Judgment : G. Rohini, J. The writ petitioner who was working as Administrative Officer (Category-1) of A.P. Judicial Ministerial Service retired from service on 31.12.2010. Accordingly, her pension was fixed in the post of Administrative Officer and she has been receiving the same. While so, by order dated 27.6.2013 the respondent No.4 sought to refix the petitioner’s pay in the post of Superintendent (Category-2) and to revise her pensionary benefits accordingly. Admittedly the said order dated 27.6.2013 was passed in terms of the proceedings of the respondent No.2 dated 13.7.2012 directing to revert the petitioner who retired as Administrative Officer to the post of Superintendent and take consequential steps for fixation of her pay and pensionary benefits as per Rules stating that as she did not possess the requisite qualification of Graduation, her promotion to the post of Administrative Officer on 29.09.2010 was irregular. Aggrieved by the said action of the respondents, the present writ petition is filed seeking a Mandamus declaring the proceedings of the 2nd respondent dated 13.7.2012 as well as the consequential order of the respondent No.4 dated 27.6.2013 are arbitrary and illegal. The petitioner also sought a direction to the respondents not to effect recovery from the pension and pensionary benefits of the petitioner. We have heard Sri P. Lakshman Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri J. Anil Kumar, the learned Standing Counsel for High Court of A.P. appearing for the respondents 1, 2 & 4. The Judicial Ministerial Service in the State of Andhra Pradesh was initially governed by the A.P. Judicial Ministerial Service Rules, 1964. The said Rules were repealed by the A.P. Judicial Ministerial Service Rules, 2003 framed in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India vide G.O.Ms.No.129, Law (LA & J Home Courts-D) Department, dated 12.11.2003. As per Rule 8 of the A.P. Judicial Ministerial Service Rules, 2003, no person shall be eligible for appointment to the different categories of posts specified therein unless he possesses the qualifications prescribed in the entry corresponding to the concerned post in Annexure-I. So far as the post of Administrative Officer which comes under Category-1 is concerned, it is to be filled by promotion from Category-2 post i.e., Superintendent. As per Rule 8 the person possessing the qualification of graduation alone shall be eligible for promotion to the post of Administrative Officer. As per Rule 8 the person possessing the qualification of graduation alone shall be eligible for promotion to the post of Administrative Officer. Prior to issuance of A.P. Judicial Ministerial Service Rules, 2003, possession of graduation as qualification was not essential for promotion to the post of Administrative Officer, but preference was given to Law Graduates and thereafter to Graduates. After the new rules were made in the year 2003 repealing the earlier Rules of the year 1964, the 2nd respondent issued a Circular dated 10.03.2005 in terms of the new Rules of 2003 rejecting the request of some of the employees who were appointed prior to the new Rules, 2003 to grant exemption from acquiring the higher qualifications prescribed thereunder for future promotion. However, subsequently, a Division Bench of this Court in W.P.No.5072 of 2009 while dealing with the claim of a Senior Assistant (Category-3 post) who was appointed as Junior Assistant prior to coming into force of 2003 Rules, for promotion to the post of Superintendent (Category-2 post) held that since Intermediate is not a qualification prescribed for promotion to the post of Senior Assistant or Superintendent under the Rules of 2003, but it is the qualification stipulated for the post of Junior Assistant, in the light of the Note-2 appended to Annexure-I the petitioner therein was eligible to be considered for appointment as Superintendent. There was also a direction by the Division Bench to issue a fresh Circular and communicate the same to the Unit Heads to consider the cases of eligible candidates for promotion to the various categories in accordance with the said judgment. In pursuance thereof, the 2nd respondent issued another Circular dated 1.5.2009 directing all the Unit Heads to follow the directions in W.P.No.5072 of 2009 scrupulously while effecting promotions to the category of posts upto Superintendent as specified in A.P. Judicial Ministerial Service Rules, 2003 to the employees who were appointed under the erstwhile Rules, 1964. In continuation of the said Circular, dated 1.5.2009, the 2nd respondent issued another Circular dated 12.8.2009 directing all Unit Heads to follow the directions of the High Court in W.P.Nos.11450 of 2005, 470, 4067 & 5072 of 2009 scrupulously while effecting promotions to the post of Administrative Officers also as specified in Andhra Pradesh Judicial Ministerial Service Rules, 2003 to the employees who were appointed under the erstwhile Rules, 1964. On the basis of the said Circular, dated 12.8.2009, some of the persons were promoted from the post of Superintendent to the post of Administrative Officer though they did not possess the requisite qualification of graduation prescribed under the Rules of 2003. The petitioner is one among them and she was promoted from the post of Superintendent (Category-2) to the post of Administrative Officer (Category-1) of A.P. Judicial Ministerial Service by proceedings of the 4th respondent, dated 29.9.2010 and on 31.12.2010 she retired from service. Aggrieved by two such promotions given to the persons who are not possessing the requisite qualification under the Rules of 2003, W.P.No.8412 of 2011 was filed by a Superintendent who is qualified but overlooked for promotion to the post of the Administrative Officer. The said writ petition was allowed by a Division Bench by order dated 11.07.2011 holding that the Unit Head committed an error in failing to consider the petitioner therein for promotion and promoting the persons who did not possess the mandatory qualification of graduation. It was also held by the Division Bench that there is nothing in the judgment dated 19.03.2009 in W.P.No.5072 of 2009 which renders eligible a person, who does not have a graduation, qualified for appointment to the post of Administrative Officer, after coming into force of the 2003 Rules nor the Circular Instructions of the 2nd respondent enjoins so. Pursuant to the said judgment in W.P.No.8412 of 2011, the 2nd respondent issued another Circular dated 13.9.2011 directing all the Unit Heads to go through the observations made in W.P.No.8412 of 2011 before conducting selection process to the posts of Administrative Officers and to take proper care and caution in effecting promotions to the post of Category-1 Administrative Officer. On the basis of the said Circular, dated 13.09.2011, some of the promotions granted to the posts of Administrative Officers were reviewed on the ground that they did not fulfil the required eligibility criteria and they were reverted as Superintendents. The persons so reverted filed W.P.No.28028 of 2011 and etc. The said batch of writ petitions were referred to the Full Bench for consideration. The persons so reverted filed W.P.No.28028 of 2011 and etc. The said batch of writ petitions were referred to the Full Bench for consideration. After considering rule position in detail, the Full Bench dismissed the writ petitions by order dated 27.1.2012 holding as under: “In the result, we hold that Rules of 2003 require that a person promoted to the post of Administrative Officer from the category of Superintendent, after the advent of the said Rules, must possess the qualification of Graduation, irrespective of whether he entered the service under the Rules of 1964 or under the Rules of 2003. The Circular in ROC No.725/2009-C.1, dated 12.08.2009 issued by the High Court indicating to the contrary is accordingly set aside and the Circular in ROC No.1981/2011-C-1, dated 13.09.2011 is upheld. Consequently, the reversion of the petitioners in this batch of cases from the posts of Administrative Officers on the ground that they do not possess Graduation qualification is unassailable. The Writ Petitions are accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances, without any order as to costs.” Admittedly the writ petitioner did not possess the qualification of graduation. However, she was promoted from the post of Superintendent to the post of Administrative Officer by proceedings dated 29.09.2010 on the basis of the Circular dated 12.8.2009. Therefore, the 2nd respondent by proceedings dated 13.7.2012 directed that the writ petitioner who got promoted as Administrative Officer without having qualification of graduation and subsequently retired from service as Administrative Officer shall be reverted as Superintendent on paper and her pay and pensionary benefits shall be fixed as per Rules. In terms thereof, the impugned order dated 27.6.2013 came to be issued by the 4th respondent. Assailing the said action of the respondents, it is vehemently contended by Sri P. Lakshmana Rao, the leaned counsel for the petitioner that the reversion of the petitioner from the post of Administrative Officer to the post of Superintendent is arbitrary and illegal since she is not a party to W.P.No.28028 of 2011 and batch decided by the Full Bench. It is also contended that her promotion on 12.11.2010 being in accordance with the policy existing at the relevant point of time, the same cannot be set at naught on the basis of the subsequent policy decision of the 2nd respondent. It is also contended that her promotion on 12.11.2010 being in accordance with the policy existing at the relevant point of time, the same cannot be set at naught on the basis of the subsequent policy decision of the 2nd respondent. The further contention is that the reversion of the petitioner and refixation of her pay reducing the pension and other benefits cannot be effected without issuing a notice to the petitioner to make her representation against the proposed action. It is also contended that the impugned order passed by the 4th respondent is contrary to the A.P. Judicial Ministerial Service Rules, 2003. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel relied upon UNION OF INDIA v. K.B. KHARE (1994 Supp (3) SCC 502), SAHIB RAM v. STATE OF HARYANA (1995 Supp (1) SCC 18), BABULAL JAIN v. STATE OF M.P. ( (2007) 6 SCC 180 ), STATE OF W.B. v. RANBINDRA NATH SENGUPTA (1998) 4 SCC 277 ), CO-OP. SOCIETIES v. ISRAIL KHAN (2010) 1 SCC 440), RAM JANAM SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. (1994) 2 SCC 622 ), T.R. KAPOOR v. STATE OF HARYANA (1989) 4 SCC 71 ). On the other hand, Sri J. Anil Kumar, the learned Standing Counsel for High Court of A.P. appearing for the respondents while relying upon COL. B.J. AKKARA (RETD.) v. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (2006) 11 SCC 709 ), COOP. SOCIETIES v. ISRAIL KHAN (2010) 1 SCC 440)and CHANDI PRASAD UNIYAL v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND ( (2012) 8 SCC 417 )submitted that even in the absence of any misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the employee in getting excess pay, the amount so paid due to wrong fixation of pay is bound to be repaid by the employee. From the admitted facts noticed above it is clear that the petitioner, who did not possess the qualification of graduation, was not eligible for promotion to the post of Administrative Officer as per A.P.J.M.S. Rules, 2003. However, she was wrongly promoted to the said post and from the date of the promotion till her retirement on 31.12.2010 she received the pay in the post of Administrative Officer and on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.12.2010 her pension and retirement benefits were fixed in the post of Administrative Officer. Thus, she received the excess amounts right from her date of promotion to the post of Administrative Officer. Thus, she received the excess amounts right from her date of promotion to the post of Administrative Officer. It is no doubt true that the promotion of the petitioner to the post of Administrative Officer and the excess payment made was not on account of any misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the petitioner. It may also be true that the petitioner had no knowledge that the payments being made to her are in excess to what she is entitled to. However, the fact remains that the promotion of the petitioner to the post of Administrative Officer was in violation of the provisions of the A.P.J.M.S. Rules, 2003 and that the excess amounts were paid to her wrongly in the post of Administrative Officer. In other words, the excess amounts received by the petitioner were without the authority of law. The question whether it is permissible to recover the overpayments made to an employee due to irregular or wrong pay fixation is no longer res integra. In CHANDI PRASAD UNIYAL’S case (10 supra) certain excess payments were effected to the appellant therein due to a mistake committed by the District Educational Officer in fixing the pay scale. Assailing the proceedings initiated for recovery of the overpayments made, it was contended by the appellants therein that as the payments were effected due to a mistake but not due to any misrepresentation or fraud committed by the appellants, the decision taken by the respondents to recover the amount is not legal. Rejecting the said contention, it was held by the Supreme Court: 14. We are concerned with the excess payment of public money which is often described as “taxpayers’ money” which belongs neither to the officers who have effected overpayment nor to the recipients. We fail to see why the concept of fraud or misrepresentation is being brought in such situations. The question to be asked is whether excess money has been paid or not, may be due to a bona fide mistake. Possibly, effecting excess payment of public money by the government officers may be due to various reasons like negligence, carelessness, collusion, favouritism, etc. because money in such situation does not belong to the payer or the payee. Situations may also arise where both the payer and the payee are at fault, then the mistake is mutual. Possibly, effecting excess payment of public money by the government officers may be due to various reasons like negligence, carelessness, collusion, favouritism, etc. because money in such situation does not belong to the payer or the payee. Situations may also arise where both the payer and the payee are at fault, then the mistake is mutual. Payments are being effected in many situations without any authority of law and payments have been received by the recipients also without any authority of law. Any amount paid/received without the authority of law can always be recovered barring few exceptions of extreme hardships but not as a matter of right, in such situations law implies an obligation on the payee to repay the money, otherwise it would amount to unjust enrichment. Though the appellants therein relied upon the decisions of SAHIB RAM’S case (2 supra) and other decisions wherein the Courts directed not to recover the excess payments, the said decisions were distinguished observing as under: 13. We are not convinced that this Court in various judgments referred to hereinbefore has laid down any proposition of law that only if the State or its officials establish that there was misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the recipients of the excess pay, then only the amount paid could be recovered. On the other hand, most of the cases referred to hereinbefore turned on the peculiar facts and circumstances of those cases either because the recipients had retired or were on the verge of retirement or were occupying lower posts in the administrative hierarchy. In CHANDI PRASAD UNIYAL’S case (10 supra) it was also made clear that no principle of law as such was laid down in the judgment cited by the appellants therein that only if there is misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the recipients of the money in getting excess paid, the amount paid due to irregular or wrong fixation of pay can be recovered. In the light of the legal position noticed above, it can be safely concluded that the recipients of the excess amounts that were paid without authority of law cannot seek a direction to restrain the employer from recovering the said amounts as a matter of right and that such excess amounts can always be recovered except in the cases of extreme hardship. Coming to the instant case, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Administrative Officer on 29.09.2010 and after working in the said post for a period of about three months, she retired from service on 31.12.2010. Subsequently the impugned order of the respondent No.2 was passed on 13.7.2012. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner worked in the post of Administrative Officer only for a period of about three months and moreover the post she was occupying was the highest post in the Judicial Ministerial Service, we are of the opinion that this is not a case of extreme hardship. It is also relevant to note that it was specifically pleaded in the counter-affidavit of the respondents 2 and 4 that most of the similarly situated employees who were wrongly promoted and received excess payments have refunded the excess amounts so received by them. Therefore, making any exception in the case of the petitioner would also amount to discrimination if any relief is granted to the petitioner. So far as the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are concerned, except BABULAL JAIN’S case (3 supra), the rest of the decisions are clearly distinguishable on facts and the ratio laid down therein cannot be applied to the case on hand. In BABULAL JAIN’S case (3 supra) the appellant therein was working as Accountant (Assistant Gr.II) in Collectorate and he was transferred on deputation to the post of Election Supervisor having higher responsibilities. However, subsequently, it was found that he was not entitled to higher pay as no channel of promotion is existing from Assistant Gr.II to Election Supervisor and the excess pay paid to him was sought to be recovered. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court held: “However, in a case of this nature, no recovery should be directed to be made. The appellant has discharged higher responsibilities. It is not a case where he obtained higher salary on committing any fraud or misrepresentation. The mistake, if any, took place on a misconception of law. He was at least entitled to some allowances. In refixing his pay, his claim to that effect has not been considered. He has since retired. A sum of Rs.22,000/- has been recovered from him. Such recovery has been effected without issuing any show-cause notice. The mistake, if any, took place on a misconception of law. He was at least entitled to some allowances. In refixing his pay, his claim to that effect has not been considered. He has since retired. A sum of Rs.22,000/- has been recovered from him. Such recovery has been effected without issuing any show-cause notice. His case on merit in this behalf had not been considered by the Government and even by the Tribunal.” As could be seen, the relief granted to the appellant in BABULAL JAIN’S case (3 supra) was also in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the said case and no principle of law as such was laid down. On the other hand, in CHANDI PRASAD UNIYAL’S case (10 supra) which is a later decision and is rendered by a Co-ordinate Bench, the issue was considered in detail and after reviewing the decided cases on the issue, it was held that any amount paid/received without the authority of law can always be recovered barring few exceptions of extreme hardships but not as a matter of right. It was also added that in such situations law implies an obligation on the payee to repay the money, otherwise it would amount to unjust enrichment. Under the circumstances, following the law laid down in CHANDI PRASAD UNIYAL’S case (10 supra), we are of the opinion that the impugned orders cannot be held to be illegal on any ground whatsoever. However, having regard to the fact that the recovery of excess amounts has not yet been effected, before effecting the recovery the petitioner shall be put on notice and after considering her representation the method and manner of recovery be decided. The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Consequently the miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Writ Petition shall stand closed.