JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, Judge: Petitioners-Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “the employer” for the sake of convenience) has challenged the award, dated 30.12.2011, passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Shimla, (H.P.) in Reference No. 134 of 2007. 2. Essential facts necessary for adjudication of this petition are that the respondent-workman (hereinafter referred to as “the workman” for the sake of convenience), was appointed as Driver in the Corporation on 21.10.1997 on contract basis. He joined his duties on 26.11.1997. He was regularized on 26.11.1998. He was put on probation for a period of two years as per Clause 2(ix) of the appointment letter. He was served with a memorandum on 24.07.1999, to which he filed reply on 06.08.1999. Thereafter, the petitioner was terminated on 29.02.2000. He raised a demand notice on 01.10.2005. The employer filed reply to the same. The workman filed a claim petition vide Annexure P-7. The employer filed reply to the same vide Annexure P-8. The learned Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Shimla, (H.P.) passed the award in favour of the workman on 30.12.2011. 3. Mr. Adarsh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that since the work of the workman was not found satisfactory, his services were terminated as per Clause 2(ix) of the appointment letter on 29.02.2000. He then contended that the learned Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Shimla, H.P. has come to a wrong conclusion that the order, dated 29.02.2000, was not punitive in nature. He also contended that the principles of natural justice have also been followed in this case. 4. Mr. H.K. Paul, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the award, dated 30.12.2011. According to him, since the workman has been removed due to misconduct, a regular inquiry was required to be held by the employer. He then contended that the order, dated 29.02.2000, was stigmatic and punitive in nature. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings carefully. 6. The following reference has been made by the State Government to the Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Shimla, H.P.: “Whether the termination of services of Shri Shyam Lal, S/o Shri Fattu Ram workman by the Divisional Manager, Himachal Road Transport Corporation, Shimla, w.e.f. 29.2.2002 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If Yes, what relief of service benefits the aggrieved workman is entitled as per demand notice (copy enclosed) ?” 7. If Yes, what relief of service benefits the aggrieved workman is entitled as per demand notice (copy enclosed) ?” 7. The workman, as noticed above, was regularized on 26.11.1998. He was put on probation for a period of two years as per Clause 2(ix) of the appointment letter. 8. The workman was issued a memorandum on 24.07.1999. He has filed reply to the same on 06.08.1999. Thereafter, the impugned order was passed on 29.02.2000. The order, dated 29.02.2000, does not cast any stigma. It is also not punitive. It is termination simpliciter. The termination of the petitioner is not on the ground of indiscipline or misconduct. The purpose of putting an employee under probation is to see his suitability for job. The workman has remained absent from duty willfully during the period of probation. He has been given an opportunity to explain his position by issuing a memorandum, dated 24.07.1999. Thereafter, the order, dated 29.02.2000, has been passed. There is no violation of the principles of natural justice. 9. Learned Presiding Judge, Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Shimla, H.P. has not at all discussed how the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 have been violated by issuing order, dated 29.02.2000, though Issue No. 1 was framed to this effect. There is not even a whisper on this account. Rather, the learned Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Shimla, H.P. has travelled beyond the reference made by the State Government. 10. The workman has also preferred an appeal, which was rejected by the competent authority. It was not necessary to hold a regular inquiry against the workman, as argued by Mr. H.K. Paul, learned counsel for the respondent. What has been stated in memorandum, dated 24.07.1999, is that the conduct of the workman during the probation period was not found satisfactory due to his involvement in various acts of omission and commission. The termination of the workman is strictly as per Clause 2(ix) of the appointment letter, since he has not been found suitable by the employer to discharge the duties of Driver. 11. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajit Singh and others Vs. The termination of the workman is strictly as per Clause 2(ix) of the appointment letter, since he has not been found suitable by the employer to discharge the duties of Driver. 11. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajit Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and another (1983) 2 Supreme Court Cases 217 have held that the period of probation gives a sort of locus pententiae to the employee to observe the work, ability, efficiency, sincerity and competence of the servant and if he is found not suitable for the post, the master reserves a right to dispense with his service without anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period. Their Lordships have held as under: “7. When the master servant relation was governed by the archaic law of hire and fire, the concept of probation in service jurisprudence was practically absent. With the advent of security in public service when termination or removal became more and more difficult and order of termination or removal from service became a subject matter of judicial review, the concept of probation came to acquire a certain connotation. If a servant could not be removed by way of punishment from service unless he is given an opportunity to meet the allegations if any against him which necessitates his removal from service, rules of natural justice postulate an enquiry into the allegations and proof thereof. This developing master servant relationship put the master on guard. In order that an incompetent or inefficient servant is not foisted upon him because the charge of incompetence or inefficiency is easy to make but difficult to prove, concept of probation was devised. To guard against errors of human judgment in selecting suitable personnel for service, the new recruit was put on test for a period before he is absorbed in service or gets a right to take post. Period of probation gave a sort of locus poenitentiae to the employer to observe the work, ability, efficiency, sincerity and competence of the servant and if he is found not suitable for the post, the master reserved a right to dispencse with his service without anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period which is styled as period of probation. Viewed from this aspect, the Courts held that termination of service of a probationer during or at the end of a period of probation will not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment because the servant so appointed has no right to continue to hold such a post any more than a servant employed on probation by a private employer is entitled to. (See Purshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, 1958 SCR 828 : ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ). The period of probation therefore furnishes a valuable opportunity to the master to closely observe the work. of the probationer and by the time the period of probation expires to make up his mind whether to retain the servant by absorbing him in regular service or dispense with his service. Period of probation may vary from post to post or master to master. And it is not obligatory on the master to prescribe a period of probation. It is always open to the employer to employ a person without putting him on probation. Power to put the employee on probation for watching his performance and the period during which the performance is to be observed is the prerogative of the employer. 9. Having clearly ascertained the purpose and intendment underlying the concept of probationary period in service jurisprudence, one can confidently say, that it is not absolutely necessary to prescribe a period of probation in each case and the State Government as an appointing authority will have discretion in this matter subject to rules by which appointment is governed, otherwise the rule would be counter-productive. Highly qualified and experienced persons coming into service at a later stage in life like petitioners. Ajit Singh and Rajinder Singh, who after rendering service for a long period of 26 years came to be appointed as direct recruits, would be disinclined to be on a probation for a period of two years. And the appointing authority, in this case the State Government, not any lower officer, noting their worth and value may either wholly dispense with the period of probation or reduce it considerably. If such be the purpose and intendment underlying the concept of probationary period, it is reasonable to infer that in respect of such experienced and highly qualified persons, the appointing authority, the State Government, must have prescribed the period of probation of one year. If such be the purpose and intendment underlying the concept of probationary period, it is reasonable to infer that in respect of such experienced and highly qualified persons, the appointing authority, the State Government, must have prescribed the period of probation of one year. And that is why uniformly in each appointment order, the appointee concerned was told that his period of probation would be one year only. To hold with the respondents that this is a typographical cum-clerical error is such oversimplification as would be doing violence to common sense. We are therefore, of the opinion that in case of each of the appointees the period of probation prescribed was one year only. 12. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishnadevaraya Education Trust and another Vs. L.A. Balakrishna (2001) 9 Supreme Court Cases 319 have held that the services of an employee on probation can be terminated if he is not found suitable for the job without assigning any reason. Their Lordships have held as under: “5. There can be no manner of doubt that the employer is entitled to engage the services of a person on probation. During the period of probation, the suitability of the recruit/appointee has to be seen. If his services are not satisfactory which means that he is not suitable for the job, then the employer has a right to terminate the services as a reason thereof. If the termination during probationary period is without any reason, perhaps such an order would be sought to be challenged on the ground of being arbitrary. Therefore, normally services of an employee on probation would be terminated, when he is found not to be suitable for the job for which he was engaged, without assigning any reason. If the order on the face of it states that his services are being terminated because his performance is not satisfactory, the employer runs the risk of the allegation being made that the order itself casts a stigma. We do not say that such a contention will succeed. Normally, therefore, it is preferred that the order itself does not mention the reason why the services are being terminated. 7. In the instant case, the second order which was passed terminating the services of the respondent was innocuously worded. We do not say that such a contention will succeed. Normally, therefore, it is preferred that the order itself does not mention the reason why the services are being terminated. 7. In the instant case, the second order which was passed terminating the services of the respondent was innocuously worded. Even if we take into consideration the first order which was passed which mentioned that a Committee which had been constituted came to the conclusion that the job proficiency of the respondent was not up to the mark, that would be a valid reason for terminating the services of the respondent. That reason cannot be cited and relied upon by contending that the termination was by way of punishment. 13. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pavanendra Narayan Verma Vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences and another (2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 520 have held that generally speaking when a probationer’s appointment is terminated, it means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in the termination order may be. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. Their Lordships have held as under: “8. Since the decision in Parshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India [ AIR 1958 SC 36 ], Courts have had to perform a balancing act between denying a probationer any right to continue in service while at the same time granting him the right to challenge the termination of his service when the termination is by way of punishment. The law has developed along, apparently, illogical lines in determining when the termination of temporary appointee or probationer's services amounts to punishment. 19. Thus some courts have upheld an order of termination of a probationer's services on the ground that the enquiry held prior to the termination was preliminary and yet other courts have struck down as illegal a similarly worded termination order because an inquiry had been held. Courts continue to struggle with semantically indistinguishable concepts like 'motive' and 'foundation'; and terminations founded on a probationer's misconduct have been held to be illegal, while terminations motivated by the probationer's misconduct have been upheld. The decisions are legion and it is an impossible task to find a clear path through the jungle of precedents, 21. Courts continue to struggle with semantically indistinguishable concepts like 'motive' and 'foundation'; and terminations founded on a probationer's misconduct have been held to be illegal, while terminations motivated by the probationer's misconduct have been upheld. The decisions are legion and it is an impossible task to find a clear path through the jungle of precedents, 21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive, is to see whether prior to the termination, there was (a) a full scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct (c) which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present, the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely, if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld. 29. Before considering the facts of the case before us, one further seemingly intractable area relating to the first test needs to be cleared viz. what language in a termination order would amount to a stigma? Generally speaking, when a probationer's appointment is terminated it means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in the termination order may be. Although strictly speaking, the stigma is implicit in the termination, a simple termination is not stigmatic. A termination order which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationer's appointment is also not stigmatic. The decisions cited by the parties and noted by us earlier also do not hold so. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. 31. Returning now to the facts of the case before us. The language used in the order of termination is that the appellant's "work and conduct has not been found to be satisfactory." These words are almost exactly those which have been quoted in Dipti Prakash Banerjee's case as clearly falling within the class of non-stigmatic orders of termination. It is therefore, safe to conclude that the impugned order is not ex facie stigmatic. 32. We are also not prepared to hold that the enquiry held prior to order of termination turned this otherwise innocuous order into one of punishment. It is therefore, safe to conclude that the impugned order is not ex facie stigmatic. 32. We are also not prepared to hold that the enquiry held prior to order of termination turned this otherwise innocuous order into one of punishment. An employer is entitled to satisfy itself as to the competence of a probationer to be confirmed in service and for this purpose satisfy itself fairly as to the truth of any allegation that may have been made about the employee. A charge sheet merely details the allegations so that the employee may deal with them effectively. The enquiry report in this case found nothing more against the appellant than an inability to meet the requirements for the post. None of the three factors catalogued above for holding that the termination was in substance. punitive exist here. 14. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Progressive Education Society and another Vs. Rajendra and another (2008) 3 Supreme Court Cases 310 have held that while terminating the services of a probationer, the authority is not required to give reasons for termination except to inform employee that his performance was found unsatisfactory. Their Lordships have held as under: “15. On a consideration of the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, the main issue which, in our view, requires determination in this appeal is whether the provisions of Rules 14 and 15, and, in particular sub-Rule (6) of Rule 15 of the MEPS Rules, 1981, would control the powers vested in the Management of the School under Sub-Section (3) of Section 5 of the MEPS Act. The law with regard to termination of the services of a Probationer is well established and it has been repeatedly held that such a power lies with the Appointing Authority which is at liberty to terminate the services of a Probationer if it finds the performance of the Probationer to be unsatisfactory during the period of probation. The assessment has to be made by the Appointing Authority itself and the satisfaction is that of the Appointing Authority as well. The assessment has to be made by the Appointing Authority itself and the satisfaction is that of the Appointing Authority as well. Unless a stigma is attached to the termination or the Probationer is called upon to show cause for any shortcoming which may subsequently be the cause for termination of the Probationer's service, the Management or the Appointing Authority is not required to give any explanation or reason for terminating the services except informing him that his services have been found to be unsatisfactory.” 15. Similarly, their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Kumar Srivastava Vs. State of Jharkhand and others (2011) 4 Supreme Court Cases 447 have held that if while adjudging suitability of the probationer, it is found that the performance of the probationer was not satisfactory and therefore he is not found suitable for job, it is only a termination simpliciter and not removal from service on the grounds of indiscipline or misconduct and such decision cannot be said to be stigmatic or punitive. Their Lordships have held as under: “9. The records placed before us disclose that at the time when the impugned order was passed, the appellant was working as a Probationer Munsif. A person is placed on probation so as to enable the employer to adjudge his suitability for continuation in the service and also for confirmation in service. There are various criteria for adjudging suitability of a person to hold the post on permanent basis and by way of confirmation. At that stage and during the period of probation the action and activities of the appellant are generally under scrutiny and on the basis of his overall performance a decision is generally taken as to whether his services should be continued and that he should be confirmed, or he should be released from service. In the present case, in the course of adjudging such suitability it was found by the respondents that the performance of the appellant was not satisfactory and therefore he was not suitable for the job. 10. The aforesaid decision to release him from service was taken by the respondents considering his overall performance, conduct and suitability for the job. While taking a decision in this regard neither any notice is required to be given to the appellant nor he is required to be given any opportunity of hearing. 10. The aforesaid decision to release him from service was taken by the respondents considering his overall performance, conduct and suitability for the job. While taking a decision in this regard neither any notice is required to be given to the appellant nor he is required to be given any opportunity of hearing. Strictly speaking, it is not a case of removal as sought to be made out by the appellant, but was a case of simple discharge from service. It is, therefore, only a termination simpliciter and not removal from service on the grounds of indiscipline or misconduct. While adjudging his performance, conduct and overall suitability, his performance record as also the report from the higher authorities were called for and they were looked into before any decision was taken as to whether the officer concerned should be continued in service or not. 12. The order of termination passed in the present case is a fall out of his unsatisfactory service adjudged on the basis of his overall performance and the manner in which he conducted himself. Such decision cannot be said to be stigmatic or punitive. This is a case of termination of service simpliciter and not a case of stigmatic termination and therefore there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court.” 16. Accordingly, in view of the discussions and analysis made hereinabove, the writ petition is allowed. The award, dated 30.12.2011, made by the learned Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Shimla, H.P. is set aside. The pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.