Satyendra Singh Chauhan, J.— The petition has been filed for quashing of the orders dated 5.7.2008, 23.9.2008 and 25.9.2010. The petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Conductor and since then he has been discharging his duties on the post in question. When on 1.10.2006 while the petitioner was on duty, the Regional Checking Squad checked the bus of the petitioner numbering UP79 A/6764 and in the cheeking it was found that out of 21 passengers, 12 passengers were traveling without ticket. On the basis of the aforesaid checking, an endorsement was made in the Way Bill of the petitioner and thereafter charge sheet was issued and enquiry followed. After enquiry, the petitioner was dismissed from service vide order dated 5.7.2008. Thereafter, petitioner preferred an appeal, which was also dismissed vide order dated 23.9.2008. The petitioner preferred a revision before the Chairman, which too was dismissed on 25.9.2010. Hence this petition. Submission of counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner has been discriminated in the matter of award of punishment and in an identical situation, another Conductor, namely, R.N. Dubey, was found involved in similar misconduct, wherein the Regional Manager, Etawah proceeded to award punishment to him by withholding two increments with cumulative affect, whereas in the case of petitioner, he has proceeded to dismiss the petitioner from service. The aforesaid order has been made the ground of challenge and it has been submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been discriminated in the matter of award of punishment though he was going to retire within 26 days at that time. He further submits that there is no finding in the impugned order that money passed on to the petitioner. In absence of any such finding, counsel for the petitioner states that according to the own circular of the opposite parties dated 11.10.2012 liability could not have been fastened upon the petitioner. In support of his contention, counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the apex Court rendered in the case of Rajendra Yadav vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, (2013) 3 SCC 73 as well as this Court rendered in the case of Naresh Chandra Gupta vs. General Manager (Karmik), U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Lucknow and others, 2010 (28) LCD 212. Counsel for the opposite parties, on the other hand, has submitted that no doubt a decision has been taken by the opposite parties in respect of one similarly situated person, namely, R.N. Dubey, who was found carrying 33 passengers without ticket, but it has been submitted that the misconduct of the petitioner is grave in nature and, therefore, he cannot be allowed to remain in employment and further that the decision is justified in the light of the settled legal position by the apex Court. In support of her contention, she has relied upon the decision of the apex Court rendered in the case of Union of India vs. Tulsi Ram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 and other cases. I have head counsel for the parties and perused the record. The only ground which has been pressed before this Court, is that the petitioner has been discriminated in the matter of award of punishment. The petitioner was found to be carrying 12 passengers without ticket, whereas the other person, namely, R.N. Dubey was found carrying 33 passengers without ticket. In the case of R.N. Dubey, the order dated 3.5.2010 has been placed on record, wherein the said Dubey was reinstated by withholding two increments with cumulative affect. The said order has not been disputed by the opposite parties. The argument of counsel for the petitioner that petitioner cannot be discriminated in the matter of award of punishment has got some force in view of the law settled by the apex Court as well as by this Court in the cases of Rajendra Yadav (supra) and . In the case of Naresh Chandra Gupta (supra), this Court held as under :- "Petitioner and co-driver Mool Chand both were equally charged with the misconduct and shortage of money. Both have collected the money and both have left the bus. From the evidence, it is evident that the money was recovered from the house of co-driver Mool Chand and the petitioner was also found there. Liability, therefore, of co-driver Mool Chand cannot be said to be of any less degree in comparison to the petitioner. It is a charge of misbehaviour or it is a charge of shortage of money, the opposite parties could not have proceeded in a discriminatory manner violating Article 14 of the Constitution and thereby awarding two punishments in respect of the same charges. It is a charge of misbehaviour or it is a charge of shortage of money, the opposite parties could not have proceeded in a discriminatory manner violating Article 14 of the Constitution and thereby awarding two punishments in respect of the same charges. This Court in the case of Barnam Singh Vs. Director, Samaj Kalyan Department, U.P. and another, (2002) 1 UPLBEC 735 held as under:- "The Counsel for the petitioner in support of his contentions has relied on a Division Bench Judgment (1990) 3 UPLBEC 1740, Jagdish Yadav v. Senior Superintendent of Police, Azamgarh and others. In paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment the Division Bench held as under:- " In para 7 of the supplementary affidavit, it has been stated that the three persons who were similarly situated as the petitioner have been reinstated and they are discharging their duties on their respective posts as police constables, and they are drawing their salaries. The learned counsel for the State did not seek time to controvert these allegations, therefore, we have no option but to rely upon them and we are of the opinion that the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs claimed in the present petition on the ground of parity alone. In the aforesaid case on similar allegations three persons were terminated while two persons were reinstated. Petitioner of that case was terminated. The Division Bench allowed the writ petition and held that he was entitled for the parity. Counsel for the petitioner further relied on 1981 (3) SLR 274, Dost Mohammad v. Union of India and others. In the aforesaid case also the Division Bench of this Court took the view that it was not open to the disciplinary authority to deal with petition differently. The writ petitioner was allowed on the plea of hostile discrimination." Keeping the overall view of the matter and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the allegations, it is proved that the petitioner has been discriminated with regard to award to punishment. At best the petitioner could have been awarded the same punishment which was awarded to Brij Raj Verma. From the facts of the present case, it is clear that in the disciplinary enquiry, petitioner was not fully exonerated. At best the petitioner could have been awarded the same punishment which was awarded to Brij Raj Verma. From the facts of the present case, it is clear that in the disciplinary enquiry, petitioner was not fully exonerated. It was held by punishment authority that petitioner has caused loss to the Government and for that loss, recovery was directed by punishing authority from the petitioner. Petitioner since has succeeded in proving that he has been discriminated in awarding of punishment, he is entitled to be dealt in similar manner as Sri Brij Raj Verma has been dealt. He is not entitled for full salary during the period when he was under suspension. The suspension allowance, which was paid to the petitioner till he was terminated be treated the amount for which petitioner was entitled during that period. However, from the date when termination order was passed i.e. 22nd October, 1996 till the petitioner attained the age of superannuation, he is entitled only to 50% of back wages. However, the said period be treated for continuity of service and other service benefits." The Apex Court in the case of Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. Vs. Jitendra Pd. Singh and another, (2001) 10 SCC 530 held as under:- 2. On an enquiry being held, the enquiry authority found that the allegation of misconduct is proved and the disciplinary authority on consideration of the report of the enquiry authority and the other relevant material dismissed the first respondent from service. Thereafter, a reference to the Labour Court at the instance of the first respondent was made. The Labour Court though held on a preliminary question that the disciplinary enquiry conducted against the first respondent is valid came to the conclusion after perusing the documentary and oral evidence on record that the dismissal was not justified and held that the was entitled to reinstatement with full back wages with continuity in service and other consequential benefits. A writ petition was filed in the High Court which was allowed but on the basis of certain offer made, the learned Single Judge also directed that the appellant shall pay to the first respondent salary from the date of discharge till the date of the order in a lump sum of Rs.50,000. Thereupon both the management and the workman filed two appeals. Thereupon both the management and the workman filed two appeals. In the appeals, several questions were raised as to whether the act attributed to the first respondent would amount to misconduct at all which will entail a disciplinary enquiry at the instance of the management to end up with his dismissal; strong reliance was placed on Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut, (1984) 1 SCC 1 . Ultimately, however, the two learned Judges were agreed on one aspect of the matter that the question, whether on misconduct attributed to the workman there should have been casual connection between misconduct and employment of the workman may not be of much significance when such acts have been taken place within the premises of the factory, should be decided in an appropriate case. What influenced the Court in deciding the matter is that: "Since as many as three workmen on almost identical charges were found guilty of misconduct in connection with the same incident, though in separate proceedings, and one was punished with only one month's suspension, and the other was ultimately reinstated in view of the findings recorded by the Labour Court and affirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court, it would be denial of justice to the appellant if he alone is singled out for punishment by way of dismissal from service." 3. As the judgment is rested upon this position, whatever other views may have been expressed in the course of the judgment may be of no significance. In that view of the matter, we think there is no need to interfere with the order made by the High Court, that too in a proceeding arising under Article 136 of the Constitution. Hence we decline to interfere with the order made by the High Court. The appeals are dismissed accordingly." The Court, therefore, is compelled to take into consideration the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that similar punishment should have been awarded to the petitioner. In view of the law settled by this Court, instead of proceeding to reduce the punishment which is in the domain of the departmental authorities to reconsider and reduce the punishment if any glaring illegality has been committed by them. In view of the law settled by this Court, instead of proceeding to reduce the punishment which is in the domain of the departmental authorities to reconsider and reduce the punishment if any glaring illegality has been committed by them. The Court is of the opinion that they have passed an order against law and they have not appreciated the facts and evidence correctly as was required by them under law, in aforesaid circumstances the Court can certainly give a direction to the departmental authorities to reconsider the issue for awarding lesser punishment as compared with co-driver Mool Chand." The apex Court in a recent judgment rendered in the case of Rajendra Yadav ( supra) has also maintained the same ratio of law and it has been held that no discrimination can be adopted in the matter of award of punishment. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is quoted as under:- " We have gone through the inquiry report placed before us in respect of the appellant as well as Constable Arjun Pathak. The inquiry clearly reveals the role of Arjun Pathak. It was Arjun Pathak who had demanded and received the money, though the tacit approval of the appellant was proved in the inquiry. The charge levelled against Arjun Pathak was more serious than the one charged against the appellant. Both appellants and other two persons as well as Arjun Pathak were involved in the same incident. After having found that Arjun Pathak had a more serious role and, in fact, it was he who had demanded and received the money, he was inflicted comparatively a lighter punishment. At the same time, appellant who had played a passive role was inflicted with a more serious punishment of dismissal from service which, in our view, cannot be sustained. The Doctrine of Equality applies to all who are equally placed; even among persons who are found guilty. The persons who have been found guilty can also claim equality of treatment, if they can establish discrimination while imposing punishment when all of them are involved in the same incident. Parity among co-delinquents has also to be maintained when punishment is being imposed. Punishment should not be disproportionate while comparing the involvement of co-delinquents who are parties to the same transaction or incident. Parity among co-delinquents has also to be maintained when punishment is being imposed. Punishment should not be disproportionate while comparing the involvement of co-delinquents who are parties to the same transaction or incident. The Disciplinary Authority cannot impose punishment which is disproportionate, i.e., lesser punishment for serious offences and stringent punishment for lesser offences. The principle stated above is seen applied in few judgments of this Court. The earliest one is Director General of Police and Others v. G. Dasayan (1998) 2 SCC 407 , wherein one Dasayan, a Police Constable, along with two other constables and one Head Constable were charged for the same acts of misconduct. The Disciplinary Authority exonerated two other constables, but imposed the punishment of dismissal from service on Dasayan and that of compulsory retirement on Head Constable. This Court, in order to meet the ends of justice, substituted the order of compulsory retirement in place of the order of dismissal from service on Dasayan, applying the principle of parity in punishment among co-delinquents. This Court held that it may, otherwise, violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In Shaileshkumar Harshadbhai Shah case (supra), the workman was dismissed from service for proved misconduct. However, few other workmen, against whom there were identical allegations, were allowed to avail of the benefit of voluntary retirement scheme. In such circumstances, this Court directed that the workman also be treated on the same footing and be given the benefit of voluntary retirement from service from the month on which the others were given the benefit. We are of the view the principle laid down in the above mentioned judgments also would apply to the facts of the present case. We have already indicated that the action of the Disciplinary Authority imposing a comparatively lighter punishment to the co-delinquent Arjun Pathak and at the same time, harsher punishment to the appellant cannot be permitted in law, since they were all involved in the same incident. Consequently, we are inclined to allow the appeal by setting aside the punishment of dismissal from service imposed on the appellant and order that he be reinstated in service forthwith. Appellant is, therefore, to be re-instated from the date on which Arjun Pathak was re-instated and be given all consequent benefits as was given to Arjun Pathak. Ordered accordingly". Consequently, we are inclined to allow the appeal by setting aside the punishment of dismissal from service imposed on the appellant and order that he be reinstated in service forthwith. Appellant is, therefore, to be re-instated from the date on which Arjun Pathak was re-instated and be given all consequent benefits as was given to Arjun Pathak. Ordered accordingly". The petitioner's case is squarely covered by the aforesaid dictum of the law which has been propounded by the apex Court as well as by this Court. Therefore, the opposite parties have committed illegality in discriminating the petitioner in the matter of award of punishment. Writ petition is accordingly allowed and the orders dated 5.7.2008, 23.9.2008 and 25.9.2010 passed by the opposite parties are hereby quashed. Since the petitioner has retired, therefore, instead of relegating the petitioner to the appointing authority, the Court is of the view that the punishment awarded to the petitioner may be substituted with withholding of two increments with cumulative affect. Opposite parties are directed to release the retiral dues of the petitioner with all consequential benefits. _____________