JUDGMENT 01. This Writ Petition was filed seeking a direction to the Respondent Nos.1 to 3 to file charge sheet in Cr.No.166 of 2003 of Begumpet Police Station forthwith and proceed against the Respondents in accordance with law. 02. It is the case of the Petitioner that in respect of an incident alleged to have occurred on 09-08-2002 due to involvement of Respondent Nos.4, 9 and others, the Petitioner lodged a complaint on 14-09-2002 in Begumpet Police Station. When no action was taken on the said complaint, she filed W.P.No.25085 of 2002 and the same was disposed of by this court on 12-08-2003 recording the representation of the Respondents that case was registered and investigation was almost nearing completion. This court while disposing of the Writ Petition directed the Respondent Nos.2 and 3 therein to take such steps as are required in law to carry the matter further. Even though Cr.No.166 of 2003 was registered and investigation was completed, when no steps were taken for filing charge sheet the present Writ Petition was filed narrating the incidents leading to the registration of complaint. 03. A counter-affidavit was filed by the 4th Respondent denying the allegations in the affidavit filed by the Petitioner and stating that with regard to incident that took place on 09-08-2002, a report was given to the Deputy Commissioner of Police only on 28-11-2002 and it was registered in Begumpet Police Station only on 25-04-2003 under Sections.448, 323, 380 and 506 of IPC. Certain counter allegations were made against the Petitioner which are not necessary for disposal of the present case. 04. Heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner, the learned Government Pleader for Home for Respondent Nos.1 to 3, Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned counsel for R-4 and Sri B.Vijaysen Reddy, learned counsel for Respondent No.7. 05. This case was admitted on 17-04-2007. On 23-06-2011, the learned counsel for the Petitioner was permitted to take out personal notice to Respondent Nos.5,6,8 and 9 failing which it was ordered that the Writ Petition would stand dismissed as against them. Since no steps were taken by the Petitioner, the Writ Petition was dismissed as against Respondent Nos.5,6,8 and 9. This case was admitted on 17-04-2007. On 23-06-2011, the learned counsel for the Petitioner was permitted to take out personal notice to Respondent Nos.5,6,8 and 9 failing which it was ordered that the Writ Petition would stand dismissed as against them. Since no steps were taken by the Petitioner, the Writ Petition was dismissed as against Respondent Nos.5,6,8 and 9. As Respondent Nos.1 to 3 did not file any counter-affidavit even after six years, the learned Government Pleader for Home was directed to inform this Court with regard to the latest position in respect of Cr.No.166 of 2003 and the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Home produced a letter of the Inspector of Police, CID, GHR, Hyderabad addressed to the learned Government Pleader for Home. The relevant portion of the said letter reads as follows: “The investigation in this case is completed, but the charge sheet has not been filed in this case, due to pending of prosecution sanction orders from the Govt. against A5 Smt.Tejdeep Kaur Menon, IPS, and A-8 Sri Kakarala Srinivas, PC-8554, CAR Hqrs, Hyderabad, since 2009. The accused A1 to A4 was arrested on 25-04-2007 and released on bail as per the orders of the Hon’ble High Court of A.P., and the accused A6 and A7 are yet to be arrested. The quash petition filed by the A3 and A4 vide Crl.P.No.5669 of 2011 in the Hon’ble High Court of A.P., is pending for admission. The counter was submitted to the PP Office and the matter was last listed on 28-10-2013 but not reached”. 06. In view of the stand taken by the investigation officers that the Charge-sheet could not be filed in view of the pendency of sanction proceedings, it is necessary to consider the position relating to sanction only for the purpose of prima facie examination of tenability of such stand. Sec.197 of Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 reads as follows: “197. 06. In view of the stand taken by the investigation officers that the Charge-sheet could not be filed in view of the pendency of sanction proceedings, it is necessary to consider the position relating to sanction only for the purpose of prima facie examination of tenability of such stand. Sec.197 of Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 reads as follows: “197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.-- (2) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction- (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government: Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a person referred to in clause (b) during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for the expression "State Government" occurring therein, the expression "Central Government" were substituted. (2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union whole acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3) The State Government may, by notification, direct that the provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply to such class or category of the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order as may be specified therein, wherever they may be serving, and thereupon the provisions of that sub-section will apply as if for the expression "Central Government" occurring therein, the expression "State Government" were substituted. (3A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3), no Court shall take cognizance of any offence, alleged to have been committed by any member of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order in a State while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force therein, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3B) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code or any other law, it is hereby declared that any sanction accorded by the State Government or any cognizance taken by a Court upon such sanction, during the period commencing on the 20th day of August, 1991 and ending with the date immediately preceding the date on which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1991, receives the assent of the President, with respect to an offence alleged to have been committed during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force in the State, shall be invalid and it shall be competent for the Central Government in such matter to accord sanction and for the Court to take cognizance thereon. (4) The Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, and the offence or offences for which, the prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held. A reading of the above provision makes it clear that the court shall not take cognizance of an offence against the class of persons mentioned in the above Section when they are accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by them while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty unless previous sanction of the concerned Government is obtained. The section gives protection against irresponsible, frivolous or vexatious proceedings for acts done in discharge of official duty and does not extend to every act or omission done by a public servant in service. The said protection is not available to the public servant if the act complained of is not in connection with the discharge of his duty or in excess of his duty. The said protection is not available to the public servant if the act complained of is not in connection with the discharge of his duty or in excess of his duty. The requirement of sanction has to be gathered from the allegations in the complaint. Dealing with the scope of said section, a 3 Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. Vs. Paras Nath Singh ( (2009) 6 SCC 372 ) extensively quoted from another decision as follows: “The Section falls in the chapter dealing with conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings. That is if the conditions mentioned are not made out or are absent then no prosecution can be set into motion. For instance no prosecution can be initiated in a Court of Session under Section 193, as it cannot take cognizance, as a court of original jurisdiction, of any offence unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate or the Code expressly provides for it. And the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence is provided by Section 190 of the Code, either on receipt of a complaint, or upon a police report or upon information received from any person other than police officer, or upon his knowledge that such offence has been committed. So far as public servants are concerned the cognizance of any offence, by any court, is barred by Section 197 of the Code unless sanction is obtained from the appropriate authority, if the offence, alleged to have been committed, was in discharge of the official duty. The Section not only specifies the persons to whom the protection is afforded but it also specifies the conditions and circumstances in which it shall be available and the effect in law if the conditions are satisfied. The mandatory character of the protection afforded to a public servant is brought out by the expression, 'no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction'. Use of the words, 'no' and 'shall' make it abundantly clear that the bar on the exercise of power of the court to take cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete. Very cognizance is barred. That is the complaint cannot be taken notice of. According to Black's law Dictionary the word 'cognizance' means 'Jurisdiction' or 'the exercise of jurisdiction' or 'power to try and determine causes'. Very cognizance is barred. That is the complaint cannot be taken notice of. According to Black's law Dictionary the word 'cognizance' means 'Jurisdiction' or 'the exercise of jurisdiction' or 'power to try and determine causes'. In common parlance it means taking notice of. A court, therefore, is precluded from entertaining a complaint or taking notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect of a public servant who is accused of an offence alleged to have committed during discharge of his official duty. Such being the nature of the provision the question is how should the expression, 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty', be understood? What does it mean? 'Official' according to dictionary, means pertaining to an office, and official act or official duty means an act or duty done by an officer in his official capacity. In B. Saha and Ors. v. M. S. Kochar ( 1979 (4) SCC 177 ) it was held :(SCC pp.184-85 para 17) "The words 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty' employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, 'it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be'. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an Act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution and the said provision.” Use of the expression, ‘official duty' implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public in the course of his service and that it should have been in discharge of his duty. The Section does not extend its protective cover to every act or mission done by a public servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty. It has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty. That is under the colour of office. Official duty therefore implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which further must have been official in nature. The Section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining its applicability to any act or omission in course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. For instance a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the Section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. But once it is established that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the Section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. For instance a police officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. For instance a police officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. To what extent an act or omission performed by a public servant in discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official was explained by this Court in Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari ( AIR 1956 SC 44 ) thus” "The offence alleged to have been committed (by the accused) must have something to do, or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty ... there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable (claim) but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty." If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that the act or omission for which the accused was charged had reasonable connection with discharge of his duty then the act must be held as official to which applicability of Section 197 of the Code cannot be disputed. In S.A. Venkataraman v. The State ( AIR 1958 SC 107 ) and in C. R. Bansi v. The State of Maharashtra ( 1970 (3) SCC 537 ) this Court has held that: "There is nothing in the words used in Section 6(1) to even remotely suggest that previous sanction was necessary before a court could take cognizance of the offences mentioned therein in-the case of a person who had ceased to be a public servant at the time the court was asked to take cognizance, although he had been such a person at the time the offence was committed." That apart, the contention of the respondent that for offences under Sections 406 and 409 read with Section 120-B of IPC sanction under Section 197?of the Code is a condition precedent for launching the prosecution is equally fallacious. This Court has stated the legal position in S.R. Munnipalli v. Bombay ( 1955 (1) SCR 1177 ) and in Amrik Singh v. State Pepsu (1955 RD-SC 9) that it is?not every offence committed by a public servant, which requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197 of the Code, nor even every act done by him while?he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties. Following the above legal position it was held in Harihar Prasad, etc. v. State of Bihar ( 1972 (3) SCC 89 ) as follows: "As far as the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120-8, read with Section 409, Indian Penal Code is concerned and also Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is concerned, they cannot be said to be of the nature mentioned in Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To put it shortly, it is no part of the duty of a public servant, while discharging his official duties, to enter into a criminal conspiracy or to indulge in criminal misconduct. Want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, therefore, no bar." Above views are reiterated in State of Kerala v. Padmanabhan Nair ( 1999 (5) SCC 690 ). Both Amrik Singh (supra) and S.R. Munnipalli (supra) were noted in that case. Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC relate to forgery of valuable security, Will etc; forgery for purpose of cheating and using as genuine a forged document respectively. It is no part of the duty of a public servant while discharging his official duties to commit forgery of the type covered by the aforesaid offences. Want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is, therefore, no bar.” This position was highlighted in State of H.P. v. M.P. Gupta ( 2004 (2) SCC 349 )” 07. In the instant case, Crime No.166 of 2003 was registered under Sections 448 (house-trespass), 323 (voluntarily causing hurt), 380 (theft in dwelling house) and 506 (criminal intimidation) IPC. A perusal of the allegations in the complaint against Respondent No.4 prima facie disclose that they do not relate to the discharge of the official duties by the 4th Respondent and hence no sanction is required in the circumstances of the case. It was well settled in H.H.B.Gill Vs. A perusal of the allegations in the complaint against Respondent No.4 prima facie disclose that they do not relate to the discharge of the official duties by the 4th Respondent and hence no sanction is required in the circumstances of the case. It was well settled in H.H.B.Gill Vs. The King(AIR 1948 PC 128) that a public servant can only be said to act or to purport to act in the discharge of his official duty if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty. The action of Police Officer in committing trespass into the floor mill of the complainant by breaking open the lock, removing the sign-board and a motor was held to be no part of their duty, actual or purported even if the property has been acquired for the purpose of Police Station. (State of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Jan Ali Mohammed Shafi, 1990 (1) Crimes 203 ). The Supreme Court in P.P. Unnikrishnan Vs. Puttiyottil Alikutty ( (2000) 8 SCC 131 ) also considered the position and held as follows: “Even under Section 197 of the Code no protection has been granted to public servants for the type of acts alleged in the case against the appellants. Decisions are a legion relating to the scope of the protection under Section 197(1) of the Code. In Matajog Dobey Vs. H.C. Bhari { 1955 (2) SCR 925 } this Court made a slight deviation from the view adopted by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Gill case (1948 Law Reports 75). This Court after referring to earlier decisions summed up the scope of Section 197(1) of the Code thus: “There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.” While following the said decision this Court has found, on a subsequent occasion, that a superior officer who assaulted his subordinate for defying his orders could not be said to have acted in the course of performance of his duty, (vide Pukhraj vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr. {1974 (1) SCR 559}. {1974 (1) SCR 559}. If a police officer dealing with law and order duty uses force against unruly persons, either in his own defence or in defence of others and exceeds such right it may amount to an offence. But such offence might fall within the amplitude of Section 197 of the Code as well as Section 64(3) of the K.P. Act. But if a police officer assaults a prisoner inside a lock-up he cannot claim such act to be connected with the discharge of his authority or exercise of his duty unless he establishes that he did such acts in his defence or in defence of others or any property. Similarly, if a police officer wrongfully confines a person in the lock-up beyond a period of 24 hours without the sanction of a magistrate or an order of a court it would be an offence for which he cannot claim any protection in the normal course, nor can he claim that such act was done in exercise of his official duty. A policeman keeping a person in the lock-up for more than 24 hours without authority is not merely abusing his duty but his act would be quite outside the contours of his duty or authority. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in General Officer Commanding Rashtriya Rifles Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another( (2012) 6 SCC 228 ) the position relating to sanction for prosecution under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Prevention of Corruption Act and the Armed forces (Special Powers) Act,1990 has been discussed at length. As already stated, the crime is registered under Sections 448, 323, 380 and 506 IPC and the acts complained of prima facie cannot be held to be in discharge of official duty. Hence no sanction is prima facie required and the competent authority can file charge sheet before the competent criminal court. The filing of charge sheet under Sec.173 Cr.P.C. precedes the act of taking cognizance by the Magistrate under Sec.190 Cr.P.C. and need not wait for sanction orders, if at all required. Sec.173 of Cr.P.C. says that every investigation shall be completed without unnecessary delay and as soon as it is completed, the officer-in-charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report. But enormous delay has been caused in filing the charge-sheet. Sec.173 of Cr.P.C. says that every investigation shall be completed without unnecessary delay and as soon as it is completed, the officer-in-charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report. But enormous delay has been caused in filing the charge-sheet. 08. This is one of the cases where the citizen is unable to set the criminal law in motion in spite of clear mandate of law, due to one reason or other. The Petitioner has to approach this Court earlier for getting her complaint registered and inspite of this court’s direction to take further steps consequent to registration of crime and completion of investigation, expeditious steps have not been taken. Though the investigation was completed long back, the filing of charge-sheet was held up on untenable ground of sanction merely because of the involvement of public servants. It is 11 years since the complaint was lodged. The journey to justice through the process of law should be swift and secure. The citizen should not have the feeling that it is difficult to proceed against public servants even if they exceed their powers or misuse their powers. When the law treats every one as equal, the law enforcement agencies should not treat some as more exceptional. 09. In the facts and circumstances of this case, it is not necessary for this court to go into merits of the case and views expressed herein either on sanction or on other matters should not be construed as expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and the parties are at liberty to take all defences available to them under law before the competent court. It is sufficient if a direction is given to the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 to issue instructions to the concerned officer to file a charge sheet within one (1) week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order since investigation was completed in 2009 itself. The Writ Petition is liable to be allowed. 10. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed. No costs.