JUDGMENT Hon'ble LOHRA, J.—The appellants have preferred this intra-Court appeal against the impugned judgment and order dated 13th September 2012 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the writ petition of the respondent-petitioner was partly allowed and the penalty of compulsory retirement was altered and substituted by penalty of withholding annual grade increments with cumulative effect. 2. Stated in succinct, the factual matrix giving rise to this appeal is that while working as Lower Division Clerk in the office of first appellant, Special Judge (Essential Commodities Act Cases), Jodhpur, the respondent-petitioner was served with a memorandum and charge-sheet dated 20th of February 2010 under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1958'). 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Responding to memorandum and charge-sheet, the delinquent submitted his reply and denied all the charges. The reply submitted by the respondent was not found to be satisfactory by the disciplinary authority and consequently a regular disciplinary enquiry was ordered against him. The enquiry was conducted by the disciplinary authority himself and in the report the delinquent respondent was indicted for all the three charges. The reply submitted by the respondent was not found to be satisfactory by the disciplinary authority and consequently a regular disciplinary enquiry was ordered against him. The enquiry was conducted by the disciplinary authority himself and in the report the delinquent respondent was indicted for all the three charges. On conclusion of the enquiry, the copy of the enquiry report was furnished to the respondent-employee and thereafter vide order dated 10th May 2010, penalty of compulsory retirement from service with forfeiture of wages for the suspension period other than subsistence allowance was inflicted. The disciplinary authority has also allowed three months' salary to the respondent. 4. Being aggrieved from the order of the disciplinary authority, the respondent preferred an appeal before the appellate authority on 19th of May 2010 and the said appeal was placed before the Appellate Committee of the High Court. The Appellate Committee, after examining the matter in its entirety, dismissed the appeal. Assailing the punishment order and the order of appellate authority, the respondent laid writ petition before the learned single Judge. The learned writ Court granted indulgence to the respondent employee by partly allowing the writ petition. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Vinit Mathur, has vehemently argued that scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution is very limited and therefore the learned Single Judge has erred in interfering with the penalty which was inflicted on the delinquent employee as a consequence of his indictment in the departmental enquiry. While buttressing his submissions with full emphasis, Mr. Mathur has argued that the matter was examined threadbare by the appellate authority also, and therefore, it was not desirable for the learned Single Judge to have interfered with the impugned punishment order. Learned counsel for the appellants Mr. Mathur has also contended that when the charges were fully established against the delinquent employee, which were of grave and serious nature, interference by the learned Single Judge was not called for. In support of his contentions, Mr. Mathur has placed reliance on a judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Union of India & Ors. vs. Narain Singh ( (2002) 5 SCC 11 ). In support of his contentions, Mr. Mathur has placed reliance on a judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Union of India & Ors. vs. Narain Singh ( (2002) 5 SCC 11 ). The Apex Court, while examining the scope of judicial review in the matter of punishment, has made following observations in Para 9 & 10 of the verdict: 9) As seen above, the Division Bench notes that the charges against the respondent are proved and that the charges are of serious nature. Once the Court came to the conclusion that the charges were proved and that the charges were of a serious nature, it was not the function of the Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment. The Division Bench was wrong in holding that factors viz. a) the person is coming from which place, b) his family background and (c) his service record etc. were to be kept in mind. In our view, the Division Bench was also wrong in holding that if a poor person pleads guilty to the misconduct, then extreme penalty of dismissal is uncalled for. In our view a Court must not lightly interfere with sentences passed after a properly conducted enquiry where the guilt is proved. Reduction of sentence, particularly in military, para-military or police services can have a demoralising effect and would be a retrograde step so far as discipline of these services is concerned. In this case the charges being of a serious nature the penalty was commensurate with the charges. Further the Division Bench has itself noted that this was the third time the respondent was punished. 10) Mr. Mehta tried to support the impugned Order on the ground that the Division Bench had taken a just and kind view considering the fact that the respondent had served for a long time and came from a poor family. He submitted that the impugned Order was a just order and should not be interfered with. We are unable to accept this submission. As stated above, the law is clear. It is not for the Court to determine the quantum of punishment once charges are proved. In this case it cannot be said that the punishment of dismissal is not commensurate with the charges. It is not for the Court to interfere on misplaced grounds of sympathy and/or mercy. 6. As stated above, the law is clear. It is not for the Court to determine the quantum of punishment once charges are proved. In this case it cannot be said that the punishment of dismissal is not commensurate with the charges. It is not for the Court to interfere on misplaced grounds of sympathy and/or mercy. 6. For authenticating his submissions, learned counsel for the appellants has also placed reliance on a judgment of Apex Court in case of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur vs. Nemichand Nalwaya ( 2011(4) SCC 584 ). The Apex Court, while examining the powers of a writ court to interfere with the punishment, has made following observations in Para 7 & 8 of the verdict: 7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. Courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, malafide or based on extran-eous considerations. (vide B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India - 1995(6) SCC 749 , Union of India vs. G. Gunayuthan - 1997(7) SCC 463 , and Bank of India vs. Degala Suryanarayana - 1999(5) SCC 762 , High Court of Judicature at Bombay vs. Shashikant S. Patil - 2001(1) SCC 416. 8. When a court is considering whether the punishment of `termination from service' imposed upon a bank employee is shockingly excessive or disproportionate to the gravity of the proved misconduct, the loss of confidence in the employee will be an important and relevant factor. 8. When a court is considering whether the punishment of `termination from service' imposed upon a bank employee is shockingly excessive or disproportionate to the gravity of the proved misconduct, the loss of confidence in the employee will be an important and relevant factor. When an unknown person comes to the bank and claims to be the account-holder of a long inoperative account, and a bank employee, who does not know such person, instructs his colleague to transfer the account from "dormant" to "operative" category (contrary to the instructions regulating dormant accounts) without any kind of verification, and accepts the money withdrawal form from such person, gets a token and collects the amount on behalf of such person for the purpose of handing it over to such person, he in effect enables such unknown person to withdraw the amount contrary to the banking procedures; and ultimately, if it transpires that the person who claimed to be account holder was an imposter, the bank cannot be found fault with if it says that it has lost confidence in the employee concerned. A Bank is justified in contending that not only the employees who are dishonest, but those who are guilty of gross negligence, are not fit to continue in its service. 7. Per contra, the respondent appearing in person, has argued that the punishment meted out to him was harsh and not commensurating with the proved delinquency. The respondent Anand Swaroop has also argued that charges against him were not of serious nature and so far as the first charge is concerned, it was in fact not proved because the allegation again him that he misbehaved with the Advocate has not been established during the enquiry. According to the respondent employee, during his deposition before the enquiry officer, the concerned Advocate has clarified that the respondent has not misbehaved with him, and therefore, in these circumstances, the conclusion of the disciplinary authority, who was also the enquiring authority, is perverse and is based on complete misreading of the evidence of the Advocate. Persisting with his submissions that Charge No.1 was not established against him, the respondent would urge that looking to trivial nature of charge No.2 & 3, the learned Single Judge was justified in interfering with the punishment order and substituting it with a punishment which would commensurate with the proved delinquency. Persisting with his submissions that Charge No.1 was not established against him, the respondent would urge that looking to trivial nature of charge No.2 & 3, the learned Single Judge was justified in interfering with the punishment order and substituting it with a punishment which would commensurate with the proved delinquency. Assailing the enquiry conducted by the disciplinary authority, the respondent has contended that as the disciplinary authority himself has acted as an enquiry officer and therefore, the impugned order is vitiated being contrary to principles of natural justice. The respondent would urge that one cannot be a judge in his cause and with these submissions; the respondent has submitted that no interference with the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is called for in this intra-court appeal. The respondent in support of his arguments has placed reliance on following judgments: 1. A.K. Kraipak & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. ( AIR 1970 SC 150 ) 2. Arjun Chaubey vs. Union of India & Ors. ( AIR 1984 SC 1356 ) 3. B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India & Ors. ( AIR 1996 SC 484 ) 4. State of Mysore vs. K. Manche Gouda ( AIR 1964 SC 506 ). In A.K. Kraipak's case (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, while emphasizing the need for observance of principles of natural justice in exercise of duties whether it be administrative, executive or quasi- judicial, made following observations in Para 20 of the verdict. 20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules, namely (1) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George vs. The University of Kerala, Civil Appeal No.890 of 1968, D/- 15-7-1968 = ( AIR 1969 SC 198 ) the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. In Arjun Chaubey's case (supra), the Apex Court, while considering the rigor of natural justice for its adherence in the departmental enquiries on the anvil of maxim “Nemo debet esse judex propria causa”, made following observations in Para 5 & 6: 5. The letter dated May 22, 1982 which contains accusations of gross misconduct against the appellant enumerates 12 charges, out of which Charges Nos. The letter dated May 22, 1982 which contains accusations of gross misconduct against the appellant enumerates 12 charges, out of which Charges Nos. 2 to 7 and 11 refer to the appellant's misconduct in relation to Respondent 3. For example, the second charge alleges that the appellant entered the office of respondent 3 and challenged him in an offensive and derogatory language. Charge No. 3 says that the appellant was in the habit of forcing himself on Respondent 3 two or three times every day with petty complaints. Charge No. 4 alleges that the appellant stormed into the office of Respondent 3 and shouted at him, using foul words. Charges 5, 6 and 7 contain similar allegations. The allegation contained in Charge No. 11 is to the effect that behaving as a leader of goondas, the appellant hired the services of other goondas and created security problems for Respondent 3 and the members of his family. It is obvious that if an inquiry were to be held into the charges framed against the appellant, the principal witness for the Department would have been Respondent 3 himself as the main accuser and the target of appellant's misconduct. It is surprising in this context that the explanation dated June 9, 1982 which was furnished by the appellant to the letter of accusation dated May 22, 1982 was considered on its merits by Respondent 3 himself. Thereby, the accuser became the judge. The letter written to the appellant by Respondent 3 on June 10, 1982 says: "I have carefully gone through your defence explanation dated 9.6.1982. to the charges given in this office letter of even No. dated 22.5.1982 and the same is not convincing at all. Before taking any action under D. & A.R., I would like to offer you another chance for giving your explanations to the specific charges conveyed to you vide this office letter dated 22.5.1982. Please submit your defence explanation within three days as to why a deterrent disciplinary action should not be taken against you". The appellant submitted his further explanation, which also was considered by Respondent 3 himself. Please submit your defence explanation within three days as to why a deterrent disciplinary action should not be taken against you". The appellant submitted his further explanation, which also was considered by Respondent 3 himself. The order of dismissal dated June 15, 1982 which was issued by Respondent 3 recites that he was fully satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry into the appellant's conduct as provided by the Rules and that he had come to the conclusion that the appellant was not fit to be retained in service and had, therefore, to be dismissed. Evidently, Respondent 3 assessed the weight of his own accusations against the appellant and passed a judgment which is one of the easiest to pass, namely, that he himself was a truthful person and the appellant a liar. In doing this, Respondent 3 violated a fundamental principle of natural justice. The main thrust of the charges against the appellant related to his conduct qua Respondent 3. Therefore, it was not open to the latter to sit in judgment over the explanation offered by the appellant and decide that the explanation was untrue. No person can be a judge in his own cause and no witness can certify that his own testimony is true. Any one who has a personal stake in an inquiry must keep himself aloof from the conduct of the inquiry. The order of dismissal passed against the appellant stands vitiated for the simple reason that the issue as to who, between the appellant and Respondent 3, was speaking the truth was decided by Respondent 3 himself. 6. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohammad Nooh, 1958 SCR 595 at p. 609 ( AIR 1958 SC 86 at p.94) S.R. Das, C.J., observed, while speaking for the majority, that the roles of a judge and a witness cannot be played by one and the same person and that it is futile to expect, when those roles are combined that the judge can hold the scales of justice even. We may borrow the language of Das, C.J., and record a finding on the facts of the case before us that the illegality touching the proceedings which ended in the dismissal of the appellant is "so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves an indelible stamp of infirmity" on the decision of Respondent 3. We may borrow the language of Das, C.J., and record a finding on the facts of the case before us that the illegality touching the proceedings which ended in the dismissal of the appellant is "so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves an indelible stamp of infirmity" on the decision of Respondent 3. In B.C. Charturvedi's case (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 can interfere with the punishment if it shocks the conscience of the Court. Apex Court has made following observations in Para 18 of the verdict. 18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. It the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. In State of Mysore's case (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that while imposing punishment on a delinquent employee, previous record of the employee cannot be looked into if the said charge is not subject matter of enquiry and the delinquent employee is not apprised about the same by the disciplinary authority. The Constitution Bench of Apex Court has made following observations in this behalf in Para 9 of the verdict. (9) In the present case the second show cause notice does not mention that the Government intended to take his previous punishments into consideration in proposing to dismiss him from service. On the contrary, the said notice put him on the wrong scent, for it told him that it was proposed to dismiss him from service as the charges proved against him were grave. On the contrary, the said notice put him on the wrong scent, for it told him that it was proposed to dismiss him from service as the charges proved against him were grave. But, a comparison of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the order of dismissal shows that but for the previous record of the Government servant, the Government might not have imposed the penalty of dismissal on him and might have accepted the recommendations of the Enquiry Officer and the Public Service Commission. This order, therefore, indicates that the show cause notice did not give the only reason which influenced the Government to dismiss the respondent from service. This notice clearly contravened the provisions of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution as interpreted by Court. 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the respondent employee in person at length and perused the materials on record. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the appellants, we have also scanned the service profile of the respondent employee. 9. On a close scrutiny of the record of the enquiry and the evidence of Advocate Mr. D.R. Loonker, it is crystal clear that a certified copy demanded by the advocate was prepared by the delinquent employee and it was delivered to the counsel. It is also apparent from the statement of Mr. Loonker that the respondent employee has not misbehaved with him. True it is that in departmental enquiries proof beyond reasonable doubt is not insisted and the charges can be established against a delinquent employee on preponderance of probabilities. Conversely, it is also a settled proposition of law that suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof. As such, mere suspicion cannot bring home guilt against a delinquent employee. Therefore, we are of the considered view that finding of the enquiry officer and the consequential punishment order, which is based on the said finding vis-a-vis the first charge, and its affirmation by the appellate authority cannot be sustained. The conclusions recorded by the learned Single Judge in this behalf therefore cannot be faulted. 10. Therefore, we are of the considered view that finding of the enquiry officer and the consequential punishment order, which is based on the said finding vis-a-vis the first charge, and its affirmation by the appellate authority cannot be sustained. The conclusions recorded by the learned Single Judge in this behalf therefore cannot be faulted. 10. Now switching on to Charge No.2 & 3, which were found to be proved against the delinquent employee, we are of the view that both the charges are not of grave and serious nature warranting the punishment of compulsory retirement under Rule 14 (v) of the Rules of 1958 on the anvil of Wednesbury's principles of proportionality. The Apex Court, in Bhagat Ram vs. Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ( (1983) 2 SCC 442 ), without referring to Wednesbury's principles of proportionality, has examined the proportionality of punishment in the light of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and concluded that dismissal on trivial charge of negligence, which has not resulted in any loss to the Department, cannot be sustained. The Apex Court made following observations in Para 15 of the verdict: 15. The question is once we quash the order, is it open to us to give any direction which would not permit a fresh inquiry to be held? After all what is the purpose of holding a fresh inquiry? Obviously, it must be to impose some penalty. It is equally true that the penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, and that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Having been influenced by all these relevant considerations, we are of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by a fresh inquiry. What option is open to us in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 to make an appropriate order. We believe that justice and fair play demand that we make an order of minor penalty here and now without being unduly technical apart jurisdiction, we are fortified in this view by the decision of this Court in Hindustan Steels Ltd., Rourkela vs. A.K. Roy & Ors. where this Court after quashing the order of reinstatement proceeded to examine whether the party should be left to pursue further remedy. where this Court after quashing the order of reinstatement proceeded to examine whether the party should be left to pursue further remedy. Other alternative was to remand the matter that being a case of an industrial dispute to the Tribunal. It is possible that on such a remand, this Court further observed that the Tribunal may pass an appropriate order but that would mean prolonging the dispute which would hardly be fair to or conducive to the interest of the parties. This Court in such circumstances proceeded to make an appropriate order by awarding compensation. We may adopt the same approach. Keeping in view, the nature of misconduct, gravity of charge and no consequential loss, a penalty of withholding his increments with future effect will meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, two increments with future effect of the appellant be withheld and he must be paid 50% of the arrears from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement. 11. The Wednesbury's principle of proportionality was examined by House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for Civil Service (1984 3 All. E.R. 935). Lord Diplock, while elucidating the need for adherence of principle of proportionality and emphasizing its need within the four corners of power of judicial review by the Courts, has held as under: “My Lords, I see no reason why simply because a decision-making power is derived from a common law and not a statutory source it should for that reason only be immune from judicial review. Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reitera-ting any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call 'illegality', the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. That is not to say that further deve-lopment on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 'proportionality' which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community; but to dispose of the instant case the three already well-established heads that I have mentioned will suffice. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 'proportionality' which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community; but to dispose of the instant case the three already well-established heads that I have mentioned will suffice. By 'illegality' as a ground for judicial review I mean that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exercisable. By 'irrationality' I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as 'Wednesbury unreasonableness' (see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp (1947) 2 All ER 680, 1948) 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that judges by their training and experience should be well equipped to answer, or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial system. To justify the court's exercise of this role, resort I think is today no longer needed to Viscount Radcliffe's ingenious explanation in Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v Bairstow (1955) 3 All ER 48, (1956) AC 14 of irrationality as a ground for a court's reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred though unidentifiable mistake of law by the decision-maker. 'Irrationality' by now can stand on its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may be attacked by judicial review. I have described the third head as 'procedural impropriety' rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe pro-cedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe pro-cedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice. But the instant case is not concerned with the proceedings of an administrative tribunal at all. My Lords, that a decision of which the ultimate source of power to make it is not a statute but the common law (whether or not the common law is for this purpose given the label of 'the prerogative') may be the subject of judicial review on the ground of illegality is, I think, established by the cases cited by my noble and learned friend Lord Roskill, and this extends to cases where the field of law to which the decision relates is national security, as the decision of this House itself in Burmah Oil Co (Burma Trading) Ltd v Lord Advocate (1964) 2 All ER 348, (1965) AC 75 shows. While I see no a priori reason to rule out 'irrationality' as a ground for judicial review of a ministerial decision taken in the exercise of 'prerogative' powers, I find it difficult to envisage in any of the various fields in which the prerogative remains the only source of the relevant decision-making power a decision of a kind that would be open to attack through the judicial process on this ground. Such decisions will generally involve the application of government policy. The reasons for the decision-maker taking one course rather than another do not normally involve questions to which, if disputed, the judicial process is adapted to pro-vide the right answer, by which I mean that the kind of evidence that is admissible under judicial procedures and the way in which it has to be adduced tend to exclude from the attention of the court competing policy considerations which, if the executive discretion is to be wisely exercised, need to be weighed against one another, a balancing exercise which judges by their upbringing and experience are ill-qualified to perform. So I leave this as an open question to be dealt with on a case to case basis if, indeed, the case should ever arise. So I leave this as an open question to be dealt with on a case to case basis if, indeed, the case should ever arise. As respects 'procedural propriety', I see no reason why it should not be a ground for judicial review of a decision made under powers of which the ultimate source is the prerogative. Such, indeed, was one of the grounds that formed the subject matter of judicial review in R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex p Lain (1967) 2 All ER 770, (1967) 2 QB 864. Indeed, where the decision is one which does not alter rights or obligations enforceable in private law but only deprives a person of legitimate expectations, 'procedural impropriety' will normally provide the only ground on which the decision is open to judicial review. But in any event what procedure will satisfy the public law requirement of procedural propriety depends on the subject matter of the decision, the executive functions of the decision-maker (if the decision is not that of an administrative tribunal) and the particular circumstances in which the decision came to be made.” 12. The Apex Court, in case of Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India & Ors. (( 1987 4 SCC 611 ), while placing reliance on the verdict of House of Lords in case of Council of Civil Service Unions (supra), has applied the doctrine of proportionality in the matter of punishment which was inflicted after Court Martial, and observed in Para 25 as infra: 25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the "decision making process". The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court-Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court-Martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review. In Council of Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for the Civil Service, Lord Diplock said: Judicial Review has I think developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground l would call 'illegality', the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 'proportionality' which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community. 13. Similarly, adhering to doctrine of proportionality, the Apex Court in case of V.R. Katarki vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (1991 Suppl. (1) SCC 267), has altered the punishment from dismissal to compulsory retirement. 14. In B.C. Chaturvedi's case (supra), on which the respondent has placed reliance, the Apex Court has stressed the need for taking note of the doctrine of proportionality if the punishment is found to be shockingly disproportionate to the delinquency. 15. The Apex Court, in case of Om Kumar & Ors. vs. Union of India ( (2001) 2 SCC 386 ), while reiterating that quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority to decide, has held that Wednesbury's principle of proportionality can be applied for examining the proportionality of the punishment besides illegality, procedural irregularity and irrationality of the punishment. 16. In a recent pronouncement, the Apex Court, in case of Coal India Limited vs. Mukul Kumar Choudhari ( (2009) 15 SCC 620 ), has thoroughly examined the Wednesbury's principle of proportionality in the matter of penalty/punishment. While examining the limited scope of judicial review in such matters, the Court has observed that question of adequacy of punishment falls within the ambit of limited scope of judicial review. In Para 19 of the verdict, the Court has observed as infra: 19. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well-recognized concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. While examining the limited scope of judicial review in such matters, the Court has observed that question of adequacy of punishment falls within the ambit of limited scope of judicial review. In Para 19 of the verdict, the Court has observed as infra: 19. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well-recognized concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision-maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of punishment which is grossly in excess to the allegations cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope of judicial review. 17. Although it was not desirable for this Court to scan the record of the respondent in the backdrop of the facts of the case, but for insistence of the learned counsel for the appellants, we have delved deep into the record. On perusal of record, we have found that there is no serious scar in the service profile of the delinquent employee indicating his blame worthy character or inefficiency. 18. One more redeeming feature of the case is that apart from irrationality of the punishment, in the light of proved delinquency, the punishment is in outrageous defiance of the logic which has persuaded the learned single Judge to take a benevolent and charitable view in the matter. 19. Upon thrashing out the law on the subject of Wednesbury’s principle of proportionality, we are convinced that in exercise of powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court can interfere in appropriate cases. However, it is also a question which requires judicial scrutiny as to whether Court while exercising its power of judicial review can substitute the punishment at its own or the matter is to be remanded back to the disciplinary authority. The normal rule is that courts are not expected to trench in this sphere and it should be left at the discretion of the disciplinary authority being its sole prerogative. The normal rule is that courts are not expected to trench in this sphere and it should be left at the discretion of the disciplinary authority being its sole prerogative. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, treating it to be a rare case, as the learned Single Judge has interfered with the punishment to shorten litigation and has substituted the same by imposing punishment of withholding the annual grade increments with cumulative effect, we are not persuaded to interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge. Thus, we are disinclined to upset the impugned order of the learned Single Judge in this intra-court appeal on the anvil of Wednesbury's principle of proportionality as it would not serve the object of substantial justice. We are clarifying it that the learned Single Judge while altering the punishment of the respondent from compulsory retirement to punishment of annual grade increments with cumulative effect has not quantified the substituted punishment with clarity. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the punishment of withholding of two annual grade increments with future effect (cumulative effect) may be treated as a substituted punishment in place of compulsory retirement from service. 20. The upshot of the above discussion is that we find no merit in this appeal, the same is accordingly dismissed.