JUDGMENT Heard counsel for the parties. 2. These review petitions are preferred by the State of Jharkhand, the respondent in the writ petitions being WPC No. 1181/2013 and WPC 1280/2013 which were decided by the common judgment dated 28th June 2013. Before proceeding to discuss the grounds seeking review, as advanced by the review petitioner, it would be appropriate to notice what was under challenge in the writ petitions. 3. The writ petitioners/respondents herein, had assailed the common impugned notification dated 16th February 2013 issued by the Deputy Secretary, Department of Sports, Art, Culture and Youth Affairs, Government of Jharkhand, whereby their services as Chairman and Member of the Jharkhand State Youth Commission were terminated in exercise of powers under Rule 4(vi) of the Jharkhand State Youth Commission Rules, 2012. 4. The common grounds for assailing the impugned notification raised on behalf of the writ petitioners were that as per the Rules of 2012, Commission has the tenure of three years and the Chairman/Member should be within the maximum age of 40 years. According to the writ petitioners, they were appointed as Chairman and Member of the Jharkhand State Youth Commission by notification contained at Memo No. 21 dated 8th January 2013 issued under the signature of Deputy Secretary of the same Department, under the orders of His Excellency The Governor of Jharkhand in exercise of powers under Rule 3 of 2012 Rules. The writ petitioners had assailed the impugned action inter-alia on the grounds that the removal of the petitioners as Chairman / Member of the Commission invoking Rule 4(vi) of the 2012 Rules, was arbitrary, without any notice and in purported exercise of Doctrine of Pleasure by the respondent State. It was their contention that Rule 4(v) lays down condition which entails disqualification for removal from the post of Chairman or Member of the said Commission. Proviso to the aforesaid Rules stipulates opportunity of hearing before any action is taken. Writ petitioners had argued that the Doctrine of Pleasure as conceived under the Constitution of India and as referred to in Part-XIV of Chapter-I of the Constitution of India relating to service under the Union and the State, is not an unqualified power; rather are subject to restriction imposed by the Constitution and to be read into the Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 5. 5. The respondent State took time to file their response and after filing of the counter affidavit, took further time to file supplementary counter affidavit to bring on record their stand. The matter was adjourned on more than one occasion to enable them to bring on record their stand and thereafter supplementary counter affidavit was also filed. Order nos. 4 & 5 dated 10th April 2013 and 26th April 2013 are being quoted here-under: “04/10.04.2013 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State submits that certain more facts are required to be brought on record by way of supplementary counter affidavit, for which the case may be adjourned. Accordingly, let the case appear after one week. In the meantime, as per the undertaking given by the counsel for the respondent State, no appointment shall be made to the Youth Commission. 05/26.04.2013 Learned AAG Mr. A. Allam, after some argument seeks some time to obtain instruction and if necessary file further affidavit. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also sought to address the Court by relying upon certain judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In that view of the matter, let both cases appear on 17th June 2013. In the meantime, interim order dated 10.4.2013 shall continue and parties will exchange their pleadings as also list of judgments on which they seek to rely.” 6. Writ petitions were thereafter heard and decided by the impugned judgment. The respondent State in the affidavit filed on their behalf had sought to justify the invocation of the power conferred under Rule 4(vi) of the 2012 Rules to remove the writ petitioners after giving them one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. It was also argued that it was not necessary to give opportunity of hearing to the petitioners as the impugned actions are not undertaken in exercise of Rule 4(v) for removing the Chairman or Members of the Youth Commission on established grounds of disqualification enumerated thereunder. During course of submission, learned State Counsel also submitted that appointments were made without following the proper procedure for public post. However, no foundational facts were brought on record in support of such submission even after filing of counter affidavit and supplementary counter affidavit. During course of submission, learned State Counsel also submitted that appointments were made without following the proper procedure for public post. However, no foundational facts were brought on record in support of such submission even after filing of counter affidavit and supplementary counter affidavit. In such circumstances, the writ petitions were heard and decided on the question, whether the respondent State is entitled to invoke the Doctrine of Pleasure for removing the petitioners from the post of Chairman/Member by giving them one month salary under Rule 4(vi) of the Rules 2012. This Court after discussing the relevant provisions contained in Part-XIV Chapter I of the Constitution of India which relates to service under Union and the State as also law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in that regard in a number of judgments in the case of Moti Ram Deka & others vs. North Eastern Frontier Railway & others ( AIR 1964 SC 600 ), Union of India vs. Tulsi Ram Patel [( 1985 3 SCC 398 ], B.P. Singhal vs. Union of India & another [ (2010) 6 SCC 331 ] and Delhi Transport Corporation vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress & others ( AIR 1991 SC 101 ), held that the invocation of the said Rule without giving any opportunity of hearing or notice to the petitioners, is arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice and deserves to be interfered in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This Court also found that the respondents had failed to bring on record any foundational facts / reasons for exercising such powers which could be the subject matter of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The impugned notification was accordingly quashed. Extracts of Paragraph-11, 14, 15 and 16 of the judgment impugned which deals with the question, are quoted here-under for better appreciation of the issues which were raised, canvassed and decided by this Court in the writ petitions. “11. The question, therefore, which falls for consideration is whether the respondent- State is entitled to invoke the Doctrine of Pleasure by removing the petitioners from the post of Chairman/ Members by giving them 1 month salary under Rule 4(vi) of the Rules of 2012. As stated herein above, the Rules have been framed in exercise of power under Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. As stated herein above, the Rules have been framed in exercise of power under Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The Part XIV Chapter I of the Constitution relates to the service under the Union and the State. Article 310 provides for recruitment and conditions of service of the person serving under Union or State. Article 310 provides for tenure of office of person serving under the Union or the State. It provides that any person holding any civil post under a State or Union holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the State. Article 310(2) provides that notwithstanding the person holding civil post under the Union or State and holding office during the pleasure of the President or Governor of the State, as the case may be, if the President or the Governor, as the case may be deem it necessary in order to secure services of the person having special qualification, provide for the payment to him of compensation, if before the expiration of an agreed period that post is abolished or he is, for reasons not connected with any misconduct on his part, required to vacate that post. Article 311 provides for manner in which the member of Civil service of the Union or State or holding the Civil post under the Union or State shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank. Article 311(2) provides that no such action can be taken except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The second proviso to the Article 311 provides for the conditions in which such an inquiry can be dispensed with. Article 311(2) provides that no such action can be taken except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The second proviso to the Article 311 provides for the conditions in which such an inquiry can be dispensed with. For better appreciation relevant provisions of Article 309 to 311 are quoted herein below:- “Article 309:-Recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State:- Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State: Provided that it shall be competent for the President or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, and for the Governor of a State or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, to make rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to such services and posts until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate Legislature under this article, and any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act. Article 310. Tenure of office of persons serving the Union or a State.- (1) Except as expressly provided by this Constitution, every person who is a member of a defence service or of a civil service of the Union or of an all-India service or holds any post connected with defence or any civil post under the Union holds office during the pleasure of the President, and every person who is a member of a civil service of a State or holds any civil post under a State holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the State. (2) Notwithstanding that a person holding a civil post under the Union or a State holds office during the pleasure of the President or, as the case may be, of the Governor of the State, any, contract under which a person, not being a member of a defence service or of an all-India service or of a civil service of the Union or a State, is appointed under this Constitution to hold such a post may, if the President or the Governor, as the case may be, deems it necessary in order to secure the services of a person having special qualifications, provide for the payment to him of compensation, if before the expiration of an agreed period that post is abolished or he is, for reasons not connected with any misconduct on his part, required to vacate that post. Article 311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.- (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed: Provided further that this clause shall not apply- (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) where an authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (c) where the President or Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. (3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause(2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final. 14. The existence of such rule was also subject matter for interpretation by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. & another Vrs. Brojo Nath Ganguly & another reported in A.I.R. 1986 SCC 1571(supra). In para 99 of the said report, while interpreting the provisions of Rule 9(i) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the said Rule confers absolute, arbitrary and unguided power on the Corporation and it violates one of the 2 great Rules of natural justice “audi alteram partem” Rule. Such rule was also described as “Henry VIII” clause. The said judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also been approved by the Constitution Bench in the case of Delhi Transport Corporation Vrs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress & others reported in A.I.R. 1991 SCC 101 (supra). 15. Such rule was also described as “Henry VIII” clause. The said judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also been approved by the Constitution Bench in the case of Delhi Transport Corporation Vrs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress & others reported in A.I.R. 1991 SCC 101 (supra). 15. In the facts of the present case, as has been noted herein above while invoking the said Rule without giving any opportunity of hearing or notice to the petitioners, the respondents have failed to bring on record any foundational facts or reasons for exercising such power. In other words the impugned action are not informed by any reasons which can be subject matter of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Such an arbitrary exercise of power to terminate the tenure of appointment of these petitioners prematurely without any opportunity of hearing or notice, therefore cannot be sustained in law as well as on facts. The reference of Article 310(2) by the learned counsel for the State is also wholly misplaced as admittedly the conditions prescribed under the said provisions are not applicable to the facts of the case for justifying the impugned action under the provision of Rule 4(vi) of the Rules of 2012 as the petitioners have been removed by only giving 1 month salary and not any compensation. Though the Rules have not been challenged by the petitioners but the exercise of power under the said Rules have to be inconformity with the Principle of Natural Justice by giving opportunity of hearing or notice to the petitioner and cannot be exercised in an unguided, uncanalized manner without any foundational basis for exercise of such power. Therefore, the impugned notification in exercise of powers under Rule 4(vi) of the Rules of 2012 cannot be upheld in the eye of law. In the background of the aforesaid facts , reasons and the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India on the specific issue of the scope of Doctrine of Pleasure the impugned actions are wholly unsustainable in law being arbitrary and violative of Principle of Natural Justice and deserve to interfered with in exercise of powers of judicial review under Article 226 of Constitution of India. 16. In that view of the matter, the impugned notification terminating the petitioners from the post of Chairman and members vide notification no. 21 dated 16.2.2013 is quashed. 16. In that view of the matter, the impugned notification terminating the petitioners from the post of Chairman and members vide notification no. 21 dated 16.2.2013 is quashed. Both the writ petitions are accordingly, allowed.” 7. In the Review Petitions, the review petitioner has now sought to bring on record the documents which are annexed as Annexures-3 & 4 being the notings on the file relating to the original appointment of these writ petitioners on the post of Chairman and Members of the Commission and the notings which preceded issuance of the impugned notification. 8. The review petitioner has stated that these documents were not produced at the time of hearing of the writ petitions and that they are new piece of evidence which after exercise of due diligence, are being brought on record in the interest of justice so that the impugned judgment can be reviewed in its light. 9. Learned AAG appearing on behalf of the State, has therefore assailed the impugned order on the grounds that the relevant documents which have been now brought on records as Annexures-3 & 4, would show that the writ petitioners were appointed as Chairman and Members of the Youth Commission without following the proper procedure. It is also submitted that the eligibility of these writ petitioners to be appointed as Chairman and Member of the Youth Commission is also wanting and, therefore, they had sufficient reason to justify issuance of the impugned notification invoking Rule 4(vi) of the 2012 Rules in exercise of Doctrine of Pleasure by His Excellency the Governor of Jharkhand. It is submitted that because of illegality attached to their appointment, these writ petitioners cannot be said to be holding a civil post and therefore, they could be removed without any requirement of following the principles of natural justice. It is submitted that because of illegality attached to their appointment, these writ petitioners cannot be said to be holding a civil post and therefore, they could be removed without any requirement of following the principles of natural justice. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, in support of his argument, has relied upon judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma & others ( AIR 1979 SC 1047 ), R. Vishwanatha Pillai vs. State of Kerala & others (2004) 2 SCC 105 and Hamza Haji vs. State of Kerala and another (2006) 7 SCC 416 to submit that if the appointment itself was illegal, the writ petitioners did not have a right to remain in service and therefore, notification of termination of services of the writ petitioners was fully justified in law. In these background, it is argued that the impugned judgment dated 28th June 2013 passed in the writ petitions is required to be reviewed in the interest of justice. 10. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners / respondents herein, has supported the impugned judgment. It is their categorical assertion that the issue raised before this Court in the said writ petitions were in relation to exercise of powers under Rule 4(vi) of the 2012 Rules in terminating their services as Chairman / Member of the Youth Commission. The State Respondent were allowed time to bring on record their stand including any such foundational facts which preceded the exercise for issuance of the impugned notification. The respondent State despite having been granted time on a number of occasion and even after filing of the counter affidavit and supplementary counter affidavit, had sought to justify the impugned notification in exercise of power under Rule 4(vi) of 2012 Rules by invoking Doctrine of Pleasure. The question relating to legality of appointment of the petitioners was never an issue which was heard and decided by this Court. It is submitted that the scope of judicial review is well laid down under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure wherein conditions for invoking the power of review are enumerated which also form the basis for exercise of review jurisdiction even by a Writ Court. 11. It is submitted that the scope of judicial review is well laid down under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure wherein conditions for invoking the power of review are enumerated which also form the basis for exercise of review jurisdiction even by a Writ Court. 11. In this case, it is argued that the materials which have been brought on record by way of Annexures-3 & 4 could not be said to be such documents which were not in the knowledge of the respondent State and that it could not have been produced after due diligence at the time of hearing of the said writ petitions. The review petitioner therefore cannot be allowed to improve its case at the stage of review. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners - respondents have relied upon judgments rendered in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Balapur, Mumbai vs. RDC Concrete (India) Private Limited (2011) 12 SCC 166, para-21, Parsion Devi and others vs. Sumitri Devi and others (1997) 8 SCC 715 para-9, 10 and Union of India and others vs. B. Valluvan and others (2006) 8 SCC 686 para-16. By relying upon the aforesaid judgments, it is submitted on behalf of the respondents that neither the impugned judgment suffers from any error apparent on the face of record, nor the grounds raised by the review petitioner relying upon Annexures-3 & 4 of the review petition can be said to fall in the category of grounds available under Order 47 CPC where any such documents which were not within the knowledge of the affected party even after exercise of due diligence, could be produced now at the stage of review. These documents were already there with the respondents and they have failed to bring on record at the time of hearing of the writ petitions. In any case, that cannot be a ground for review of the impugned judgment. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and gone through the relevant materials on record including the impugned judgment. The relevant facts and the issues which were raised, have been indicated in the earlier part of the judgment. In any case, that cannot be a ground for review of the impugned judgment. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and gone through the relevant materials on record including the impugned judgment. The relevant facts and the issues which were raised, have been indicated in the earlier part of the judgment. In the writ petitions, the notification dated 16th February 2013 terminating the services of the writ petitioners as Chairman and Member of the Jharkhand State Youth Commission by invoking Rule 4(vi) of the Jharkhand State Youth Commission Rules, 2012 were under consideration. The relevant facts and issues which were raised, canvassed and decided by this Court in the said writ petitions have been also discussed in the earlier part of the judgment. As already noticed herein above, the question which was decided by the writ court in the said writ petitions by the impugned judgment was whether the respondent State is entitled to invoke Doctrine of Pleasure for removing the writ petitioners from the post of Chairman and Member by giving them one month notice or salary under Rules 4(vi) of 2012 Rules? 13. This Court after discussing the scope of Doctrine of Pleasure, as conceived under the Constitution of India, and contained in Part XIV Chapter I of the Constitution of India which relates to the service of Union and State, as also after discussing the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its constitution bench judgment rendered in the case of Moti Ram Deka (Supra) and in the case of Delhi Transport Corporation (Supra) as also other judgments referred to therein, came to the definite conclusion that the Doctrine of Pleasure as conceived under the Constitution of India, is not an unqualified and absolute power. They are subject to restriction imposed by the Constitution and are to be read into the Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, it was found that the impugned notification have been issued invoking such Doctrine of Pleasure by the respondent State in violation of the Principles of Natural Justice without any notice or opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioners. In such circumstances, such exercise of power invoking Rule 4(vi) of 2012 Rules by the respondent State/review petitioner herein, was found to be unsustainable in law and was accordingly quashed. 14. In such circumstances, such exercise of power invoking Rule 4(vi) of 2012 Rules by the respondent State/review petitioner herein, was found to be unsustainable in law and was accordingly quashed. 14. From the aforesaid elaborate discussions, it is therefore apparent that the question relating to appointment of the writ petitioners as Chairman and Member of the Youth Commission were not an issue raised, canvassed and decided by this Court. As a matter of fact, this Court did not make any comment upon the appointment of these writ petitioners as Chairman / Member of the Youth Commission. The only issue which was decided by this Court, was in relation to exercise of power under Rule 4(vi) of 2012 Rules by which services of the writ petitioners were terminated. 15. In the present review petitions, documents vide Annexures-3 & 4 which have been brought on record, are not such documents which were not within the knowledge of the respondent State and even after exercise of due diligence, could not be produced at the time when the writ petitions were heard and decided. So, the review petitioner cannot be allowed to rely upon the aforesaid provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure in order to seek review of the impugned judgment in question on that ground. Even otherwise, it is not a case of the review petitioner that the impugned judgment suffers from any error apparent on the face of record. The provisions under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure is being quoted here-under: ORDER XLVII REVIEW 1. Even otherwise, it is not a case of the review petitioner that the impugned judgment suffers from any error apparent on the face of record. The provisions under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure is being quoted here-under: ORDER XLVII REVIEW 1. Application for review of judgment.- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or couldn't be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply of a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. 16. The words “any other sufficient reason” as contained in Order XLVII CPC has been interpreted in the case of Chhajju Ram vs. Neki (AIR 1922 PC 112) approved by the Apex Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most. Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors (1955) 1 SCR 520 , to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. Even judgment relied upon by the review petitioner in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma (Supra) also reiterates the same view. These principles have been reiterated by the Apex Court from time to time. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in a recent judgment rendered in the case of Kamlesh Verma versus Mayawati & Ors. Even judgment relied upon by the review petitioner in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma (Supra) also reiterates the same view. These principles have been reiterated by the Apex Court from time to time. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in a recent judgment rendered in the case of Kamlesh Verma versus Mayawati & Ors. reported in JT 2013 (12) 155 after elaborate discussion on the powers and scope of review, summarized the principles under which the review is maintainable. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also enumerated the grounds when the review will not be maintainable. Opinion of the Hon'ble Apex Court, as rendered by His Lordship P. Sathasivam, CJI at para-16 is quoted here-under as they lay down the principles which can be the basis for exercise of such powers of review. “16. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: (A) When the review will be maintainable:- (I) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chhajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most. Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors (1955) 1 SCR 520 , to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same Principles have been reiterated in Union of India vs. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors., JT 2013 (8) SC 275 (B) When the review will not be maintainable:- (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor Mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii)The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 17. In the aforesaid background and discussions made herein above, the review petitioner has failed to make out any ground for review of the impugned judgment in question. Accordingly, review petitions are dismissed. 18. As already observed herein above, the impugned judgment had not dealt with the issue relating to the original appointment of the writ petitioners as Chairman and Member of the Youth Commission. An interlocutory application being I.A. No. 7767/2013 in Civil Review No. 56/2013 has been filed on behalf of the writ petitioners stating therein that after passing of the judgment in the writ petitions, notices have been issued to the writ petitioners by the competent authority of the State of Jharkhand asking them to explain as to why their services be not terminated as they do not possess the necessary eligibility criteria and qualification for the said post. As it appears, respondent no. 1- writ petitioner is said to have filed his reply to the said show-cause. That might be an independent cause of action for the respondents herein to agitate and this Court refrains from commenting anything upon such exercise by the respondent State in the present review petitions. In such circumstances, the interim order dated 03rd October 2013 passed in the instant review petitions by which State authorities were restrained from taking any final decision in the matter pursuant to such notice, is vacated. Accordingly, I.A. No. 7767/2013 stands dismissed.