D. D. Rampure (Devi Dayal Rampure) v. State of M. P.
2013-09-25
SUJOY PAUL
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER By filing this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has called in question legality, validity and propriety of the order dated 17.10.2012 (Annexure P/1). Consequential order Annexure P/2 dated 12.11.2012 is also assailed in this petition. 2. The petitioner a Sub Registrar was served with a charge sheet under Rule 14 of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. Against the said charge sheet (Annexure P/3) petitioner submitted his reply and denied the charges in toto. Thereafter, the respondent No. 2 Inspector General, Registration & Superintendent Stamps instituted a departmental enquiry against the petitioner. In turn, the enquiry officer submitted his report Annexure PI 6. In his detailed report, running in six pages, the enquiry officer exonerated the petitioner from the charges and opined that the charges are not established against the petitioner. The said report was brought to the notice of the disciplinary authority/respondent No. 2. The said authority, after considering the enquiry report, passed a detailed order running in four pages, whereby enquiry against the petitioner was dropped. Thereafter by order dated 17.10.2012 (Annexure P/1) same authority/respondent No. 2 directed that after examining the department enquiry of the petitioner, which was closed and dropped by order dated 21.07.2011, it is felt necessary to examine certain more points and, therefore, matter needs to be remitted back to the enquiry officer. It is stated that after obtaining permission of review from the State Government, the matter is reviewed and is remitted back to conduct further enquiry on certain points as mentioned in Annexure P/1. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that after passing the order Annexure P/7 dated 21.07.2011 the disciplinary authority/respondent No. 2 has no authority to pass the order Annexure P/1. He submits that there exists no enabling provision in MPCS (CCA) Rules to reopen the enquiry which was dropped by Annexure P/7 by same authority. 4. Per Contra, Smt. Sangeeta Pachauri, Dy. Govt. Advocate submits that order Annexure P/1 is in consonance with Rule 29 of the CCA Rules. By placing reliance on Annexure R/1 dated 10th September, 2012, it is contended that the State Government permitted the respondent No. 2 to review the matter and therefore, the order of the disciplinary authority is in consonance with Rule 29 of CCA rules. 5. I have bestowed my anxious consideration on the rival contentions of the parties and perused the record.
5. I have bestowed my anxious consideration on the rival contentions of the parties and perused the record. 6. This is not in dispute between the parties that the petitioner was subjected to disciplinary proceedings pursuant to charge sheet Annexure P/3. The enquiry officer exonerated the petitioner vide Annexure P/6 and the disciplinary authority dropped the enquiry by accepting said enquiry report. The singular question to be decided in this matter is whether as per CCA Rules it was open to the disciplinary authority to reopen the enquiry and direct further enquiry by commanding enquiry officer to inquire certain more points as mentioned in Annexure P/1. Whole stand of the respondents is that it is in consonance with Rule 29 of CCA Rules. In the return, the stand of the respondents is that the power exercised by respondent No. 2 is flowing from Rule 29(1)(iii). However, I am not impressed with this contention. Rule 29(1) (iii) makes it clear that the said power is vested with the appellate authority. The appellate authority within six months from the date of order can exercise the power of review. Respondent No. 2 is admittedly a disciplinary authority and acted in that capacity when he accepted the enquiry report and dropped the enquiry proceedings vide Annexure P/7. Authority who has already acted as disciplinary authority, by no stretch of imagination can become appellate authority in the same department enquiry. Thus, this contention is without any substance. 7. It is apt to quote relevant portion of Rule 29 of CCA Rules which reads as under: 29.
Authority who has already acted as disciplinary authority, by no stretch of imagination can become appellate authority in the same department enquiry. Thus, this contention is without any substance. 7. It is apt to quote relevant portion of Rule 29 of CCA Rules which reads as under: 29. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules except rule 11- (i) the Governor; or (ii) the head of a department directly under the State Government, in the case of a Government servant serving in a department or office (not being the secretariat), under the control of such head of a department, or (iii) the appellate authority, within six months of the date of the order proposed to be reviewed, or (iv) any other authority specified in this behalf by the Governor by a general or special order, and within such time as may be prescribed in such general or special order may at any time, either on his or its own motion or otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and review any order made under these rules or under the rules repealed by Rule 34 from which an appeal is allowed but from which no appeal has been preferred or from, which no appeal is allowed, after consultation with the Commission where such consultation in necessary, and may- (a) confirm, modify or set aside the order; or (b).... (c) remit the case to the authority which made the order as to any other authority directing such authority to make such further inquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case; or (d) pass such other orders as it may deem fit. Provided further that no power to review shall be exercised by the head of department unless- (i) the authority which made the order in appeal; or (ii) the authority to which an appeal would lie, where no appeal has been preferred, is subordinate to him. (Emphasize supplied) 8. A microscopic reading of this provision shows that the power of review can be exercised by head of the department in certain circumstances. The second proviso makes it clear that no order can be reviewed by the head of the department when the order impugned is not passed by the authority who is not subordinate to him.
(Emphasize supplied) 8. A microscopic reading of this provision shows that the power of review can be exercised by head of the department in certain circumstances. The second proviso makes it clear that no order can be reviewed by the head of the department when the order impugned is not passed by the authority who is not subordinate to him. Putting it differently, if the order under review is not passed by the authority who is subordinate to the head of the department, power of review cannot be exercised. In the context of Rule 29, the intention of lawmakers is clear that power of review cannot be permitted to be exercised by the head of the department when the order under review is not passed by any authority inferior/subordinate to him. In the present case, the disciplinary authority passed the order Annexure P/7 and now in the capacity of reviewing authority, he cannot decide the correctness, legality and propriety of its own order. 9. Powers of disciplinary authority are defined in Rule 15 of CCA Rules, 1966. In the considered opinion of this Court, after passing the order of punishment or exoneration on enquiry officer's report, disciplinary authority becomes functions officio. No other enabling provision is brought to the notice of this Court which may enable the disciplinary authority to recall, review or modify its own order and direct the further enquiry on charges from which the petitioner has been exonerated. 10. The Apex Court in (2002) 10 SCC 471 (Union of India Vs. D.K. Pandey and another) opined that it is clear that when specific findings have been given in respect of each of the charges after discussing the matter, the disciplinary authority if not satisfied with the said report, cannot remit the matter to the enquiring authority for further enquiry. The said second enquiry intended to be conducted by the railway administration, was disapproved approved by the Supreme Court. In (2007) 11 SCC 517 (Kanailal Bera) Vs. Union of India) Apex Court opined that second enquiry on the same charges which could not be proved in first enquiry is impermissible. Punjab High Court in AIR 1991 P&H 23 (Mewa Singh, Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Chhatar Block Vs. Secretary, Development and Panchayat Dept, Govt. of Harayana and others) has taken the similar view. 11.
Union of India) Apex Court opined that second enquiry on the same charges which could not be proved in first enquiry is impermissible. Punjab High Court in AIR 1991 P&H 23 (Mewa Singh, Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Chhatar Block Vs. Secretary, Development and Panchayat Dept, Govt. of Harayana and others) has taken the similar view. 11. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, in my opinion, HOD has clearly erred in reopening the enquiry which was concluded by him by order Annexure P/7. The State Government, by office order or executive instruction cannot create jurisdiction in favour of HOD. The power of reviewing authority is to be addressed from enabling provision i.e. Rule 29 of CCA Rules. As per the said rules, as analyzed, reviewing authority has committed error of law in passing the impugned order. 12. Resultantly, impugned order Annexure P/1 cannot be permitted to stand. It is hereby set aside. Petition is allowed. No Cost.