Per Massodi, J.;— 1. Letters Patent Appeal on hand is directed against order dated 28th September 2012 in Robkar No. 02/2012 in Contempt No.466/2007, arising out of SWP No.506/1992 titled Robkar v. Shri Sudhanshu Pandey, whereby Robkar has been held not maintainable and Contempt Petition No.466/2007, dismissed. It would be appropriate to have in first place to have an overview of the facts of the case 2. Services of 446 Daily Rated Workers, working in Public Health Engineering Department, Division Handwara, were discontinued/disbanded vide order No. PHE/Works/17809-10 dated 16.03.1992. On the suspicion that their engagement was fake and fabricated. The matter surfaced in District Development Board meeting of Kupwara District, held on 24th May 1993. The Board decided to get the list furnished by Chief Engineer, Public Health Engineering, Kashmir, verified by District Development Commissioner, Kupwara, and to take further action in the matter in light of outcome of such verification. 3. The District Development Commissioner, Kupwara, submitted his report vide No.2704-09 dated 14.12,1993, wherein 362 of 449 disbanded Daily Rated Workers were reported to have been engaged in 1989,1990,1991 and 1992. In respect of others, either engagement orders were not available or were paid through temporary advances or they were not paid at all. In the meantime, the disbanded Daily Rated Workers aggrieved with the order of Chief Engineer, PHE, (K) dated 16.03.1992, approached High Court with as many as eleven writ petitions, seeking a direction to continue and regularise their services. The writ petitions were disposed of on 19th October 2000 with following order: "The Chief Engineer will appointment [appoint] a panel of officers, not less than two, to look into the factual aspect with regard to the claim of the petitioners i.e. the genuineness of the engagement of the petitioners as Daily Rated Workers and their subsequent continuation either pursuant to the directions of the court or allowed by the respondents on their own. This exercise shall be done under the supervision of the Chief Engineer and accomplished within three months. This exercise shall be done under the supervision of the Chief Engineer and accomplished within three months. The penal [panel] shall be constituted by the Chief Engineer before 15.11.2000, in case it is made out from the report of the panel that the petitioners have been continued as daily rated workers till date, have worked uninterruptedly for a period of seven years as on date and their engagement is genuine, the respondents shall process their cases for regularisation under SRO 64/94, It is clarified that if the petitioners were continuing on 31.3.1994 and they have been discontinued by the respondents, their absence or discontinuation will not be counted by the respondents as an impediment in their way for their entitlement to seek consideration for regularisation as Rule 8 of SRO 64 contemplates continuation till they complete seven years. The petitioners are at liberty also to file evidence of their engagement orders and other documents in support of their claims, on or before 15.11.2000, before the Chief Engineer. The petitioners are further at liberty to represent themselves personally or through their counsel as prayed for by the petitioners but their non-representation will not come in the way of the panel to submit the report. Registry will return the record back to the learned counsel for the respondents. Petitioners, if feel aggrieved of the report they are at liberty to challenge it. Writ petitions are disposed off alongwith connected CMPs and contempt petitions." 4. The State Government, in compliance of Writ Court order dated 19.10.2000 constituted a few committees, one after another, to identify the genuinely appointed Daily Rated Workers on the basis of record. The matter was also referred to the Vigilance Organisation for inquiry and report. The Superintendent of Police (B/K), Vigilance Organisation Kashmir (VOK), vide letter dated 22nd January 2004, informed the Chief Engineer, PHE, (K), that the allegations of irregularities as regards engagement of Daily Rated Workers, on inquiry, had not been substantiated. 5. The disbanded Daily Rated Workers-174 in number, aggrieved, that Writ Court order dated 19.10.2000 in SWP No. 506/1992 and connected matters, was nol implemented, filed another petition, being SWP No. 1673 of 2004. 5. The disbanded Daily Rated Workers-174 in number, aggrieved, that Writ Court order dated 19.10.2000 in SWP No. 506/1992 and connected matters, was nol implemented, filed another petition, being SWP No. 1673 of 2004. The writ petition was dismissed on 16th September 2005 with observation that as the issues raised were subject matter of earlier writ petition (SWP No. 506/1992 and connected matters), the right course for petitioners was to work out remedy for implementation of order dated 19.10.2000 and for "initiation of action against the defaulters". 6. Petitioners, in eleven writ petitions filed in the year 1992 (SWP No.506/1992 and connected matters) and SWP No. 1673/2004; as suggested by Writ Court, while dismissing SWP No.1673/2004, initially approached official respondents with representations and when representations did not bear any fruit, filed Contempt Petition No. 466/2007. The Court, in view of developments detailed in interim orders passed in the contempt matter from time to time, that need not to be set out in detail, on 5th April 2012 recorded satisfaction that Shri Sudhanshu Pandey, the then Commissioner/Secretary to Government, Finance Department, was guilty of civil contempt within meaning of Section 2(b), J&K Contempt of Courts Act, 1997 as he had wilfully disobeyed Writ Court order dated 19th October 2000. The Rule was directed to be framed against Shri Sudhanshu Pandey and he asked to show cause as to why he should not be dealt with and punished for civil contempt in accordance with law. 7. Shri Pandey filed his Reply on 14th May 2012. The Court, on consideration, held that there was no willful disobedience on part of alleged contemnor in complying with the Court directions. The Robkar, framed against contemnor was, accordingly, dropped and contempt petition dismissed as not maintainable. 8. The order dated 28th September 2012 is called in question in Letters Patent Appeal on hand on the grounds that the Court has erroneously held that there was no wilful disobedience on part of alleged contemnor in complying with Writ Court order dated 19.10.2000. It is pointed out that Writ Court order dated 19.10.2000 disposed of as many as eleven writ petitions, therefore, contempt petition could not have been dismissed on the ground that the title of contempt petition was different from the title of one of the writ petitions or that only some of the petitioner's in eleven writ petitions had filed contempt petition. It is pointed out that contempt petition was filed only after SWP NO/1673/2004 filed by disbanded Daily Rated Workers, to get the Writ Court order dated 19,10.2000, implemented, was dismissed with suggestion to petitioners to work out remedy to seek punishment of defaulters. The appellants dispute reliance placed by the Court on Union of India v. Dayaram ( 1997 SLJ 155 ) as according to appellants, law laid down in aforesaid case was not applicable to the facts and circumstances of present case. Mere transfer of alleged contemnor from the Finance Department, according to appellants, should not have been taken as a ground to absolve alleged contemnor and drop Robkar. It is pleaded that alleged contemnor, in his role as head of Empowerment Committee, rejected petitioners' case and therefore, could not escape consequences of the order dated 03.02.2012. It is insisted that impugned order has caused miscarriage of justice and is liable to be set-aside. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings. 10. Learned Senior Additional Advocate General has taken threshold objection to the maintainability of Appeal on the ground that as right to appeal, in terms of Section 19, J&K Contempt of Courts Act, 1997, is restricted to an "order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt" it does not extend to an order where the contempt proceedings are dropped on the ground that a case for contempt is not made out. Elaborating on his arguments, learned Senior Additional Advocate General points out that Learned Single Judge vide order under appeal, on consideration of the Reply, held that there was no wilful disobedience on part of alleged contemnor and no reason to proceed with the contempt petition, and therefore, the order did not fall within ambit of Section 19 of the Act. It is insisted that expression "order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt", would mean that Appeal is maintainable, where the Court passes order punishing contemnor and would not include an order dropping or dismissing contempt proceedings. To buttress his arguments, learned Senior Additional Advocate General places reliance on the case law reported as AIR 2001 SC 2763 ,2006(5) SCC 399, SLJ 2010 (II) 827. 11. To buttress his arguments, learned Senior Additional Advocate General places reliance on the case law reported as AIR 2001 SC 2763 ,2006(5) SCC 399, SLJ 2010 (II) 827. 11. Controverting the arguments advanced by learned Senior Additional Advocate General, learned counsel for appellants argues that the High Court, in terms of Section 94, Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, read with Article 215, Constitution of India, is a Court of Record and amongst others, has power to punish for its contempt and of all the Courts subordinate to it. It is pointed out that power, conferred on the High Court to punish for its contempt and that of Courts subordinate to it in terms of aforesaid provisions, is a Constitutional power and cannot be abridged, controlled or restricted by a Statute. Learned counsel for appellants, dilating on his argument, insists that appellate power of the Court cannot be controlled by Section 19 of the Act and is not dependent on said provision. Learned counsel argues that power to entertain, hear and deal with intra-court appeal under Letters Patent, cannot be eclipsed by Section 19, J&K Contempt of Courts Act, 1997. Learned counsel seeks to draw support from law laid down in cases reported as 2001 Cr.LJ, 2738, Supp.(1) 1993 SCC 529 , Supp. (2) 1993 SCC 433 , and AIR 2005 SC 2190. 12. Both learned counsel for the appellants and respondents, to reinforce their stand, rely on law laid down in Midnapore Peoples' Co-Op. Bank v. Chunilal Nanda & Ore reported as AIR 2006 SC 2190 (2006(5) SCC 399). The Supreme Court, in the aforesaid case on scanning law on the subject held: "11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarized thus: I. An appeal under section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should, be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of 'jurisdiction to punish for contempt' and therefore, not appealable under section 19 of CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)." 13. It follows that an order dropping the proceedings for contempt like one in question or an order exonerating contemnor is not appealable in terms of Section 19, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which is pari materia with section 19, J&K Contempt of Courts Act, 1997. Reliance placed by learned counsel for appellants on Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank case (supra) is, therefore, grossly misplaced. 14. Reliance placed by learned counsel for appellants on Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank case (supra) is, therefore, grossly misplaced. 14. Maintainability of an Appeal against an order passed in contempt petition, other than one imposing punishment on contemnor, surfaced before the Division Bench of this Court in Prabh Dayal and others v. R.S. Sachdeva and others (2001 CRI.L.J. 2738) again relied upon by learned counsel for appellants, and Abdul Gani Bhat v. State and others (2010 (II) SLJ 827 : 2010 (2) JKJ HC-45 (DB)). In both the cases, the Division Bench, relying on law laid down in AIR 1974 SC 2255 , held Appeal under section 19, Contempt of Courts Act, not maintainable. In both the matters, Learned Single Judge had arrived at conclusion that no case was made out for exercising jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The observation made by Division Bench of this Court in Prabh Dayal case (supra) that though the Appeal against an order dropping contempt proceedings, would not be maintainable in terms of Section 19, Contempt of Courts Act, still the Division Bench would be competent to remind the respondents of their obligation to abide by the Court direction, is of no relevance to the controversy involved in the present case. 15. In view of settled legal position, as is evident from above referred case law, an appeal, against an order dismissing the contempt petition or dropping the show cause notice issued to the alleged contemnor, is not maintainable. This, however, does not clinch the matter. It remains to be seen whether an appeal against an order of Contempt Court, otherwise than one imposing punishment on contemnor, even if not permissible under Section 19 of the Act, would be still maintainable under Clause 12, Letters Patent granted to the High Court, and Section 19 of the Act cannot abridge, control or restrict such power. 16. It needs to be pointed out that the contempt proceedings are different from other proceedings before a High Court. The issue in contempt proceedings, as emphasized in Bell Products Private Limited v. M.K. Gupta, Contempt Appeal Nos. 1 to 3 of 2008, decided on 25th September 2008, is between Court and the contemnor. This is reason that only the contemnor punished by the Contempt Court has a right to appeal against an order. The issue in contempt proceedings, as emphasized in Bell Products Private Limited v. M.K. Gupta, Contempt Appeal Nos. 1 to 3 of 2008, decided on 25th September 2008, is between Court and the contemnor. This is reason that only the contemnor punished by the Contempt Court has a right to appeal against an order. In case contempt proceedings are dropped or the petition dismissed, the court does not determine any rights-but merely arrives at a conclusion that alleged contemnor has not violated or disobeyed Court order. Therefore, law makers in their wisdom, have not provided for appeal against such an order. Having said so, let us now try to understand the nature and scope of appeal under Letters Patent. Letters Patent is the Charter, under which High court is established. However, the powers given to High Court under Letters Patent are not at par with its Constitutional powers. In Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar (2002) 3 SCC 705 ), it was held that the powers given to High Court under Letters Patent are akin to the Constitutional powers given to High Court and when Letters Patent gives to the High Court power of appeal against judgement of Single Judge, the right to entertain the appeal would not get excluded unless the Statutory enactment concerned excludes an appeal under Letters patent. Supreme Court, in the said background, held that Section 54, Land Acquisition Act, does not exclude an appeal under Letters Patent, The law laid down in Sharda Devi's case (supra) fell for consideration of the Apex Court in P.S. Sathappan (dead) by LRS. v. Andra Bank Ltd. and others (2004) 11 SCC 672 ). The Court held that observations made in Sharda Devi's case, do not put Letters Patent at a par with the Constitution. It would be appropriate to reproduce para 27 of the judgement: "Thereafter in the case of Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar reported in (2002) 3 SCC 705 the question again arose whether a Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable in view of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. A three Judges Bench of this Court held that a Letters Patent was a Charter under which the High Courts were established and that by virtue of that Charter the High Court got certain powers. A three Judges Bench of this Court held that a Letters Patent was a Charter under which the High Courts were established and that by virtue of that Charter the High Court got certain powers. It was held that when a Letters Patent grants to the High Court a power of Appeal, against a Judgment of a single Judge, the right to entertain such an Appeal does not get excluded unless the statutory enactment excludes an Appeal under the Letters Patent. It was held that as Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act did not bar a Letters Patent Appeal such an Appeal was maintainable. At this stage it must be clarified that during arguments, relying on the sentence "The powers given to a High Court under the Letters patent are akin to the constitutional powers of a High Court" in para 9 of this Judgment it had been suggested that a Letters Patent had the same status as the Constitution of India. In our view these observations merely lay down that the powers given to a High Court are the powers with which that High Court is constituted. These observations do not put Letters Patent on par with the Constitution of India. 17. The Court summed up its conclusion in para 148 of the judgement. One of the conclusions drawn was that "Letters Patent being a subordinate legislation has the farce of law but the same is subject to Act of Parliament" and that "if a higher status is given to a Letters Patent over a law passed by Parliament including the Code of Civil Procedure, the same would run contrary to the history of the Letters Patent as also the parliamentary Acts". 18. Section 19, J&K Contempt of Courts Act, 1997, as already pointed out, restricts the scope of appeal against an order or decision, rendered by High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. An appeal, otherwise not maintainable under Section 19 of the Act, therefore, would not be maintainable under Letters Patent. So viewed the argument advanced by learned counsel for appellant that appeal is maintainable under Letters Patent, independent of Section 19, Contempt of Courts Act, cannot be accepted. 19. An appeal, otherwise not maintainable under Section 19 of the Act, therefore, would not be maintainable under Letters Patent. So viewed the argument advanced by learned counsel for appellant that appeal is maintainable under Letters Patent, independent of Section 19, Contempt of Courts Act, cannot be accepted. 19. The argument that as the High Court is a Court of Record and in terms of Article 215, Constitution of India, read with Section 94, Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, conferred power to punish for its contempt as also that of subordinate courts and that the power being Constitutional in character, cannot be abridged, controlled or restricted by a Statute, is not relevant to the present controversy. It is pertinent to point out that Section 19, Contempt of Courts Act, does not abridge or restrict power of High Court available under Article 215 and. Section 94 to punish for contempt of itself or courts subordinate to it It only defines ambit and scope of an appeal and nature of order passed in contempt proceedings, against which such appeal may be preferred, Section 19, therefore, does not in any manner offend Article 215, Constitution of India or Section 94, Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. The contempt court order in question, therefore, cannot be labeled as one passed in exercise of powers under Article 215 or Section 94 and appeal held maintainable under Letter Patent of the High Court. 20. For the reasons discussed, we are of the opinion that the appeal against the order of Single Judge dated 28th September 2012, whereby Robkar has been dropped and contempt petition dismissed, is not maintainable under Section 19, Jammu and Kashmir Contempt of Courts Act, 1997. 21. Viewed thus the appeal is dismissed.