Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 1141 (PNJ)

Ram Rattan v. Deputy Commissioner

2013-08-23

RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK

body2013
Judgment Rameshwar Singh Malik, J. The twin important questions of law that fall for consideration of this Court are: (i) Whether the Registrar had any jurisdiction to cancel the sale deed under the Registration Act, 1908? (ii) Whether the impugned order cancelling the sale deeds without issuing notice or granting any opportunity of being heard to the vendees, was sustainable in law? The present writ petition is directed against the order dated 27.12.1993 passed by Deputy Commissioner-cum-Registrar, Sonepat, whereby the four sale deeds dated 17.06.1992 were cancelled by him, under the Registration Act, 1908 ('the Act', for short). The brief facts of the case are that Khewat No. 202/190 was comprising of 988 canals and 17 marlas of land, situated in the village of the parties. This land was owned by the Hindus as well as the Muslims. Consequent upon the partition of the country in 1947, share of the Muslims cosharers, who migrated to Pakistan, was declared as evacuee property and the same came to be vested in the custodian. The Joint Khewat No. 202/190 was partitioned by the Tehsildar (sales) cum-Assistant Collector, Ist Grade, Rohtak, vide order dated 13.03.1989 and the share of Muslims, who migrated to Pakistan was separated from the share of local residents. Mutation No. 2014/1 was sanctioned on 06.04.1989 in favour of custodian department qua the share of Muslims cosharers, who had migrated to Pakistan. However, four Muslims cosharers, namely, Mehandi Hassan and Vakeel, sons of Mauji, Nazar son of Imamdin and Aziz son of Sajawal stayed back and did not migrate to Pakistan. They continued to remain in cultivating possession of the area to the extent of their shares in the joint holding. Due to an apparent inadvertent mistake, shares of the abovesaid four Muslims coshares was also included in the evacuee property without any notice to them, probably on the assumption that they has also migrated to Pakistan. Thereafter, these four Muslims owners sold their shares measuring 63 kanals 18 marlas by four separate sale deeds Annexures P1 to P4 dated 17.06.1992, in favour of the petitioners. Thereafter, these four Muslims owners sold their shares measuring 63 kanals 18 marlas by four separate sale deeds Annexures P1 to P4 dated 17.06.1992, in favour of the petitioners. Petitioners approached the Patwari Halka for entering the mutation in their favour on the basis of abovesaid four sale deeds (Annexure P1 to P4) but the Patwari declined to enter the mutation on the ground that the land purchased by the petitioners had already been sold in open auction to respondents No. 3 and 4 on 18.01.1989. In the interregnum, Assistant Collector, IInd Grade, Sonepat, reported to the Collector on 29.10.1991 that the Tehsildar (Sales) was not competent to partition the joint Khewat and sanction mutation. Permission to review mutation order dated 06.04.1989 was sought and was granted on 09.12.1991. Assistant Collector reviewed and cancelled the mutation order dated 06.04.1989, vide his order dated 27.12.1991. Petitioners submitted application dated 17.04.1993 to the Joint Secretary, Rehabilitation-cum-Settlement Commissioner respondent No. 2 for cancellation of auction sale dated 18.01.1989. Respondent No. 2 allowed this application of the petitioners, vide his order dated 01.02.1994 (Annexure P6) holding that the auction sale was unsustainable. Tehsildar (sales) was directed to send suomoto reference to the competent authority for setting aside the auction sale, made in favour of the private respondents. It was further directed that Assistant Collector, Sonepat would partition the Khewat and the area coming to the share of the custodian would be disposed of in open auction. During this period, private respondents also submitted an application to the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Registrar, Sonepat on 28.09.2013 alleging that they had purchased 75 kanals and 4 marlas of land in open auction on 18.01.1999 and thereafter, Mehandi Hassan etc. had wrongly sold the same land to the petitioners. The Deputy Commissioner-cum-Registrar respondent No.1 cancelled the four sale deeds (Annexure P1 to P4), vide his impugned order dated 27.12.1993 (Annexure P5), without issuing any notice to the petitioners and also without granting any opportunity of being heard. As a consequence of the impugned order (Annexure P5), petitioners were dispossessed and the shares of the land in question was given to the private respondents. Hence, this writ petition. While issuing notice of motion, vide order dated 20.09.1995 a Division Bench of this Court granted statusquo regarding possession. Respondents filed their written statements whereas a separate written statement was filed on behalf of respondent No.2. Hence, this writ petition. While issuing notice of motion, vide order dated 20.09.1995 a Division Bench of this Court granted statusquo regarding possession. Respondents filed their written statements whereas a separate written statement was filed on behalf of respondent No.2. Thereafter, the case was admitted for regular hearing. That is how, this Court is seized of the matter. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners were bonafide purchasers. They purchased the land in question from the rightful owners and for due consideration. Since there was no adverse entry recorded in the relevant revenue record, the title of the vendors of the petitioners, was clear because of which the petitioners purchased the land in question. He further submits that respondent No.1 has no authority or jurisdiction under the Act to cancel the sale deeds (Annexure P1 to P4) because of which the impugned order (Annexure P5) was wholly without jurisdiction. The impugned order was not sustainable in law because the same was passed behind the back of the petitioners without issuing any notice or granting them an opportunity of being heard. Since the impugned order dated 27.12.1993 passed by Deputy Commissioner-cum-Registrar, was a non-speaking and cryptic one, the same may be set aside by allowing the present writ petition. In support of his contention, he relies upon the following judgments: Nyadarsingh Vs. Chensingh, (S) AIR (1955) Madya Bharat 205 (V.42, C.64 Nov.), Nand Singh Vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Ferozpur and others, 1973 PLJ 76 DB, Ram Gopal and others Vs. State of Punjab and others, 2002 (1) PLJ 32 DB, Bhartu Vs. Ram Sarup, 1981 PLJ 204 Full Bench, Jodh Singh Vs. Registrar (Deputy Commissioner), Ambala and others, 1999 (1) R.C.R. (Civil) 441 and Vaid Family Charitable Trust and another Vs. State of Haryana and others, 2011(4) R.C.R. (Civil) 587. Per contra, learned counsel for the private respondents submits that the impugned order was passed as per the true facts of the case, because the land was no more available for sale. It has already been purchased by them in the public auction. The impugned order deserves to be upheld. Supporting the arguments raised by learned counsel for the private respondents, learned counsel for the State contended that the petitioners ought to have been more vigilant, particularly when both the parties were from same village. Petitioners were bound to suffer for their own mistake. The impugned order deserves to be upheld. Supporting the arguments raised by learned counsel for the private respondents, learned counsel for the State contended that the petitioners ought to have been more vigilant, particularly when both the parties were from same village. Petitioners were bound to suffer for their own mistake. He prays for dismissal of the writ petition. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length, after careful perusal of the record of the case and giving thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised, this Court is of the considered opinion that in view of the given fact situation of the case, the present writ petition deserves to be allowed. To say so, reasons are more than one, which are being recorded hereinafter. The material fact of cancellation of four sale deeds (Annexure P1 to P4) is not in dispute. Once it is so, the questions which arises for consideration is whether the Registrar had the jurisdiction to cancel the sale deeds and that too without giving an opportunity of being heard to the beneficiaries of the sale deeds petitioners herein. Since the answer to the question posed above depend on the interpretation of Section 68 of the Act, it would be appropriate to reproduce the same for ready reference and it reads as under: 68. Power of Registrar to superintend and control Sub-Registrars. (1) Every Sub-Registrar shall perform the duties of his office under the superintendence and control of the Registrar in whose district the office of such Sub-Registrar is situate. (2) Every Registrar shall have authority to issue (whether on complaint or otherwise) any order consistent with this Act which he considers necessary in respect of any act or omission of any Sub-Registrar subordinate to him or in respect of the rectification of any error regarding the book or the office in which any document has been registered. A combined reading of the abovesaid provisions of law contained in Section 68 of the Act, would show that the Registrar has got only the superintending control on the Sub-Registrar, who is working under his control. The harmonious interpretation and purposeful construction of Section 68 of the Act is that the Registrar has not been conferred any jurisdiction to cancel the sale deed. The harmonious interpretation and purposeful construction of Section 68 of the Act is that the Registrar has not been conferred any jurisdiction to cancel the sale deed. Any contrary interpretation shall run counter to the legislative intent behind Section 68 of the Act and would also defeat the object sought to be achieved. Having said that, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that the Registrar has got no jurisdiction to cancel the sale deeds and the impugned order cannot be sustained for this reason alone. It is again an admitted position on record that before passing the impugned order (Annexure P5), respondent No.1 did not issue any notice to the petitioners nor they were granted any opportunity of being heard. In this view of undisputed position on record, it is unhesitatingly held that since the basic principles of natural justice have been glaringly violated by respondent No.1, while passing the impugned order, the same cannot be sustained. The golden rule of audi alteram partem stood violated in the present case. Further, any order or decision passed by any authority or Court exercising quasi judicial or judicial powers is expected to be supported with cogent reasons. Whenever rights of the parties are decided, the quasi judicial authorities are always expected to support their orders and decisions with reasons. Any quasi judicial order or judgment without any reason would be like a body without soul. Reasons are the integral part of an order. It is equally important that if an authority does not give any reason in support of its order, it would be difficult for the higher Courts in the hierarchy to appreciate as to what was the reasons, which weighed with the lower authority. Thus, the authority, like respondent No.1 in the present case, was expected to speak in its order as to what were the reasons which weighed with him, at the time of the passing of the impugned order. This is the reason that orders should not be cryptic and non-speaking. If the authorities, after due consideration of the matter, reflect their mind in the orders passed, supporting it with cogent reasons, it would always facilitate the higher authorities in the hierarchy and the Courts to understand and appreciate the matter in a much better way. Since the impugned order is a cryptic and non-speaking order, it cannot be sustained. If the authorities, after due consideration of the matter, reflect their mind in the orders passed, supporting it with cogent reasons, it would always facilitate the higher authorities in the hierarchy and the Courts to understand and appreciate the matter in a much better way. Since the impugned order is a cryptic and non-speaking order, it cannot be sustained. The abovesaid view taken by this Court finds support from a Division Bench judgment of Lahore High Court in Hussain Ali Shah Vs. Sardar Ali Shah and others, AIR 1933 Lahore 786, A judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thota Ganga Laxmi Vs. Government of Andra Pradesh 2011(4) R.C.R.(Civil) 78, Full Bench judgment of Madras High Court in M/s. Latif Estate Line India Ltd. Vs. Mrs. Hadeeja Ammal, 2011 AIR (Madras) 66,a judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Hazi Mohammad Ahmed Vs. State of Andra Pradesh rep. By District Registrar, Hyderabad and others, passed in Writ Petition No. 22160 of 2011 decided on 24.11.2011, a Division Bench judgment of Orissa High Court in Subeda Nayak Vs. Govt. of Orissa, 2008(63) AIC 771, and a judgment of Karnataka High Court in Binny Mill Labour Welfare House Building Cooperative Society Ltd. Vs. D.R. Mruthyunjaya Aradhya, 2008 ILR (Karnataka) 2245. The issue of interpretation of Section 68 of the Act fell for consideration before a Division Bench of Lahore High Court in Hussain Ali Shah's case (supra), as far back as in the year 1933. It was held that Section 68 of the Act confers the power on the Registrar to exercise superintendence and control over the Sub-Registrar, which was his administrative power. Section 68(2) of the Act, does not confer upon the Registrar, the power of cancelling the registration of a document, execution of which was not denied and which has already been registered by the Sub-Registrar. The view taken by the Division Bench of Lahore High Court in Hussain Ali Shah's case (supra) still holds the field. Learned counsel for the respondents failed to put into service any substantive argument in this regard, so as to persuade this Court to take a different view than the one is taken hereinabove. Rule of audi alteram partem is the basic rule of natural justice. Respondent No.1, in the present case, failed to follow the abovesaid basic rule before passing the impugned order. Rule of audi alteram partem is the basic rule of natural justice. Respondent No.1, in the present case, failed to follow the abovesaid basic rule before passing the impugned order. In fact, the Rule of audi alteram partem is an integral part of the concept of rule of law enshrined in our Constitution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court applied this golden principle of natural justice in its celebrated judgment way back in the year 1969 in the case of State of Orissa Vs. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, AIR 1969 S.C. 1269. It was further followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sayeedur Rehman Vs. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1973 S.C. 239 and then in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 S.C. 597 . Similarly, rule of audi alteram partem, as well as the above said judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court were followed in S.L. Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 S.C. 136 , Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. Union of India, AIR 1981 S.C. 818 , Olga Tellis VS. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 S.C. 180 and Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, AIR 1978 S.C. 851 . The abovesaid law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Bina Pani Dei's case (supra) had been consistently followed even in later judgments and no deviation has been found therefrom. Recapitulating the facts of the present case and respectfully following the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as different High Courts of the Country, this Court is of the considered view that both the questions posed at the outset, have to be replied in favour of the petitioners and the same are replied, accordingly. No other argument was raised. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that in the given fact situation of the case, the present writ petition deserves to be allowed. Consequently, impugned order dated 27.12.1993 passed by Deputy Commissioner-cum-Registrar respondent No.1, is hereby ordered to be set aside. Resultantly, the present writ petition stands allowed, however, with no order as to costs.