ORDER Dama Seshadri Naidu, J. 1. The present Writ Petition is filed assailing the Award dated 10.07.2007 in I.D. No. 138 of 2003 on the file of the third respondent-Labour Court, which, in its turn, returned a 'nil' award, upholding the Order of oral termination said to have passed against the petitioner by the respondent Authorities. The facts, in brief, as pleaded by the petitioner, are that the petitioner joined as Motivator in the first respondent Municipality on 01.04.1988 in Engineering Section and worked as such till 31.03.1992. Though he had been discharging his duties to the utmost satisfaction of the Management, abruptly the authorities orally terminated his services on 01.04.1992 without assigning any reasons whatsoever. It being in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('the Act' for brevity), the petitioner raised an Industrial Dispute in I.D. No. 138 of 2003 on the file of the Labour Court, which in turn rendered an Award dated 10.07.2007, dismissing the claim of the petitioner, holding that the petitioner did not complete 240 days of continuous service in the respondent Corporation to be considered within the scope of 25-F of the Act. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner approached this Court by filing the present Writ Petition. 2. The first respondent-Municipal Commissioner filed its Counter affidavit opposing the claim of the petitioner. Incidentally, a perusal of it shows that it contains a faithful traversal of the contentions of the petitioner but nothing beyond. In other words, every plea on the part of the petitioner has been denied by the first respondent, but no positive countervailing plea has been taken to sustain the Award of the Labour Court. 3. Be that as it may, supporting the findings of the Labour Court in the impugned Award, the first respondent has contended that though the petitioner is treated to have worked from 01.04.1988 to 31.03.1992, there is no material to establish that he continuously worked for 240 days to consider his case under the provisions of the Act. Thus, it is contended that the Labour Court has rightly repelled the contention of the petitioner and refused the relief in a just and proper manner. 4. The 2nd respondent i.e., the Director, Municipal Administration, has filed Counter Affidavit supporting the view taken by the first respondent, apart from supporting the findings of the Labour Court in the impugned Award. Thus, it is contended that the Labour Court has rightly repelled the contention of the petitioner and refused the relief in a just and proper manner. 4. The 2nd respondent i.e., the Director, Municipal Administration, has filed Counter Affidavit supporting the view taken by the first respondent, apart from supporting the findings of the Labour Court in the impugned Award. It is essentially contended that on the failure of the petitioner to establish that he worked continuously for 240 days in the first respondent Corporation, the question of considering his case under Section25F of the Act does not arise and as such, he is not entitled to any relief. 5. Sri M. Pitchaiah, learned counsel for the petitioner, has strenuously contended that the Award impugned, to begin with, is an outcome of non-application of mind, apart from being an adjudication in perversity. It is specifically contended that the Labour Court has accepted the Service Certificate issued by the Employer-first respondent, wherein it has been clearly stated that the petitioner has worked for a period of 1226 days in a period of four years beginning from 01.04.1988 to 31.03.1992. Despite this, the Labour Court has held that the said Certificate did not show that the petitioner continuously worked for 240 days between 01.04.1988 and 31.03.1992. In other words, the Labour Court has held that there is no positive material to establish that the petitioner has continuously worked for 240 days one year prior to his removal from service. 6. Though there is an elaborate discussion on various issues in the Award, the learned counsel has contended that much of the discussion is extraneous in nature, barring the singular aspect whether the petitioner had put in the minimum requisite days of service before his termination. The learned counsel has also brought to the notice of this Court that two of the other N.M.Rs, who joined the services of the first respondent subsequent to the petitioner, were also removed from service in the same manner. Aggrieved thereby, when they approached the self same Labour Court, it passed an Award in their favour, directing the first respondent to reinstate them into service with 50% of back wages. In fact, the Corporation, based on the direction of the Labour Court, reinstated them. To the said effect, the learned counsel for the petitioner has showed the proceedings issued in their favour. In fact, the Corporation, based on the direction of the Labour Court, reinstated them. To the said effect, the learned counsel for the petitioner has showed the proceedings issued in their favour. Elaborating on the said aspect, the Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that when the petitioner has also been similarly situated, the Labour Court, in the first place, has failed to appreciate the issue in a correct perspective. On the other hand, the first respondent Corporation, having reinstated those two NMRs into service based on the directions of the Labour Court, has steadfastly refused to reinstate the petitioner simply saying that they were reinstated based on the directions of the Labour Court, where as the petitioner could not succeed in getting a relief from it. 7. The Learned counsel for the petitioner has brought to my notice what is stated to be a simple matter of arithmetic in computing 240 continuous days of service in one year. Elaborating further, the learned counsel has stated that after deducting 52 weekly offs, apart from 8 optional holidays, the man-days in a year would come to 305. Since the petitioner admittedly worked for four continuous years, the total number of man-days would be 1220 out of 1460 days (365x4) in four years. The very record of the first respondent has shown that the petitioner has worked for 1226 days in the said period of four years, which essentially means, in the words of the learned counsel, the petitioner has put in 240 days not only in the last year prior to his removal from service, but also every year. Thus, the learned counsel has contended that, beyond any pale of doubt, the petitioner has worked for the minimum number of days making himself eligible to be considered for regularisation or else to have considered in terms of Section 25F of the Act, 1947. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged this Court to set aside the Award passed by the 3rd respondent, as being without any merit, as it suffers from non-application of mind and perversity of findings. 8. Per contra, Smt. M. Santha, learned Standing Counsel for the first respondent-Municipality, has defended the Award of the Labour Court, contending that the labour Court has taken into account all aspects that have gone into making of the Award. 8. Per contra, Smt. M. Santha, learned Standing Counsel for the first respondent-Municipality, has defended the Award of the Labour Court, contending that the labour Court has taken into account all aspects that have gone into making of the Award. She has contended that the petitioner could not positively establish that he completed 240 days of service without a break in the last year prior to his removal from service. The learned Standing Counsel has submitted that since the petitioner has approached for a positive relief, the burden has lain on him to establish that he continuously worked for 240 days. The learned Standing Counsel has vehemently contested the statement of the petitioner that since the first respondent is the custodian of the record, the burden, in fact, is on the Municipality to establish that the petitioner has not put in 240 continuous days of service. It has specifically been contended by the learned Standing Counsel that on mere surmises and conjunctions (sic. conjectures) it cannot be held that the petitioner has put in 240 days. She has strenuously submitted that the Labour Court is the final Court of fact and that its findings on fact cannot lightly be interfered with by this Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, especially in a writ of certiorari. According to the learned Standing Counsel, only the decision making process, rather the decision itself, can be subjected to scrutiny. Summarising her submissions, the learned Standing Counsel has urged this Court that the present writ petition lacks of merits and deserves to be dismissed. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent, apart from perusing the record. 10. On perusal of the record, the issue runs in a narrow compass. The issue is whether the petitioner has put in 240 continuous days of service in one year immediately preceding the termination of his services. It is not disputed that the petitioner joined the service of the first respondent Corporation in the year 1988 as Motivator and continued to be in service till 01.04.1992 when the services of the petitioner were said to have been terminated orally. It is further indisputable that the first respondent issued Service Certificate attesting to the fact that prior to his termination the petitioner in all worked for 1260 days. It is further indisputable that the first respondent issued Service Certificate attesting to the fact that prior to his termination the petitioner in all worked for 1260 days. As has been rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, after deducting weekly offs and also the national holidays, out of the total number of days in four years, i.e., 1460 days, the working days would be 1220. As per the certificate issued by the very first respondent, the petitioner worked on all those days in those four years. Thus, it leads to an inevitable conclusion that the petitioner did complete or put in 240 days of continuous service, and it is beyond pale of any doubt. In the light of it, the Labour Court ought to have evaluated the issue, instead of brushing aside the contention of the petitioner on the premise that he could not establish the factum of his working for 240 days between 31.03.1992 and 01.04.1992. 11. In any event, it is axiomatic, in the face of the Service Certificate issued by the first respondent, that the respondent Municipality has failed to establish, rather estopped from contending, that the petitioner had not continuously worked for 240 days prior to the termination of his services. Though there is any amount of shifting of onus, the first respondent could not discharge the said burden. It is further axiomatic to conclude that any person or entity has the best evidence at its disposal, but has not produced it in support of its contention, invariably, as a matter of a common law principle, if not in terms of statutory obligation under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, an adverse inference is to be drawn that if the said evidence had been produced, it would have gone against him or it. Going by the same principle, this Court, without any hesitation, holds that the petitioner has put in 240 continuous days as per the Service Certificate issued by the first respondent Corporation. 12. It has to be further observed, as was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and as has not been contradicted by the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent, that two other persons, who are admittedly juniors in service to the petitioner, holding the same post, were reinstated in the light of the Awards passed in I.D. Nos. 20 of 1995 and 183 of 1995. 20 of 1995 and 183 of 1995. The petitioner has also brought on record the material concerning the reinstatement, thus, establishing that the Corporation has acted upon the direction of the Labour Court. It is further relevant that in the Counter Affidavit filed by the first respondent, the reason assigned for not considering the case of the petitioner is that the other two persons got positive directions from the Court, whereas the petitioner failed in his effort. 13. Be that as it may, in the manner stated above, it can be safely held that the petitioner has put in 240 days of service in the last year prior to his removal, and, therefore, his services ought not to have been terminated summarily without taking recourse to Section 25F of the Act. Accordingly, without any further adjudication in this issue, this Court hereby directs the first respondent-Municipality to reinstate the petitioner as motivator with continuity of service with all attendant benefits, but without back wages. With the above direction, the Writ Petition stands allowed. No order as to costs. The miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this Writ Petition shall stand closed.