ORAL JUDGMENT This appeal filed under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, is directed against the order dated 10.09.2009 passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna in claim application bearing O.A. No. 00168/1999, whereby the claim case has been dismissed. 2. Mr. Dhirendra Nath Jha has appeared on behalf of the appellant while the respondent railways has been represented by learned counsel Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha. 3. Facts of the case briefly stated is that the wife of the claimant boarded the 3040 Down Janata Express at Kiul station for going to Mananpur on 18.06.1998. The wife of the claimant is stated to have an accidental fall while in process of getting down at the Mananpur station due to jerk and jostling amongst the passengers and came under the wheels of the train and suffering fatal injuries died on the spot. The second class railway ticket of the deceased, was found missing. The claimant husband of the deceased setting up a claim of Rs. 5,00,000/- filed the application on 25.6.1999 under Section 125 of the Railways Act, 1989 read with Section 16 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 giving rise to O.A. No. 00168 of 1999. Whereas except a one page written statement containing ornamental objections no written or oral evidence was led by the Railways to contest the claim, the claimant filed the following documentary evidence in support of his claim: - (i) Exhibit A/1 and Exhibit A/2; affidavit of the claimant, the memo of the Station Master dated 18.6.1998 addressed to the G.R.P. reporting the untoward incident giving rise to U.D. Case No. 8 of 1998. (ii) Exhibit A/3; the FIR in U.D. Case No. 8 of 1998. (iii) Exhibit A/4; the inquest report. (iv) Exhibit A/5; the postmortem report. (v) Exhibit A/6; the final report. (vi) Exhibit A/7 the death certificate. (vii) Exhibit A/8 the identity card of the claimant. 4. The tribunal on the basis of the rival pleadings framed six issues of which issue no. 2 relatable to untoward incident and issue no. 3 relatable to bona fide passenger are issues relevant for adjudication of this appeal. (v) Exhibit A/6; the final report. (vi) Exhibit A/7 the death certificate. (vii) Exhibit A/8 the identity card of the claimant. 4. The tribunal on the basis of the rival pleadings framed six issues of which issue no. 2 relatable to untoward incident and issue no. 3 relatable to bona fide passenger are issues relevant for adjudication of this appeal. The tribunal while reading into the documentary evidence led by the claimant has held the case to be that of a “run over” and not a case of “untoward incident” falling within the purview of Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). On the issue of missing ticket also it has been held by the tribunal that the burden of proving that the deceased was travelling on a valid ticket squarely fell upon the claimant and in absence of its production, the deceased would not be treated to be a bona fide passenger in terms of the explanation provided under Section 124A of the Act and thus would not be entitled to any compensation. While expressing such opinion the learned Technical Member as the single member bench constituting the tribunal, has gone beyond his jurisdiction to pass unwarranted remarks over the judicial pronouncement of the superior courts on the issue of bona fide passenger which this Court would be taking note of hereinafter in this judgment. 5. As I have observed hereinabove, except for a one page written statement which contains only ornamental objections to the claim set up by the claimant, no evidence worth whatsoever was led by the railways to contest the claim. Even the written statement merely shifts the onus on the claimant to prove his claim and nothing more. Except formal denial, the issue of “untoward incident” or cause of death, was not contested. 6. Section 123(c) of the Act defines „untoward incident? and includes in Sub-Section (2), the accidental falling of any passenger from a train carrying passengers. Section 124A of the Act relates to payment of compensation on account of “untoward incident” and opening with a non obstante clause the provision in clear terms holds the Railway administration liable for payment of compensation for loss occasioned by death or injury as a result of “untoward incident”. The exceptions for avoiding this liability are set out in clause “a to e” of the provision. The exceptions for avoiding this liability are set out in clause “a to e” of the provision. The legislative intent of Section 124A is explicit and self eloquent leaving no room for confusion. The Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2008) 9 SCC 527 (Union of India vs. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar) has held that the principles underlying Section 124A of the Act is based on strict liability which is also known as no fault liability. The same view has also been expressed in a subsequent judgment reported in (2010) 12 SCC 443 (Jameela and others vs. Union of India). 7. The legislative intendment of the provisions as interpreted by the Supreme Court leaves no room for confusion that the moment a claim is set up founded on an “untoward incident”, it casts a liability on the Railway administration to pay compensation and which liability continues until the Railway administration by leading oral or documentary evidence are able to satisfy that the death or the injury has occasioned by any of the reasons set up in Clause-“a to e” of the said provision and in no other circumstance. A death on a railway track would be presumed to be a case of “untoward incident” unless it is proved otherwise by the Railway administration with the aid of evidence and in which event the burden would shift on the claimant to prove the same. This presumption is rebuttable but the onus would lie on the Railway administration to rebut this presumption by leading evidence to contest the claim and avoid the liability. The legislative intendment of Section 124A also reflects the same view with the exception of the proviso. 8. Adverting to the order impugned in this appeal, it is observed that the Technical Member has gravely erred in carving out a category of a “run over case” as forming a distinct category even in absence of any such distinction being found in the Act. Every case of a “run over” is a case of “untoward incident” and vice versa unless it is demonstrated by the Railway administration by leading evidence that the accident fell within the proviso to Section 124A and in no other circumstance. There is no room for presumption or speculation nor is it within the domain of the courts either to legislate or to provide casus omissus when no such intendment is reflected from the statutory provisions. There is no room for presumption or speculation nor is it within the domain of the courts either to legislate or to provide casus omissus when no such intendment is reflected from the statutory provisions. 9. In view of the legal position discussed hereinabove and in absence of any evidence led by the Railways, it is to be seen whether the documentary evidence led by the claimant reflects any such circumstance which is strong enough to negate the claim set up by the claimant and bring it within the scope of the proviso to Section 124A of the Act. The memo which is Exhibit-2 simply reports that a woman aged about 22-23 years has died due to amputation by coming under the wheels of a train. It does not report anything else. In the circumstances it was highly presumptuous for the Technical Member to have read into the report to hold that it was a case of “run over” and did not fall within the definition of an “untoward incident”. This Court completely fails to appreciate the analogy drawn by the tribunal for rejecting the claim by creating third category which is beyond the substantive provision of Section 124A and its proviso. 10. The provision of Section 124A is a beneficial piece of legislation and being a welfare legislation it has to be given a more liberal and wider interpretation and not a literal and a pedantic interpretation as being given by the tribunal. It is a matter of record that no evidence was led by the railways to demonstrate that the deceased died due to any of the reasons which fell within Clause- “a to e” of the proviso to Section 124A of the Act. Even when no evidence either oral or documentary was led by the railways to contest on this issue, this role has been taken up by the tribunal itself to act as a prosecutor as well as an adjudicator. Law is well settled that courts cannot travel beyond pleadings. In the present case even when it is not the case of the railways that the case falls within the exception provided in Section 124A, the tribunal has proceeded to draw a conclusion on a completely presumptuous speculation. This is certainly not the role of a tribunal performing quasi judicial functions. In the present case even when it is not the case of the railways that the case falls within the exception provided in Section 124A, the tribunal has proceeded to draw a conclusion on a completely presumptuous speculation. This is certainly not the role of a tribunal performing quasi judicial functions. A matter has to be adjudicated on the basis of the evidence and not beyond that. The finding of the tribunal that since no injury was found on other part of the body hence the nature of ante mortem injury suggested that it was a case of “run over” and not a case of “accidental fall”, is a conjectural finding. The tribunal has failed to appreciate that the moment a passenger has an accidental fall it results in a run over by the train. There cannot be any other form of death under the wheels until it is proved that the person died by reason of any of the Clause- “a to e” of the proviso to Section 124A of the Act. 11. For the reasons aforementioned, the conclusion drawn by the tribunal for holding the death to be outside the definition of “untoward incident” is based on presumption, conjecture and speculation and being contrary not only to the statutory provisions but also the judicial pronouncement interpreting the provision, cannot be upheld and is set aside. 12. The second ground on which the claim has been rejected is the non recovery of the ticket. The learned Technical Member forming the single member bench of the tribunal while expressing his opinion to reject the claim has clearly exceeded his jurisdiction and the bar of judicial discipline. The issue of non recovery of a ticket from a deceased passenger who was a victim of untoward incident was subject matter of a contest which fell for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in a case reported in 2008 (3) PLJR 711 (Smt. Kaushalaya Devi vs. Union of India) and it was held in paragraph-5 that a person found within the precinct of the railway station would logically have a presumption that he had a ticket for himself and that it was obligatory on the part of the Railway administration to prove to the contrary. The issue as regarding recovery of ticket being settled by the Division Bench of this Court, the Member (Technical) forming the bench has made the following indecorous and indiscreet observations: “10. All the above sections read together plainly mean that, burden of proof to establish that deceased was traveling on a valid authority, lies on the claimant seeking award of claim for compensation from the Tribunal on the premise that deceased who fell a victim to an untoward incident was a passenger as defined under law. Judicial verdicts which have settled the principle in this matter and, hence, have the force of law, prima facie, appear to run counter to the above legislative provisions under law of evidence. 11. Do they imply that relevant provisions under Indian Evidence Act, quoted above have been reduced to nullity by judgments of Honl. Courts? It would certainly be wrong to draw any such conclusions and, hence, to place the entire matter in its correct perspective we need to give them a harmonized construction in order to resolve the apparent dichotomy.………………………………………………………………………………………………” (Emphasis supplied) 13. The observations are in a clear breach of judicial discipline and nothing short of contempt. The technical member has clearly exceeded the bar and does not even seem to understand the damage. The utterances reflect a drought of legal understanding and smacks of arrogance. 14. Judicial discipline and judicial propriety are the backbone of the Indian justice delivery system and no person whosoever can be permitted to disfigure this system much less an adjudicating authority sitting at the bottom rung of a judicial hierarchy. 15. Judicial hierarchy and its binding precedents are the hallmark of the Indian judicial system and the duties are well defined. Each Court is bound by the precedents set by the superior court and which principle equally applies to intra court decision. A Single Judge is bound by a Division Bench pronouncement, a Division Bench is bound by a larger Bench pronouncement and so on. Whereas such principles applies within the Court and have binding effect, the subordinate court in trying to dislodge such discipline, is clearly deprecable. The learned technical member appears to be in a complete ignorance of the principles underlying a binding precedent and observance of judicial propriety. The observation shockingly outrageous reflects an arrogance which does not befit the role of a judicial authority. 16. The learned technical member appears to be in a complete ignorance of the principles underlying a binding precedent and observance of judicial propriety. The observation shockingly outrageous reflects an arrogance which does not befit the role of a judicial authority. 16. The Supreme Court in a judgment reported in (1989) 3 SCC 396 (Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija and others vs. Collector, Thane Maharashtra and others) made the following observations on the issue of judicial discipline: “18. It would be difficult for us to appreciate the judgment of the High Court. One must remember that pursuit of the law, however glamorous it is, has its own limitation on the bench. In a multi-judge court, the judges are bound by precedents and procedure. They could use their discretion only when there is no declared principle to be found, no rule and no authority. The judicial decorum and legal propriety demand that where a learned Single Judge or a Division Bench does not agree with the decision of a bench or a Division Bench does not agree with the decision of a bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the matter shall be referred to a large bench. It is a subversion of judicial process not to follow this procedure.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. In another judgment reported in (2008) 10 SCC 1 (Official Liquidator vs. Dayanand and others), the Supreme Court in paragraph-91 had to observe as follows: “91. We may add that in our constitutional set-up every citizen is under a duty to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions. Those who have been entrusted with the task of administering the system and operating various constituents of the State and who take oath to act in accordance with the Constitution and uphold the same, have to set an example by exhibiting total commitment to the constitutional ideals. This principle is required to be observed with greater rigour by the members of judicial fraternity who have been bestowed with the power to adjudicate upon important constitutional and legal issues and protect and preserve rights of the individuals and society as a whole. Discipline is sine qua non for effective and efficient functioning of the judicial system. This principle is required to be observed with greater rigour by the members of judicial fraternity who have been bestowed with the power to adjudicate upon important constitutional and legal issues and protect and preserve rights of the individuals and society as a whole. Discipline is sine qua non for effective and efficient functioning of the judicial system. If the courts command others to act in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and rule of law, it is not possible to countenance violation of the constitutional principle by those who are required to lay down the law.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. The case in hand is not an isolated instance or an exception rather this Court has been experiencing orders passed by single member bench of the tribunal which are nothing short of a personalized opinion, are dehors the evidence on record, beyond the pleadings and in ignorance of settled legally binding precedents rather in defiance thereof. 19. In the circumstances discussed, this Court is forced to think whether the exercise of power by the learned Chairman under Section 4(4) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 constituting single member bench is serving the object and purpose for which it was constituted or is generating litigations. 20. The provision of Section 4(2) and 4(4) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 and Section 5(2) and (6) of the Central Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 are identical. Whereas Section 4(2) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act and Section 5(2) of the Administrative Tribunal Act provides for constitution of a Bench and mandates that a “Bench” would consist of a Judicial Member and an Administrative Member, Section 4(4) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act and Section 5(6) of the Administrative Tribunal Act vests power in the Chairman, to constitute single member benches. 21. A challenge to the provision of Section 5 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 was a subject matter of discussion of a constitution bench decision reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 (L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India) and in paragraph-98 thereof, the constitution bench while upholding the vires of Section 5, had made the following observations: “98. Since we have analysed the issue of the constitutional validity of Section 5(6) of the Act at length, we may now pronounce our opinion on this aspect. Though the vires of the provision was not in question in Dr. Since we have analysed the issue of the constitutional validity of Section 5(6) of the Act at length, we may now pronounce our opinion on this aspect. Though the vires of the provision was not in question in Dr. Mahabal Ram case, we believe that the approach adopted in that, the relevant portion of which has been extracted in the first part of this judgment, is correct since it harmoniously resolves the manner in which Sections 5(2) and 5(6) can operate together. We wish to make it clear that where a question involving the interpretation of a statutory provision or rule in relation to the Constitution arises for the consideration of a Single Member Bench of the Administrative Tribunal, the proviso to Section 5(6) will automatically apply and the Chairman or the Member concerned shall refer the matter to a Bench consisting of at least two Members, one of whom must be a Judicial Member. This will ensure that questions involving the vires of a statutory provision or rule will never arise for adjudication before a Single Member Bench or a Bench which does not consist of a Judicial Member. So construed, Section 5(6) will no longer be susceptible to charges of unconstitutionality.” (Emphasis supplied) 22. The case in hand shows how absence of a judicial member leads to judicial indiscipline especially, where the Technical Member has no judicial training. 23. Adverting to the case in hand, the judgment under challenge based on irrelevant considerations, containing conjectural conclusions, and based on no evidence, is a perversity defined and thus cannot be sustained. 24. For the reasons aforementioned, the judgment and order impugned cannot be upheld and is accordingly set aside. The claim case is allowed. The claimant would be entitled to a compensation of Rs. 4,00,000/- and following the judgment reported in AIR 2009 SC 3098 (Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi & Ors. vs. Union of India & Anr.) would be accompanied with interest payable @ 6 per cent from the date of filing of the claim case until the date of the impugned order and thereafter @ 9 per cent until the date of realization. 25. The appeal is allowed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. 26. Let the lower court records be transmitted to the tribunal concerned forthwith. 27. 25. The appeal is allowed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. 26. Let the lower court records be transmitted to the tribunal concerned forthwith. 27. For the observations that I have made in this order, I deem it proper that a copy of this judgment be forwarded to the Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal, New Delhi and the Railway Board for their information.