JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kumar, J. The petitioner, invoking writ jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has prayed for quashing of an order dated 10.7.1998 passed by the Deputy Development Commissioner cum Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Khagaria, whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service with immediate effect. The petitioner has further prayed for commanding the respondent to allow the petitioner to continue on the post of Chaukidar, Zila Parishad, Inspection Bunglow, Gogri without any break. Short fact of the case as pleaded in the writ petition is that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Chaukidar, Inspection Bunglow, Gogri, in the month of February, 1983 on compassionate ground. The grand father of the petitioner namely Doman Ali while functioning as Chaukidar, Inspection Bungalow, Gogri, died due to cancer on 6.8.1981 and thereafter, the petitioner who was looking after his grand mother, was appointed on compassionate ground. He thereafter, worked at different places continuously without any break and he received salary up to the month of October, 1993 and thereafter he was not paid salary till the date of filing of the writ petition. As per petitioner vide letter dated 3.5.1995 (Annexure-5) he was directed to submit his appointment letter and also to give explanation with regard to discrepancy in respect of his date of birth. He gave explanation along with an affidavit stating therein that his appointment letter was misplaced. It was also indicated that his correct date of birth was 28.4.1964 as mentioned in the certificate of Class VII and date of birth mentioned in the matriculation certificate i.e. 1.1.1967 was incorrect, even thereafter, by order contained in Annexure-1 he was dismissed from service. 2. Sri Laxmi Narayan Das, learned counsel for the petitioner while assailing the order has firstly argued that the order impugned whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from service has been passed without initiating departmental proceeding and as such order impugned is liable to be set aside. He submits that petitioner being grand son of the deceased employee was appointed on compassionate ground in the year 1983 itself and he without any break was continuously discharging his duty till the date of order of dismissal, and as such, the order impugned is contrary to the principle of natural justice. He submits that petitioner being grand son of the deceased employee was appointed on compassionate ground in the year 1983 itself and he without any break was continuously discharging his duty till the date of order of dismissal, and as such, the order impugned is contrary to the principle of natural justice. It was argued that though at the time of initial appointment of the petitioner in the year 1983 grand son of deceased employee was not entitled for being appointed on compassionate ground but subsequently in the year 1995 the Government of Bihar had come out with an instruction whereby grand son was also made eligible to be appointed on compassionate ground. According to Sri Das since the petitioner has continued on his post for such a long time and even before order of dismissal the notification was issued enabling grand son of deceased employee to be appointed on compassionate ground, the petitioner was not required to be dismissed on such ground. He further submits that it is true that before the authority concerned certificates showing contradictory date of birth of the petitioner were brought on record but in the matriculation certificate of the petitioner error had occurred in respect of date of birth of the petitioner. The petitioner's correct date of birth as 28.4.1964 was recorded in the school leaving certificate, which was initially produced by the petitioner at the time of his appointment. However, subsequently in the matriculation certificate date of birth of the petitioner was incorrectly recorded as 1.1.1967. After noticing that error had occurred in the matriculation certificate the petitioner tried to get the same corrected and as such he approached the Zila Parishad for returning the same (matriculation certificate) so that he may take steps for getting the date of birth corrected in the matriculation certificate. Despite his best effort Zila Parishad had never returned the said matriculation certificate. According to learned counsel for the petitioner in view of date of birth recorded in the school leaving certificate the petitioner had attained majority at the time of appointment. In any event appointment of the petitioner made long back was not required to be interfered with. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that government circular dated 20th December 1995 entitling even maternal grand son in addition to wife, son, daughter etc. In any event appointment of the petitioner made long back was not required to be interfered with. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that government circular dated 20th December 1995 entitling even maternal grand son in addition to wife, son, daughter etc. for being appointed on compassionate ground was noticed by a single bench of this court in a case reported in Gangia Devi and Another Vs. The State of Bihar and Others, (2005) 3 PLJR 124 . He submits that from the government circular itself it has been noticed by this court that even maternal grand son was entitled to be appointed on compassionate ground. He further submits that keeping in view the fact that subsequently in the year 1995 the grand children were made entitled for being appointed on compassionate ground, the petitioner's appointment though made in the year 1983 without such provision was legalized by virtue of notification by the Government of Bihar in the year 1995. He has referred to paragraph No. 6, 7 and 9 of Division Bench judgment of this court reported in Brajendra Prasad Poddar Vs. The State of Bihar and Others (1990) 2 PLJR 668 , He has further relied on a single bench judgment of this court reported in Bivekanand Singh and Another Vs. State of Bihar and Others, He submits that since it was appointment on compassionate ground and there is no allegation against the petitioner that he misrepresented before the authority concerned for being appointed on compassionate ground though he was grand son of the deceased employee, after allowing the petitioner to continue in service for such a long time, the petitioner's appointment only on the ground that at the relevant time grand son was not entitled to be appointed on compassionate ground may not be questioned. Lastly it has been argued that though he was dismissed from service by the impugned order i.e. Annexure-1 in the year 1998, by virtue of order of stay passed by this court the petitioner is still continuing on the said post and accordingly at this stage i.e. after such a long time the appointment of the petitioner may not be disturbed and the order impugned may be set aside. Sri Das has also argued that the correct date of birth of the petitioner is the same which was recorded in the transfer certificate. Sri Das has also argued that the correct date of birth of the petitioner is the same which was recorded in the transfer certificate. The petitioner has brought on record a copy of transfer certificate to show that his date of birth is 28.4.1964. This has been brought on record as Annexure-10 to the reply affidavit on behalf of the petitioner to the counter affidavit. He further submits that the certificate issued by the school showing date of birth as 28.4.1964 was examined by the D.D.C. and on being satisfied that date of birth in the transfer certificate was correct, same was incorporated in the service identity card of the petitioner i.e. Annexure-11 to the reply affidavit of the petitioner. 3. Sri Nikesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 4 submits that since the initial appointment of the petitioner was itself void ab initio, there was no requirement for holding a departmental enquiry but only after asking for explanation from the petitioner his service was required to be dismissed, which has been done in the present case. He submits that in the year 1983 a grand son was not at all entitled to be appointed on compassionate ground. There was no such circular or instruction but illegally he (petitioner) was appointed on compassionate ground after death of his grand father namely, Doman Ali. Fact remains that at the time of death of grand father of the petitioner father of the petitioner and his uncle were alive and father of the petitioner was also employed. Since the father of the petitioner and son of the deceased employee was already in government service, there was no need to provide employment on compassionate ground, even then, one way or the other the petitioner being grand son of the deceased employee was appointed on compassionate ground, which was illegal and void ab initio. Initially the petitioner had produced school leaving certificate showing his date of birth as 28.4.1964. However, subsequently during his service for getting promotion the petitioner produced his matriculation certificate in which his date of birth was mentioned as 1st January, 1967. Initially the petitioner had produced school leaving certificate showing his date of birth as 28.4.1964. However, subsequently during his service for getting promotion the petitioner produced his matriculation certificate in which his date of birth was mentioned as 1st January, 1967. Sri Nikesh Kumar submits that at the time of initial appointment in the year 1983 had petitioner submitted his matriculation certificate showing his date of birth as 1st January, 1967 the petitioner would have not been eligible to be appointed being aged about 16 years and as such the petitioner was asked to clarify the position and produce his appointment letter. From November, 1993 his salary was also stopped. Despite request made by the Zila Parishad the petitioner initially did not respond and even vide Annexure-5 to the writ petition in the year 1995 reminder was also issued and finally the petitioner was dismissed from service vide Annexure-1 to the writ petition on two grounds. Firstly, at the time of appointment being grand son he was not entitled to be appointed and secondly, contradictory certificates showing date of birth were brought on record. Since the appointment was itself illegal and void ab initio, there was no requirement for initiating a regular departmental enquiry. Sri Nikesh Kumar, learned counsel for the Zila Parishad, on the point that in a case of illegal appointment there is no requirement for initiation of a regular departmental proceeding or even for issuance of notice, has relied on number of judgments of this court as well as the Hon'ble Apex Court. He has firstly referred to Ram Babu Kumar Vs. State of Bihar and Others (2005) 2 PLJR 448 , He has specifically referred to paragraph No. 8, 9 and 12 of the said judgment, which are quoted hereinbelow:- 8. It is not in dispute that at the time when the petitioner's father died, his mother was in service who still continues to be an employee of the State Government. In view of the resolution of the State Government, in case of the other spouse of the employee dying in harness, the dependent children are not entitled to be appointed on compassionate ground. It has been held so by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Choudhary Vs. In view of the resolution of the State Government, in case of the other spouse of the employee dying in harness, the dependent children are not entitled to be appointed on compassionate ground. It has been held so by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Choudhary Vs. The State of Bihar and Others (2000) 4 PLJR 651 , thereof, it has been clearly held that if both the husband and wife are in Government service and one of them die, in that situation, the benefit of appointment on compassionate ground will not be available to the dependent of the family. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows: 13. According to the aforesaid provision, if both the husband and wife are in Government service and one of them dies; in that situation the benefit of appointment on compassionate ground will not be available to the dependant of the family. If the aforesaid sub-clause 1(Anga) is read in isolation without considering the other provisions of the Circular/Instructions including the application form as contained in Annexure-1 and the object of appointment on compassionate ground, then the submission advanced on behalf of counsel for the petitioner has some force, but after taking into consideration other provisions of the Circular/Instruction and the object of compassionate appointment, I am not inclined to accept the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner. If any statutory provision which is subject matter of consideration is clear and unambiguous, then the plain meaning has to be given, unless the said meaning defeats the object of the provision or leads to anomaly, absurdity and inconsistency. If the provision is capable of more than one meaning the principle of purposive construction should be applied, so that the purpose and object for which the provision has been made are given effect to. The sole purpose of appointment on compassionate ground is to tide over the financial crisis in case of emergency. If at the relevant time the family has financial resources to meet the hardship, then no dependent can be appointed on compassionate ground. If the provision as contained in clause 1(Anga) is interpreted in the manner as suggested by the petitioner, then that would frustrate the very object of appointment on compassionate ground. If at the relevant time the family has financial resources to meet the hardship, then no dependent can be appointed on compassionate ground. If the provision as contained in clause 1(Anga) is interpreted in the manner as suggested by the petitioner, then that would frustrate the very object of appointment on compassionate ground. If one of the spouses dies and the other spouse retires, then the dependent is to be appointed on compassionate ground even though the source of livelihood is available to the family in the shape of pension and other retrial benefits. If appointment on compassionate ground is made in such a situation, then it would be an appointment on the ground of descent and not to meet the sudden hardship caused to the untimely death of an employee. 9. Principle of natural justice is not an unruly horse and its application depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Here, the petitioner undisputedly was not entitled to be appointed on compassionate ground. Petitioner is not in a position to assail the order terminating the service on merit but on technical plea that before terminating his service, he was not given any opportunity. Nothing has been placed on record to show that the petitioner's appointment was valid and in the light of resolution of the State Government, he was entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. In fact, the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Choudhary (supra) has clearly held that such dependent shall not be entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. In such a situation, I am of the opinion that failure to give notice itself shall not vitiate the order. The view which I have taken finds support from the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Awadhesh Kumar Choudhary (supra). 12. Mr. Prakash lastly submits that the petitioner had not suppressed the fact of her mother being as employee of the State Government and he has been appointed taking into account the said fact and hence, later on, his service cannot be terminated on the ground of his mother being an employee of the State Government. In this connection, he has drawn my attention to the statement made in the application form. I do not find any substance in this submission of the learned counsel. In this connection, he has drawn my attention to the statement made in the application form. I do not find any substance in this submission of the learned counsel. The question of fraud and misrepresentation in the present case has no relevance at all. Petitioner, on his own pleading, is not entitled to be appointed on compassionate ground. In fact, the petitioner has not assailed the termination of his appointment on that ground. In a case in which the dependent is not entitled to be appointed on compassionate ground whether he had made false representation or committed fraud has no bearing at all to determine the validity of appointment. 4. Sri Nikesh Kumar, learned counsel for the Zila Parishad has further relied on a full bench judgment of this court reported in Awadesh Kumar Choudhry and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others (1987) PLJR 1074, particularly paragraph No. 17 of the judgment, which is quoted hereinbelow:- 17. To sum up, it is categorically held that no notice is required to be given in a case of termination simpliciter. It is further held that no notice is required to be given even if the termination is on the ground that the appointment itself was invalid and the principle of natural justice or Article 311 is not attracted in such a case. The substantial question posed at the outset is, therefore, answered in negative and it is held that no notice was required to be given to the petitioners before terminating their services since termination of their services was termination simpliciter and no stigma was attached to it. It is further held that no notice was required to be given to the petitioners even if their termination was on the ground that their appointment itself was invalid. 5. Similarly learned counsel for the Zila Parishad has referred to paragraph No. 19 and 20 of Mohd. Sartaj and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others AIR 2006 SC 3492 , For just decision in the matter it is relevant to quote the same, which are as follows:- 19. 5. Similarly learned counsel for the Zila Parishad has referred to paragraph No. 19 and 20 of Mohd. Sartaj and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others AIR 2006 SC 3492 , For just decision in the matter it is relevant to quote the same, which are as follows:- 19. In the present case, the appellants' case fall within the exception laid down in S.L. Kapoor's case (supra) and other supporting cases, as admittedly, the appellants were not qualified and they did not possess the B.T.C. or Hindustani Teacher's Certificate or Junior Teacher's Certificate or Certificate of Teaching or certificate of any other training course recognized by the State Government as equivalent thereto at the time of their initial appointment. In view of the basic lack of qualifications, they could not have been appointed nor their appointment could have been continued. Hence the appellants did not hold any right over the post and therefore no hearing was required before the cancellation of their services. In the present case, the cancellation order has been issued within a very short span of time giving no probability for any legitimate expectation to the appellants regarding continuation of their service. There was no separate appointment order issued in favour of the appellants but the memorandum dated 19.6.85 wherein the list of selected candidates was published, provided that all the selected candidates must join their respective schools/colleges within 15 days and from this the nature of appointment made cannot be ascertained. Moreover, the cancellation order itself gives an opportunity that if they do hold and possess the B.T.C. qualification along with intermediate qualification, they may contact and get the same verified on 14.8.85 by the appointing authority and they may bring this to the notice of the concerned authorities. The copy of the order of cancellation was also sent to the Principal concerned of the institution with the remarks that he should relieve urdu teacher with immediate effect if he did not possess the certificate of passing the examination of intermediate and B.T.C.; and, if he possessed these certificates he should submit the same to the office of the District Basic Education Officer, Muzaffarnagar. Therefore, it is apparent that any person having the basic qualification for the appointment can produce it before the concerned official so that immediate steps can be taken with regard to the order of appointment cancellation. 20. Therefore, it is apparent that any person having the basic qualification for the appointment can produce it before the concerned official so that immediate steps can be taken with regard to the order of appointment cancellation. 20. In our opinion, on the above facts no prejudice has been caused to the appellants by not serving notice of giving hearing before the order of cancellation was issued. 6. Basing on decisions of this court as well as the Hon'ble Apex Court as noted above, it has been argued that the appointment of the petitioner since was illegal and void ab initio only after calling for an explanation from the petitioner the order impugned has been passed which is valid and legal order. Sri Nikesh Kumar has further argued that though there is reference of circular of the state government of the year 1995, entitling a grand son/maternal grand son to be appointed on compassionate ground which has been noticed in Gangia Devi case (Supra), despite his best effort he has not been able to find such circular or instruction, on the contrary, he has argued that at least in the year 1983 the year in which the petitioner was appointed on compassionate ground there was no such provision for appointing a grand son on compassionate ground. While referring to Abhimanyu Ram Vs. State of Bihar and Others he submits that a grand son is not entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. Besides this he has referred to government instruction contained in Memo No. 3/R-1-304/73 Ka. 12754, dated 12.7.1977 which speaks regarding the persons, who are entitled to be appointed on compassionate ground. According to the said circular grand son was not entitled to be appointed on compassionate ground. 7. While giving reply Sri Das has further relied on a judgment of this court reported in Usha Sinha Vs. The State of Bihar and Others). He has referred to paragraph No. 5 and 6 of the judgment, which are quoted hereinbelow:- 5. It is technically true that the plea taken on behalf of the State Government that the District Establishment Committee and the District Magistrate overlooked the Circulars of 1997 and 2002 and made appointment against the guidelines laid down by the State Government. As far as the role of the petitioner is concerned, she is not expected to look into the circulars and challenge the legality and correctness of her appointment. As far as the role of the petitioner is concerned, she is not expected to look into the circulars and challenge the legality and correctness of her appointment. If there was a flaw in the consideration for appointment, it ought to have been taken into account by the members of the District Establishment Committee who are Incharge of making appointments on compassionate grounds. 6. In the case of Naresh Ram Vs. The State of Bihar and Others, (2000) 2 PLJR 716 , a question arose when the appointment on compassionate grounds was cancelled on the ground that it was made even before the father of the appointee had died-in-harness. The Court held that as the petitioner was entitled for appointment on compassionate ground, the Court referred the matter to the Director-in-Chief, Health Services, Government of Bihar, Patna to consider for making appointment on compassionate ground, as it is not expected that the petitioner was to test the legality of his appointment. Similarly, in the case of Bivekanand Singh and Another Vs. State of Bihar and Others (2006) 4 PLJR 45, the Authorities had terminated the appointment on compassionate ground for the reason that the appointment was made beyond the limitation period. Again, the Court held the appointment on compassionate ground was made by the authorities and the incumbent was not supposed to test the correctness of his or her appointment. 8. He submits that since the petitioner was not at fault at the time of appointment, the appointment of the petitioner can not be cancelled at subsequent stage and he may not be allowed to suffer for the fault committed by the authority concerned. Sri Das has also referred on the same point Naresh Ram Vs. The State of Bihar and Others, 9. Besides hearing learned counsel for the parties, I have also perused the materials available on record. Fact remains that on the date when the petitioner was appointed he was not entitled to be appointed on compassionate ground being grand son of the deceased employee. The fact that father of the petitioner was in government service has also not been disputed by the petitioner. Fact remains that on the date when the petitioner was appointed he was not entitled to be appointed on compassionate ground being grand son of the deceased employee. The fact that father of the petitioner was in government service has also not been disputed by the petitioner. Even learned counsel for the petitioner at the time of argument has admitted that at the time of appointment of the petitioner grand son was not entitled to be appointed on compassionate ground but he has tried to develop his case on the ground of Gangia Devi case (supra). In Gangia Devi case (supra) this court had noticed that in the year 1995 grand son was made entitled to be appointed on compassionate ground. On aforesaid facts it is not in dispute that in the year 1983 when the petitioner was appointed on compassionate ground being grand son of the deceased employee he was not entitled to be appointed and as such the petitioner's appointment was itself illegal and void ab initio. In view of Ram Babu Kumar Vs. State of Bihar and Others, as has been noticed above, there was no requirement for even giving notice to the petitioner for cancelling his appointment. Moreover, as discussed above the petitioner was asked by the authority concerned to give explanation also. Secondly the petitioner himself had brought two contradictory certificates before the authority concerned relating to his date of birth. According to school leaving certificate/transfer certificate on which reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner and pleaded that correct date of birth of the petitioner was 28.4.1964. As per said date of birth he was major at the time of appointment. However, while claiming promotion the petitioner produced his matriculation certificate in which date of birth of the petitioner was recorded as 1.1.1967. Time without number it has been held that the date of birth recorded in matriculation certificate - shall be given preference to other certificates and documents in respect of date of birth. Of-course, a plea has been taken by learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner wanted to get the date of birth corrected in the matriculation certificate but fact remains that the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate of the petitioner was noticed long back, however, the same was never got corrected. Of-course, a plea has been taken by learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner wanted to get the date of birth corrected in the matriculation certificate but fact remains that the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate of the petitioner was noticed long back, however, the same was never got corrected. If the date of birth as per matriculation certificate, which is existing till date, is taken into account fact remains that even otherwise the petitioner was not entitled to be appointed in the year 1983, due to the reason that as per the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate the petitioner was about 16 years old at the time of his appointment. Further the plea of the petitioner that petitioner is still continuing on the post by virtue of order of stay passed by this court may not justify his illegal appointment. Since once it is held that the appointment order was itself illegal and void ab initio, as per settled law there was no justification for conducting a regular departmental enquiry and by calling for explanation only the order of dismissal was required to be passed, which has been done in the present case. Judgments which have been referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner have got no direct relevance in the facts and circumstances of the present case. I do not find any ground for interference with the impugned order. The writ petition stands dismissed. However, in view of the facts and circumstances, no cost is being imposed. In view of dismissal of this writ petition interim order of stay granted earlier stands automatically vacated.