Judgment L. Narasimha Reddy, J. This letters patent raises certain important questions of law, apart from presenting a complex set of facts. It arises out of a decree, dated 12.9.1986, passed by the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Ongole in OS No. 98 of 1981. 2. Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 in the suit are the appellants herein. The sole plaintiff is respondent No. 1 and defendant Nos. 1 to 5 are respondent Nos. 2 to 6. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as arrayed in the suit. 4. The plaintiff filed the suit for the relief of specific performance of an agreement of sale, dated 12.12.1978, EX.A1, against the defendant£ in respect of the suit schedule property, a house in a plot of about 300 square yards, situated in Tangutur Village, opposite to Sri Seeta Rama Swamy Temple and to direct the defendants to put him in possession thereof. Alternative relief in the form of a decree for a sum of Rs. 7,300/-, being the earnest money of Rs. 1,000/-, interest of Rs. 300/- and damages of Rs. 6,000/- was also claimed. It was pleaded that defendant No. 1, who was residing at Madras along with her children, defendant Nos. 2 to 5, is the owner of the property and that in the second week of December 1978, she came to Tangutur with a proposal to sell the said property. The Secretary of the plaintiff-Bhaktha Sangam (Society) is said to have negotiated with defendant No. 1 for purchase of the property and that bargain was settled at Rs. 24,000/-. An agreement is said to have been executed on 12.12.1978 and that on the same day, advance of Rs.1,000/- was paid, incorporating a condition that the balance of sale consideration must be paid by the end of April 1979. 5. The plaintiff pleaded that after defendant No. 1 executed the agreement in its favour, some Vysyas of Tangutur Village have approached defendant No. 1 and offered to purchase the property at a higher price of Rs. 30,000/-. On reliably learning that an ante-dated agreement was got executed in favour of defendant Nos. 6 to 8, by availing the service of a notary at Madras, the plaintiff got issued a public notice on 20.12.1978, asserting its rights under Ex.A1. 30,000/-. On reliably learning that an ante-dated agreement was got executed in favour of defendant Nos. 6 to 8, by availing the service of a notary at Madras, the plaintiff got issued a public notice on 20.12.1978, asserting its rights under Ex.A1. A notice is also said to have been served upon the Joint Registrar, Ongole with a request, not to execute any document in respect of the suit schedule property and the Joint Registrar is said to have made an endorsement, to the effect that the parties have to avail the remedies in accordance with law. Notices were exchanged between the parties and ultimately, the plaintiff came to know that an agreement of sale was executed by defendant Nos. 1 to 5 in favour of defendant Nos. 6 to 8 and that was followed by a sale deed, dated 10.12.1978, Ex.B2. Pleading that the agreement of sale, dated 7.12.1978, Ex.B1, was a fabricated and ante-dated one and neither that agreement nor the consequential sale deed, dated 10.12.1978, would defeat the rights of the plaintiff under Ex.A1, the suit was filed. 6. Defendant No. 1 filed a written statement on behalf of herself and her children, defendant Nos. 2 to 5. She pleaded that defendant Nos. 6 to 8 approached her at Madras with a request to sell the suit schedule property and after due negotiations, an agreement, Ex.B1, was executed, duly signed by her, her major children; and that minor children were represented by her. She stated that the property devolved on all of' them from her husband and she cannot undertake any transaction on her own accord. As regards Ex.A1, she stated that after Ex.B1 was executed, the Secretary of the plaintiff-society, PW1, came to her and made a request to sell the property and when she expressed her inability to accede to his request, in view of the execution of Ex.B1, PW1 is said to have asked her to sign on a paper with a promise that he would take care of all the legal issues. She stated that Ex.A1 was fabricated on the signed blank papers. She pleaded that once the sale deed was executed after receiving the entire consideration, rights of herself and her children stand transferred to defendant Nos. 6 to 8 and the filing of suit is nothing but a speculative attempt. She stated that Ex.A1 was fabricated on the signed blank papers. She pleaded that once the sale deed was executed after receiving the entire consideration, rights of herself and her children stand transferred to defendant Nos. 6 to 8 and the filing of suit is nothing but a speculative attempt. She further pleaded that the plaintiff-society was not properly represented and that there was no readiness and willingness on its part as required under law assuming that Ex.A1 is a validly executed document. 7. Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 filed a separate written statement. They pleaded that the suit itself is misconceived, since it is not filed on the basis of the resolution of the plaintiff-society. They submitted that Ex.B1 is the earliest agreement and with a view to defeat their claim, P.W.1 managed to obtain a blank signed paper from defendant No. 1 and filed a speculative suit. It was also urged that after the property was purchased, it is being run as a Kalyana Mandapam and that there are no merits in the suit. 8. The trial Court decreed the suit, through its judgment, dated 12.9.1986, and granted the relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale. Aggrieved by the decree, defendant Nos. 6 to 8 filed AS No. 2638 of 1986 and defendant Nos. 1 to 5 filed AS No. 915 of 1989, before this Court. Through a common judgment, dated 18.2.2002, a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed both the appeals. Hence, this LPA under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is filed against the decree in AS No. 2638 of 1986. 9. It is relevant to mention here that the remedy of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent stood removed with effect from 1.7.2002 by virtue of amendments to the CPC, through Act No. 22 of 2002. The present LPA was filed one week earlier to that date; on 24.6.2002 and accordingly, it was numbered. However, defendant Nos. 1 to 5 presented LPA (SR) No. 49304 of 2002 against AS No. 915 of 1989, together with an application to condone delay, on 11.7.2002; i.e. one week after Act 22 of 2002 came into force. The delay was condoned on 3.3.2003, but the LPA was dismissed on 31.3.2003. 10. Sri M. Ravindranath Reddy, learned Counsel for defendant Nos. 1 to 5 presented LPA (SR) No. 49304 of 2002 against AS No. 915 of 1989, together with an application to condone delay, on 11.7.2002; i.e. one week after Act 22 of 2002 came into force. The delay was condoned on 3.3.2003, but the LPA was dismissed on 31.3.2003. 10. Sri M. Ravindranath Reddy, learned Counsel for defendant Nos. 6 to 8, submits that the trial Court and the learned Single Judge of this Court proceeded on the assumption that a mere finding as to execution of Ex.A1 would be sufficient to decree the suit and that they did not bestow their attention on the execution of Ex.B1 or the other circumstances, such as readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff. He contends that even if Ex.A1 is taken as proved, relief could not have been granted unless the plaintiff was successful in proving that Ex.B1 was not executed at all. He submits that being anterior in point of time, Ex.B1 would render Ex.A1 inoperative. He contends that not a word was said either by the trial Court or by the learned Single Judge on this important aspect, though a specific issue was framed on this. 11. Learned Counsel contends that even if Ex.A1 is taken as proved and Ex.B1, an anterior agreement of sale is not pitted against it, the relief of specific performance could not have been granted once it was proved that (a) PW1 was not authorized by the plaintiff-society to negotiate the transaction; (b) no funds of the society were paid for this purpose; (c) PW1 did not possess any means to pay the balance of consideration even by the time he deposed as a witness; and (d) he did not take the plaintiff-society into confidence, even after the suit was filed. 12. Learned Counsel further submits that the suit schedule property was held by the husband of defendant No. 1 and father of defendant Nos. 2 to 5 and once it has devolved upon them on his death, defendant No. 1 did not have the exclusive right to enter into Ex.A1 and accordingly, the said document is unenforceable in law or at any rate, not binding upon defendant Nos. 2 to 5. 13. 2 to 5 and once it has devolved upon them on his death, defendant No. 1 did not have the exclusive right to enter into Ex.A1 and accordingly, the said document is unenforceable in law or at any rate, not binding upon defendant Nos. 2 to 5. 13. As regards the objection raised by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff as to the maintainability of the present LPA, on account of the dismissal of the LPA filed against the decree in AS No. 915 of 1989, the learned Counsel submits that the principle of extended res judicata does not apply to the facts of the case. He submits that it is only when a party, being under obligation to institute appeals against various decrees suffered by him, fails to present appeals against some of them, that the appeals filed by him would stand barred by res judicata on account of the fact that the decrees in the other proceedings assumed finality, due to failure in filing the appeals against them; and not when another party was not successful in preferring the appeal. He further submits that even otherwise, the principle does not get attracted when several appeals have arisen out of a decree in a single suit. He has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narhari v. Shanker, AIR 1953 SC 419 and Bajranglal Shivchandrai Ruia v. Shashikant Ruia, 2004(6) ALD 1 (SC) = (2004)5 SCC 272 . 14. Sri M.V.S. Suresh Kumar, learned Counsel for the plaintiff, on the other hand, submits that the present LPA is not maintainable in law, since LPA (SR) No. 49304 of 2002 filed against AS No. 915 of 1989, disposed of through a common judgment along with AS No. 2638 of 1996, was dismissed at the threshold. He submits that notwithstanding the fact that both the appeals arose out of the decree in as No. 98 of 1981, they assumed independent character with the dismissal of the appeals and the parties were under obligation to prefer the appeal against both the decrees. He contends that the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narhari's case would no longer hold good in view of the judgment in Badri Narayan Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, AIR 1962 SC 338 . 15. He contends that the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narhari's case would no longer hold good in view of the judgment in Badri Narayan Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, AIR 1962 SC 338 . 15. On merits, Sri Suresh Kumar submits that Ex.B1 was only an ante-dated document, to defeat the rights of the plaintiff under Ex.A1 and that the trial Court and the learned Single Judge have taken the correct view of the matter. He submits that defendant No. 1 has represented to the plaintiff that she is entitled to transact on behalf of herself and the minor children and accordingly, executed Ex.A1 and that the objection raised by defendant Nos. 6 to 8 in this behalf cannot be sustained in law. Learned Counsel submits that the discussion undertaken by the trial Court was comprehensive in nature and the same holds good for the findings in respect of Exs.A1 and B1. He submits that the concurrent findings recorded by the trial Court and the learned Single Judge cannot be set aside in the LPA. 16. As observed earlier, the suit was filed for the relief of specific performance of an agreement of sale, or in the alternative, for refund of a sum of Rs. 7,300/-. 17. The trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration: 1. Whether the agreement, dated 12.12.1978, said to have been executed by D1 is true, valid and binding on the defendants? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim specific performance of contract, dated 12.12.1978? 3. Whether the agreement, dated 7.12.1978 entered into between D1 to D5 and D6 and D7 is true, valid and binding on the plaintiff? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any damages, if so, to what amount? 18. On behalf of the plaintiff, PWs.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A1 to A18 were filed. On behalf of the defendants, DWs.1 to 12 were examined and Exs.B1 to B18 were filed. The suit was decreed and the two appeals, being AS Nos. 2638 of 1986 and 915 of 1989 came to be filed. The learned Single Judge of this Court broadly framed two questions, namely (a) whether Ex.B1 is genuine or ante-dated and (b) whether the execution of Ex.A1 by defendant No. 1 is valid, in view of Sections 6 and 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Both the appeals were dismissed. The learned Single Judge of this Court broadly framed two questions, namely (a) whether Ex.B1 is genuine or ante-dated and (b) whether the execution of Ex.A1 by defendant No. 1 is valid, in view of Sections 6 and 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Both the appeals were dismissed. 19. Though it is not necessary to frame any points in an appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, we find that the following points arise for consideration: 1. Whether the present LPA is barred by the principle of res judicata? 2. Whether the plaintiff proved execution of Ex.A1 and even if proved, whether it is enforceable in law? 3. Whether the plaintiff was able to establish that Ex.B1 was not validly executed? 4. Whether the plaintiff made out a case for grant of the relief of specific performance of an agreement of sale or the alternative relief? 20. Point No. 1: This point is framed in view of the strong objection raised by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff. On the suit being decreed, two separate appeals were filed by defendant Nos. 1 to 5 on the one hand and defendant Nos. 6 to 8 on the other. Both the appeals were dismissed through a common judgment by the learned Single Judge of this Court. Defendant Nos. 1 to 5 on the one hand and defendant Nos. 6 to 8 on the other presented separate LPAs. However, the one filed by defendant Nos. 6 to 8 passed through, whereas the LPA filed by defendant Nos. 1 to 5 met with the obstruction brought about by Act No. 22 of 2002. The dismissal of LPA filed by defendant Nos. 1 to 5 was not on merits. 21. The principle of res judicata enunciated under Section 11 CPC, in its extended form, applies at the stage of appeals also. Broadly stated, if a trial Court has clubbed several suits and disposed of them through a common judgment, the aggrieved parties are under obligation to prefer appeals against all the decrees. 1 to 5 was not on merits. 21. The principle of res judicata enunciated under Section 11 CPC, in its extended form, applies at the stage of appeals also. Broadly stated, if a trial Court has clubbed several suits and disposed of them through a common judgment, the aggrieved parties are under obligation to prefer appeals against all the decrees. Failure to file appeal against the decree in one suit, would result in a situation where the findings referable to that particular suit or other proceedings assume finality and since it was through a common judgment, the extended principle of res judicata gets attracted and bars the appeal filed against the common judgment, insofar as it related to other proceedings. 22. In this regard, a subtle distinction needs to be maintained. If the proceedings commenced with the filing of only one suit, mere fact that at a later stage, the suit gave rise to several appeals and further appeal against the decree in one such appeal was not filed or if filed, it failed, does not attract the principle of res judicata. The doubt in this context mostly arises on account of the fact that the fine distinction between the judgment on the one hand and the decree on the other, is not maintained, while applying the principle of res judicata. In Narhari's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the principle of res judicata or estoppel operate against the judgment and not decree. The Hon'ble Supreme Court explained as under: "...... the estoppel is not created by the decree but it can only be created by the judgment. The question of res judicata arises only when there are two suits. Even when there are two suits, it has been held that a decision given simultaneously cannot be a decision in the former suit. When there is only one suit, the question of res judicata does not arise at all and in the present case, both the decrees are in the same case and based on the same judgment, and the matter decided concerns the entire suit. As such, there is no question of the application of the principle of res judicata. The same judgment cannot remain effective just because it was appealed against with a different number or a copy of it was attached to a different appeal. The two decrees in substance are one." 23. As such, there is no question of the application of the principle of res judicata. The same judgment cannot remain effective just because it was appealed against with a different number or a copy of it was attached to a different appeal. The two decrees in substance are one." 23. Placing reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Badri Narayan Singh's case, Sri M.V.S. Suresh Kumar, learned Counsel for the plaintiff, sought to plead that the principle laid down in Narahari's case would no longer hold the field. 24. Badri Narayan Singh's case (supra) arose out of an Election Petition, wherein, dual relief of setting aside the election of the successful candidate and declaration that the election petitioner be treated as elected, was prayed for. The trial Court granted first limb of the relief, but rejected the second one. Two appeals were filed. The elected candidate i.e., the respondent in the Election Petition felt aggrieved by the order of the trial Court setting aside his election. The election petitioner, on the other hand, felt aggrieved by the denial of relief of declaration to the effect that he is elected. The appellate Court dismissed the appeal filed by the elected candidate and allowed the appeal filed by the election petitioner. The elected candidate, however, filed SLP only against the order through which the appellate Court held that the election petitioner is declared elected. He did not file appeal against the order passed by the appellate Court dismissing his appeal filed against the order setting aside the election. The Supreme Court held that failure of the elected candidate to prefer appeal against the order setting aside his election resulted in that, becoming final and as long as it stands, he cannot have any grievance whether the election petitioner is declared elected or not. In the course of discussion, reference was made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narhari's case. The facts in Badri Narayan Singh's case (supra) are totally dissimilar and the decision of the Supreme Court in that case did not depend upon the operation of the principle of res judicata, but, on failure to challenge an order, which was imminently prejudicial to the interest of the elected candidate. 25. The facts in Badri Narayan Singh's case (supra) are totally dissimilar and the decision of the Supreme Court in that case did not depend upon the operation of the principle of res judicata, but, on failure to challenge an order, which was imminently prejudicial to the interest of the elected candidate. 25. Assuming that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Narhari's case (supra) received any dent with the judgment in Badri Narayan Singh's case (supra), the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in Bajranglal Shivchandrai Ruia's case (supra) puts at rest, the uncertainty, if any. In that case, two appeals arose out of one suit and out of two appeals, two SLPs were filed. One of the SLPs was dismissed for default. When the surviving appeal came up for hearing, it was pleaded that dismissal of the SLP that arose out of the common judgment would operate as res judicata. Repelling that contention, the Supreme Court held: "It is not possible to accept that the principle of res judicata will apply to bar the appeal. Section 11 CPC would bar the Court from trying any suit or issue in which the matter "directly and substantially in issue" between the same parties or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, has been "heard and finally decided by such Court". In the present case, Bajranglal and Shyamsunder were defendants in Original Suit No. 118 of 1973. The suit was dismissed and the plaintiff Satyavati carried an appeal to the Division Bench. In the appeal, both Bajranglal and Shyamsunder were respondents. The Division Bench reversed the Single Judge's judgment and decreed the suit by its judgment. As the respondents in the appeal before the Division Bench both Bajranglal and Shyamsunder were aggrieved by the decree against them. The present appellant Bajranglal filed SLP No. 8425 of 1993 on 27.5.1993, while Shyamsunder filed his appeal SLP No. 18492 of 1993 on 17.12.1993. Leave was granted in Bajranglal's appeal on 4.10.1993 while leave was granted in Shyamsunder's case on 17.12.1993. Subsequently, Bajranglal's appeal was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 5293 while Shyamsunder's appeal was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 7490 of 1993. Leave was granted in Bajranglal's appeal on 4.10.1993 while leave was granted in Shyamsunder's case on 17.12.1993. Subsequently, Bajranglal's appeal was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 5293 while Shyamsunder's appeal was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 7490 of 1993. Shyamsunder's appeal was dismissed for default for non-removal of office objection on 15.1.2001. Thus, it is obvious that both in the matter of filing the SLP and granting of leave, Bajranglal's appeal was earlier and Shyamsunder's was later in time. In these circumstances, we are unable to accept the contention that an order dismissing a subsequent appeal for default can operate as res judicata in respect of an earlier appeal. Neither Section 11 C.P.C. nor any principle derivable therefrom, would bar the appeal as contended by the respondents. The contention is misconceived and we see no merit in the contention. In our judgment, the appeal is perfectly maintainable." 26. Added to that, the dismissal of the LPA filed by defendant Nos. 1 to 5 was not on merits, but on account of an impediment created by law. It was a circumstance, far less in its purport compared to the one of dismissal for default. 27. Another aspect is that res judicata, in its application to suits, or in its extended application to appeals and other proceedings operates against a person, who is pursuing the remedies, and in relation to his acts and omissions of others. In the context of preferring appeals, what the principle ordains is that, if being under obligation and necessity to file appeals against several decrees, arising out of the same judgment fails to appeal against some, would be exposed to the consequences of allowing the judgment becoming final, vis-a-vis the other proceedings. If a particular party has preferred the appeal or appeals to the extent he felt aggrieved, but other aggrieved parties either have failed to prefer appeal or have permitted the appeals to be dismissed otherwise than on merits, the one who promptly and consciously pursued the remedies or proceedings cannot be penalized, for the failure of others. 28. Another aspect is the point of time, at which the dismissal of one of the appeals takes place. 28. Another aspect is the point of time, at which the dismissal of one of the appeals takes place. From the brief discussion undertaken above, it becomes clear that for the application of principle of res judicata in the context of filing of appeals, the following facts become relevant: (a) The party against whom the principle is sought to be invoked must be under obligation to file more appeals than one, but has failed to file appeals against one or some; and not when a different party was under obligation to file it, but has failed to do so; and (b) The dismissal of one of the several appeals for default would not operate as res judicata, particularly when the one which is dismissed was instituted at a later point of time? (c) In case several appeals have arisen out of a single suit, operation of the principle gets diluted, if not precluded, in the context of availing further remedies. 29. In the instant case, viewed from any angle, the principle of res judicata, does not operate. Hence, the preliminary objection is overruled and point No. 1 is answered accordingly. 30. Point No.2: This point is in relation to execution of Ex.A1. It has two facets, i.e. (a) the factum of execution and (b) the legal competence of defendant No. 1. While the plaintiff as PW1 pleaded that Ex.A1 was signed by defendant No. 1 after it was scribed, DW1 pleaded that PW1 approached her after execution of Ex.B1 representing that the plaintiff intends to purchase the property, since it is situated opposite to the Temple, under its administration and that PW1 would take care of the legal complications that may arise. In all fairness, DW1 admitted her signature on Ex.A1. Notwithstanding the circumstances under which she explained the execution of Ex.A1, it can be taken as proved. 31. Coming to the second aspect, it is not in dispute that the suit schedule property was owned by the husband of defendant No. 1. On his death, it devolved upon D.W.1 and her children, defendant Nos. 2 and 5. It is stated that defendant Nos. 2 and 5 were majors by the date of Ex.A1. A specific plea was raised in this behalf and the same was not contradicted by PW1. The other evidence, such as defendant Nos. On his death, it devolved upon D.W.1 and her children, defendant Nos. 2 and 5. It is stated that defendant Nos. 2 and 5 were majors by the date of Ex.A1. A specific plea was raised in this behalf and the same was not contradicted by PW1. The other evidence, such as defendant Nos. 2 and 5 figured as signatories in Ex.B1 and allegation that defendant No. 5 was living separately adds strength to that plea. Further, assuming that if defendant Nos. 2 to 5 were minors, there was a necessity to incorporate a clause in Ex.A1 to the effect that PW1 is representing the minors and is signing the document on behalf of herself and her minor children. The name of the executant is shown as DW1 alone and not her children. The signature is that of DW1 alone. Therefore, a serious legal infirmity has crept into Ex.A1, inasmuch as it was executed by one of the six legal heirs of late Venkata Lakshmi Narasimha Rao, the joint owners of the suit schedule property. Therefore, the point is answered in favour of the defendants. 32. Point No. 3: Assuming that Ex.A1 is validly executed and it is otherwise enforceable in law, the plaintiff would have been successful if only he proved that Ex.B1 is not validly executed. PW1 was very much aware about the existence of Ex.B1, which is anterior in point of time, compared to Ex.A1. Obviously being aware of that necessity, extensive reference was made in the plaint to Ex.B1 and it was pleaded that it was ante-dated. 33. The plea of ante-dating a document is taken, mostly by the persons, who are parties to that document. However, in the present case, both the parties to Ex.B1 have no qualms against each other. It is only a third party, namely the plaintiff, which has taken that plea. Heavy burden rested upon it. In fact, the trial Court framed an issue on this aspect. However, the entire discussion was in relation to Issue No. 1 pertaining to Ex.A1 and after answering it, it has just proceeded as though no further discussion is necessary about Ex.B1. The finding in relation to Ex.B1 reads as under: "Under Issue No. 3, I have to hold that Ex.B1 agreement dated 7.12.1978 is not true, valid and as such it is not binding on the plaintiff." 34. The finding in relation to Ex.B1 reads as under: "Under Issue No. 3, I have to hold that Ex.B1 agreement dated 7.12.1978 is not true, valid and as such it is not binding on the plaintiff." 34. Not a single witness was examined by the plaintiff in this behalf. PW1 did not have any knowledge about Ex.B1, nor does he have any role to play in that behalf. PWs.2 and 3 were examined in relation to Ex.A1. Though DW1 was cross-examined extensively, not a single factor was elicited from her to doubt the execution of Ex.B1. It is important to note that Ex.B1 was signed not only by DW1, but also her major daughters. Further, she has signed separately on behalf of herself and her minor children. Added to that, it is a notarized document written on a stamp paper. Notarization would play an important role in the context of ascertaining the date of execution of a document, which is notarized; though it may not vouch for the contents thereof. Not only the public notary puts his signature and affixes a stamp on the document, but also enters the document in his register. One of the avowed purposes for which the concept of notarization is evolved is to ensure that a valid proof as to the date of execution is provided. In case the plaintiff doubted the validity of the notarization of Ex.B1, it could have certainly summoned the concerned notary or the register maintained by him. No such steps were taken. 35. In contrast, Ex.A1 was written on a white paper. If the plaintiff was confident enough and claims that the date put on a white paper constituting Ex.A1, can be treated as valid, there is no reason why the date on the notarized document can be doubted. 36. The notices and other correspondence that emanated from the plaintiff, in fact, provide an intrinsic evidence in this regard. In the plaint itself, it was mentioned that PW1 became aware of the parties availing the services of a notary and the same was mentioned in the notices that were exchanged between the parties. Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 were clear, consistent and certain about the execution of Ex.B1. Except making a bald allegation that Ex.B1 was ante-dated, the plaintiff did not prove the same. 37. Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 were clear, consistent and certain about the execution of Ex.B1. Except making a bald allegation that Ex.B1 was ante-dated, the plaintiff did not prove the same. 37. Though the learned Single Judge also framed a question about Ex.B1, he too did not bestow his attention to it. Here again, finding was recorded on Ex.B1 by undertaking discussion with reference to Ex.A1. The relevant portion reads as under: "As the main question being whether Ex.B1 is ante-dated, the other evidence as sought to be let in on behalf of the defendants may not have any relevance. Except attacking Ex.A1 on the ground that it has been fabricated on a white paper, absolutely no foundation is laid for such a theory nor there is any material even at this stage to accept the same. In view of the fact that the plaintiff institution is not having sufficient space, there is every justification for it in seeking such additional extent for the purpose of development. It is also to be seen that the theory of signing on white paper is a later development than coming forward at the very inception and at the first opportunity. The pleading is also quite silent on behalf of the defendants. Any such evidence without a foundation in the pleading may not have any relevance. In the circumstances, the Court below has given detailed reasons on appreciation of the entire evidence. On a perusal of the same and the entire record, I do not find any varying reasons to differ with the same. Accordingly, it has to be held that the Court below has rightly found that Ex.B1 is ante-dated whereas Ex.A1 is true, valid and enforceable. In view of the above, it has to be held that the plaintiff is entitled to seek specific performance of Ex.A1." Therefore, it emerges that the plaintiff failed to establish that Ex.B1 was ante-dated. 38. Paint No. 4: Now remains last point. It pertains to the entitlement of the plaintiff to claim the relief of specific performance of an agreement of sale. The discussion on this point needs to be taken on the premise that the plaintiff has not only proved that Ex.A1 is validly executed, but also Ex.B1 was ante-dated. In the context of granting relief of specific performance, execution of an agreement is not end of it. The discussion on this point needs to be taken on the premise that the plaintiff has not only proved that Ex.A1 is validly executed, but also Ex.B1 was ante-dated. In the context of granting relief of specific performance, execution of an agreement is not end of it. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act places an obligation on the plaintiff in such a suit to plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. Even where no specific issue is framed on this behalf, it is a requirement under law. CPC also insists that a specific clause must be contained in the plaint, in that behalf. 39. In the instant case, plaintiff did state in the plaint that it is always ready and willing to perform its part of contract. It has already been mentioned that the plaintiff is a society and has its own Managing Committee. It is only when the committee takes a decision to purchase the property and take further steps, that the transaction on its behalf would gain acceptability and legality. PW1 claimed that he is the Secretary of the plaintiff at the relevant point of time. Not a single document under which the plaintiff authorized PW1 was filed. In the cross-examination, the following was elicited from him. "There are 11 persons of the plaintiff society. I quoted the price of the purchase for the society on the same day. By then, I had not consulted with the other members of the society. I quoted the price taking the entire responsibility on my shoulders. No resolution has so far been passed by the plaintiff society to purchase the property. We are maintaining accounts. But they have never been audited and none of the authorities of Endowment Department inspected it. The Endowment Department has no concern with it. On the date of Ex.A1, I paid Rs.1,000/-. The agreement was written and the amount paid on the same day when the talks were finalised in the same sitting. Ex.A1 was written at about 3 or 4 p.m. D1 and Hanumantha Rao had come at one and the same time. I could not inform the President as he was not in the Village. But, I could not inform even the joint Secretary. I paid my own amount towards the advance. Ex.A1 was written at about 3 or 4 p.m. D1 and Hanumantha Rao had come at one and the same time. I could not inform the President as he was not in the Village. But, I could not inform even the joint Secretary. I paid my own amount towards the advance. I did not withdraw any amount of the plaintiff temple, as, by them also the amount was deposited in the State Bank of India, Tangutur and Syndicate Bank, Tangutur. Till now also, I have not reimbursed my amount from the plaintiff society. We have not given any notice to D1 before April, 1979." 40. From this, it is clear that the entire show was run by PW1 without the concern of the plaintiff-society. Neither he kept the plaintiff informed about the transaction before it was entered into nor did he inform them after the suit was filed. The very initiation of the suit on behalf of the plaintiff was incompatible. 41. In none of the notices issued by PW1, he offered to pay the balance of consideration. He was cross-examined in the year 1985 i.e. four years after the suit was filed. As regards the readiness to pay the balance of consideration, this is what he said in the cross-examination: "We have not given any notice to D1 before April, 1979. Though we were not having any amount by April, 1979, in the Bank or with us ready, but we had already taken promises from the Devotees. I was having a cash of Rs. 5,6 thousand with me. If needed, I was prepared to dispose of my land and invest that money in purchasing the land for the temple. Though I was having a ready cash of Rs. 5,6 thousand only, but I have got credit in the society and could raise the required amount." 42. No other evidence is necessary to form an opinion that let alone the plaintiff, even P.W.1 was not possessed of the means to pay the balance of consideration. Mere taking of plea as to readiness is not sufficient. The same must be established to the satisfaction of the Court. 43. Unfortunately, neither the trial Court nor the learned Single Judge of this Court bestowed their attention to this important and pivotal aspect. Mere taking of plea as to readiness is not sufficient. The same must be established to the satisfaction of the Court. 43. Unfortunately, neither the trial Court nor the learned Single Judge of this Court bestowed their attention to this important and pivotal aspect. It needs no mention that the relief of specific performance is equitable and discretionary in nature and it is only when the plaintiff proves all the ingredients stipulated under law to the satisfaction of the Court, that the relief can be granted. The plaintiff through PW1 has miserably failed in this behalf. Neither there are bona fides in the suit nor any truth in the contention of PW1. The name of the plaintiff was unnecessarily drawn into picture, on account of over-enthusiasm exhibited by PW1. He is not entitled for the relief of specific performance. 44. The alternative relief of refund of the advance with damages was also prayed for. Once DW1 admitted her signature on Ex.A1, the contents thereof including the payment of advance of Rs. 1,000/- can be taken as true, notwithstanding the patent illegality from which the said document suffered. We are of the view that alternative relief of refund of the amount together with interest can be granted. Since the amount was paid way back in the year 1978, any investment of that amount in purchasing of even a small bit of land at that time would have resulted in ownership of a plot, whose present value would be around Rs. 2,00,000/- by this time. 45. We, therefore, allow the LPA setting aside the decree passed by the trial Court in OS No. 98 of 1981. In its place, alternative relief of refund of the advance is granted for a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs only). The said amount would carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of this judgment, till the date of realization. There shall be no order as to costs. 46. The miscellaneous petitions filed in this appeal shall also stand disposed of.