JUDGMENT Alok Aradhe, J.:- This appeal is by defendants No. 1, 2 and 5, which was admitted on following substantial questions of law: - “1. Whether in view of the averments in para-9 of the plaint, the defendants were put in possession as Adhiyadar sharing crops till 1983, being in contravention of section 168 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, the appellants defendants have acquired the status of occupancy tenant and by operation of law the Bhumi Swami? 2. Whether the approach of both the Courts below with respect of section 21 of the Rewa Registration Act is sustainable in view of the provision of section 1 of the same Act ?” 2. Facts leading to filing of the appeal briefly stated are that the original plaintiff filed a suit on the ground that suit lands admeasuring 2.67 acres were allotted on lease to his father namely Bhura and defendant No. 1's grandfather namely Babadeen some time in the year 1924-25, who had half share each in the suit lands. It was further pleaded that Bhura died 40 years ago and on his death, his interest in the suit land devolved on plaintiff namely Ramsajivan. On Babadeen's death his interest in the suit lands devolved on defendants No. 1 and 2's father namely Bhagwatdeen and after his death, on defendant's No. 1 and 2. It was also pleaded that parties were in joint possession of the suit lands. However, in the year 1970, the original plaintiff suffered from leprosy and was unable to carry out the agricultural operations and, therefore, handed over the suit lands for cultivation to defendants in lieu of which defendants agreed to share the crop. However, defendants No. 1 and 2 got prepared a forged sale deed and got their name mutated in the revenue records. In the year 1983, the defendants No. 1 and 2 refused to share the proceeds of the crop from the suit lands. The plaintiff therefore filed the suit seeking the relief of declaration that order of mutation in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2 is null and void. The plaintiff also sought the relief of possession, damages and mesne-profits. 3. The plaintiff therefore filed the suit seeking the relief of declaration that order of mutation in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2 is null and void. The plaintiff also sought the relief of possession, damages and mesne-profits. 3. The defendants No. 1 and 2 filed the written statement in which inter alia it was pointed out that Ramsajivan in the year 1946 had sold his share in the suit land to Bhagwatdeen for a consideration of 85 vide Ex. D/1 and since then, Bhagwatdeen is in possession of the suit land as owner thereof. It was further pleaded that in the year 1966, defendants No. 1 and 2 sold the land admeasuring 1.29 acres to one Rajkishore and the order of mutation dated 4-11-1970 has been passed with the consent of the plaintiff. Alternatively, the plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession was also taken in the written statement. 4. The trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 12-3-1998 inter alia held that execution of sale deed Ex. D/1 has not been proved as neither the scribe nor any person conversant with the signature of the witnesses to the sale deed has been examined by defendants No. 1 and 2. It was further held that since 1947 till 1985, the sale deed (Ex. D/1) did not see the light of the day and was produced for the first time in the year 1985. It was also held that if any document was executed in the year 1946 for a consideration of more than 25, the same required registration in view of Rewa Registration Act, 1917 and since Ex. D/1 i.e. the sale deed is unregistered, therefore, the same was excluded from consideration. The trial Court further held that plaintiff and defendants No. 1 and 2 were in joint cultivating possession, therefore, the plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession cannot be accepted. The aforesaid decree has been affirmed in appeal. 5. D/1 i.e. the sale deed is unregistered, therefore, the same was excluded from consideration. The trial Court further held that plaintiff and defendants No. 1 and 2 were in joint cultivating possession, therefore, the plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession cannot be accepted. The aforesaid decree has been affirmed in appeal. 5. Learned senior counsel for the appellants while inviting the attention of this Court to para 9 of the plaint as well as section 168 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, submitted that the plaintiff and his son Rambahadur were co-owners and since Rambahadur did not suffer from any disability, therefore, the land in question were leased out to defendants No. 1 and 2 in violation of section 168 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 and therefore, the defendants had become Bhumiswamis in respect of lands in question. Learned senior counsel for the appellants while referring to paragraph 224 of the Mullas Hindu Law 17th Edition, further submitted that under the Mitakshara law each son upon his birth takes an interest equal to that of his father in ancestral property, whether it be movable or immovable. It was contended that the right which the son takes at his birth in the ancestral property is wholly independent of his father and he does not claim through his father and the Courts below wrongly excluded the document Ex. D/1 i.e. the sale deed for want of registration as there is no material on record to show that the usufruct in respect of the property in question is more than 25 per annum. It was pointed out that the document in question was executed in the year 1946 and the provisions of Transfer of Property Act were made applicable to Vindhya Pradesh region w.e.f. 16-4-1950. Therefore, registration of sale deed was not required. Lastly, it was urged that plaintiff may fall back upon the plea taken by defendants if no prejudice is caused to the defendants. In support of his submissions, learned senior counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on decisions of Supreme Court in Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1967 SC 1910 and Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad and others, AIR 1951 SC 177 . 6. In support of his submissions, learned senior counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on decisions of Supreme Court in Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1967 SC 1910 and Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad and others, AIR 1951 SC 177 . 6. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the respondents while inviting the attention of this Court to averments made in the plaint in paragraphs 3, 4, 7, 9, 10 and 11 and the averments contained in paragraphs 3, 4, 7, 9-A, 10 and 26 of the written statement submitted that the parties cannot be permitted to travel beyond the pleadings and set up a new case. It is submitted that in view of the pleadings of the parties and in the facts of the case, the provisions of section 168 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code do not apply. It is further submitted that since defendants were in possession of the land as owners since 1946, therefore, the question of the plaintiff letting out the land to them on lease does not arise as per the version of the defendants themselves. It is also urged that in view of section 25 of the Rewa Registration Act, 1917, the document Ex. D/1 required compulsory registration and therefore, the same was rightly excluded from consideration by the Courts below. It is also submitted that the Courts below have found the document Ex. D/1 to be suspicious and have held that same has not been proved. However, the aforesaid finding has not been assailed by the appellants. It was pointed out that the document Ex. D/1 is not properly stamped and, therefore, the same cannot be looked into even for colateral purposes and the plaintiff cannot be permitted to raise a new plea for the first time in the Second Appeal. In support of his submissions, learned senior counsel for the respondents have placed reliance on Mohammad Bagar and others v. Maimun-Nisa Bibi and others, AIR 1956 SC 548 , Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and others, (1976) 4 SCC 184 , FGP Ltd. v. Saleh Hooseini Doctor, (2009) 10 SCC 223 , Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak and others, (1977) 2 SCC 814 , Jai Singh and others v. Gurmej Singh, (2009) 15 SCC 747 , Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779 , Ram Rattan v. Parma Nand, AIR (33) 1946 PC 51 and Jagdish Prasad v. Kanhaiyalal @ Kandhai and others, 2013(3) MPLJ 6191. 7. I have considered the respective submissions made by learned senior counsel for the parties and have perused the records. It is well settled in law that the parties cannot be permitted to travel beyond the pleadings. It is trite law that in the absence of any pleading, no amount of evidence adduced by the parties can be looked into. See: Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College and others, AIR 1987 SC 1242 . In this context, the pleadings of the parties may be seen. In para 7 of the plaint, the plaintiff has averred that the plaintiffs father and defendant No. 1 and 2's grandfather were in joint cultivating possession of the suit lands and after their death, the plaintiffs and Bhagwatdeen were in joint cultivating possession of the suit land. It has further been pleaded that suit lands have not been subjected to partition amongst the plaintiff and defendants No. 1 and 2 till filing of the suit and the same continued to be in joint cultivating possession. The averments made in para 7 of the plaint have been admitted by the defendants No. 1 and 2 in para 7 of the written statement. The admission in pleadings stand on a higher footing and are binding on the parties and constitute waiver of proof. See: Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Iccharam alias Brijram and others, AIR 1974 SC 471 . In paragraph 9 of the plaint, it has been stated that plaintiff sometime in the year 1967-68 suffered from leprosy and was unable to carry on the agricultural operations; therefore, he handed over the suit land to the defendants for cultivation and agreed to take his share in the crops. In para 9-A of the written statement, the aforesaid averment has been denied and it has been pleaded that plaintiff's father in the year 1946 sold the suit land vide sale deed for a consideration of 85 and placed the defendants No. 1 and 2 in possession. Thus, the fact that the suit lands were in joint cultivating possession of the parties till same were allegedly sold in the year 1946 to defendant No. 1 and 2's father is admitted. 8. Thus, the fact that the suit lands were in joint cultivating possession of the parties till same were allegedly sold in the year 1946 to defendant No. 1 and 2's father is admitted. 8. The relevant extract of section 168 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 reads as under: - “168. Leases. - (1) Except in cases provided for in sub-section (2), no Bhumiswami shall lease any land comprised in his holding for more than one year during any consecutive period of the three years: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to the lease of any land - (i) made by Bhumiswami who is a member of a registered Cooperative Farming Society to such Society; (ii) held by a Bhumiswami for non-agricultural purposes. Explanation. - For the purposes of this section - (a) “lease” means a transfer of a right to enjoy any land, made for a certain time, expressed or implied in consideration of a price paid or promised or of money or any other thing of value to be given periodically to the transferer by the transferee who accepts the transfer on such terms, (b) any arrangement whereby a person cultivates any land of a Bhumiswami with bullocks belonging to or procured by such person (lessee) and on condition of this giving a specified-share of the produce of the land to the Bhumiswami shall be deemed to be a lease, (c) the grant of a right merely to cut grass or to graze cattle or to grow 'Singhara' or to propagate or collect lac, pluck or collect tendu leaves shall not be deemed to be a lease of the land. (2) A Bhumiswami who is - (i) a widow; or (ii) an unmarried woman; or (iii) a married woman who has been deserted by her husband; or (iv) a minor; or (v) a person subject to physical or mental disability due to old age or otherwise; or (vi) a person detained or imprisoned under any process of law; or (vii) a person in the service of Armed Forces of the Union; or (viii) a public, charitable or religious institution; or (ix) a local authority or a Co-operative Society; may lease the whole or any part of his holding: Provided that where a holding is held jointly by more than one person the provisions of this sub-section shall not be applicable unless all such persons belong to any one or more of the classes aforesaid: Provided further that any lease made in pursuance of this subsection shall cease to be in force after one year of the determination of the disability by death or otherwise”. 9. In the instant case, admittedly, the original plaintiff's father and defendant No. 1 and 2's grandfather were in joint cultivating possession of the land in question. From close scrutiny of averments made in paragraph 9 of the plaint, it is evident that the plaintiff has not set up the case that the suit lands were leased out to the defendants and since the co-owners did not belong to the category specified in section 168(2) of the Code, therefore, the provisions of section 168 of the Code have no application to the facts of the case. Accordingly, the first substantial question of law framed by this Court is answered in the negative and against the appellants. 10. The relevant extract of section 1 of the Rewa Registration Act, 1917 reads as under: - “1. Registry of the following writing will be compulsory. (ka) Writing relating to immovable property valued 25 deriving yearly profit - ka (kha) Writing relating to movable property value 50/- - Kha (Ga) Any sentence of part (ka) and (kha) of this section will not be applicable to the following writings. That is registry of the following writings is not compulsory. 1. Writing for compromise 2. Any agreement through which right accrued to obtain any writing described in part (ka) of this section. 3. Decrees and order of the Court and Pancyati Faisla. 4. That is registry of the following writings is not compulsory. 1. Writing for compromise 2. Any agreement through which right accrued to obtain any writing described in part (ka) of this section. 3. Decrees and order of the Court and Pancyati Faisla. 4. Sanad issued by Government in respect of giving immovable or movable property. 5. Writing of partition of goods by officer. 6. Any writing on the back of mortgage through which recovery of all or some amount of the mortgage may be accepted and any receipt regarding recovery of mortgage or that of sale and any receipt acknowledging receipt of cash. 7. Auction certificate in the name of purchaser relating to any property auctioned by officer of goods or civil.” Section 25 of the Act reads as under: - “Registry will be of what type - Section 25 There will be two types of Registry one optional i.e. as of right and second compulsory i.e. necessary. Registry will be as of right up to 50 cash and 25 yearly profit i.e. what wishes the executor of the document may do so and if he does not wish then nothing is essential. Such document will not be understood illegal but which document is in respect of profit more than cash of 50 and more than land profit of 25 then its registry is necessary i.e. such document without registry will be understood illegal in Court - (ka) Exemption - If without comment it is admitted as registered then it will be capable of solemn affirmation.” From a conjoint reading of section 1 and section 25 of the Act, it is evident that any document relating to immovable property which derives yearly profit of 25 is required to be compulsorily registered. If section 25 is read to mean that a property of more than 50 in value requires compulsory registration, the same would be in conflict of section 1 of the Act. It is the duty of the Courts to avoid “a head on clash” between two sections of the same Act and, “whenever it is possible to do so, to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise”. See: Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Justice G.P. Singh, 13th Edition. There is no material on record to show that the property in question was yielding income of 25 per annum, therefore, the document Ex. See: Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Justice G.P. Singh, 13th Edition. There is no material on record to show that the property in question was yielding income of 25 per annum, therefore, the document Ex. D/1 did not require compulsory registration. It is pertinent to mention here that provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 as well as the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 were made applicable to Vindhya Pradesh region by section 3 of Part-C State (Laws) Act, 1950 w.e.f. 16-4-1950. The document Ex. D/1 has been executed in the year 1946, therefore, the same neither required registration nor required payment of stamp duty as per the provisions of Indian Stamp Act, 1899. For the aforementioned reasons, the second substantial question of law framed by this Court is answered in the negative and in favour of the appellants. 11. Though the second substantial question of law has been answered in favour of the appellants, yet the same is of no assistance to them, as mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not dispense with its proof. See: Sait Tarajee Khimchand and others v. Yelamarti Satyam and others, AIR 1971 SC 1865 and Gwalior Ceramic and Potteries Pvt. Ltd. v. Karamchand Thapar and Bros. Coal Sales Ltd., Gwalior, 1996 MPLJ 772 . Both the Courts below on meticulous appreciation of evidence on record have held that the defendants have failed to prove the execution of the document Ex. D/1, as neither the scribe nor the attesting witnesses have been examined. The defendants have also not examined any witnesses who were conversant with the handwriting of either the scribe or the attesting witnesses, in case the attesting witnesses to the sale deed had expired. The Courts below have also taken into account the evidence of DW-1 Mahesh Prasad who in paragraphs 12 and 13 of his evidence has admitted that he has not produced the sale deed (Ex. D/1) before the competent authority at any point of time. Thus, the document which was executed in the year 1946 saw the light of the day in the year 1985 i.e. nearly after a period 39 years. 12. For the aforementioned reasons, I do not find any merit in the appeal. The same fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.