ORDER The petitioner has approached this Court challenging the order dated 06.10.2012 whereby a notice of superannuation from service was given to the petitioner. 2. The brief facts of the case are that, the petitioner was appointed on 23.05.1981. A statement has been made in the writ petition that his date of birth as recorded in the School Leaving Certificate is, 12th March, 1965. The petitioner raised a grievance with respect to correction of his date of birth on 27.01.2012, however by the impugned letter dated 06.10.2012 he has been made to superannuate from service w.e.f. 31st January 2013. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed denying the claim of the petitioner and stating as under: 6.“That I say that as it appears from the service records, the date of birth of the petitioner was mentioned as 28.01.1953 and accordingly, the respondents had issued a notice of retirement to the petitioner intimating that the petitioner will retire on completion of 60 years of age. It is submitted that the petitioner had already superannuated from service and 2had withdrawn amount against the retiral benefits without any protest. 7. That I say that by the conduct of the petitioner, the petitioner has already accepted his date of birth as 28.1.1953. 8. That I say that the petitioner had raised the present dispute regarding the correction of the date of birth in the service record of the company at the fag end of service or even the petitioner had already superannuated from the service. It is further pertinent to mention herein that it is well settled proposition of law through judicial pronouncement that no court will interfere for correction of the date of birth of the petitioner at the fag end of the service. 9. That I say that the petitioner is relying upon Annexure1 to the writ petition and claiming his date of birth to be 12.3.1965. It is necessary to mention herein that during the entire service period the petitioner had not submitted Annexure1 in the office of the respondent. 10. That I say that on perusal of the Annexure1 to the writ petition, it appears that the Admit Card and School Leaving Certificate is of one Mr. It is necessary to mention herein that during the entire service period the petitioner had not submitted Annexure1 in the office of the respondent. 10. That I say that on perusal of the Annexure1 to the writ petition, it appears that the Admit Card and School Leaving Certificate is of one Mr. Baijnath Yadav son of Wakil Yadav while in service record, the name of the petitioner was mentioned as Baiju Gope son of Wakil Gope which creates reasonable doubt or the genuineness of the documents marked as Annexure1 of the writ petition. 11. That I say that for the first time the respondent came to know about the content of the Annexure2 dated 9.11.2012 that will also create reasonable doubt over the genuineness of the claim of the petitioner. 12. That the petitioner states that the petitioner had submitted his service excerpt on 30.6.1990 without any objection and mentioned therein the date of birth as 28.1.1953. It is necessary to mention herein that during the entire service period, the petitioner herein not objected nor had made any application before the appropriate authorities for the correction of date of birth in the service record of the petitioner. It is further pertinent to mention herein that while submitting the service excerpt, the petitioner had admitted his date of birth as 28.1.1953.” 4. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents on record. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the specific provision made in the National Coal Wage Agreement has not been followed in this case inasmuch as, the date of birth of the petitioner recorded in the admit card issued for appearing in the matriculation examination has not been taken into consideration and a wrong date of birth has been taken on record. He has further relied on a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of “Kamta Pandey Vs. B.C.C.L.” reported in (2007) 3 JLJR 726 , to support his contention that in exceptional cases, even at the fag end of service if manifest injustice is caused to the petitioner, the date of birth is to be corrected. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent relying on the judgment in the case of “G.M., Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., West Bengal Vs. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent relying on the judgment in the case of “G.M., Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., West Bengal Vs. Shib Kumar Dushad & Others” reported in (2000) 8 SCC 696 , has submitted that at the fag end of service, if a dispute is raised by an employee with respect to the correction in date of birth, the writ petition cannot be entertained and therefore, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted 4that even in other cases, this Court has held that the matriculation certificate of an employee is a valid and most acceptable document which can be relied upon for the purpose of deciding the correct date of birth of an employee and in this case since the petitioner was issued an admit card for appearing in the matriculation examination, the date of birth as recorded in the admit card issued to the petitioner should have been considered by the respondent authority. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the petitioner after his superannuation, has collected all his retiral benefits without any protest and thus he has in fact accepted his date of birth. Moreover, at the time when the petitioner was appointed in the year, 1980, if his date of birth is accepted to be 12.03.1965, the petitioner would be under the age of 18 years which is not permissible in law and this is also a ground on which this writ petition should be dismissed, as the petitioner has taken a false plea. 9. Before adverting to the contentions raised by both the parties, it would be proper to notice the judgments rendered on this issue. In “State of T. N. Vs. T. V. Venugopalan”, reported in (1994) 6 SCC 302 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where the rule provided that application for alteration of recorded date of birth would be entertained only if made within five years after entering into the service, application made thereafter could not have been entertained because the employee had already lost his right to make such application. 10. In “Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department & Ors. Vs. 10. In “Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department & Ors. Vs. R. Kirubakaran”, reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 155, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the application seeking correction in the date of birth should be made within the time fixed by any rule or order and in absence of such a rule or order, it should be made within a reasonable time. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held 5that an application filed after 33 years of service and only about a year before superannuation ought not to have been allowed by the Tribunal. 11. In “State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Ramanath Patnaik”, reported in (1997) 5 SCC 181 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that after the retirement the correction in the date of birth in the service record is not permissible. 12. In “State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Gulaichi (Smt)”, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 483 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has interfered with the order of High Court because a correction in the date of birth as recorded in Service book was sought at the verge of retirement. 13. Thus, it would appear that in certain cases, there is a limitation of 5 years, within which any dispute with respect to correction of date of birth can be raised by an employee. However, if such a stipulation is not made, it would be a reasonable time within which such a dispute has to be raised by an employee. In the present case, admittedly the petitioner has raised a grievance only on 27.01.2012 whereas, he was to superannuate w.e.f. 31.01.2013 i.e., just one year prior to date of superannuation. I further find that the decision relied upon by the petitioner is clearly distinguishable on facts. In the present case, I do not find any violation of National Coal Wage Agreement as contended by the counsel for the petitioner. Moreover, in the present case the petitioner has not been issued a matriculation certificate and the admit card cannot be equated with the certificate and therefore, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is not tenable. In the present case, I do not find any violation of National Coal Wage Agreement as contended by the counsel for the petitioner. Moreover, in the present case the petitioner has not been issued a matriculation certificate and the admit card cannot be equated with the certificate and therefore, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is not tenable. I am of the considered opinion that besides the factual aspect of the case, the main issue before this Court is whether at the fag end of the service, more particularly, just one year prior to the date of superannuation such a dispute is permitted to be raised by the employee, and I find that in view of 6 the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this is not permissible in law. 14. I find no merit in this writ petition and accordingly it is dismissed.