Judgment : K.C. Bhanu, J. This Criminal Appeal, under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "Cr.P.C."), is directed against the judgment, dated 03-07-2009, in Sessions Case No.54 of 2008 on the file of the Principal Sessions Judge, Adilabad, whereunder and whereby, appellants/A1 and A2 were found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) and accordingly, they were convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life each and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only) each, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one month each. 2. The prosecution case in brief may be stated as follows: PW1 is the wife, PW2 is the elder brother and PW4 is the mother of M. Narayana Reddy (hereafter referred to as ‘the deceased’). PW3 is the elder brother of PW1. PW5 is the junior paternal uncle of PW3, PW6 is the mediator to the scene of offence. PW11 is the Magistrate who conducted Test Identification Parade. PW12 is the Doctor who conducted post mortem examination. PW13 is the Sub-Inspector of Police who registered the crime. PW14 is the Investigating Officer. The wife of A1 is the sister of A2. A3’s wife is the sister of A1. There were boundary disputes between A1 and the deceased. Since 4 or 5 days prior to the incident, the deceased was not going to his fields because of the disputes. One day prior to the incident, the deceased went to Waghapur village to bring PW3, his brother-in-law and PW5 for his support in the village. On the next day, the deceased came to the village along with PWs.3 and 5 at about 1.30 p.m. PW4, the mother informed that A1 along with his henchman from Pendalawada came and asked her about the whereabouts of the deceased. PW4 informed that it is not safe for the deceased to stay in the village. However, the deceased, PWs.3 and 5 went to the fields of the deceased. When the deceased reached the road to Karanji, A1 to A3 came there. A1 beat the deceased with Gadiga Goyyalu (cart peg) on his shoulder. A2 beat the deceased with Gadiga Goyyalu (cart peg) on the other shoulder. A3 beat the deceased with Gadiga Goyyalu (cart peg) on the head. The deceased fell down and received bleeding injuries. When the deceased reached the road to Karanji, A1 to A3 came there. A1 beat the deceased with Gadiga Goyyalu (cart peg) on his shoulder. A2 beat the deceased with Gadiga Goyyalu (cart peg) on the other shoulder. A3 beat the deceased with Gadiga Goyyalu (cart peg) on the head. The deceased fell down and received bleeding injuries. After beating the deceased, A1 held the towel around the neck of PW5 and threatened him. PWs.3 and 5 left the place without looking back. At about 3.00 p.m., a school boy came and informed PW4 that the deceased was lying with bleeding injuries near the house of one Yelampally Satenna. PW4 went to the spot and found the deceased. PW1, the wife of the deceased was returning from the fields at about 3.00 p.m. On the way, she found a man lying there with injuries. Due to fear she did not go there. She returned to her house. At the house, PW4 informed that the deceased was killed by A1 and his men. On 17-07-2007, at about 5 p.m., PW1 went to Jainath Police Station and gave a report to PW13, the Sub-Inspector of Police. Ex.P1 is the report. PW13 registered the same as Crime No.44 of 2007 of Jainath Police Station under Section 302 read with 34 IPC. Ex.P24 is the First Information Report sent to the court. The same was received by the learned Magistrate on 18-07-2007 at 10.30 a.m. The distance is 18 Kms. PW14-Inspector of Police, Adilabad Rural Circle took up investigation and proceeded to the scene of offence at about 5.30 p.m. He conducted scene of offence panchanama Ex.P2. Ex.P3 is the rough sketch. He seized M.Os.1 to 3. PW8 is the photographer, who took the photographs. PW14 examined PWs.1 to 4 and recorded their statements. On 18-07-2007, PW14 held inquest over the dead body of the deceased between 9 and 11 a.m. in the presence of PW7. Ex.P4 is the inquest report. He examined PWs.3 and 5 and recorded their statements. Thereafter, the dead body was sent to post mortem examination. On 18-07-2007 PW12, the Assistant Professor, District Headquarters Hospital, Adilabad conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and found 8 external injuries. Ex.P4 is the inquest report. He examined PWs.3 and 5 and recorded their statements. Thereafter, the dead body was sent to post mortem examination. On 18-07-2007 PW12, the Assistant Professor, District Headquarters Hospital, Adilabad conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and found 8 external injuries. Ex.P23 is the post mortem examination report According to the Doctor, the death was due to cardio respiratory failure due to hemorrhage due to the major vessel of neck and injury to brain. PW14 arrested A1 to A3 on 21-07-2007 and interrogated them. In pursuance of their confession, M.Os.8 and 9 Gadiga Goyyalu (cart peg) and a sickle were recovered from A1. M.O.10 is the Gadiga Goyya and the same was recovered on the confession of A2. On 28-08-2007, PW11, the Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Mobile Court, Adilabad conducted test identification parade in the Sub-jail. PWs.3 and 5 identified A1 and A2 but could not identify A3. Ex.P16 is the test identification parade proceedings. After completion of investigation, PW14 filed charge sheet. 3. The trial Court framed the following charges against the accused: “FIRSTLY: That on or about 17-07-2007 at about 2.00 p.m., at or near the house of Yempalli Santenna in Kura village you A1 to A3 due to land disputes with the deceased Matapu Narayana Reddy, S/o.Ganga Reddy, 37 years, in furtherance of your common intention to kill him attacked him with stout sticks i.e., gadugoyya and a sickle and that in that transaction A1 of your beat the deceased on his head, mouth and left shoulder and you A1 further attacked him with a stick and silt his throat with a sickle and caused bleeding injuries and killed him and that you A1 thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302 r/w. 34 of the IPC and within my the cognizance. SECONDLY: That in the course of the same transaction and at the same time and place mentioned in charge No.1 above you A2 beat the deceased on his shoulder with a stout stick i.e, gadugoyya and killed him and that you A2 thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302 r/w. 34 of the IPC and within my the cognizance. SECONDLY: That in the course of the same transaction and at the same time and place mentioned in charge No.1 above you A2 beat the deceased on his shoulder with a stout stick i.e, gadugoyya and killed him and that you A2 thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302 r/w. 34 of the IPC and within my the cognizance. THIRDLY: That in the course of the same transaction and at the same time and place mentioned in charge No.1 above you A3 beat the deceased with a stout stick i.e, gadugoyya and caused injuries on his both thighs and other parts of the body and killed him and that you A3 thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302 r/w. 34 of the IPC and within my the cognizance. When the above charges were read over and explained to the accused in Telugu, they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. To substantiate the charges, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 14 and got marked Exs.P-1 to P-24 besides the case property M.Os.1 to 11. 5. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. with reference to the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. They denied the same and when they were called upon to enter into the defence, they did not adduce any evidence, but during the course of cross-examination of PWs.1, 3 and 5, Exs.D1 to D5 were marked. 6. The learned Sessions Judge after considering the evidence of PWs.3 and 5 coupled with medical evidence found A1 and A2 guilty and accordingly, they were convicted and sentenced as stated above. As A3 was not shown to be the assailant of the deceased and PWs.3 and 5 did not identify him as assailant of the deceased, he was acquitted. Challenging the conviction and sentence, the present appeal is filed by A1 and A2. 7. The points for determination are: Whether the prosecution proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt against A1 and A2 for the charges under Sections 302 read with 34 IPC and whether the judgment of the trial Court is correct, legal and proper or not? 8. Challenging the conviction and sentence, the present appeal is filed by A1 and A2. 7. The points for determination are: Whether the prosecution proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt against A1 and A2 for the charges under Sections 302 read with 34 IPC and whether the judgment of the trial Court is correct, legal and proper or not? 8. POINTS:- The learned counsel for the appellants/A1 and A2 vehemently contended that Ex.P1 was brought into existence after due deliberations on the next day of the incident; that PWs.3 and 5 who were close relatives of the deceased, were set up by the prosecution as eye-witnesses; that their conduct in not informing about the incident to police while they were proceeding to their village is highly un-natural because the deceased is closely related to them; that both PWs.3 and 5 were turned hostile, therefore, their evidence cannot be relied upon and the Investigating Officer has not collected any evidence to show that there were boundary disputes existing between A1 and the deceased; that PWs.3 and 5 who belong to different village, have not explained the purpose for which they came to the village of the deceased and that admittedly PWs.3 and 5 were summoned to the place of inquest on the next day of the incident and after their arrival they were shown as eye-witnesses by ante-dating First Information Report; that PW1 did not state as to how she came to know that PWs.3 and 5 are the eye-witnesses to the incident, which itself shows that they were planted witnesses; that none of the independent witnesses who were present at the time of the incident is examined though the incident has taken place at the outskirts of the village where some residential houses are located; that the material objects have not been sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory to show that they contained the same blood group of the deceased; that as PWs.3 and 5 are strangers to accused, how they could be in a position to identify the assailants of the deceased after lapse of long time; that even according to their evidence, A1 and A2 beat the deceased with cart pegs on the body of the deceased whereas A3 caused injury on the head which proved to be fatal and that injury on the neck has not been explained by the prosecution and therefore, these aspects have not been considered by the trial Court while appreciating the evidence. Hence, he prays to set aside the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court. 9. Hence, he prays to set aside the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court. 9. On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor contended that the presence of PWs.3 and 5 is quite natural and probable that having come to the village, they were proceeding along with the deceased to the fields to see PW1 and therefore, their presence at the time of incident is convincing; that as the incident has taken place in the outskirts of village, none of the independent witness could not have witnessed the incident; that the police could not examined them as eye-witnesses to the incident; that PWs.3 and 5 though related to the deceased closely, but at the same time, their evidence cannot be doubted as their presence is established beyond all reasonable doubt and further more, Ex.P1 was lodged within few hours after, the incident and their names have been mentioned as they proceeded along with the deceased from the house, and further the visit of PWs.3 and 5 to the village was also spoken by PWs.1, 2 and 4, therefore, they are the best persons to witness the incident; that as A1 intimidated both PWs.3 and 5, they have no other go except to go to their village and there is nothing un-usual in their conduct or behaviour in not going to the house of PW1 to inform about the incident, therefore that cannot be a ground to discredit their testimony; that further when PW11 conducted Test Identification parade, PWs.3 and 5 identified A1 and A2 as the assailants of the deceased; that after following the due procedure, the Test Identification parade was conducted and that further there is evidence on record, which would go to show that the deceased was having boundary and also path way dispute with A1 and for that reason, there is every possibility for the accused to commit the murder of the deceased; that the ocular testimony is completely in corroboration with the medical evidence and some technical errors committed by the Investigating Officer in not sending the material objects to the Forensic Science Laboratory by itself is not a ground to doubt the case of the prosecution especially when the presence of PWs.3 and 5 is established beyond all reasonable doubt; that it is also proved by the prosecution that A1 and A2 are the assailants of the deceased and after elaborate consideration of evidence on record the trial Court rightly found A1 and A2 guilty for the offence under Section 302 r/w.34 IPC and that order needs no interference by this Court. Hence, he pays to dismiss the appeal. 10. The scene of occurrence is in the outskirts near the house of one Yelampally Satenna in Kura village. PW6 is one of the mediators who was present when the Inspector observed the scene of occurrence on 17-07-2007 at about 5.45 p.m. He said that the dead body was found at the spot and at the scene of occurrence M.Os.1 to 3 were seized, which are blood stained earth and controlled earth and pair of chappals. Admittedly, those incriminating material which were seized from the scene of occurrence have not been sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory to ascertain whether they contained any human blood or the same blood group of the deceased. Except suggesting that he signed on Ex.P2 scene of occurrence panchanama in the Police Station and M.Os.1 to 3 were not seized in his presence, nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination of PW6 to doubt his testimony. So as seen from Ex.P2, it is clear that the scene of occurrence is near the house of Yelampally Satenna in Kura village. Ex.P3 is the rough sketch. PW14-the Inspector of Police categorically stated that the scene of occurrence is near the house of Yelampally Satenna. The objective findings in both these reports are admissible in evidence. The contents in Exs.P2 and P3 remained unchallenged. So, from the evidence of PWs.6 and 14 and the recitals in Exs.P2 and P3, it is clear that the incident of murder has taken place near the house of Yelampally Satenna in Kura village. Even the accused is also not seriously denying or disputing about the taking place of incident near the house of Yelampally Satenna. 11. PW7 is one of the inquest mediators when PW14 conducted inquest on the dead body of the deceased on 18-07-2007 from 9.00 to 11.00 a.m. under Ex.P4 panchanama. The inquest mediators found certain injuries on the dead body of the deceased. They opined that the deceased died as a result of injuries sustained by him. The apparent cause of the death as spoken by PWs.7 and 14 and as mentioned in Ex.P4 panchanama remained unchallenged. 12. PW8 is the Photographer who has taken positive photographs of the dead body of the deceased, which were marked as Exs.P5 to P10 and Ex.P11 are the negatives of the said photographs. The apparent cause of the death as spoken by PWs.7 and 14 and as mentioned in Ex.P4 panchanama remained unchallenged. 12. PW8 is the Photographer who has taken positive photographs of the dead body of the deceased, which were marked as Exs.P5 to P10 and Ex.P11 are the negatives of the said photographs. There are some houses at the spot and agricultural fields are located at a distance of 20 to 25 yards away from the spot. 13. PW12 is the Doctor who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased and found the following ante-mortem external injuries: 1. Laceration over occipital area 4” x 1”. 2. Laceration of 2”x ?” x skin deep over upper lip. 3. Contusion 6cm x 2 cm on left cheek. 4. Contusion 16 cm x 4 cm on right thigh. 5. Contusion 10cm x 5 cm on right iliac area. 6. Contusion on right shoulder 15cm x 6 cm. 7. Contusion on left shoulder 6cm x 10 cm. 8. Laceration on the anterior neck 6” x 2” x 3”. He also found the following internal injuries: 1. Occipital bone fractured with extrusion (heriniation) of occipital lobe (protrusionofbra) of brain about 10cm x 5 cm. 2. Laceration of strap mussels of the neck trachea right carotid artery right jugular vain. He stated that injury No.1 is possible by heavy blunt object like M.Os.8, 10 and 11, whereas injury No.2 is possible by sharp object like M.O.9 sickle. Of the external injuries, the lacerated wounds are possible by a sharp object like a sickle and contusions are possible by blunt object. The cause of the death of the deceased to the best of his knowledge was due to cardio respiratory failure secondary to hemorrhage due to injury to major vessels of neck and injury to brain. Internal injury No.1 by itself is enough to cause the death. So also injury No.2 is also by itself enough to cause the death. The time of the death is 6 to 36 hours prior to his post mortem examination and Ex.P23 is the post mortem examination report. It is suggested to him that all the injuries in Ex.P23 are post-mortem injuries and that he gave opinion under the pressure from the police but the same is denied. Practically, the evidence of PW12 and the recitals in Ex.P23 remained un-challenged. It is suggested to him that all the injuries in Ex.P23 are post-mortem injuries and that he gave opinion under the pressure from the police but the same is denied. Practically, the evidence of PW12 and the recitals in Ex.P23 remained un-challenged. Therefore, the homicidal nature of the death of the deceased is established. 14. Now, it has to be seen whether the accused are the assailants of the deceased or not? 15. The entire case rests upon the evidence of PWs.3 and 5. They belong to Waghapur village, Adilabad district. The incident has taken place in Kura village. Admittedly, PWs.3 and 5 do not know A1 and A2 prior to the incident. Perhaps that is a reason why the police gave a requisition to the Judicial Magistrate of First Class to conduct Test Identification Parade to test the memory of PWs.3 and 5. In view of the fact that PWs.3 and 5 appears to be chance witnesses and they are closely related to the deceased, their evidence has to be evaluated and appreciated carefully and cautiously. The law is well settled that the relationship by itself is not a ground to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. After careful scrutiny, if the evidence of relatives is found to be true and trustworthy, it can be acted upon. On this aspect it is pertinent to refer to a decision reported in Hari Obula Reddy and others vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1981 Supreme Court 82), wherein it is held in paragraph Nos.12 and 13 as follows: 12. P.W. 1 also had fully supported the prosecution story set out at the commencement of this judgment. He emerged unshaken from the ordeal of a lengthy and searing cross-examination. He frankly admitted his close relationship with the deceased. At first flush, our impression was that P.W. 1 is a partyman of the deceased who had borne with the deceased in earlier incidents of factious strife. In order to clear up the point, we further heard the arguments of the learned Counsel and carefully scrutinized the record all over again. We find that in any incident, litigation or previous proceeding with which the deceased or his partymen were concerned, P.W. 1 did not figure as an accused, or respondent or a witness or in any other capacity. We find that in any incident, litigation or previous proceeding with which the deceased or his partymen were concerned, P.W. 1 did not figure as an accused, or respondent or a witness or in any other capacity. Thus, all that can be said is that P.W. 1, being the maternal uncle of the deceased, and P.W. 2, being the son of a person who was being prosecuted along with the deceased for the murder of a person belonging to the opposing faction of the accused, can be said to be interested witnesses. But it is well settled that interested evidence is not necessarily unreliable evidence. Even partisanship by itself is not a valid ground for discrediting or rejecting sworn testimony. Nor can it be laid down as an invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis of conviction unless corroborated to a material extent in material particulars by independent evidence. All that is necessary is that the evidence of interested witnesses should be subjected to careful scrutiny and accepted with caution. If on such scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or inherently probable, it may, by itself, be sufficient, in the circumstances of the particular case, to base a conviction thereon. Although in the matter of appreciation of evidence, no hard and fast rule can be laid down, yet, in most cases, in evaluating the evidence of an interested or even a partisan witness, it is useful as a first step to focus attention on the question, whether the presence of the witness at the scene of the crime at the material time was probable. If so, whether the substratum of the story narrated by the witness, being consistent with the other evidence on record, the natural course of human events, the surrounding circumstances and inherent probabilities of the case, is such which will carry conviction with a prudent person. If the answer to these questions be in the affirmative, and the evidence of the witness appears to the court to be almost flawless, and free from suspicion, it may accept it, without seeking corroboration from any other source. If the answer to these questions be in the affirmative, and the evidence of the witness appears to the court to be almost flawless, and free from suspicion, it may accept it, without seeking corroboration from any other source. Since perfection in this imperfect world is seldom to be found, and the evidence of a witness, more so of an interested witness, is generally fringed with embellishment and exaggerations, however true in the main, the court may look for some assurance, the nature and extent of which will vary according to the circumstances of the particular case, from independent evidence, circumstantial or direct, before finding the accused guilty on the basis of his interested testimony. We may again emphasise that these are only broad guidelines, which may often be useful in assessing interested testimony, and are not iron-cased rules uniformly applicable in all situations. 13. Now, let us apply these broad tests to the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2. 16. In evaluating the evidence of eye-witnesses particularly the evidence of chance witnesses, two important considerations are relevant i.e., whether their presence is found to be acceptable and whether there is anything inherently improbable to doubt their testimony. Similarly, the witness reaction is also important in view of the arguments advanced by the learned senior counsel for the appellants. On this aspect it is apt to refer to a decision reported in Rana Pratap and others v. State of Haryana ((1983) 3 Supreme Court cases 327), wherein it is held in paragraph No.6 as follows: “Yet another reason given by the learned Sessions Judge to doubt the presence of the witnesses was that their conduct in not going to the rescue of the deceased when he was in the clutches of the assailants was unnatural. We must say that the comment is most unreal. Every person who witnesses a murder reacts in his own way. Some are stunned, become speechless and stand rooted to the spot. Some become hysteric and start wailing. Some start shouting for help. Others run away to keep themselves as far removed from the spot as possible. Yet others rush to the rescue of the victim even going to the extent of counter-attacking the assailants. Every one reacts in his own special way. There is no set rule of natural reaction. Some become hysteric and start wailing. Some start shouting for help. Others run away to keep themselves as far removed from the spot as possible. Yet others rush to the rescue of the victim even going to the extent of counter-attacking the assailants. Every one reacts in his own special way. There is no set rule of natural reaction. To discard the evidence of a witness on the ground that he did not react in any particular manner is to appreciate evidence in a wholly unrealistic and unimaginative way.” From the above decision, it is clear that reaction of the witnesses vary from man to man. There cannot be any fixed set of norms for a set of reaction. One may be stunned, one may be speechless, one may try to abscond and one may try to intervene in the incident. Therefore, a witness cannot react in a particular way, but that cannot be a ground to discredit his testimony. Following the above principle, it has to be seen whether the evidence of PWs.3 and 5 can be accepted and whether an implicit reliance can be placed on their evidence. Both of them have stated that prior to the death of the deceased, there were disputes between the deceased and A1. A1 belongs to Karangi village and he is an agnate to the deceased. There were boundary disputes with regard to pathway between the deceased and A1 to go to their lands. A day prior to the death of the deceased, the deceased came to the village of PW3 and requested them to come to his village in order to settle the dispute between himself and A1. The deceased also informed them that because of the said dispute with A1, he was not going to his land for doing agricultural work. Therefore, on the next day i.e., on the date of the incident, they went to Kura village by bus and reached the village at 1.00 p.m. and proceeded to the house of the deceased. At the house of the deceased, PW4 who is the mother of the deceased informed them that some persons from Pendalwada village came and threatened PW2 and told the deceased that not to venture to go out from the house and she also asked PW3 to leave the village by the same bus in which PWs.3 and 5 came to the village. They had a tea in the house of the deceased. Then all the three viz., PW3, PW5 and the deceased left the house to go to the lands. The purpose of going to the land along with the deceased was to see PW1 who is no other than the sister of PW3. While they were proceeding to the lands of the deceased by walk and when they reached near the place of occurrence which is the road leading to Karanji village, A1 and A2 came there along with another person. A1 beat the deceased with a cart peg on one of the shoulders of the deceased, whereas A2 also beat the deceased with another cart peg on another shoulder of the deceased. The third person beat the deceased with the cart peg on head. The deceased fell down and both of them did not intervene to stop the attack because they were afraid of them. The deceased sustained bleeding injuries and became un-conscious. Thinking that accused also beat them, they left the scene of occurrence. Admittedly, they proceeded to the village by walk to some extent and thereafter by bus. Both of them did not made any attempt to go to the house of PW1 to inform about the incident. So also they did not go to the police to inform them about the incident. The explanation given by PW3 shows that A1 held his towel around his neck and threatened him with dire consequences to kill him if he reported the incident to anybody. A1 also threatened them not to go to Kura village. Therefore, both of them left to their village. At the time of recording evidence, the Court put a specific question to PW3, which reads as follows: “Q: You said that the deceased is the husband of your own sister. Did you not feel that you should provide him medical aid when he was lying with injuries there? Ans: I left the place without caring for the deceased as A1 Matapu Venkat Reddy threatened me and also my paternal uncle.” In these circumstances, it is not expected from PWs.3 and 5 to rush to the Police Station to lodge a complaint. Because of fear of accused, they did not even try to go to the house of deceased to inform about the incident to the inmates of the house. Because of fear of accused, they did not even try to go to the house of deceased to inform about the incident to the inmates of the house. Therefore, on the next day, they were summoned to the Government Hospital where inquest was conducted and during the course of inquest, PW14 examined them and recorded their statements. 17. Some omissions were elicited from the evidence of PW3, which reads as under: “I did not state to police or in the J.F.C.M. Court that I was going to the house of Prabhakar Reddy at Karanji. I did not state to police that A1 Matapu Venkat Reddy intimidated me and I did not state this aspect even in the JFCM Court. I did not state to Police that PW4 Chandrabai told the deceased and us to go back from Kura village in the samebus in which we went to that village earlier on that day. I did not state this aspect even before the J.F.C.M., Court. I did not state before police or before the J.F.C.M., that having went to the Kura village I decided to see PW1 at her lands even though PW4 warned us. I did not state to police that the deceased told me also about his disputes with A1 Matapu Venkat Reddy.” 18. It is suggested to PW3 that the deceased did not come to his village but the same is denied. Those above omissions or improvements made by PW3 are trivial in nature and they did not affect the main fabric of the prosecution case. The main fabric of the prosecution case is that they came to the village of the deceased at about 1.00 or 2.00 p.m. and thereafter they were proceeding towards the lands of the deceased and while they were passing near the scene of occurrence, the incident has taken place. Therefore, in the entire cross-examination of PWs.3 and 5, nothing has been elicited to show that they have bitter enmity against A1 and A2 to speak false. As a matter of fact, these two witnesses do not know A1 and A2 prior to the incident because admittedly, they belong to a different village. Therefore, they would not have implicated A1 and A2 falsely at the instance of PWs.1 and 4 or even at the instance of police. As a matter of fact, these two witnesses do not know A1 and A2 prior to the incident because admittedly, they belong to a different village. Therefore, they would not have implicated A1 and A2 falsely at the instance of PWs.1 and 4 or even at the instance of police. They withstood the test of cross-examination by answering all the questions put in the cross-examination as to how they reached Kura village and as to how they were proceeding the lands and how the incident had taken place. Having come down to Kura village, there is every reason for PW3 to go to the lands to see his own sister who admittedly present in the lands. After taking tea in the house of the deceased, they started from the house. No doubt, Exs.D2 and D3 are elicited from the evidence of PW3 which is to the effect that they started from Waghapur during pagalu time to go to Kura village. Ex.D3 which is the statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., reads that before we reached the fields three persons attacked with hard weapons. So, these two contradictions would not in any manner affect the main core of the prosecution case nor credibility of these witnesses. 19. Similarly, in the evidence of PW5, Ex.D4 was elicited, which is to the effect that the incident has occurred when they reached the fields. Ex.D5 is also elicited as the mother of the deceased told that PW3 was present in the fields, she may likely to be attacked, therefore, they wanted to go to fields that is the reason for going to the fields of the deceased. The reason is though inconsistent with the evidence of PW3, but at the same time, it is not so serious contradiction so as to doubt the evidence of PW5. 20. Both the witnesses were declared hostile by the prosecution when they were re-called on 11-02-2009. For the sole reason that they did not state that one of the accused was armed with sickle, for that purpose learned Government Pleader conducting the case declared hostile even though there is no such necessity. Simply because PWs.3 and 5 were declared hostile by the prosecution, it does not mean that their evidence has to wiped out from the record. Simply because PWs.3 and 5 were declared hostile by the prosecution, it does not mean that their evidence has to wiped out from the record. Such part of their testimony which inspire confidence can be taken to corroborate the other evidence, if any, available on record in view of the decision reported in Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (AIR 1976 Supreme Court 294), wherein it is held in paragraph No.51 as follows: “51. From the above conspectus, it emerges clear that even in a criminal prosecution when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the court, by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as Washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed in regard to a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.” Admittedly, the presence of PWs.3 and 5 with the deceased at the time of the incident is established. Their presence at the scene of occurrence is quite probable as proper explanation was given. Furthermore, their names have been clearly mentioned in the First Information Report. Ex.P1 was lodged by PW1 who is no other than the wife of the deceased. The related portion in Ex.P1 would clearly go to show that on 17-07-2007 at about 1.00 p.m. the deceased and his brother-in-law and junior paternal uncle (PWs.3 and 5) came from Waghapur village and that her mother-in-law advised them not to go to the lands as the elders convened a panchanayat but in spite of the said advice, all the three persons stated that they will go to the land and left the place. Therefore, the presence of PWs.3 and 5 has specifically mentioned in Ex.P1 as the persons who accompanied the deceased from the house of the deceased to his fields and shortly thereafter the incident has taken place. So, when the First Information Report was brought into existence within few hours of the incident where the names of PWs.3 and 5 have been mentioned as the persons who accompanied the deceased, there is every possibility for them to witness the incident. Therefore, the presence of PWs.3 and 5 at the time of incident is established beyond all reasonable doubt. 21. It is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that Ex.P1 was ante-dated and it was reached the Court at about 10.30 a.m., on 18-07-2007. It is not in dispute before this Court that the jurisdictional Court is located at a distance of 18 Kms., from the Police Station. So, some delay in sending the report to the Court cannot be said to be fatal to the case of the prosecution. 22. PW13 has categorically stated that he received the report from PW1 at 5.00 p.m. and thereafter he informed about the registration of case to the Inspector of Police. Nothing has been elicited from the evidence of PW13 to show that he ante-dated the First Information Report and Ex.P1 was prepared on the next day. From the evidence of PW13 and Ex.P1, it is clear the First Information Report was lodged at 5.00 p.m., on 17-07-2007 and the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the First Information Report was ante-dated in the absence of any material, cannot be accepted. 23. Further PW2 who is the elder brother of the deceased also stated about the motive that about one and half years prior to the death of the deceased, A1 filed a Criminal Case against PW2 and the deceased for attempt to commit the murder. By the date of the death of the deceased, trial was pending in that case. About 4 or 5 days prior to the death of the deceased, a verbal altercation took place between the deceased and A1 over the boundary dispute. As no body in the village came forward to support the case of the deceased, the deceased went to Waghapur to bring PWs.3 and 5. About 4 or 5 days prior to the death of the deceased, a verbal altercation took place between the deceased and A1 over the boundary dispute. As no body in the village came forward to support the case of the deceased, the deceased went to Waghapur to bring PWs.3 and 5. Therefore, there is a clear motive for the accused to commit the murder of the deceased, as they were on logger hands prior to the incident. 24. PW4 who is the mother of the deceased has categorically stated that on the date of the incident, the deceased, PWs.3 and 5 came to the house and in spite of her warning them not to proceed to the land of the deceased, they went there at 1.30 p.m. The presence of PWs.3 and 5 on the date of the incident in the village is established beyond all reasonable doubt. They are not shown to have been planted to support the case of the prosecution. 25. In view of the fact that PWs.3 and 5 do not know the accused prior to the incident, the police requested the concerned jurisdictional Magistrate to held Test Identification Parade. In pursuance of the request, PW11 conducted Test Identification Parade after duly following the procedure as contemplated under Criminal Rules of Practice. In the Test Identification Parade, PWs.3 and 5 identified A1 and A2 as assailants of the deceased, but they are unable to identify A3 who allegedly participated in the commission of offence. The object of holding the Test Identification Parade is to test the memory of the witness who had no prior acquaintance with the accused who participated in the commission of offence. On this aspect it is pertinent to refer to a decision reported in view of the decision reported in SIDHARTHA VASHISHT @ MANU SHARMA VS. STATE (NCT OF DELHI) ( 2010 (6) SCC 1 ), wherein it is held in paragraph Nos.256 and 259 as follows: 256. The law as it stands today is set out in the following decisions of this Court which are reproduced as herein under in Munshi Singh Gautam vs. State of M.P. (2005) 9 SCC 631 , at page 643: “16. As was observed by this Court in Matru vs. State of U.P. 1971 2 SCC 75 identification tests do not constitute substantive evidence. As was observed by this Court in Matru vs. State of U.P. 1971 2 SCC 75 identification tests do not constitute substantive evidence. They are primarily meant for the purpose of helping the investigating agency with an assurance that their progress with the investigation into the offence is proceeding on the right lines. The identification can only be used as corroborative of the statement in Court. (See Santokh Singh vs. Izhar Hussain 1973 2 SCC 406 .) The necessity for holding an identification parade can arise only when the accused are not previously known to the witnesses. The whole idea of a test identification parade is that witnesses who claim to have seen the culprits at the time of occurrence are to identify them from the midst of other persons without any aid or any other source. The test is done to check upon their veracity. In other words, the main object of holding an identification parade, during the investigation stage, is to test the memory of the witnesses based upon first impression and also to enable the prosecution to decide whether all or any of them could be cited as eyewitnesses of the crime. The identification proceedings are in the nature of tests and significantly, therefore, there is no provision for it in the Code and the Evidence Act. It is desirable that a test identification parade should be conducted as soon as after the arrest of the accused. This becomes necessary to eliminate the possibility of the accused being shown to the witnesses prior to the test identification parade. This is a very common plea of the accused and, therefore, the prosecution has to be cautious to ensure that there is no scope for making such an allegation. If, however, circumstances are beyond control and there is some delay, it cannot be said to be fatal to the prosecution. 17. It is trite to say that the substantive evidence is the evidence of identification in court. Apart from the clear provisions of Section 9 of the Evidence Act, the position in law is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. The facts, which establish the identity of the accused persons, are relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act. As a general rule, the substantive evidence of a witness is the statement made in court. The facts, which establish the identity of the accused persons, are relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act. As a general rule, the substantive evidence of a witness is the statement made in court. The evidence of mere identification of the accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of a prior test identification, therefore, is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. It is, accordingly, considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier identification proceedings. This rule of prudence, however, is subject to exception, when, for example, the court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration. The identification parades belong to the stage of investigation, and there is no provision in the Code which obliges the investigation agency to hold or confers a right upon the accused to claim a test identification parade. They do not constitute substantive evidence and these parades are essentially governed by Section 162 of the Code. Failure to hold a test identification parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in court. The weight to be attached to such identification should be a matter for the courts of fact. In appropriate cases it may accept the evidence of identification even without insisting on corroboration. (See Kanta Prashad vs. Delhi Administration AIR 1958 SC 350 , Vaikuntam Chandrappa vs. State of A.P. AIR 1960 SC 1340 , Budhsen Vs State of U.P. (1970) 2 SCC 128 and Rameshwar Singh vs. State of J&K (1971) 2 SCC 715 ) 19. In Harbhajan Singh vs. State of J&K (1975) 4 SCC 480 , though a test identification parade was not held, this Court upheld the conviction on the basis of the identification in court corroborated by other circumstantial evidence. In Harbhajan Singh vs. State of J&K (1975) 4 SCC 480 , though a test identification parade was not held, this Court upheld the conviction on the basis of the identification in court corroborated by other circumstantial evidence. In that case it was found that the appellant and one Gurmukh Singh were absent at the time of roll call and when they were arrested on the night of 16.12.1971 their rifles smelt of fresh gunpowder and that the empty cartridge case which was found at the scene of offence bore distinctive markings showing that the bullet which killed the deceased was fired from the rifle of the appellant. Noticing these circumstances this Court held: (SCC p. 481, para 4). “In view of this corroborative evidence we find no substance in the argument urged on behalf of the appellant that the investigation officer ought to have held an identification parade and that the failure of Munshi Ram to mention the names of the two accused to the neighbours who came to the scene immediately after the occurrence shows that his story cannot be true. As observed by this Court in Jadunath Singh vs. State of U.P. 17 absence of test identification is not necessarioy fatal. The fact that Munshi Ram did not disclose the names of the two accused to the villages only shows that the accused were not previously known to him and the story that the accused referred to each other by their respective names during the course of the incident contains an element of exaggeration. The case does not rest on the evidence of Munshi am alone and the corroborative circumstances to which we have referred to above lend enough assurance to the implication of the appellant.” Malkhansing vs. State of M.P., (2003) 5 SCC 746 at 752 “7. It is trite to say that the substantive evidence is the evidence of identification in court. Apart from the clear provisions of Section 9 of the Evidence Act, the position in law is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. The facts, which establish the identity of the accused persons, are relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act. As a general rule, the substantive evidence of a witness is the statement made in court. The facts, which establish the identity of the accused persons, are relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act. As a general rule, the substantive evidence of a witness is the statement made in court. The evidence of mere identification of the accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of a prior test identification, therefore, is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. It is accordingly considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier identification proceedings. This rule of prudence, however, is subject to exceptions, when, for example, the court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration. The identification parades belong to the stage of investigation, and there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which obliges the investigation agency to hold, or confers a right upon the accused to claim a test identification parade. They do not constitute substantive evidence and these parades are essentially governed by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Failure to hold a test identification parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in court. The weight to be attached to such identification should be a matter fro the courts of fact. In appropriate cases it may accept the evidence of identification even without insisting on corroboration.” 259. In Mullagiri Vajram vs. State of A.P. 1993 Supp. (2) SCC 198, it was held that though the accused was seen by the witness in custody, any infirmity in TIP will not affect the outcome of the case, since the deposition of the witnesses in Court was reliable and could sustain a conviction. The photo identification and TIP are only aides in the investigation and does not form substantive evidence. The substantive evidence is the evidence in the court in oath. Keeping the above principles in mind, it is to be seen whether there are any compelling or substantial reasons to interfere with the judgment of the trial Court and whether the identification of A1 and A2 by PWs.3 and 5 inspires confidence. The Test Identification Parade was conducted on 25-08-2007. The accused were arrested on 21-07-2007. Keeping the above principles in mind, it is to be seen whether there are any compelling or substantial reasons to interfere with the judgment of the trial Court and whether the identification of A1 and A2 by PWs.3 and 5 inspires confidence. The Test Identification Parade was conducted on 25-08-2007. The accused were arrested on 21-07-2007. Further PW11 who is the jurisdictional Magistrate has categorically stated that he conducted Test Identification Parade on 25-08-2007. Prior to holding of Test Identification Parade, he recorded the statements of two witnesses. So, from the evidence of evidence of PW11 and Ex.P16 Test Identification proceedings, it is clear that PWs.3 and 5 identified the assailants of the deceased. In view of the fact that incident has taken place around 3.00 p.m., in a broad daylight, there is a possibility for these witnesses to identify the assailants even after laps of long time. The physical features of A1 and A2 must have been imprinted in the minds of PWs.3 and 5 to enable them to identify at a later point of time. Therefore, the identification of A1 and A2 in the Test Identification Parade cannot be shown to be improper. Furthermore, identification of the accused in the Court by the witnesses is the substantive piece of evidence and the Test Identification Parade proceedings can be used to corroborate the evidence of the witnesses. So, the Test Identification Parade coupled with the testimony of PWs.3 and 5 would clearly go to show that it is A1 and A2 who participated in the commission of offence. Therefore, the identification by PWs.3 and 5 is shown to be proper and correct. 26. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that since none of A1 and A2 caused any serious injuries on the body of the accused, benefit of doubt should be given to them because admittedly, the third person who was not identified by PWs.3 and 5 caused the vital blow on the head of the deceased and hence, he prays to acquit the accused. There cannot be any dispute that under Section 34 IPC an act committed by a person in furtherance of the common intention of the persons was equally liable for the punishment. No doubt, the vicarious liability is un-known to criminal law but at the same time Section 34 IPC is exception to the said general principle of law. There cannot be any dispute that under Section 34 IPC an act committed by a person in furtherance of the common intention of the persons was equally liable for the punishment. No doubt, the vicarious liability is un-known to criminal law but at the same time Section 34 IPC is exception to the said general principle of law. The existence of common intention amongst participants in a crime in the essential element for application of this section. For invoking Section 34 IPC, prior concert or a pre-arranged plan has to be established. But it can also develop at the spot. The essence of Section 34 IPC is a simultaneous consensus of the minds of the persons participating in the criminal action to bring about a particular result. Once the Court basing on the evidence available on record finds that all the accused shared common intention, the question of proving specific overt acts of each of the accused may not be necessary. It is apt to refer to a decision in Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana ( AIR 1999 S.C. 1083 ), wherein it is held in paragraph No.10 as follows: “11. To apply Section 34, IPC apart from the fact that there should be two or more accused, two factors must be established: (i) common intention and (ii) participation of the accused in the commission of an offence. If common intention is proved but no overt act is attributed to the individual accused, Section 34 will be attracted as essentially it involves vicarious liability but if participation of the accused in the crime is proved and common intention is absent, Section 34 cannot be invoked. In every case it is not possible to have direct evidence of common intention. It has to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case.” 27. On this aspect it is pertinent to refer to a decision reported in Pandurang and others v. State of Hyderabad ( AIR 1955 S.C. 216 ), wherein it is held in paragraph Nos.32 and 33 as follows: “32. Now in the case of section 34 we think it is well established that a common intention presupposes prior concert. On this aspect it is pertinent to refer to a decision reported in Pandurang and others v. State of Hyderabad ( AIR 1955 S.C. 216 ), wherein it is held in paragraph Nos.32 and 33 as follows: “32. Now in the case of section 34 we think it is well established that a common intention presupposes prior concert. It requires a pre-arranged plan because before a man can be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another, the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of them all: Mahbub Shah v. King-Emperor (AIR 1945 PC 118). Accordingly there must have been a prior meeting of minds. Several persons can simultaneously attack a man and each can have the same intention, namely the intention to kill, and each can individually inflict a separate fatal blow and yet none would have the common intention required by the section because there was no prior meeting of minds to form a pre-arranged plan. In a case like that, each would be individually liable for whatever injury he caused but none could be vicariously convicted for the act of any of the others; and if the prosecution cannot prove that his separate blow was a fatal one he cannot be convicted of the murder however clearly an intention to kill could be proved in his case: Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King- Emperor (AIR 1925 PC 1) and Mahbub Shah v. King-Emperor (AIR 1945 PC 118). As their Lordships say in the latter case, "the partition which divides their bounds is often very thin: nevertheless, the distinction is real and substantial, and if overlooked will result in miscarriage of justice". 33. The plan need not be elaborate, nor is a long interval of time required. It could arise and be formed suddenly, as for example, when one man calls on bystanders to help him kill a given individual and they, either by their words or their acts, indicate their assent to him and join him in the assault. There is then the necessary meeting of the minds. There is a pre-arranged plan however hastily formed and rudely conceived. But pre-arrangement there must be and premeditated concert. It is not enough, as in the latter Privy Council case, to have the same intention independently of each other, e.g., the intention to rescue another and, if necessary, to kill those who oppose.” 28. There is a pre-arranged plan however hastily formed and rudely conceived. But pre-arrangement there must be and premeditated concert. It is not enough, as in the latter Privy Council case, to have the same intention independently of each other, e.g., the intention to rescue another and, if necessary, to kill those who oppose.” 28. Similarly, the Supreme Court also explained the principle of joint liability as mentioned in Section 34 IPC in the decision reported in Ram Tahal and others v. the State of U.P. ((1972) 1 Supreme Court cases 136), wherein it is held in paragraph No.5 as follows: “While this is so the question is whether the convictions under Sec. 302 and 307 can be sustained on the ground that they had a common intention to commit the said offence. The learned Advocate for the Appellant strenuously contends that before the appellants can be convicted under the aforesaid section read with Sec. 34 it must be shown that they had a prior concert to commit the said offence which cannot be concluded on the facts of this case. There is no doubt that a common intention should be anterior in time to the commission of the crime showing a prearranged plan and prior concert, and though, it is difficult in most cases to prove the intention of an individual, it had to be inferred from the act or conduct or other relevant circumstances of the case. This inference can be gathered by the manner in which the accused arrived on the scene and mounted the attack, the determination and concert with which the beating was given or the injuries caused by one or some of them, "he acts done by others to assist those causing the injuries the concerted conduct subsequent to the commission of the offence for instance that all of hem had left the scene of the incident together and other acts which all or some may have done as would help in determining the common intention. In other words, the totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to commit an offence with which they could be convicted. In other words, the totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to commit an offence with which they could be convicted. This Court had in Krishna Govind Patil's case already referred to earlier, held that the prearranged plan may develop on 'he spot during the course of the commission of the offence but the crucial circumstance is that the said plan must precede the act constituting the offence. If that be so before a Court can convict a person under Sec 302 or read with 34 of the I.P.C. it should come to a definite conclusion that the said person had a prior concert with one or more persons named or un- named for committing the offence.” Therefore, though A3 was not identified by PWs.3 and 5, as one of the assailants still the benefit of doubt cannot be given to others when the prosecution could able to establish that the known persons along with un-known persons shared the common intention, all are jointly liable for the acts of other persons. The incident has taken place at about 3.00 p.m., while the deceased, PWs.3 and 5 were proceeding to the lands, which are located in the outskirts of Kura village. Before reaching the fields near the house of Yelampally Satenna, the incident has taken place. At that time, A1 was armed with cart peg and A2 was also armed with some weapon attacked the deceased. The deceased sustained as many as 11 injuries on his body, wherein two injuries appear to have been caused by sickle or cart pegs and those injuries are proved to be vital. So, the way in which the accused rushed to the scene of occurrence, the way in which the accused attacked the deceased and as the death of the deceased is almost instantaneous and the accused leaving the place after the incident would clearly go to show that all the accused shared the common intention with a view to eliminate the deceased in view of the longstanding civil and criminal disputes between A1 and the deceased. Therefore, when once all the accused shared the common intention, the question of specific overt acts by each of the accused is not at all necessary and there is no obligation on the prosecution to prove the specific overt acts of the accused. Therefore, when once all the accused shared the common intention, the question of specific overt acts by each of the accused is not at all necessary and there is no obligation on the prosecution to prove the specific overt acts of the accused. Therefore, A1 and A2 are rightly convicted by the trial Court invoking Section 302 read with 34 IPC. Identity of A3 has not been established by the prosecution as PWs.3 and 5 failed to identify him when PW11 conducted Test Identification Parade proceedings in the Sub-Jail, Adilabad and as well as when they were testifying in the Court. Therefore, benefit of doubt was given rightly by the learned Sessions Judge to A3, as his participation in the commission of offence has not been established. The same benefit of doubt cannot be extended to A1 and A2 as case of A1 and A2 does not stand on the same footing with that of A3. Therefore, the trial Court after elaborate consideration of evidence on record rightly found A1 and A2 guilty and that order of conviction needs no interference by this Court and the appeal is devoid of merit. 29. In the result, the appeal is dismissed confirming the judgment dated 03-07-2009, in Sessions Case No.54 of 2008 on the file of the Principal Sessions Judge, Adilabad. 30. Miscellaneous Petitions pending, if any, in this Criminal Appeal shall stand closed.