ORDER Menon, J. -- 1. As common questions of law and fact are involved in all these three revisions, which have been filed under section 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam 1983; and, as challenge is made to an order identical in nature passed on 3.2.2003, thethree revision petitions are being decided by this common order. For the sake of convenience, documents and material available in the record of Civil Revision No.579/2003 is being referred to in this order. 2. Applicant M/s. Mahalinga Shetty and Company claims to be a Company registered under the Companies Act with its office in New Delhi. The Company claims to be Engineers, Contractors and carry out various building, construction and engineering activities. Certain contract was granted to the applicant-Company by the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as ‘MPEB’), in the matter of providing RCC Lining in bed and slide slopes of Power Channel and various other works in the matter of excavation of certain work pertaining to Tons Hydro Electric Project. For the present, the particulars of the contract and work are not relevant. Suffice it to say that the applicant-Company filed three reference cases under section 7 of the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Adhiniyam of 1983’). The references were made to the M.P. State Arbitration Tribunal, a statutory Tribunal created under the Adhiniyam of 1983; and, in all the three reference cases certain claims were made, which were ‘disputes’ as contemplated under section 2(1)(d) of the Adhiniyam of 1983. All the petitions seeking the reference were made on 9.2.1987; and, the non-applicant Board appeared in all the cases and filed their written statement/reply on 4.11.1987. At that point of time, no counter claim was raised by the non-applicant/Board. However, for the first time a counter-claim was raised on 30.6.1989. When this counterclaim was filed, it is seen that certain interlocutory proceedings were taking place and on 8.3.1996, a preliminary objection was raised by the applicant-Company with regard to maintainability of the counter claim. 3. The preliminary objection raised by the applicant-Company was on three grounds. However, for the first time a counter-claim was raised on 30.6.1989. When this counterclaim was filed, it is seen that certain interlocutory proceedings were taking place and on 8.3.1996, a preliminary objection was raised by the applicant-Company with regard to maintainability of the counter claim. 3. The preliminary objection raised by the applicant-Company was on three grounds. The first ground was that as the counter-claim is being filed directly in the reference proceedings without raising a demand with the applicant-Company, it cannot be termed as a ‘dispute’ within the meaning of section 2(1)(d) and in the absence of a demand being made, a arbitral dispute will not come into existence, therefore, the counter-claim was not maintainable. The second ground canvassed was that the counter claim is barred by time, as it is filed beyond the period of limitation. The third ground canvassed was that as required under section 7B of the Adhiniyam of 1983, the counter-claim raised without first referring it to the final authority as contemplated under the agreement, was not maintainable. 4. When these objections were filed, the matter was kept pending and finally on 18.9.2000 vide Document No.19, the non-applicant Board issued a notice of demand to the applicant-Company and made a claim with regard to the assertion made in the counter-claim and in paragraph 7 of this notice dated 18.9.2000 – Document No.19, the non-applicant Board made an averment to the effect that ‘as various judgments of the High Court and the Arbitration Tribunal contemplate that before lodging a counter-claim by the department, a notice of demand has to be made to the other party, the notice is being issued to cure the legal deficiency in raising the counter-claim’. When this notice was given, applicant-Company submitted its reply vide Document No.20 on 23.10.2000, and denied the claim made and pressed its objection with regard to the counter-claim. Finally, by the impugned order, when the objections raised by the applicant Company are rejected and the counter-claim is held to be maintainable, all these civil revisions have been filed. As far as the dates and others facts, as is narrated hereinabove, are concerned, there is no dispute and the parties accept the same. 5. Shri V.R. Rao, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the applicant- Company, raised three grounds in support of his contentions. As far as the dates and others facts, as is narrated hereinabove, are concerned, there is no dispute and the parties accept the same. 5. Shri V.R. Rao, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the applicant- Company, raised three grounds in support of his contentions. The first ground canvassed by the learned Senior Advocate was to the effect that to constitute a ‘dispute’ within the meaning of section 2(1)(d) of the Adhiniyam of 1983, and for the purpose of making a reference under section 7, a demand has to be raised and it is only when the demand made is refused or is not acceded to, that an arbitral dispute arises, which gives the cause for seeking a reference. It was submitted by the learned Senior Advocate that in the present case, no such demand was made, on the contrary the counter-claim was directly filed on 30.6.1989, without raising any demand by the Board with the Company and, therefore, as no ‘dispute’ as contemplated under this statute is made out, the counter-claim as was presented on 30.6.1989, was not permissible. In support of this contention, learned Senior Advocate places reliance on two judgments rendered by Division Benches of this Court : Dilip Construction Company Baroda v. Hindustan Steel Limited, Ranchi [ 1973 JLJ 695 = AIR 1973 MP 261 ]; and P.C. Rajput v. State Government of Madhya Pradesh and others [ 1993 JLJ 423 = AIR 1993 MP 107 ]. It was argued by the learned Senior Advocate that in both these cases the law laid down is that without raising a demand, no ‘dispute’ comes into existence, which could be referred for arbitration under the Adhiniyam of 1983. 6. The second ground canvassed by the learned Senior Advocate was that the written statement was filed by the non-applicant Board in reply to the reference made on 4.11.1987 and even though they raised a counter-claim on 30.6.1989, but as the counter-claim was filed without raising any demand, it was for the first time that notice raising the demand was submitted on 18.9.2000 vide Document No.19 and when then this was denied on 23.10.2000 by the applicant-Company, the counter-claim became a claim in accordance with law only on 18.9.2000. It is argued by learned Senior Advocate that for all practical purposes and for admissibility of the counter-claim, the counter-claim was submitted in accordance to law on 18.9.2000 i.e. ... It is argued by learned Senior Advocate that for all practical purposes and for admissibility of the counter-claim, the counter-claim was submitted in accordance to law on 18.9.2000 i.e. ... after a period of more than 11 years and 3 months of filing of the reference and as this delay of 11 years and 3 months is not explained, it is said that the counter-claim was barred by time and should have been rejected. 7. Finally, it was argued by learned Senior Advocate that in view of section 7A read with section 7B of the Adhiniyam of 1983, a counter claim made without referring the matter to the competent final authority for a decision in terms of the work contract, was not maintainable. Referring to the provisions of the agreement in question i.e. ... Clause 26 of the Agreement Ex.D-5, learned Senior Advocate argued that reference of the claim to the competent/final authority as contemplated under this clause is a requirement of law, a condition precedent for maintainability of a reference, which includes a counter-claim, and as this statutory requirement is not complied with, it was argued that the counter-claim was not maintainable. In support of the aforesaid contention, learned Senior Advocate places reliance on a judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Jaiswal Construction v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1997 ATLR 1]; and a Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ravi Kant Bansal v. M.P. Audyogik Kendra Vikas Nigam (Gwalior) Limited [ 2006(2) JLJ 186 = 2006(2) MPLJ 299 ], to say that even for raising a counter-claim referring the matter to the final authority in terms of the work contract is a requirement of law and if this requirement is not fulfilled, the claim is not maintainable. 8. Shri V.R. Rao, learned Senior Advocate, on the basis of the aforesaid three contentions argued that the learned arbitration Tribunal in a very casual manner, even after it accepted the contentions with regard to delay, held that in public interest the delay in raising the counter-claim has to be ignored and only on public interest proceeded to interfere in the matter, even though it held that under law the counter claim was not maintainable. Accordingly, it was emphasized by learned Senior Advocate that the claim made by the non-applicant in the counter-claim was not maintainable and he seeks for interference. 9. Shri M.L. Jaiswal, learned Senior Advocate for the non-applicant, refuted the aforesaid contentions and submitted that as far as raising a demand before filing the counter-claim is concerned, once the reference was pending before the Arbitration Tribunal, making a demand was not at all necessary for the purpose of maintainability of the counter-claim. It was emphasized by him that this procedure is not at all required when an arbitration dispute at the instance of one of the parties, was already pending. In support of the aforesaid contentions, learned Senior Advocate places reliance on two judgments: one rendered by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, in the case of Joseph Vilangadan v. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Limited and another [AIR 1998 Kerala 99]; and, another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises [ AIR 2011 SC 3814 ]. Referring to these judgments, it was submitted that raising of a demand with the other party in the facts and circumstances when the reference was already pending is not called for. 10. As far as the question of limitation in raising the claim is concerned, learned Senior Advocate invites our attention to paragraph 9 of the order impugned passed by the Tribunal and submitted that the cause of action for raising the counter-claim arose on 12.8.1987, when the agency which was inducted in place of the applicant, concluded the work and when quantification of claim on an ascertained amount became possible. Thereafter, as the counter-claim was filed within three years on 30.6.1989, it is argued that the counter-claim was maintainable; and, the second ground canvassed by Shri V.R. Rao is said to be unsustainable. Learned Senior Advocate thereafter invited out attention to a judgment rendered by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of P.K. Pande v. State of M.P. and others [2000 Arb. WLJ 290], to say that in the matter of raising a counter-claim, demand or reference to the final authority as per the works contract is not required. Learned Senior Advocate thereafter invited out attention to a judgment rendered by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of P.K. Pande v. State of M.P. and others [2000 Arb. WLJ 290], to say that in the matter of raising a counter-claim, demand or reference to the final authority as per the works contract is not required. Learned Senior Advocate submitted that when the reference was already pending, a counter-claim could be raised by one of the parties without referring the matter to the final authority as is required under section 7B of the Adhiniyam of 1983. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. Having considered the rival contentions, we propose to deal with each of the three questions as were canvassed before us. 12. The first question canvassed by Shri V.R. Rao, learned Senior Advocate, was to the effect that without raising a demand with the applicant-Company the counter-claim presented on 30.6.1989 was not maintainable. To consider this question, we may take note of the definition of ‘dispute’ as is envisaged in section 2(1)(d) of the Adhiniyam of 1983. ‘Dispute’ under this provision is defined to mean ‘a claim of ascertained money valued at Rs.50,000/- or more relating to any difference arising out of the execution or non-execution of a works contract or part thereof’. 13. Before dealing with the same and other questions that arise for consideration, we may take note of the fact that in this case the arbitration proceedings are being held in accordance to a statutory procedure by a statutory Tribunal constituted under the Adhiniyam of 1983; and, in the Adhiniyam of 1983 in the matter of raising a dispute and for adjudication of the same, a detailed procedure is contemplated. As far as the question of raising the claim without a demand being made is concerned, the question was considered by a Division Bench of this Court, in the case of P.C. Rajput (supra). After taking note of the definition of the word ‘dispute’, as is indicated hereinabove, the learned Division Bench in paragraph 19 has indicated that what is required to be seen by the Court is whether there has been any assertion of a claim and denial of the same by the other party. In paragraph 19, the matter is so dealt with : “19. In paragraph 19, the matter is so dealt with : “19. In the instant case, what is required to be seen is, that, whether there has been any assertion of a claim and denial of the same by the other side. It is the assertion of the claim and denial by the other side that gives rise to the dispute. The definition of the work dispute in section 2(1)(d) is a claim of ascertained money valued at Rs.50,000/- or more relating to a difference arising out of the execution or nonexecution. Word difference arising out of must receive the meaning as understood in Arbitration Jurisprudence under section 2(2) of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied) Thereafter, various provisions of the agreement are taken note of and the law laid down in the case of Jaiswal Construction (supra), relied upon by Shri V.R. Rao, is considered and in paragraph 25, it has been held that a dispute as contemplated under section 2(1)(d) arises only when there is assertion and denial as understood under the arbitration jurisprudence. Absence of denial when an approach is made should be presumed to give rise to a dispute entertainable by the arbitration Tribunal. Finally, reference is made to the judgment in the case of Dilip Construction Company (supra), and the final conclusion is derived at in paragraph 28, is that under the Scheme of the Act, namely the Adhiniyam of 1983, it is clear that a dispute has to be raised under the Scheme of the contract agreement; and, it is held that without raising a dispute no cause for arbitration accrues, it is held in paragraph 30 that the view taken by the Court gets statutory sanction by incorporation of sections 7A and 7B. 14. In the case of Dilip Construction Company (supra), also, the principle has been laid down and in paragraph 12, after taking note of various judgments, the following three principles have been crystallized as under : “(i) The existence of a difference or dispute is an essential condition for the arbitrator’s jurisdiction to act under an arbitration clause in an agreement; (ii) The jurisdiction of an arbitrator depends not upon the existence of a claim or the accrual of a cause of action, but upon the existence of a dispute. A dispute implies an assertion of a right by one party and repudiation thereof by another; and; (iii) A failure to pay is not a difference and the mere fact that a party could not or would not pay does not in itself amount to a dispute unless the party who chooses not to pay raises a point of controversy regarding, for instance, the basis of payment or the time or manner of payment.” (Emphasis supplied) It is this principle which has been again upheld by the subsequent Division Bench, in the case of P.C. Rajput (supra). The aforesaid judgment in the case of P.C. Rajput (supra), has been followed by another Division Bench, in the case of Jaiswal Construction (supra). 15. Even though Shri M.L. Jaiswal, learned Senior Advocate for the non-applicant, by placing reliance on the Kerala High Court judgment in the case of Joseph Vilangadan (supra), and the Supreme Court case of State of Goa (supra), tried to refute this contention, but we are of the considered view that the judgments relied upon by Shri Jaiswal pertains to the provisions of the Arbitration Act of 1940 and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986, wherein there is no specific definition of the word ‘dispute’ and the requirement of law as is contemplated under the Adhiniyam of 1983. In the case of State of Goa (supra), the question was considered in the light of the matter being agitated with reference to section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; in a proceeding held before the Chief Justice or his designate, and it was held by the Supreme Court that for invoking the jurisdiction under section 11, raising of a demand was not necessary. Both these cases are distinguishable and are based on the requirement of law as was applicable in those cases whereas in the present case a different process is specially laid in the Adhiniyam of 1983. In view of the above, we are of the considered view that without raising a demand with the applicant-Company, the counter claim made directly in the pending reference under the Adhiniyam 1983 was not maintainable. Accordingly, the first question is answered in favour of the applicant-Company. 16. The second question pertains to the question of limitation. In view of the above, we are of the considered view that without raising a demand with the applicant-Company, the counter claim made directly in the pending reference under the Adhiniyam 1983 was not maintainable. Accordingly, the first question is answered in favour of the applicant-Company. 16. The second question pertains to the question of limitation. For the purpose of considering this question, at the very outset we may take note of certain observations made by the Tribunal in the impugned order. In paragraph 12, the Tribunal has recorded a finding that the counter-claim is not maintainable and the counter-claim cannot be turned into a dispute unless a demand is made and has referred to the meaning of the word ‘dispute’ as contemplated under section 2(1)(d), however, on the ground that a demand was made on 18.9.2000 and in various other cases, the Tribunal has permitted raising of a demand when the matter was pending, the dispute is said to be maintainable. If that be so, then even if for a moment, we come to the conclusion that the Tribunal was right in holding so due to the procedure being followed by the Tribunal in various other cases then also a counter-claim, complete in all respects in accordance to law, and entertainable by the Tribunal came into existence only when the demand note was raised vide Document No.19 on 18.9.2000 and not before that. If this is the position, then this will have a great bearing on the question of limitation. Accordingly, after taking note of this aspect of the matter, we would now proceed to consider the second question of limitation. 17. In paragraph 9 of the impugned judgment, the Tribunal has held that the cause of action for raising the counter-claim accrued to the non-applicant on 12.8.1987 and finding that the counter-claim was raised on 30.6.1989 it is held that the counter-claim, which is filed within three years, is within the period of limitation. We are unable to accept this contention. What was submitted on 30.6.1989 was not a counter-claim, which was entertainable under law. We are unable to accept this contention. What was submitted on 30.6.1989 was not a counter-claim, which was entertainable under law. If the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the cases of P.C. Rajput (supra), Jaiswal Construction (supra) and Dilip Construction Company (supra), are taken note of and if the findings recorded by the Tribunal in paragraphs 6 and 7 is considered, the Tribunal itself admits that a counter-claim without a demand being raised in not maintainable; existence of a dispute is a pre-condition for maintainability of the counter-claim, but then goes to hold that as the demand notice was raised on 18.9.2000, the legal deficiency which is technical in nature is cured and, therefore, the counter-claim is maintainable. This is not correct, what was filed on 30.6.1989 was not a counter claim, which could be entertained under law, the counter claim in accordance to the requirement of law came into existence only on 18.9.2000. Even in the notice issued, Document No.19 dated 18.9.2000, non-applicant in paragraph 7 say that by various judgments of the High Court of M.P. and the M.P. Arbitration Tribunal, it has become a must that before lodging a counter-claim by the department a notice showing the recoverable debatable amount must be got served upon the contractor. It is stated in this paragraph that in this case a notice has not been served and, therefore, there is a legal deficiency and only for curing this legal deficiency the notice is being sent. If that be the position and if the Tribunal itself admits that the legal deficiency in raising the counter-claim is cured, because the notice for demand was submitted on 18.9.2000, then the counter-claim in the eye of law, which was maintainable, was only filed on 18.9.2000 and, therefore, under law the date of filing of the counter claim would be 18.9.2000 and not 30.6.1989, as held by the Tribunal. What was submitted on 30.6.1989 by way of a counter-claim was not a counter-claim maintainable under law, it became a legally acceptable counter-claim only on 18.9.2000 and it is only from this date that the counter-claim can be said to have been raised, that being the position, the delay of more than 11 years and 3 months in raising the counter-claim remains unexplained and the Tribunal in paragraph 13, after taking note of all these factors, admits that the counter-claim is barred by time, but the delay is condoned only by saying that in public interest Government claim should not be rejected on the technical ground of delay. This is not permissible. When law contemplates doing of a particular thing within a particular time and when inaction on the part of the non-applicant in taking action in time has resulted in accrual of a legally enforceable right to the applicant, the same could not be taken away in the manner done. 18. In the present case, the delay of more than 11 years has not been properly explained. The claim was made by the applicant-Company before the Tribunal on 9.2.1987 and even though written statement was filed by the non-applicant on 4.11.1987, they raised the counter-claim only on 30.6.1989 even though cause of action arose to them on 12.8.1987. Counter-claim, complete in all respect, came into existence on 18.9.2000, the period of delay i.e. ... 11 years and 3 months, in raising the counter-claim, is not at all explained. That apart, on 8.3.1996, the applicant Company raised an objection with regard to maintainability of the counter-claim and also pointed out that there is delay in raising the counter-claim. Even then the non-applicant kept quiet again for four years and it was only on 18.9.2000 that remedial action for bringing the counter-claim in accordance to the requirement of law was initiated. That being so, it was a case where there was an inordinate unexplained delay on the part of the non-applicant and, therefore, in condoning the delay and permitting the counter claim to be raised after such an long period of time, the learned Tribunal has committed grave error. Accordingly, we see no reason to condone the delay and hold that the action of the Tribunal in condoning the delay, only by mentioning public interest, was an error of jurisdiction committed by the Tribunal which warrants interference. 19. Accordingly, we see no reason to condone the delay and hold that the action of the Tribunal in condoning the delay, only by mentioning public interest, was an error of jurisdiction committed by the Tribunal which warrants interference. 19. Finally, the last question warranting consideration is as to whether the counter-claim was maintainable without referring the matter to the final authority for adjudication. If the agreement in question is taken note of, it would be seen that the agreement contemplates a detailed procedure which includes referring the matter for adjudication to the Superintending Engineer and then to the Chief Engineer, before a claim should be raised. Sections 7A and 7B of the Adhiniyam of 1983 was incorporated by M.P. Amending Act No.9 of 1990 with effect from 24.4.1990. Both these provisions contemplate a procedure for making reference and counting limitation. Sub-section (1)(a) of section 7B and sub-section (1)(b) contemplate that the Tribunal shall not admit a reference petition unless the dispute is first referred for decision of the final authority under the terms of the works contract, and the petition to the Tribunal is made within one year from the date of communication of the decision of the final authority. Thereafter, a proviso to this section contemplates that if the final authority fails to decide the dispute within a period of six months from the date of reference then the reference petition shall be filed in the Tribunal within a period of one year from the date of expiry of the period of six months. Thereafter, sub-section (2) of section 7 contemplates as under : “(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where no proceeding has been commenced at all before any Court preceding the date of commencement of this Act or after such commencement but before the commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1990, a reference petition shall be entertained within one year of the date of commencement of Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1990 irrespective of the fact whether a decision has or has not been made by the final authority under the agreement.” 20. Both the provisions of sections 7A and 7B and the requirement of making a reference to the final authority before raising a counter claim has been the subject matter of consideration by the Full Bench of this Court, in the case of Ravi Kant Bansal (supra). Both the provisions of sections 7A and 7B and the requirement of making a reference to the final authority before raising a counter claim has been the subject matter of consideration by the Full Bench of this Court, in the case of Ravi Kant Bansal (supra). The question framed for reference to the Full Bench, in the case of Ravi Kant Bansal (supra), by a Division Bench of this Court on 22.2.2006, was made after taking note of the observations made by the Division Bench in the case of P.K. Pande (supra), relied upon by Shri M.L. Jaiswal, Senior Advocate, and the question made in reference to the Full Bench reads as under : “Whether under the Scheme of Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 a counter-claim can be entertained without referring the dispute to the final authority under the works contract?” Finally, the reference is answered by holding that the Tribunal cannot entertain or admit a counter-claim if the dispute raised in the counter-claim filed by the opposite party has not been referred to the final authority in terms of the works contract; and, when the matter is referred to the final authority if the counter-claim has not been filed before the Tribunal within the period of limitation as provided in Clause (b) or (a) of sub-section 1 of section 7B. If that was the law laid down by the Full Bench, then in this case also we cannot accept the contention of Shri M.L. Jaiswal based on the case of P.K. Pande (supra). The case of P.K. Pande (supra), has been considered by the Full Bench and the Full Bench lays down the law after such consideration to say that the Tribunal cannot entertain or admit a counter-claim if it has not been referred to the final authority. In this case, admittedly as per the requirement of the works contract before raising the counter-claim the matter was never referred to the final authority. 21. Even though parties did not make any submission with regard to applicability of the provisions of sections 7A and 7B, in this case we cannot lose sight of the fact that sections 7A and 7B of the Adhiniyam of 1983 was introduced by Amending Act No.9 of 1990 and came into force with effect from 24.4.1990. 21. Even though parties did not make any submission with regard to applicability of the provisions of sections 7A and 7B, in this case we cannot lose sight of the fact that sections 7A and 7B of the Adhiniyam of 1983 was introduced by Amending Act No.9 of 1990 and came into force with effect from 24.4.1990. That being so, the question would be as to whether the said Amending Act will apply in the present case where the reference was made on 9.2.1987 and according to the respondent, they filed their written statement on 14.11.1989 and the socalled counter-claim on 30.6.1989. To consider this question we may take note of the findings recorded hereinabove, wherein after evaluating the legal provisions, we have already come to the conclusion that a counter-claim is also in the nature of a reference and all the principles and procedure governing making of a reference are applicable in the case of a counter-claim also. 22. Admittedly, Amending Act No.9 of 1990 came into force on 24.4.1990, and based on a detailed analysis of the legal principles, we have come to the conclusion that a counter-claim in accordance to the requirement of law was raised on 18.9.2000. That being so, in this particular case even though the reference was pending from 1987, the counter-claim complete in all respects and in accordance to law, was raised only on 18.9.2000, when the provisions of Amending Act No.9 of 1990 came into force. That being so, in this case the requirement of sections 7A and 7B, in the matter of raising the counter-claim becomes applicable and as the Full Bench in the case of Ravi Kant Bansal (supra), has clearly laid that a counter-claim without referring to the final authority is not maintainable, we have no hesitation in holding that the counter-claim in the present was not maintainable when it was presented on 18.9.2000, as the statutory requirement of section 7B was not complied with on 18.9.2000 before raising the counter-claim. 23. 23. That apart, if sub-section (2) of section 7B is taken note of, it clearly contemplates that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if no proceeding has commenced before any Court or if such proceedings have commenced before Act No.9 of 1990 came into force then within a period of one year necessary compliance has to be made and the period of limitation in a pending matter is fixed at 1 year from the date of commencement of the amended provision i.e. 24.4.1990. That being so, the counter-claim complete in all respects in the pending proceeding was to be raised within one year from the date of commencement of the Amending Act of 1990, and as the counter-claim in question was raised only on 18.9.2000 in accordance to the requirement of law i.e. beyond the period of one year from 24.4.1990, on this count also the counter-claim was not maintainable. 24. Accordingly, considering the question from all angles, we are of the considered view that in rejecting the objection raised by the applicant, the learned Tribunal has committed grave error of law, has acted in excess of jurisdiction and contrary to the jurisdiction vested in it and as the counter-claim was not maintainable, it has to be dismissed. 25. Accordingly, these petitions are allowed. Orders-impugned dated 3.2.2003, passed in Reference Cases No.20/1987, 21/1987 and 22/1987 by the M.P. State Arbitration Tribunal, impugned in these petitions, are quashed and the counter claim filed by the respondent, in all the three cases are dismissed. All the three petitions are allowed and disposed of. No order as to costs.