etc. Apart from physical training, lectures were made on the subject 'jihad in India' with an object of waging war against the Government of India. The prosecution alleged that the appellant entered into a criminal conspiracy in Madhya Pradesh and other places and decided to conduct training camps for the members of SIMI. 3. The prosecution alleged that the appellant was absconding after the incident. A red corner notice was issued by the Interpol and, accordingly, the appellant was detained in Dubai. The appellant was brought to India on 2.8.2013, after completing the formalities for extradition. The appellant was arrested by the NIA at New Delhi. The appellant is in judicial custody from 3.8.2013 onwards. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant belongs to Aluva and he has no connection with any terrorist organisation or with the other accused. It is submitted that the appellant did not participate in the training camp at Wagamon and he did not impart training or attend the training classes. The learned counsel submitted that, in the facts and circumstances, the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act is not attracted. 4. We also heard the Special Prosecutor for National Investigating Agency, who supported the order passed by the court below. 5. The offences alleged against the accused are very serious in nature. The allegation is that the appellant and the other accused are members of SIMI. The said organisation is included in the Schedule to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 as one of the terrorist organisations. Section 2(m) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 defines “terrorist organisation” as an organisation listed in the Schedule or an organisation operating under the same name as an organisation so listed. 6. Section 43D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act provides for modified application of certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Every offence punishable under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act shall be deemed to be cognizable offence within the meaning of clause (c) of Section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply with the modification as mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 43D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. Every offence punishable under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act shall be deemed to be cognizable offence within the meaning of clause (c) of Section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply with the modification as mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 43D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 43D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act provides that nothing in Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply in relation to a case involving the arrest of any person accused of having committed an offence punishable under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. Sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 43D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act read as follows: “43D. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code.-- ...... (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release: Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. (6) The restrictions on granting of bail specified in sub-section (5) is in addition to the restrictions under the Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.” 7. In the present case, the prosecution has produced materials before the court below to support its case. It is alleged that the appellant purchased two air guns from Cochin Armoury on 26.11.2007, a few days before the dates on which camp was held at Wagamon. Apart from two air guns, he also purchased two packets of pellets, each packet containing 500 pellets. Used projectiles were recovered from the scene of occurrence. The forensic examination conducted by the ballistic expert would disclose the use of firearms in the camp. Records would also reveal that explosives were used in the camp. Apart from two air guns, he also purchased two packets of pellets, each packet containing 500 pellets. Used projectiles were recovered from the scene of occurrence. The forensic examination conducted by the ballistic expert would disclose the use of firearms in the camp. Records would also reveal that explosives were used in the camp. Prima facie, the materials produced in the case would show that persons assembled at Wagamon had connections with SIMI and that theory classes and practical training were arranged for the participants. The materials in the case would also prima facie disclose that the appellant went to Wagamon and stayed there. He was having two air guns and 1000 pellets. On the basis of the materials on record, the court below was justified in arriving at the conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the appellant is prima facie true. 8. It is true that the freedom of movement of a citizen is a precious fundamental right. The freedom of movement and the right to live peacefully of the citizens of the country in general are also precious rights. The law imposes certain restrictions on the rights of persons who indulge in certain criminal acts which would have impact on the fundamental, statutory and civil rights of the citizens at large. When pitted against the rights of the citizens at large, the individual right of a citizen is of less importance. That is why a provision like sub-section (5) of Section 43D was introduced in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, by Act 35/2008. It is not the number of days that a person stays in jail which becomes relevant for the purpose of considering whether he is entitled to bail. It is magnitude of the offence and the impact of granting bail to him that matters. Statutory provisions like sub-section (5) of Section 43D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act would also become relevant and decisive in the matter of granting bail. 9. In Muhammed Navas v. Station House Officer (2009 (3) KLT SN 64 (C.No.62), while dealing with an application under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, one of us (Justice K.T.Sankaran) held thus: “It is true that the petitioner is in judicial custody since 7.11.2008. 9. In Muhammed Navas v. Station House Officer (2009 (3) KLT SN 64 (C.No.62), while dealing with an application under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, one of us (Justice K.T.Sankaran) held thus: “It is true that the petitioner is in judicial custody since 7.11.2008. The question is not whether how long a person is in judicial custody, but whether it is feasible to release him on bail in the facts and circumstances of the case. Counting of the days of detention is not the criterion to be adopted in all cases. Facts and circumstances may vary in each case. Terrorism is an evil affecting the life and liberty of peace loving people. Terrorism has no barriers. It may strike anybody at any time. Any amount of precautionary measures and security arrangements may prove futile to combat terrorism. Fundamental right to individual liberty is certainly valuable. But when it is pitted against the life and liberty of the people at large, it becomes insignificant. Terrorism affects the growth of the nation; the resources of the nation have to be utilised for combating terrorism; it could be utilised in better ways for the betterment of the people. Offences against individuals are to be distinguished from offences affecting the nation and the people at large. Parameters to be adopted in the matter of considering the plea for bail would also be different in these two types of cases. A strict approach in the latter category of cases is justified. Sympathy has no role in dealing with such cases.” 10. The learned Special Prosecutor for NIA submitted that the appellant is involved in 35 cases registered at different police stations in the State of Gujarat in which offences under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act are involved. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that he has no instructions with respect to this allegation. 11. The facts and circumstances of the case would prima facie reveal commission of a very serious offence where several persons, including the appellant, are involved. The court below was right in holding that the materials in the case would satisfy the ingredients of the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. No grounds are made out to interfere with the well considered order passed by the court below. The Criminal Appeal is, accordingly dismissed.