ORDER Ravi Malimath, J. 1. A complaint under Sections- 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act') was registered against the petitioner who was working as a Junior Engineer for the Town Municipal Corporation, Athani. Investigation was conducted and a charge-sheet was filed. By an order dated 26.03.2011, the IVth Additional District Judge and Special Judge, Belgaum in Special Case No. 78/2008, found the petitioner guilty of the offence punishable under Section- 7 of the Act and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 1 1/2 years and pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, and in default of payment of the fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of three months. For offence punishable under Section- 13 of the Act, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 2 1/2 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of the fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of 6 months. 2. By an order dated 27.07.2011, the petitioner was terminated from service. He challenged the same before the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal, wherein by an order dated 02.03.2012, the Tribunal dismissed the application with an opportunity to approach the appropriate forum. Hence he approached the appellate authority. Thereafter, by the impugned order dated 27.07.2011, the second respondent terminated the services of the petitioner. Questioning the same, the present writ petition is filed. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that aggrieved by the conviction, the petitioner has filed Criminal Appeal No. 2651/2011, and by the order dated 20.04.2011, the conviction and sentence was suspended. He therefore contends that in view of the suspension of the conviction itself, the question of terminating the petitioner does not arise. 4. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that aggrieved by the conviction, the petitioner has filed Criminal Appeal No. 2651/2011, and by the order dated 20.04.2011, the conviction and sentence was suspended. He therefore contends that in view of the suspension of the conviction itself, the question of terminating the petitioner does not arise. 4. In support of his case reliance is placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2007 (2) SCC 574 , in the case of Navjot Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab and Another, with particular reference to para-5 of the judgment, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court therein referred to the observations made in an earlier case of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2007 (1) SCC 673 , in the case of Ravikant S. Path v. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali, wherein it was held as follows: 15(11) It deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case. Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. An order of stay, of course, does not render the conviction non-existent, but only non-operative. 5. Therefore, it is pleaded that since the conviction has been stayed, no termination can be passed on the same. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the respondent is erroneous and that the order of termination be set-aside. 6. Respondent No. 2 is served and unrepresented. The learned Government Advocate appearing for respondent No. 1 defends the impugned order. He contends that the question of reinstating the petitioner back into service does not arise. That once a conviction order has been passed by the Court, the same has to be necessarily gone into. In support of the same, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in, AIR 1995 SC 1364 , in the case of Deputy Director of Collegiate Education (Administration), Madras v. S. Nagoor Meera, with reference to para-10, to contend that until and unless the conviction is set-aside, it is not advisable to retain such a person in service. Para-10 of the judgment reads as follows: 10. Para-10 of the judgment reads as follows: 10. What is really relevant thus is the conduct of the government servant which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. Now, in this case, the respondent has been found guilty of corruption by a criminal court. Until the said conviction is set-aside by the appellate or other higher court, it may not be advisable to retain such person in service. As stated above, if he succeeds in appeal or other proceeding, the matter can always be reviewed in such a manner that he suffers no prejudice. 7. It is therefore pleaded that there is no error committed by the respondent in passing the impugned order. 8. On examining the impugned order, the same narrates the manner in which the proceedings took place and the apparent conviction of the petitioner. Reference is made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 770/2001, which is a reported judgment in 2001 Crl.L.J. 4234, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the same issue on hand, was of the view that only because an appellate or revisional court has decided to entertain an order of conviction, a public servant could not be reinstated into service. That if he is held to do so, the public will suffer and sometimes irreparable. That it would impair the morale of the other persons manning such office and that he being a man under conviction would have to issue orders to juniors. Therefore, the Court should not aid public servants who stands convicted until he is exonerated. 9. It was held at Para 11 as follows: 11. Corruption by public servants has now reached a monstrous dimension in India. Its tentacles have started grappling even the Institutions created for the protection of the republic. Unless those tentacles are intercepted and impeded from gripping the normal and orderly functioning of the public offices, through strong legislative, executive as well as judicial exercises the corrupt public servants could even paralyse the functioning of such institutions and thereby hinder the democratic polity. Proliferation of corrupt public servants could garner momentum to cripple the social order if such men are allowed to continue to manage and operate public institutions. Proliferation of corrupt public servants could garner momentum to cripple the social order if such men are allowed to continue to manage and operate public institutions. When a public servant was found guilty of corruption after a judicial adjudicatory process conducted by a court of law, judiciousness demands that he should be treated as corrupt until he is exonerated by a superior Court. The mere fact that an appellate or revisional forum has decided to entertain his challenge and to go into the issues and findings made against such public servants once again should not even temporarily absolve him from such findings. If such a public servant becomes entitled to hold public office and to continue to do official acts until he is judicially absolved from such findings by reason of suspension of the order of conviction it is public interest which suffers and sometimes even irreparably. When a public servant who is convicted of corruption is allowed to continue to hold public office it would impair the morale of the other persons manning such office, and consequently that would erode the already shrunk confidence of the people in such public institutions besides demoralising the other honest public servants who would either be the colleagues or subordinates of the convicted person. If honest public servants are compelled to take orders from proclaimed corrupt officers on account of the suspension of the conviction the fall out would be one of shaking the system itself Hence it is necessary that the Court should not aid the public servant who stands convicted for corruption charges to hold any public office until he is exonerated after conducting a judicial adjudication at the appellate or revisional level. It is a different matter if a corrupt public officer could continue to hold such public office even without the help of a Court order suspending the conviction. 10. Under these circumstances, Tarn of the considered view that the order of the respondent is in tune with the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to herein above. The contention of the petitioner that once a conviction has been stayed, the petitioner would have to be reverted back to the position or his position should not be disturbed, cannot be accepted in the face of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself. 11. The contention of the petitioner that once a conviction has been stayed, the petitioner would have to be reverted back to the position or his position should not be disturbed, cannot be accepted in the face of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself. 11. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Navjot Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab and Another is only to the extent wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when a conviction is stayed the effect is that the conviction is not operative from the date of stay. The consequence of the conviction and as to whether a public servant convicted on a corruption charge is entitled to hold public office or can be terminated is answered by the earlier judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as referred to herein above. In fact the judgment in the case of K.C. Sareen v. C.B.I., Chandigarh, was referred to with approval in the subsequent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Under these circumstances, Tarn of the considered view that there is no error committed by the respondents in the impugned order that calls for interference in this writ petition. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court covers the issue on hand. No employee could be entitled to continue in the service only because his conviction has been stayed. Under these circumstances, I do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order. The writ petition being devoid of merits is dismissed.