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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 1132 (MP)

S. D. Tiwari v. Union of India

2013-09-18

K.K.TRIVEDI

body2013
JUDGMENT This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the two petitioners is directed against the order dated 10/17.10.2012 passed by the respondent No. 1-Union of India, in Ministry of Civil Aviation, whereby a direction is given to fix the seniority of the merged employees and officers of International Airports Authority of India (hereinafter referred to as IAAI for brevity) and National Airports Authority (hereinafter referred to as NAA for brevity) from the date on which the common Recruitment and Promotion Regulations in Airports Authority of India (hereinafter referred to as AAI for short), were implemented. It is contended that there was a difficulty in fixing the seniority of the merged officers and employees of AAI and, therefore, the matter was referred to the Central Government. Three committees were constituted in succession, which gave their reports. The third Committee at the last gave a definite finding as to why the seniority of such merged employees should be determined with effect from the year 2009. The Central Government though accepted the entire recommendations made by the third Committee, yet the report of the second Committee was accepted only for the purposes of prescribing a cut off date for determination of the seniority. Since this was done without any justified reason, the impugned order to this extent was liable to be quashed. It will be necessary to give brief history of this dispute which was pending before the respondents for a long time, which is summarised hereinafter. 2. The Parliament has enacted an Act known as Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as 1994 Act for brevity) for the purposes of establishing an authority to look after all activities related to construction and management of International and domestic airports, establishing air traffic control and air space management. Prior to the establishment of the AAI by virtue of 1994 Act, such activities were being controlled by Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA). The object of making of such an Act was the need to meet out the growing operational activities as well as heavy investment for modernisation of airports, which was difficult to be controlled by DGCA. With this object, the 1994 Act was made. Section 3 of the Act deals with constitution and incorporation of the authority for the purposes of the Act, which reads thus:- “3. With this object, the 1994 Act was made. Section 3 of the Act deals with constitution and incorporation of the authority for the purposes of the Act, which reads thus:- “3. Constitution and incorporation of the Authority.-(1) With effect from the appointed day, the Central Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute an authority to be called the Airports Authority of India. (2) The Authority shall be a body corporate by the name aforesaid having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power, subject to the provisions of this Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property both movable and immovable, and to contract and shall be the said name sue and be sued. (3) The Authority shall consist of- (a) a Chairperson to be appointed by the Central Government; (b) the Director General of Civil Aviation, or an officer not below the rank of the Deputy Director General of Civil Aviation, to be appointed by the Central Government, ex officio; (c) not less than eight and not more than fourteen members to be appointed by the Central Government. (4) The Chairperson shall be a whole-time member and other members referred to in clause (c) of subsection 3) may be appointed as whole-time or part-time members as the Central Government may think fit. (5) The Chairperson and the members referred to in clause (c) of sub-section (3) shall be chosen from among persons who have special knowledge and experience in air transport or any other transport services, industry, commercial or financial matters or administration and from among persons who are capable of representing organisations of workers and consumers. 3. The purpose of such a constitution of the AAI and its manner of function indicates that the Chairperson of the authority was though appointee of the Central Government, but he alone was not the sole authority to take a decision. Any decision was required to be taken only and only by the AAI. The functions of the AAI are enumerated in Chapter-III Section 12 of the 1994 Act, which nowhere describe that only the Chairperson of the AAI would be required to discharge these functions. Meaning thereby since the AAI is a body, corporate having perpetual succession and common seal, was the only AAI to take any decision in the matter relating to functions of the authority. Meaning thereby since the AAI is a body, corporate having perpetual succession and common seal, was the only AAI to take any decision in the matter relating to functions of the authority. To some extent, the Parliament gave power to the Central Government under Section 40 of the 1994 Act, to issue directions which for the convenience is reproduced as hereunder:- “40. Power of the Central Government to issue directions.-(1) Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of this Act, the Authority shall, in the discharge of its functions and duties under this Act, be found by such directions on questions of policy as the Central Government may give in writing to it from time to time. Provided that the Authority shall, as far as practicable, be given opportunity to express its views before any direction is given under this sub-section. (2) The decision of the Central Government whether a question is one of policy or not shall be final. (3) The Central Government may, from time to time, issue directions to the Authority regarding the discharge of any functions to it under clause (e) of subsection (3) of section 12 and the Authority shall be bound to comply with such directions.” 4. At the same time, there was power given to make Rules under Section 41 of the 1994 Act. The AAI was also given power under Section 42 of the said Act to make Regulations, which contemplates a condition that any regulation made by the AAI under this Section will have no effect until it has been approved by the Central Government and published in the official Gazette. This provision of Section 42 is also relevant as much emphasis has been placed by the petitioners on these powers and making of regulations, therefore, the same is reproduced hereunder for the purposes of convenience:- “42. Power to make regulations.-(1) The Authority may make regulations not inconsistent with this Act and the rules made thereunder to provide for all matters for which provisions is necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act. Power to make regulations.-(1) The Authority may make regulations not inconsistent with this Act and the rules made thereunder to provide for all matters for which provisions is necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such regulations may provide for- (a) the time and places of the meetings of the Authority and the procedure to be followed for the transaction of business including the quorum at such meetings under sub-section (1) section 8; (b) the conditions of service and the remuneration of officers and other employees to be appointed by the Authority under sub-section (2) of section 10; (c) the construction of residential accommodation for the officers and other employees appointed by the Authority under clause (e) of subsection (3) of section 12; (d) the storage or processing of goods in any warehouse established by the Authority under clause (g) of sub-section (3) of section 12 and the charging of fees for such storage or processing; (e) the contracts or class of contracts which are to be sealed with the common seal of the Authority and the form and manner in which a contract may be made by the Authority under sub-section (1) of section 21; (f) the custody and restoration of lost property and the terms and conditions under which lost property may be restored to the persons entitled thereto under section 34; (g) the disposal of any lost property in cases where such property is not restored; (h) securing the safety of aircraft, vehicles and persons using the airport or civil enclave and preventing danger to the public arising from the use and operation of aircraft in the airport or civil enclave; (i) preventing obstruction within the airport or civil enclave for its normal functioning; (j) prohibiting the parking or waiting of any vehicle of carriage within the airport or civil enclave except at places specified by the Authority; (k) prohibiting or restricting access to any part of the airport or civil enclave; (l) preserving order within the airport or civil enclave and preventing damage to property therein; (m) regulating or restricting advertising within the airport or civil enclave; (n) requiring any person, if so directed by an officer appointed by Authority in this behalf, to leave the airport or civil enclave or any particular part of the airport or civil enclave; and (o) generally for the efficient and proper management of the airport or civil enclave. (3). Any regulation made under any of the clause (h) to (o) (both inclusive) of sub-section (2) may provide that a contravention thereof shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees and in the case of a continuing contravention with an additional fine which may extend of twenty rupees for every day during which such contravention continues after conviction for the first such contravention. (4). No regulation made by the Authority under this section shall have effect until it has been approved by the Central Government and published in the Official Gazette. (5). Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the first regulations under this Act shall be made by the Central Government and shall have effect on being published in the Official Gazette. (6). The first regulations framed under sub-section (5) shall remain in force until such time the Authority has made regulations and they are published in the Official Gazette.” 5. The Central Government has framed certain regulations in exercise of its power and the regulations are known as the Airports Authority of India (General Conditions of Service and Remuneration of Employees) Regulations 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the 2003 Regulations for brevity). These Regulations have been framed in exercise of the aforesaid power and are not in dispute. 6. Before coming into force of the 1994 Act, the IAAI was established under the Act known as the International Airports Authority Act 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 1971 Act for short). The NAA was established under the National Airports Authority Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the 1985 Act for short). On account of making of 1994 Act both these Acts of 1971 and 1985 were repealed under Section 46 of the 1994 Act by the Parliament. The safeguard was under sub-section (2) of Section 46 with respect to the act done under the aforesaid repealed Act. This is how the services of the employees and officers of the IAAI and NAA were saved as it is not in dispute that all such employees and officers of both the authorities were appointed in exercise of power conferred under the relevant Regulations or Rules made by IAAI and NAA. This is how the services of the employees and officers of the IAAI and NAA were saved as it is not in dispute that all such employees and officers of both the authorities were appointed in exercise of power conferred under the relevant Regulations or Rules made by IAAI and NAA. Though a final merger of the two establishments or the authorities had taken place by virtue of coming into force of the 1994 Act and after publication of the Notification, but there was difficulty in determining the seniority and service benefits of the employees of both the organisations, which ultimately resulted in disputes before the AAI. It seems that there were different sets of Rules and there were different conditions of service as well, therefore, facing these difficulties, the matter was referred to the Central Government by the AAI. Precisely, this was felt necessary because of provisions of Section 18 of the 1994 Act, which prescribes provisions in respect of officers and other employees of IAAI and NAA. Since it has to be seen whether such provisions were to be implemented in the manner indicated or as claimed, it would be necessary to look into those provisions and, therefore, provisions of Section 18 of the 1994 Act is reproduced:- “18. Provisions in respect of officers and other employees of the International Airports Authority and the National Airports Authority.- (1) (a) Every officer or other employee of the International Airports Authority serving in its employment immediately before the appointed day shall, in so far as such officer or other employee is employed in connection with the undertaking which has vested in the Authority by virtue of this Act, becomes, as from the appointed day, an officer or, as the case may be, other employee of the International Airports Division of the Authority. (b) Every officer or other employee of the National Airports Authority serving in its employment immediately before the appointed day shall, in so far as such officer or other employee is employed in connection with the undertaking which has vested in the Authority by virtue of this Act, becomes, as from the appointed day, an officer, as the case may be, other employee of the National Airports Division of the Authority. (2) Every officer or other employee of the International Airports Authority or the National Airports Authority who becomes an officer or, as the case may be, other employee of the Authority, as referred to in sub-section (1), shall hold his office or service therein by the same tenure, at the same remuneration, upon the same terms and conditions, with the same obligation and with the same rights and privileges as to leave, passage, insurance, superannuation scheme, provident fund, other funds, retirement, pension, gratuity and other benefits as he would have held under the International Airport Authority or, as the case may be, the National Airports Authority if its undertaking had not vested in the Authority and shall continue to do as an officer or other employee, as the case may be, of the Authority or until the expiry of a period of one year from the appointed day if such officer or other employee opts not to be the officer or other employee of the Authority within such period: Provided that if the Authority thinks it expedient to extend the period so fixed, it may extend the same up to a maximum period of one year. (3) Where an officer or other employee of the International Authority or the National Airports Authority opts under sub-section (2) not to be in the employment or service of the Authority in which the undertakings of the International Airports Authority and the National Airports Authority have vested, such officer or other employee shall be deemed to have resigned from the respective cadre. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) or in any other law for the time being in force, the transfer of the services of any officer or other employee of the International Airports Authority or the National Airports Authority to the Authority shall not entitle such officer or other employee to any compensation under this Act or under any other law for the time being in force and no such claim shall be entertained by any Court, Tribunal or other authority. (5) The officers and other employees who have retired before the appointed day from the service of the International Airports Authority or the National Airports Authority and are entitled to any benefits, rights or privileges shall be entitled to receive the same benefits, rights or privileges from the Authority which the undertaking of the International Airports Authority and the National Airports Authority have vested. (6) The trusts of the Provident Fund and Group Insurance and Superannuation Scheme of the International Airports Authority or the National Airports Authority and any other bodies created for the welfare of officers or employees would continue to discharge their functions in the Authority as was being done hitherto in the International Airports Authority or the National Airports Authority and tax exemption granted to Provident Fund or Group Insurance and Superannuation Scheme would continue to be applied to the Authority. (7) After the expiry of the period of one year, or the extended period, as referred to in sub-section (2), all the officers and other employees transferred and appointed to the Authority, other than those opting not to be the officers or employees of the Authority within such period, shall be governed by the rules and regulations made by the Authority in respect of the service conditions of the officers and other employees of the said Authority.” 7. When the matter travelled to the Central Government, the Central Government thought it better to constitute a Committee to seek guidance as to how such a dispute be resolved. This is how the first Committee was constituted and the said Committee was referred the issue to give its opinion. The Committee report is not available on record, but it appears that the Committee constituted under the Chairmanship of Justice J.D. Jain gave its report. Again certain difficulties were found in implementing the said Scheme of fixation of seniority after merger and sometime in the year 2005, another Committee headed by S. Krishnamurthy was constituted in the year 2005. It is pertinent to mention here that though Justice Jain Committee gave the report long back, but it was not implemented and in the meanwhile 2003 Regulations were made by the Central Government. It is not known or explained as to why action was not taken on the recommendations or what were the difficulties felt by the authorities in implementing those recommendations of Justice Jain Committee. It is not known or explained as to why action was not taken on the recommendations or what were the difficulties felt by the authorities in implementing those recommendations of Justice Jain Committee. However, the Krishnamurthy Committee gave its report on 30.11.2007 precisely fixing a date of fixation of seniority on merger, on coming into force of the Regulations which were framed in the year 2005, by the authority in exercise of its power under Section 42 of the 1994 Act. Again facing with difficulty, yet another Committee of three members headed by Alok Sinha, Joint Secretary of Ministry of Civil Aviation was formed which gave its report on 28.6.2012 again precisely fixing a cut off date for the purposes of determination of seniority in the year 2009, i.e. the date of making an application under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme formulated by the AAI. 8. The dispute arose when these reports were sent to the AAI and again the matter was referred to the Central Government for taking a final decision and, ultimately, a final decision was taken by the Central Government and while approving almost the entire report of the Alok Sinha Committee, only the cut off date for seniority after merger was picked up from the Krishnamurthy Committee report. As has been reflected from the documents placed on record by all the parties, the dispute was continuously raised in different places by the different set of employees in respect of determination of seniority. In some places, even the recommendations made by the Committee were sought to be implemented. In terms of certain directions, the AAI was constrained to maintain different seniority list for employees of IAAI and NAA and was granting them promotion in accordance to their seniority in their respective list. However, after considering all these aspects, since the Central Government has issued the order impugned, as has been indicated herein above for preparation of a common seniority list of all employees and officers of AAI, this order is sought to be challenged in the present petition. 9. However, after considering all these aspects, since the Central Government has issued the order impugned, as has been indicated herein above for preparation of a common seniority list of all employees and officers of AAI, this order is sought to be challenged in the present petition. 9. It is, vehemently, contended by learned Senior counsel for the petitioners that if upon consideration of a report, the Central Government was of the opinion that the purpose for which Committee is constituted is not fulfilled and the dispute could not to be resolved and a third Committee is constituted, it was not open to the Central Government to ignore the recommendations made by the third Committee. It is the contention that when there was a difficulty faced by the AAI in resolving the dispute, matter was rightly referred to the Central Government for seeking a direction under Section 40 of the 1994 Act. Once a reference was made to the Central Government, the Committees were constituted, and the reason for constituting a third Committee was that Central Government itself was of the opinion that issue was not to be resolved in appropriate manner on the strength of the previous two committee reports. May be that because of the lapse of time after making of report by a Committee, there were substantial changes in the conditions which were examined by the Central Government and, therefore, it was thought better to constitute a third Committee. When the report was made by the Committee, each and every fact was deliberated and categorical suggestion was given that too cut with a purpose to sort out all probable difficulties, suggesting that it would be better to fix the cut off date for determination of inter se seniority from the date of making of an application under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme (hereinafter referred to as VRS for brevity) made by the IAAI. This was thought that it will curtail the chances of any litigation which might have taken place because of the retrospective fixation of seniority and that being so, such a recommendation made was not to be ignored in cryptic manner as has been done by the Central Government by the impugned order. This was thought that it will curtail the chances of any litigation which might have taken place because of the retrospective fixation of seniority and that being so, such a recommendation made was not to be ignored in cryptic manner as has been done by the Central Government by the impugned order. Since these aspects have not been considered, no reasons have been assigned in the order as to why the cut off date for determination of inter se seniority after merger is not to be accepted, such an unreasoned order is liable to be quashed. It is also pointed out that the objections which have been raised in the return filed by the respondents are unsustainable in view of the fact that there is no bar to raise such an issue. Though the AAI may be bound to comply with the said order of the Central Government, but it cannot be enforced illegally against the persons like petitioners and, therefore, such an order is still bad in law and ignoring the preliminary objections raised, the relief claimed by the petitioners is required to be granted. 10. Per contra, it is vehemently contended by learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 that though in the return originally filed, the documents were not placed on record, but by filing an additional affidavit the note sheets have been brought on record indicating that there was complete consideration of all such facts and then the decision is taken by the Central Government. If the reasons are assigned in the note sheet though may not be reflected in the order, as per the law, it cannot be said that the impugned order is non-speaking or unreasoned. It is contended that each and every aspect, the recommendations made by all the three Committees were taken note of and after due deliberation since the decision is taken, no scope of judicial review of such an action of the Central Government is available and, therefore, the order impugned need not be interfered with. It is contended that each and every aspect, the recommendations made by all the three Committees were taken note of and after due deliberation since the decision is taken, no scope of judicial review of such an action of the Central Government is available and, therefore, the order impugned need not be interfered with. While highlighting the facts as recorded in the note sheet, the originals of which were made available in the Court, but the copies of which have already been filed on record by the interveners, it is contended by learned counsel appearing for respondents No. 2 and 3 that there was hardly anything left unconsidered by the Central Government and, therefore, the contentions raised by the petitioners in their petition are misconceived. It is contended that the decision making authority had rightly considered all the aspects, has dealt each and every situation and has decided in accordance to law. It is put forth that though the regulations made by the AAI are not approved and published in Gazette, but the same were accepted, implemented and the benefit of the same was extended even to the persons liked petitioners. After taking advantage of such a regulations, without even calling in question the validity of such regulations, it cannot be said that the determination of inter se seniority from the date of coming into force of those regulations is per se illegal. Thus, it is contended that the entire contentions raised by the petitioners are misconceived and the petition deserves to be dismissed. 11. Learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of interveners, contended that petitioners want to take advantage of both the regulations of the year 2005 as they were also benefited by those regulations and without challenging the validity of those regulations they now want to say that the date of coming into force of the regulations cannot be the date of determination of inter se seniority. The issue relating to VRS adopted by the AAI is meaningless. Those who have opted for VRS had already gone out of the employment after acceptance of their voluntary retirement applications and cannot agitate any matter with respect to any service benefit even if they are granted benefit of seniority on account of the order passed by the Central Government subsequently unless they call in question the order granting permission to voluntary retire. Even otherwise, this would be an issue inter se, the aforesaid employees who have opted for voluntary retirement and AAI and there would not be any question of disadvantage to the persons like petitioners. Those who have taken advantage of the regulations, have gained something, cannot disown the said regulations in such a manner and thus would not be entitled to say that the cut off date for determination of fixation of inter se seniority cannot be fixed on the date of coming into force of such regulations. It is put forth that the entire claim thus made is misconceived and the petition deserves to be dismissed. 12. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 13. The first and foremost question would be what are the rights of employees and officers of the aforesaid two organisations after their merger in one stream under an enactment. This law is well settled as was seen and examined by the Apex Court in the case of S.P. Shivprasad Pipal Vs. Union of India and others [ (1998) 4 SCC 598 ]. The scope of judicial review is very limited in such a case and it is to be seen whether the principle governing equation of post for merger of cadres were strictly followed or not. Whatever the source of recruitment, whatever the procedural requirement for recruitment, whatever the salary and qualification for the post in different organisations or establishment, the purpose of those posts are to be taken into consideration. Only when the different cadres are merged, certain principles have to be born in mind as is observed by the Apex Court in para 5 of the report which read thus:- “5. However, when different cadres are merged certain principles have to be borne in mind. These principles were enunciated in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni (SCR at p. 678) while considering the question of integration of government servants allotted to the services of the new States when the different States of India were reorganized. This Court cited with approval the principles which had been formulated for effecting integration of services of different States. This Court cited with approval the principles which had been formulated for effecting integration of services of different States. These principles are: In the matter of equation of posts, (1) where there were regularly constituted similar cadres in the different integrating units the cadres will ordinarily be integrated on that basis but (2) where there were no such similar cadres, the following factors will be taken into consideration in determining the equation of posts: (a) Nature and dues of a post; (b) Powers exercised by the officers holding a post, the extent of territorial or other charge held or responsibilities discharged; (c) The minimum qualifications, if any, prescribed for recruitment to the post and; (d) The salary of the post. This Court further observed that it is not open to the court to consider whether the equation of posts made by the central Government is right or wrong. This was a matter exclusively within the province of the Central Government. Perhaps the only question the court can enquire into is whether the four principles cited above had been properly taken into account. This is the narrow and limited field within which the supervisory jurisdiction of the court can operate.” 14. Now the question is if after establishment of AAI, the common cadres were prepared in service, how the seniority is to be fixed. This particular aspect was also considered by the Apex Court in the case of S.P. Shiv Prasad Pipal (supra) in paragraph 14 of the report, which read thus:- “The Cadre Review Committee after examining the kinds of duties discharged by these officers decided that since they all worked in the area of labour welfare, it would be desirable that they could widen their experience. This would be possible if the cadres were integrated and the posts were made interchangeable so that the members of the cadre could get a more varied experience in different areas of labour welfare, thus making for a better equipped cadre. Therefore, although the exact nature of work done by the three cadres was different, it would be difficult to say that one cadre was superior or inferior to the other cadre or service.” 15. Therefore, although the exact nature of work done by the three cadres was different, it would be difficult to say that one cadre was superior or inferior to the other cadre or service.” 15. Keeping in view the aforesaid enunciation of law by the Apex Court, it is to be seen whether the date of fixation of inter se seniority would change the nature of date of seniority of the person concerned from the date of initial appointment or not. Again in the case of Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board Vs. M.S. Krishnaswamy and others AIR 2001 SC 2761 ), the Apex Court examined these aspects distinguishing the merger of service after abolition of a particular organisation or establishment in another when the employees of such an organisation were declared surplus, were terminated from service, but after making a policy were absorbed in other organisations, it was categorically held that the fixation of seniority in case of a simple transfer of service from one department to the other department is with reference to the original date of appointment and not with reference to the date of absorption in transferee department. If at all the services of persons like petitioners were discontinued because of abolition of NAA, they would not have been entitled to the seniority of the period of service they have rendered in NAA. None of the employees of IAAI would have granted such a seniority had said authority been abolished and their services have been terminated, but here is the case where two authorities though separately constituted under two different enactments of the Parliament, have been merged in one authority and there are certain protections conferred on such employees under the provisions of Section 18 of 1994 Act. It would have been much better if these aspects have been examined and a decision is taken for implementation of the inter se seniority. This particular observation is made in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of H.S. Vankani and others Vs. State of Gujrat and others AIR 2010 SC 1714 ) wherein, the apex Court in paragraph 25 has held thus:- “25. Seniority is a civil right which has an important and vital role to play in one's service career. Future promotion of a Government servant depends either on strict seniority or on the basis of seniority-cum-merit or merit-cum-seniority etc. State of Gujrat and others AIR 2010 SC 1714 ) wherein, the apex Court in paragraph 25 has held thus:- “25. Seniority is a civil right which has an important and vital role to play in one's service career. Future promotion of a Government servant depends either on strict seniority or on the basis of seniority-cum-merit or merit-cum-seniority etc. Seniority once settled is decisive in the upward march in one's chosen work or calling and gives certainty and assurance and boosts the morale to do quality work. It instills confidence, spreads harmony and commands respect among colleagues which is a paramount factor for good and sound administration. If the settled seniority at the instance of one's junior in service is unsettled, it may generate bitterness, resentment, hostility among the Government servants and the enthusiasm to do quality work might be lost. Such a situation may drive the parties to approach the administration for resolution of that acrimonious and poignant situation, which may consume lot of time and energy. The decision either way may drive the parties to litigative wilderness to the advantage of legal professionals both private and Government, driving the parties to acute penury. It is well known that salary they earn, may not match the litigation expenses and professional fees and may at times drive the parties to other sources of money making, including corruption. Public money is also being spent by the Government to defend their otherwise untenable stand. Further it also consumes lot of judicial time from the lowest court to the highest resulting in constant bitterness among parties at the cost of sound administration affecting public interest. Courts are repeating the ratio that the seniority once settled, shall not be unsettled but the men in power often violate that ratio for extraneous reasons, which at times calls for departmental action. Legal principles have been reiterated by this Court in Union of India and Another Vs. S.K. Goel and others (2007) 14 SCC 641 : ( AIR 2007 SC 1199 : 2007 AIR SCW 1235), T.R. Kapoor v. State of Haryana (1989) 4 SCC 71 : ( AIR 1989 SC 2082 ), Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana, (2003) 5 SCC 604 : ( AIR 2003 SC 2000 : 2003 AIR SCW 1508). S.K. Goel and others (2007) 14 SCC 641 : ( AIR 2007 SC 1199 : 2007 AIR SCW 1235), T.R. Kapoor v. State of Haryana (1989) 4 SCC 71 : ( AIR 1989 SC 2082 ), Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana, (2003) 5 SCC 604 : ( AIR 2003 SC 2000 : 2003 AIR SCW 1508). In view of the settled law the decisions cited by the appellants in G.P. Doval's case, AIR 1984 SC 1527 (supra), Prabhakar and Others case, AIR 1976 SC 1093 G. Deendayalan, R.S. Ajara are not applicable to the facts of the case. 16. Now coming to the decision made by the respondents. The Committee headed by Shri Alok Sinha, gave its report dated 28.6.2012 placed on record as Annex. P/12 with the writ petition. The Committee conducted four meeting and in detail deliberated various factors. In its fourth meeting held on 26.6.2012, the Committee considered all the reports and formulated the question in following manner:- (a) How the merger is to take place (i.e. the principle of merger of seniority) ?; and (b) When the merger should take place (i.e. the date of effect of merger of seniority) ? The principles taken note of by the Committee in answer to give recommendations for the first question is not in dispute as in whole such a recommendation was accepted by the Central Government which was given in paragraph 2.6.3 of the report, which is reproduced for ready reference:- “2.6.3 The principle of 'length of service in the post' for merger of inter-se-seniority contained in the aforementioned two recommendations made by the Jain Committee as well as the Krishnamoorthy Committee is also in line with the policy being followed in the Government in determining seniority on amalgamation/merger of cadres. Accordingly, the Committee decided to recommend adoption of the above principle of merger as per the following proposal (as analysed in detail in the AAMAB Note dated 12.7.2011):- (i) The principle of length of regular service in the common grade subject to maintenance of inter-se-seniority in the grade in the respective division (Metro/Non-Metro) may be adopted for determining the inter-se-seniority of employees in the same grade in the same cadre-discipline in AAI as a whole subject to the following:- (a) Length of regular service will commence from the date of regular appointment to the grade held by an employee of the crucial date of effect of merger of seniority. (b) If the date of appointment to the grade of an employee in a particular division is the same as that of an employee in an another division, then their inter-se-seniority will be determined on the basis of their date of regular appointment in the lower grades and if it is also the same, then it will be decided by their date of birth, I.e. the elder will be senior to the younger. (c) In respect of persons in the same grade in the same cadre/disciplines but in different divisions on the crucial date, if they were appointed to that grade through common merit list, their inter-se-seniority in the common/merged seniority list will be determined on the basis of their position in the merit list prepared at the time of their appointment irrespective of the division to which they belong and not on the basis of their date of joining/date of birth. (d) In respect of persons appointed/promoted to the grade being held by them on the crucial date through the same merit/select list in the same division, if the date of joining of the 'last person' in a group of persons in that list is earlier than his seniors, then the date of joining of that 'last person' will be the deemed date of joining in respect of his seniors in that group and inter-se-seniority on merger in the common grade will be determined with reference to the said deemed date of joining.” 17. The only dispute is with respect to the date of effect of merger i.e. the answer to the second question which is given in paragraph 2.6.4 by the said committee. The only dispute is with respect to the date of effect of merger i.e. the answer to the second question which is given in paragraph 2.6.4 by the said committee. The Committee deliberated, took certain developments subsequently taken into consideration and made a categorical observations in para 2.6.8 of the report saying that the date of merger should be 1st of August 2009 when the date of option prescribed in the special VRS Scheme had come to an end. This particular recommendation was not accepted by the respondent Central Government and only this much of the part of the order is sought to be challenged in the present petition. The law is well settled in this respect as has been referred to herein above. If the seniority is not to be disturbed and total length of service is required to be taken, the date of merger cannot be anything else than the date of coming into force of the Act itself. In fact, the merger had taken place virtually on Notification of the AAI. Therefore, it was incorrectly discussed by Alok Sinha Committee that the date of merger would be something else when specially recommended for grant of seniority taking into account the services rendered. It was also incorrectly considered that by a prospective date of merger, the possibility of future dispute will come to an end or would be minimise. It was irrational to consider that those who have opted for VRS and have already left the establishment of AAI would again wake up and start claiming service benefits in case the retrospective seniority is granted to them. In any case, even if such issue is raised, that was to be considered by the Courts or the authorities only when the VRS is set aside or revoked. In light of the settled law that once an option to retire has been given, duly accepted by the competent authority, it cannot be recalled or challenged, such an observation of the Alok Sinha Committee was misnomer. In light of the settled law that once an option to retire has been given, duly accepted by the competent authority, it cannot be recalled or challenged, such an observation of the Alok Sinha Committee was misnomer. Though these aspects have not been discussed in the note sheet placed by the interveners on record, but after careful examination of the note sheet, it reveals that if from the date of regulation though may not be full regulation in terms of the provisions of the 1994 Act, the date of inter se seniority after the merger is fixed or the benefit of common seniority is extended, it cannot be said that any right of persons like petitioners would be prejudicially affected. Thus, since there is adequate safeguard with respect to the past services rendered by persons like petitioners, since there is sufficient protection granted to the persons like petitioners, it is incorrect to say that even if the date of merger is retrospectively fixed, any adverse impact would fall on them. 18. The aspect of judicial review is very limited, but looking to these circumstances as have come on record even after judicial review, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is no arbitrariness in making such a policy and issuing such an order. 19. In view of the discussions made herein above, there is no scope of interference in the order passed by the respondent No. 1. The petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The interim order stands vacated forthwith. There shall be no order as to costs.