Judgment : G.Chandraiah, J. 1. Challenging the order, dated 14.11.2013 passed in W.P.M.P.No.39506 of 2013 in W.P.No.31789 of 2013, whereunder the learned Single Judge granted interim suspension of the appointment of the 4th respondent to the post of Deputy Registrar, made in pursuance of the Notification dated 13.02.2013, the present writ appeal is filed. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that since the 4th respondent is eligible, he has been selected and appointed as the Deputy Registrar; and the interim stay granted by the learned Single Judge created administrative inconvenience; and hence the writ appeal is filed. 4. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent, who is the petitioner in the writ petition, would submit that the impugned order passed in the W.P.M.P. No. 39506 of 2013 is only an interlocutory order and as such the writ appeal is not maintainable under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a citation reported in Midnapore Peoples’ Co-operative Bank Ltd., & others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others (AIR 2006 Supreme Court 2190). 5. The learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent would submit that in pursuance of the notification referred in the writ petition, the writ petitioner was not selected to the post of Deputy Registrar and the allegation made by the writ petitioner that the 4th respondent has not fulfilled the requisite qualifications, is not correct and untenable and he further submits that the interlocutory order has been passed and the 1st respondent in the writ appeal is one of the applicant along with the respondents 3 to 6, for the post of Deputy Registrar in the University of Hyderabad pursuant to the notification referred to in the affidavit and he obtained the impugned order of interim suspension and hence the same may be set aside. 6. From the material on record, it could be seen that pursuant to the notification, 4th respondent was selected to the post of Deputy Registrar. Questioning the appointment of the respondents 4 to 6, the writ petition was filed by the writ petitioner mainly contending that the 4th respondent does not fulfill the requisite qualification therefore he is not entitled to the post of Deputy Registrar. Questioning the appointment of the respondents 4 to 6, the writ petition was filed by the writ petitioner mainly contending that the 4th respondent does not fulfill the requisite qualification therefore he is not entitled to the post of Deputy Registrar. Counter has been filed by the respondent University contending that the 4th respondent is qualified, therefore, he has been appointed. The merits of the respective contentions need to be gone into during the course of hearing. The learned Single Judge passed only interlocutory order against which the present appeal is filed under Section 15 of the Letters Patent. 7. It is to be noticed that by passing the present interim order, the learned Single Judge has not finally decided the rights and obligations of the parties. Hence we are of the considered view that the present writ appeal is not maintainable. The Apex Court in the decision referred to supra while interpreting the word “Judgment” occurring in Section 15 of the Letters Patent held that interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of case which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice to a parties, but which do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties, are not “Judgment” for the purpose of filing appeals provided under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The relevant portion of the judgment at paragraph Nos.12, 15 and 16 are extracted as under for better appreciation: 12. We will next consider as to whether an intra-court appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent was available against the interlocutory order dated 20-11-1998 containing the directions on merits of the dispute. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for an appeal from a “judgment” of a Single Judge in exercise of original jurisdiction to a Division Bench. In Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania the scope of clause 15 of the Letters Patent was considered. This Court held: “The concept of a judgment as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure seems to be rather narrow and the limitations engrafted by sub-section (2) of Section 2 cannot be physically imported into the definition of the word ‘judgment’ as used in clause 15 of the Letters Patent because the Letters Patent has advisedly not used the terms ‘order’ or ‘decree’ anywhere. The intention, therefore, of the givers of the Letters Patent was that the word ‘judgment’ should receive a much wider and more liberal interpretation than the word ‘judgment’ used in the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time, it cannot be said that any order passed by a trial Judge would amount to a judgment; otherwise there will be no end to the number of orders which would be appealable under the Letters Patent. It seems to us that the word ‘judgment’ has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader and not a narrower sense. In other words, a judgment can be of three kinds: (1) A final judgment.— * * * (2) A preliminary judgment.— * * * (3) Intermediary or interlocutory judgment.—Most of the inter-locutory orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43 Rule 1 and have already been held by us to be judgments within the meaning of the Letters Patent and, therefore, appealable. There may also be interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order 43 Rule 1 but which also possess the characteristics and trappings of finality in that, the orders may adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding. Before such an order can be a judgment the adverse effect on the party concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote. (SCC pp. 55-56, para 113) * * * … in other words every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. (SCC p. 57, para 115) * * * … any discretion exercised or routine orders passed by the trial Judge in the course of the suit which may cause some inconvenience or, to some extent, prejudice to one party or the other cannot be treated as a judgment otherwise the appellate court (Division Bench) will be flooded with appeals from all kinds of orders passed by the trial Judge. … … the interlocutory order in order to be a judgment must contain the traits and trappings of finality either when the order decides the questions in controversy in an ancillary proceeding or in the suit itself or in a part of the proceedings. (SCC p. 58, para 119)” 15. Interim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of a case, fall under one or the other of the following categories: (i) Orders which finally decide a question or issue in controversy in the main case. (ii) Orders which finally decide an issue which materially and directly affects the final decision in the main case. (iii) Orders which finally decide a collateral issue or question which is not the subject-matter of the main case. (iv) Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment. (v) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties. 16. The term “judgment” occurring in clause 15 of the Letters Patent will take into its fold not only the judgments as defined in Section 2(9) CPC and orders enumerated in Order 43 Rule 1 CPC, but also other orders which, though may not finally and conclusively determine the rights of parties with regard to all or any matters in controversy, may have finality in regard to some collateral matter, which will affect the vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties. Interlocutory orders which fall under categories (i) to (iii) above, are, therefore, “judgments” for the purpose of filing appeals under the Letters Patent. On the other hand, orders falling under categories (iv) and (v) are not “judgments” for the purpose of filing appeals provided under the Letters Patent. (Emphasis added) At the cost of the repetition, it is to be noticed that the learned Single Judge has not decided the rights and obligations of the parties and only passed interlocutory orders and hence in our considered view the same does not satisfy the trappings of the judgments as defined under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and it will be appropriate for the appellant to file vacate petition. Accordingly, the writ appeal is disposed of with the said observation. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed.