Judgment : These two writ petitions are disposed of through the common judgment. The writ petitioner is common in both the cases. Methodist Degree College, Hyderabad, represented by its Manager and Correspondent, is the 2nd respondent in both the writ petitions. The Methodist Church is the 1st respondent. In W.P.No.25526 of 1999, which shall be referred to as the former writ petition hereinafter, Commissioner, Collegiate Education of Andhra Pradesh is the 3rd respondent. The Director of Higher Education, Government of Andhra Pradesh and the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Hyderabad, are respondents 4 and 5 in W.P.No.13945 of 2006, which shall be referred to as the latter writ petition hereinafter. 2. In the former writ petition, the petitioner initially claimed for a direction to extend Revised Pay Scales of 1999 to him. It would appear that the Revised Pay Scales were implemented to the petitioner subsequent to the filing of the writ petition. The writ petitioner amended the prayer through orders dated 20-01-2011 in W.P.M.P.No.28773 of 2010 seeking for extending Revised Pay Scales from time to time including the Revised Pay Scales of 2004 and 2009. In the latter writ petition, the orders dated 06-7-2006 retrenching the petitioner are questioned. Dr. P.B.Vijaya Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the retrenchment of the petitioner through orders dated 06-7-2006 is liable to be set aside and the Revised Pay Scales of 2004 and 2009 are liable to be implemented to the petitioner. 3. The petitioner was appointed in 1997-98 as temporary Lecturer on hourly basis. On 02-7-1998, he was appointed temporarily for the academic year 1998-99. While things stood thus, on 21-7-1998, the 2nd respondent-College issued a Notification to fill up the posts of regular Lecturers. The petitioner applied in response to the Notification. He was called for interview to appear before the Board on 04-9-1998. On 11-01-1999, the petitioner was appointed and was put on probation for a period of 3 years. It is the case of the petitioner that Osmania University approved the appointment of the petitioner as a regular candidate through proceedings dated 22-9-1999. He was called for interview to appear before the Board on 04-9-1998. On 11-01-1999, the petitioner was appointed and was put on probation for a period of 3 years. It is the case of the petitioner that Osmania University approved the appointment of the petitioner as a regular candidate through proceedings dated 22-9-1999. Rule 7(4) of the Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Establishment, Recognition, Administration and Control of Institutions of Higher Education) Rules, 1987 (1987 Rules, for short) passed through G.O.Ms.No.29, Education (Rules), dated 05-02-1987, reads: “(4) Payment of salaries to staff: The educational agency of any private institution shall pay salaries to its staff as per the Government scales of pay and by following such procedure as may be prescribed by Government from time to time, in this regard.” On the basis of Rule 7(4) of 1987 Rules, the petitioner claims that he is entitled to the Revised Pay Scales of 2004 and 2009. 4. Separate Rules were issued in respect of Minority Educational Institutions called the Andhra Pradesh Minority Educational Institutions (Establishment, Recognition and Regulation) Rules, 1988 (1988 Rules, for short) issued through G.O.Ms.No.526, Education (Rules), dated 21-12-1988. Rule 8(3) of 1988 Rules reads: “(3) The staff appointed shall be paid salaries at the rates prescribed and by following the procedure prescribed by the competent authorities from time to time.” The Rule did not adumbrate that salary to the staff in a private institution shall be on par with the Government scales of pay. Rule 8(3) of 1988 Rules merely contemplates that the salaries of Minority Educational Institutions shall be at the rates prescribed and shall be paid following the procedure prescribed by the competent authority from time to time. 5. G.O.Ms.No.1, Education (P.S.2), dated 01-01-1994, created The Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Establishment, Recognition, Administration and Control of Schools under Private Managements) Rules, 1993 (1993 Rules, for short). 1993 Rules, from the very title are with reference to the control and administration of Schools and not Colleges or Junior Colleges. The preamble of 1993 Rules reads that the Rules were framed in supersession of various Rules including 1988 Rules issued through G.O.Ms.No.526, dated 21-12-1988, so far as Schools are concerned. In other words, 1993 Rules did not supersede 1988 Rules so far as the Degree Colleges and Junior Colleges are concerned. The preamble of 1993 Rules reads that the Rules were framed in supersession of various Rules including 1988 Rules issued through G.O.Ms.No.526, dated 21-12-1988, so far as Schools are concerned. In other words, 1993 Rules did not supersede 1988 Rules so far as the Degree Colleges and Junior Colleges are concerned. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that 1993 Rules are applicable to Schools whereas 1988 Rules were applicable to all Minority Educational Institutions. In view of the preamble of 1993 Rules, it is evident that 1993 Rules superseded 1988 Rules so far as the Schools are concerned. Consequently, after 1993 Rules came into force, the Minority Educational Institutions other than the Schools are governed by 1988 Rules whereas Minority Educational Institutions so far as Schools are concerned are governed by 1993 Rules. 6. In Frank Authority P.S.E. Assocn. v. Union of India ( AIR 1987 SC 311 ), with reference to Delhi School Education Act, 1973, it was observed that the requirement under Section 10 of the Delhi School Education Act that scales of pay and allowances of employees of recognized private schools shall not be less than the employees of schools run by appropriate Authority does not infringe Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 7. In M.D.Soujanya v. S.V.V.P.V.M.C. Mahila Vidya Peeth ( 2006 (2) ALD 251 ), a learned single Judge of this Court held that Rule 7(4) of 1987 Rules was made in public interest and based on public policy and that the same cannot be waived. The decision in this case was questioned in Writ Appeal No.930 of 2006. The Division Bench agreed with the view expressed by the learned single Judge and held that whether the State extends financial assistance to the private educational institutions or does not so extend, the managements of the private educational institutions are not relieved of their obligation to pay proper salary and other benefits contemplated by law. 8. Later, in W.P.No.19832 of 1999, another learned single Judge of this Court once again held that the employee of a private unaided college is entitled to be paid the scales prescribed by the Government on par with the Government Degree College Lecturers. 9. On the basis of those decisions, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the former writ petition may be allowed. 10. 9. On the basis of those decisions, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the former writ petition may be allowed. 10. Sri P.Veera Reddy, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent-College being the employer of the petitioner, did not question the application of 1988 Rules to the Minority Educational Institutions. He did not even claim that 1993 Rules superseded 1988 Rules so far as the 2nd respondent-College is concerned. He, however, submitted that under Rule 8 of 1988 Rules, the appointment of teaching and non-teaching staff in Minority Educational Institutions shall be made by a Staff Selection Committee constituted by the Representative of the Competent Authority and that the candidates sponsored by Employment Exchange alone shall be eligible for selection by the Staff Selection Committee. He pointed out that Rule 8 of 1988 Rules envisages that in the event the Employment Exchange is not able to sponsor suitable candidates, the concerned Educational Institution may advertise calling for applications from the candidates possessing requisite qualifications. He contended that the petitioner was not sponsored by the Employment Exchange and that the very appointment of the petitioner was not in accordance with Rule 8 of 1988 Rules. 11. It may be recalled that the petitioner has not forced himself upon the 2nd respondent-College. In response to a Notification dated 21-7-1998, the petitioner was called to interview and was interviewed on 04-9-1998. He was subsequently appointed and was put on probation with effect from 11-01-1999. I am afraid that the 2nd respondent-College and the 1st respondent-Management cannot take advantage of their own lapse in not calling candidates from the Employment Exchange and deny the benefits to the petitioner. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 submitted that the respondents 1 and 2 never intended to appoint the petitioner as a permanent candidate, so much so, they did not follow the preliminary part of Rule 8 of 1988 Rules. I am afraid that the respondents 1 and 2 are trying to approbate and reprobate at one and the same time. Having appointed the petitioner as a Lecturer and having put the petitioner on probation for a period of 3 years, it would not lie in the mouths of the respondents 1 and 2 that they never intended to appoint the petitioner on a permanent basis. Having appointed the petitioner as a Lecturer and having put the petitioner on probation for a period of 3 years, it would not lie in the mouths of the respondents 1 and 2 that they never intended to appoint the petitioner on a permanent basis. The contention of the respondents 1 and 2 that the petitioner was not appointed in accordance with the Rules and Regulations and that the petitioner was not appointed on permanent basis, so much so, Rule 8(3) of 1988 Rules would not apply to the petitioner, therefore, cannot be accepted and is accordingly rejected. 13. As an alternative defence, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 contended that the salaries have not been prescribed so far by the competent Authority and that the petitioner consequently cannot seek for the scale on par with other Government Lecturers. As long as no scale is specially provided for the teaching and non-teaching staff of the Minority Educational Institutions, it has to be assumed that they are entitled to the same Scale of Pay as the teaching and non-teaching staff of other Government Institutions. Consequently, the relief that the petitioner seeks through the 1st writ petition deserves to be granted directing the respondents to implement Revised Scales of Pay to the petitioner as and when such Scales come into force. 14. So far as the 2nd writ petition is concerned, the petitioner passed NET and SLET and also holds Ph.D. in Telugu. However, recording that there was no sufficient workload, the petitioner was retrenched through proceedings dated 06-7-2006. Interim orders were passed by this Court on 08-7-2006 suspending the order of retrenchment. The petitioner consequently has been continuing in service. 15. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of retrenchment was passed without prior approval under Section 83 of the Education Act, 1982 (the Act, for short). Section 83 of the Act dealing with the retrenchment of employees reads: “Where retrenchment of any employee is rendered necessary by the management or competent authority consequent on any change relating to education or course of instruction or to any other matter, such retrenchment may be, effected with the prior approval of the competent authority or the next higher authority, as the case may be.” 16. Such retrenchment, as already noticed, under Section 83 of the Act is with the approval of the competent Authority or the next higher Authority, as the case may be. Section 79 of the Act dealing with dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or suspension of the employees of private institutions, however, has no application as this is not a case of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank nor is it a case of suspension. 17. The 1st question in this context is whether a Writ would lie against a private educational institution. In VasaviCollegeof Engineering vs. A.Suryanarayana ( 1991 (3) ALT 335 ), a Division Bench of this Court observed that a writ petition is maintainable against recognized private educational institutions whether such institutions were admitted to grant-in-aid or otherwise. The Division Bench opined that a teacher of such an institution could seek appropriate remedy through a writ petition. Therefore, there is no doubt that these writ petitions against the 1st and the 2nd respondents are maintainable. 18. Regarding the condition envisaged by Section 83 of the Act that prior approval of the competent Authority is needed to retrench an employee, it was held in E.UDDANDA RAMAIAH vs. V.R.S. AND Y.R.N. COLLEGE (1995 (2) An.W.R. 146) that prior approval of the competent Authority is a condition precedent for terminating the services of regular or temporary employees. 19. In R.Akkulaiah v. Government of A.P. ( 1996 (3) ALD 8 ), the services of a teacher working in an unaided section were terminated when the section has been closed down by the management. The Regional Joint Director of School Education set aside the termination order as prior approval was not obtained from the competent Authority for such termination. The view of the Regional Joint Director was confirmed by the High Court holding that in view of Section 83 of the Act, retrenchment/termination of the services of a teacher can be with the prior approval of the competent Authority only. 20. In W.P.No.14093 of 1999, a learned single Judge of this Court passed orders on 17-4-2008 that the termination of the services of a Junior Lecturer in Civics without following the procedure required under Sections 79 or 83 of the Act is arbitrary and illegal. This order was confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court through orders dated 17-7-2008 in W.A.No.723 of 2008. 21. This order was confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court through orders dated 17-7-2008 in W.A.No.723 of 2008. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the 2nd respondent-College, in fact, approached the competent Authority for permission and failed to obtain permission from the competent Authority. The 2nd respondent-College herein filed W.P.No.16229 of 2008 seeking a direction to the competent Authority to grant approval for the retrenchment of the petitioner herein. The writ petition was disposed of directing the competent Authority to consider the representation of the 2nd respondent-College herein to accord approval. The 2nd respondent-College, however, was not granted any approval to retrench the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in this background considered that the retrenchment of the petitioner is in violation of Section 83 of the Act and is not permitted. 22. The learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 pointed out that there was no vengeance on the part of the respondents 1 and 2 to victimize the petitioner. He submitted that the petitioner was a Lecturer in Telugu and that there was no student ready to take Telugu as a subject, so much so, there is no need to continue the petitioner as a Lecturer in Telugu. He pointed out that no one was appointed by the management in the place of the petitioner as a Lecturer. He also submitted that during the period of probation, commencing from 11-01-1999, the petitioner could be removed without prior Notice. He also pointed out that Osmania University did not approve the appointment of the petitioner but merely noted the appointments of various Lecturers including the petitioner. The proceedings of Osmania University dated 22-9-1999 noting the appointments of various teaching staff including the petitioner were in response to the letter of the Principal of the College dated 15-6-1999. The respondents 1 and 2 cannot now contend that Osmania University did not approve the appointments and that the services of the petitioner therefore are liable to be terminated. 23. The learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 also contended that the petitioner did not avail alternative remedy and that he, therefore, is not entitled to seek the relief through a writ petition. He referred to Section 80 of the Act, which provides appeal from an order of punishment imposed by a private management against its employee. 23. The learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 also contended that the petitioner did not avail alternative remedy and that he, therefore, is not entitled to seek the relief through a writ petition. He referred to Section 80 of the Act, which provides appeal from an order of punishment imposed by a private management against its employee. Section 81 of the Act provides for an appeal to Government. Section 89 of the Act is a general provision of appeal. Section 90 of the Act deals with revision to Government. It is contended that the petitioner, who did not avail alternative remedy, cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 contended that the respondents 1 and 2-Institutes are unaided minority institutes. Be that as it may, when the 1st respondent-Management did not follow Section 83 of the Act, the respondents cannot insist that the petitioner ought to have preferred alternative relief. Further, admittedly the unofficial respondents did not pass orders under Section 79(1) proviso but passed orders under Section 83 of the Act by retrenching the services of the petitioner. Consequently, Section 83 of the Act and the decisions referred to squarely apply to the facts of the case. The retrenchment of the petitioner is violative of Section 83 of the Act; the petitioner therefore is entitled to seek for reinstatement. 24. However, whether the petitioner is entitled to back wages is a question that is to be considered. In R.Akkulaiah (5 supra), it was observed that a retrenched teacher would be entitled to back wages if he could establish that he was not gainfully employed elsewhere during the period he was out of service. The respondents claimed that the petitioner was gainfully employed during the period he was out of service. The question of the petitioner being not entitled to back wages does not arise since the petitioner obtained interim directions and continued to be in service. Consequently, the question of back wages does not arise for consideration in this case. 25. Accordingly, both the writ petitions are allowed. The respondents are directed to implement the Pay Scales of 2004 and 2009 and subsequent Pay Scales, if any, to the petitioner together with arrears. The retrenchment of the petitioner through orders dated 06-7-2006 is set aside. Consequently, the question of back wages does not arise for consideration in this case. 25. Accordingly, both the writ petitions are allowed. The respondents are directed to implement the Pay Scales of 2004 and 2009 and subsequent Pay Scales, if any, to the petitioner together with arrears. The retrenchment of the petitioner through orders dated 06-7-2006 is set aside. As the petitioner has been continuing in service, he is entitled to wages during the period of his employment. If the respondents 1 and 2 did not extract work from him, it was at their peril only. Consequently, the impugned retrenchment order in the 2nd writ petition is set aside. The writ petitioner is entitled to wages during the period he continued to be in service, if not paid already. The arrears and wages shall be cleared within 8 (eight) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No special orders are passed regarding the reinstatement of the petitioner since the retrenchment of the petitioner was stayed through an interim order leading to the continuation of the petitioner in service. No costs.