JUDGMENT 1.Heard. 2. The petitioners have filed this petition against the orders dated 3-5-2012 (Annexure P-l) passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad (DRAT) and dated 12-3-2012 (Annexure P-2) passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jabalpur (DRT). 3. The petitioner No. 2 is the Director of the petitioner No. 1 -Company. Respondent No. 1-Bank filed an Original Application before the Tribunal for recovery of an amount of Rs. 2,99,10,616/-. The Tribunal issued notices to the petitioners and other persons. The notices were not served on the petitioners and thereafter, the notices were published in the newspaper. Ex parte judgment was passed on 14-1-2009. An application was filed for setting aside exparte judgment. It was set aside vide order dated 7-3-2011 and Original Application was retorted to file. 4. The petitioners were directed to file written statement on 15-4-2011, however, the petitioners did not file the written statement within time and they filed the written statement on 18-11-2011. On the aforesaid ground, the DRT directed that the petitioners shall not be allowed to file the written statement unless they pay the principal amount borrowed from the Bank. The Tribunal allowed the petitioners to contest the claim subject to depositing the principal amount within one month. Against the aforesaid order, an appeal was filed, that appeal has also been dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal. 5. This Court considered in detail the power of the Tribunal to impose the conditions in the event of setting aside exparte proceedings in W.P. No. 1987/2013, Alok Saboo s/o Shri C.K. Saboo Vs. Business r/o Saboo Bhawan, Naya Bazar. In the present case, there was delay in filing the written statement and the Tribunal has imposed a condition that the petitioners have to deposit principal amount. 6. The issue involved in this petition is the same, which has been decided by this Court in Alok Saboo (supra), in which, this Court has held as under : -- "(5) The main question for consideration before the Court is that whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to impose rigorous and stringent condition in setting aside the ex parte order. (6) Section 19 of the Act of 1993 prescribes procedure of Tribunal. Section 19 (4) of the Act is in regard to issuance of summons and Section 19 (5) of the Act is in regard to submitting written statement by the defendant. (6) Section 19 of the Act of 1993 prescribes procedure of Tribunal. Section 19 (4) of the Act is in regard to issuance of summons and Section 19 (5) of the Act is in regard to submitting written statement by the defendant. The aforesaid Sections are as under: -- '19 (4). On receipt of the application under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Tribunal shall issue summons requiring the defendant to show cause within thirty days of the service of summons as to why the relief prayed for should not be granted. 19 (5). The defendant shall, at or before the first hearing or within such time as the Tribunal may permit, present a written statement of his defence.’ (7) Section 22 of the Act of 1993 prescribes that the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice. Sub-section (2) of Section 22 further prescribes that the Tribunal has the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure while trying a suit in respect of the matters. One of them is Section 22 (2) (f) of the Act dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex parte, another is Section 22 (2) (g) of the Act setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it ex parte. It means that the Tribunal has power while setting aside ex parte order or dismissal of any application or decide it ex parte pari materia with the powers as vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. (8) Rules have also been framed by the Central Government to regulate the procedure of Debts Recovery Tribunal, named as The Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1993') in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 36 of the Act, 1993. Rule 12 of the Rules of 1993 is in regard to filing of reply and other documents by the defendant. The aforesaid Rule is as under : -- '12. Filing of reply and other documents by the defendant. Rule 12 of the Rules of 1993 is in regard to filing of reply and other documents by the defendant. The aforesaid Rule is as under : -- '12. Filing of reply and other documents by the defendant. -- (1) The defendant may file two complete sets containing the reply to the application along with documents in a paper book form with the Registry within one month of the service of the notice of the filing of the application on him. (2) The defendant shall also endorse one copy of the reply along with documents as mentioned in sub-rule (1) to the applicant. (3) The Tribunal may, in its discretion on application by the defendant, allow the filing of reply referred to in sub-rule (1), after the expiry of the period referred to therein. (4) If the defendant fails to file the reply under sub-rule (1) or on the date fixed for hearing of the application, the Tribunal may proceed forthwith to pass an order on the application as it thinks fit.' Sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 of the Rules of 1993 prescribes that the Tribunal has discretion to allow time to take written statement on record of the defendant filed after expiry of the period under sub-rule (1) of Rule .12. (9) From the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that the Tribunal has to guide itself while setting aside ex parte proceeding taking into consideration the provisions of Civil Procedure Code. (10) Order IX Rule 7 of CPC prescribes the procedure, where defendant appears on day of adjourned hearing and assigns good cause for previous non-appearance. The relevant provision is as under : -- '7. Procedure where defendant appears on day of adjourned hearing and assigns good cause for previous non-appearance. (10) Order IX Rule 7 of CPC prescribes the procedure, where defendant appears on day of adjourned hearing and assigns good cause for previous non-appearance. The relevant provision is as under : -- '7. Procedure where defendant appears on day of adjourned hearing and assigns good cause for previous non-appearance. -- Where the Court has adjourned the hearing of the suit ex parte, and the defendant, at or before such hearing, appears and assigns good cause for his previous non-appearance, he may, upon such terms as the Court directs as to costs or otherwise, be heard in answer to the suit as if he had appeared on the day fixed for his appearance.' (11) In our opinion, it was obligatory on the Tribunal to consider the provisions of Order IX Rule 7 of CPC while setting aside the ex parte proceeding, because the petitioners were proceeded ex parte on the ground that they did not file written statement within time. Order IX Rule 13 of CPC is in regard to setting aside ex parte decree, that is not applicable in the case. (12) Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Kumar Madan and others Vs. Rule N. Gupta Technical Education Society and others, AIR 2002 SC 2082 has held as under in regard to power of the Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Order IX Rule 7 CPC : -- 'Order IX, Rule 7 empowers Court, while setting aside ex parte order to impose costs and also to put the defendants applicants on terms power in the Court to impose costs and to put the defendant-applicant on terms is spelled out from the expression 'Upon such terms as the Court directs as to costs or otherwise'. On an adjourned hearing, in spite of the Court having proceeded ex parte earlier the defendant is entitled to appear and participate in the subsequent proceedings as of right. An application under Rule 7 is required to be made only if the defendant wishes the proceedings to be relegated back and re-open the proceedings from the date wherefrom they became ex parte so as to convert the ex parte hearings into bi parte. An application under Rule 7 is required to be made only if the defendant wishes the proceedings to be relegated back and re-open the proceedings from the date wherefrom they became ex parte so as to convert the ex parte hearings into bi parte. While exercising power of putting the defendant on terms under Rule 7 the Court cannot pass an order would have the effect of placing the defendant in a situation more worse off then what he would have been if he had not applied under Rule 7. So also the conditions for taking benefit of the order should not be such as would have the effect of decreeing the suit itself. Similarly, the Court may not in the garb of exercising power of placing upon terms make an order which probably the Court may not have made in the suit itself. The purpose of Rule 7 in its essence is to ensure the orderly conduct of the proceedings by penalizing improper dilatoriness calculated merely to prolong the litigation.' (13) Hon'ble the Supreme Court further in the case of G.L. Vijain Vs. K. Shankar, (2006) 13 SCC 136, has held as under in regard to power of the Court under Order IX Rule 7 and Order IX Rule 13 of CPC : -- '7. The Court's power to impose condition for entertaining an application must be provided for under the statute itself. We may immediately notice the distinction between the power of the Court exercised under Order IX Rule 7 of the Code of the Civil Procedure vis-a-vis Order IX Rule 13 thereof. Whereas while exercising its jurisdiction under Order IX Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court can impose conditions in regard to payment of costs, but while exercising its power under Order IX Rule 13 thereof, the Court can exercise a larger jurisdiction in the sense that it can impose other conditions.' (14) From the aforesaid judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, the principle of law is that while exercising powers under Order IX Rule 7 of CPC, the Court can impose condition in regard to payment of costs, but it cannot impose such hard and stringent condition, which would negate the purpose of adjudication. As observed by the Court, purpose of the provision is to ensure orderly conduct of the proceedings of the Court by penalizing improper dilatoriness calculated merely to prolong the litigation. (15) Section 22 (2) of the Act of 1993 provides that while setting aside an order of ex parte the Tribunal has the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, in our opinion, the Tribunal cannot impose a condition in setting the ex parte proceeding, which is so stringent amounting to finalisation of dispute that it would become impossible for the party to comply the condition. However, the Tribunal can impose the cost. (16) The Orissa High Court in the case of M/s. Jholei Baba Agency Vs. State Bank of India, AIR 2009 Orissa 109, has held as under in regard to power of the Tribunal to grant of time for filing the written statement beyond the prescribed period : -- '22. In view of the above, law can be summarised that the Tribunal is competent to grant time for filing the WS beyond the period prescribed under the statute. What should be the reasonable time to be granted would depend upon the facts of the case and complexity of the issues involved therein. However, the Court or Tribunal should not proceed in hot haste, rather exercise the discretion judiciously. The Tribunal does not have the power to impose a condition of pre-deposit of any part of the claim amount while considering the application for grant of time for filing the WS. Undoubtedly, in such a case, the Tribunal can impose a cost if the facts so require.' (17) Madras High Court in the case of Main Leather Wear Exports and others Vs. Oriental Bank of Commerce, Chennai, 2012 (2) DRTC 829 (Mad.), has held as under in regard to power of the Tribunal in passing an order of setting aside ex parte order : -- '10. It is true that the Debts Recovery Tribunal was entitled to pass discretionary orders as a condition precedent to set aside the ex parte order. However, such condition should not be onerous. It is not as if the petitioners have filed the application belatedly to set aside the ex parte order, within the statutory period. It is true that the Debts Recovery Tribunal was entitled to pass discretionary orders as a condition precedent to set aside the ex parte order. However, such condition should not be onerous. It is not as if the petitioners have filed the application belatedly to set aside the ex parte order, within the statutory period. Under the guise of setting aside the ex parte order, Debts Recovery Tribunal made an attempt to recover the amount without taking up the matter on merits. The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal also committed the very same illegality by confirming the order, of course, with modification in respect of amount. The hyper-technical attitude taken by the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal made the petitioners to approach this Court on account of this and the very proceeding before the Debts Recovery Tribunal is still pending. We are, therefore, of the aforesaid opinion that the order impugned in the civil revision petition deserves to be set aside.' (18) Division Bench of Indore Bench of this High Court in the case Suresh Bansal Vs. Bank of India and others, unreported order, dated 6-3-2012, passed in Writ Petition No. 1674/2012, has held as under in regard to power of Debts Recovery Tribunal while taking the written statement on record, which was passed beyond prescribed period : -- 'In the circumstances, the DRT while ordering to take the WS on record was not justified in imposing such a harsh condition. In the facts and circumstances, the WS could have been ordered to be taken on record by imposing reasonable cost. The Tribunal also without adverting to the record dismissed the appeal by maintaining the order of DRT that too by imposing cost of Rs. 25,000/-. Thus, in our view, both the impugned orders are not liable to be sustained and as such are hereby quashed.' (19) In this view of the matter, in our opinion, the Debts Recovery Tribunal and Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal both have committed an error of law while imposing the condition on the petitioners to deposit an amount of Rs. 1 crore by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, which has been modified subsequently as Rs. 50 lacs by Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, because the condition is stringent. The application is in regard to recovery of an amount of Rs. 1 crore by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, which has been modified subsequently as Rs. 50 lacs by Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, because the condition is stringent. The application is in regard to recovery of an amount of Rs. 8,86,75,238.69 and as per Counsel for the petitioners, some of the amount has already been recovered by the Bank under the proceedings of SARFAESI Act and property has also been attached. In our opinion, looking to the conduct of the petitioners, a cost has to be imposed upon the petitioners because, prima facie, we are of the view that the petitioners were responsible for not filing the written statement within prescribed period mentioned in the Rule of 1993. (20) Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Amarjeet Singh Vs. Devi Ratan, (2010) 1 SCC 417 , has held as under in regard to imposition of costs by the Court: -- The Court's constant endeavour must be to ensure that everyone gets just and fair treatment. The Court while rendering justice must adopt a pragmatic approach and in appropriate cases realistic costs and compensation be ordered in order to discourage dishonest litigation. The object and true meaning of the concept of restitution cannot be achieved or accomplished unless the Courts adopt a pragmatic approach in dealing with the cases.' (21) Hon'ble the Supreme Court further in the case of A. Shanmugam Vs. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam represented by its President and others, (2012) 6 SCC 430 , has held as under in regard to imposition of costs by the Court: -- '36. Unless wrongdoers are denied profit or undue benefit from frivolous litigations, it would be difficult to control frivolous and uncalled for litigations. Experience also reveals that our Courts have been very reluctant to grant the actual or realistic costs. We would like to explain this by giving this illustration. When a litigant is compelled to spend Rs. 1 lakh on a frivolous litigation, where is hardly any justification in awarding Rs. 1,000 as costs unless there are special circumstances of that case. We need to decide cases while keeping pragmatic realities in view. We would like to explain this by giving this illustration. When a litigant is compelled to spend Rs. 1 lakh on a frivolous litigation, where is hardly any justification in awarding Rs. 1,000 as costs unless there are special circumstances of that case. We need to decide cases while keeping pragmatic realities in view. We have to ensure that unscrupulous litigant is not permitted to derive any benefit by abusing the judicial process.' (22) Keeping in mind the aforesaid principle and conduct of the petitioners, in our opinion, it would be just and proper to impose cost of Rs. 1 lac on the petitioners. (23) The argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that in accordance with the provisions of Section 19 (5) of the Act of 1993, the date of hearing means the first hearing when the case is fixed before the Presiding Officer and not before the Registrar, could not be accepted. Rule 12 (1) of the Rules of 1993 provides that the defendant shall file reply to the application along with documents in a paper book form with the Registrar within one month of the service of the notice of filing of the application on him. If we accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, then it would negate and redundant the statutory provisions of Rule 12 (1) of the Rules of 1993. Hence, we do not find any merit in the contention put forth by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. It is hereby rejected. (24) This writ petition is disposed of with the following directions : -- (I) That, the impugned orders dated 12-3-2013 (Annexure P-l) passed by Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad and dated 17-12-2012 (Annexure P-2) passed by Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jabalpur, are hereby quashed. (II) That, the petitioners are permitted to participate in the proceedings and the written statement filed by the petitioners be taken on record, on the condition that they shall pay cost of Rs. 1 lac to the respondent No. 1-Bank within a period of thirty days from the date of passing of this order." 7. (II) That, the petitioners are permitted to participate in the proceedings and the written statement filed by the petitioners be taken on record, on the condition that they shall pay cost of Rs. 1 lac to the respondent No. 1-Bank within a period of thirty days from the date of passing of this order." 7. In the present case, Rule 12 of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 (hereinafter referred to "Rules of 1993") quoted above in the order prescribes that the defendant may file two complete sets of written statement with documents within a period of one month of the service of notice. Rule 12 (3) of the Rules of 1993 gives discretion to the Tribunal to allow time to file reply. 8. In the present case, there is delay on the part of the petitioners to file reply and the Tribunal imposed a condition that the petitioners have to deposit the principal amount. In our opinion, as held by this Court in W.P. No. 1987/2013, the Tribunal has no such power to impose the condition. In the similar circumstances, the Division Bench of Indore Bench of this High Court in the case of Suresh Bansal Vs. Bank of India and others, unreported order, dated 6-3-2012, passed in Writ Petition No. 1674/2012, has imposed costs of Rs. 25,000/- on account of non-filing the reply within time. In our opinion, in the present case also, it would be just and proper if we impose costs of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Rupees only) on the petitioners. 9. Before parting with the case, we may observe that in spite of pronouncement of judgments on this point by this Court, the Tribunal has unnecessarily imposed the condition. We hope that the Tribunal shall keep in mind the law in this regard because it is fundamental principle of law that it is the duty of the Judge or Presiding Officer to work within the framework of law. 10. Consequently, the petition is allowed. The impugned orders dated 3-5-2012 (Annexure P-l) and dated 12-3-2012 (Annexure P-2) are hereby quashed. Subject to depositing costs of Rs. 25,000/-, the petitioners be permitted to participate in the proceedings and the reply filed by the petitioners shall be taken on record. No order as to costs.