JUDGMENT Mr. Mahavir S. Chauhan, J.:- RSA No. 2890 of 1988, Chattan Singh (deceased, represented by LRs) and others vs. Charan Singh alias Charna, (ii) RSA No.2891 of 1988, Chattan Singh (deceased, represented by LRs) and others vs. Gurcharan Singh alias Gurcharn, (iii) RSA No.2892 of 1988, Chattan Singh (deceased, represented by LRs) and others vs. Rachna Ram @ Rachna, (iv) RSA No.2893 of 1988, Chattan Singh (deceased, represented by LRs) and others vs. Diala and (v) RSA No.2894 of 1988, Chattan Singh (deceased, represented by LRs) and others vs. Miria, involve common questions of fact and law and are directed against common judgment and decree dated 9.10.1987 passed by learned Sub Judge IIIrd Class, Ambala (for short,”the trial Court”) and dated 21.11.1988 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ambala (for short, “the Appellate Court”) and, therefore, are proposed to be disposed of by this common judgment being passed in RSA No.2890 of 1988, Chattan Singh and others vs. Charan Singh alias Charna. Plaintiffs’ plea: 2. Syntax of events indicates that five Civil Suits, namely, Civil Suits No. 341 to 345 of 16.4.1985 were brought by plaintiffs Miria, Gurcharan Singh, Rachna, Diala and Charan Singh, respectively, for possession of the suit land. Case pleaded by the plaintiffs (respondents herein) was that the plaintiffs, namely, Miria, Gurcharan Singh, Rachna, Diala and Charan Singh were given land comprised in Khasra Nos. 991/5, 991/1, 991/3, 991/4 and 991/2, measuring 2 biswas each (for short as ‘the suit land’), vide registered deeds dated 25.8.1976, Exhibits P1, P2, P3, P4 and P5, respectively, by the village panchayat of village Bhanoo Kheri for construction of houses and to use it as bara. Mutations were also sanctioned in their favour and possession of the land was also delivered to them. But Kartar Singh, predecessor-in-interest of the defendants (appellants herein) forcibly occupied the aforesaid pieces of land somewhere in the year 1980 without any right, title or interest being available to him and posthumous Kartar Singh aforesaid, the appellants have been continuing in possession of the suit land and have turned a deaf ear to the beseechments of the respondents to admit their claim and retrieve possession of the suit land to them. Defendants’ plea: 3. Defendants’ plea: 3. Appellants contested the suit by filing a written statements and came out with a plea that neither the respondents had anything to do with the suit land nor was the village panchayat, its owner and as such, the deeds executed by the village panchayat in favour of the respondents did not convey any title in their favour. Rather, according to averments of the appellants in the written statements, the registered deeds (Exhibits P1, P2, P3, P4 and P5) were illegal, ineffective and void as the suit land was a Khalwara or Gitwar, was outside the abadi deh and, thus, was not shamlat Deh. Even otherwise, according to the plea of the appellants in the written statement, the suit land was a bachat land, left unallotted at the time of consolidation, and was mustarka murtihanan. Thus, it did not vest in the village panchayat, rather it belonged to the appellants, through their fore-fathers before consolidation and in the scheme of consolidation it was provided that whosoever would get any Khalwara or Bara would have to give double of the area to its owner. As the suit land was not allotted to any body, the appellants through their forefathers continued in its possession. It was also stated that previously, father of the appellant was in possession of the suit land and after his death, the appellants had stepped into his shoes. Some preliminary objections were also pleaded and a prayer for dismissal of the suit was made in the written statements. Replications and issues: 4. By bringing replications to the written statements the appellants controverted all what was said adverse to their interest in the written statements and re-asserted their pleas as contained in the plaint. 5. In view of diagonally opposing stands adverted to by the parties, the learned trial Court decided to enter into an inquisition to find out which of the two pleas, one put up on behalf of the respondents and the other by the appellants, was correct, and to facilitate such an inquisition it identified, from the pleadings of the parties, the areas of conflict in the form of following issues:- “1. Whether the plaintiff is owner of land in dispute ? OPP 2. Whether the suit of the plaintiff has not been properly valued for the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction and the less court fee has been paid. Whether the plaintiff is owner of land in dispute ? OPP 2. Whether the suit of the plaintiff has not been properly valued for the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction and the less court fee has been paid. If so to what effect ? OPD 3. Relief.” Suits decreed: 6. After conclusion of evidence of the parties, learned trial Court afforded an opportunity of hearing to both the sides, appraised the evidence, returned findings on both the issues propitious to the plea of the respondents and, vide judgment and decree dated 9.10.1987, decreed the suits holding the respondents entitled for possession of the suit land. However, no order as to costs was passed. Appeals dismissed: 7. Appeals brought by the defeated defendants(appellants herein) to challenge the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 9.10.1987 were dismissed by the court of learned Additional District Judge, Ambala, vide judgment and decree dated 21.11.1988. Regular Second Appeals: 8. Having been defeated before the trial Court and the Appellate Court, the appellants have brought the instant Regular Second Appeals to assail correctness of the findings recorded by the courts below. 9. Respondents are contesting the appeals. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record very minutely. In criticism of the impugned judgments & decrees: 11. On behalf of the appellants it is argued that the matter involves a very important and substantial question of law, i.e., whether the amendment of a statute dates back to the inception of the statute or could be prospective in nature. Learned senior counsel points out that the courts below have misread, mis-interpretted and mis-construed the provisions of Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, applicable to Haryana State, amended by Haryana Amendment Act, 1980 (for short,”the Act”) more particularly, Section 2(b) of the amending Act which has substituted Section 2(g) (vi) of the original Act with a new Section. According to the learned senior counsel, the Legislature by amending Section 2(g)(vi) intended to give it prospective effect but the courts below have misinterpretted it to have retrospective effect only. According to the learned senior counsel, the Legislature by amending Section 2(g)(vi) intended to give it prospective effect but the courts below have misinterpretted it to have retrospective effect only. To illustrate, the learned senior counsel points out that while amending Sections 13, 13-A and 13-B of the Act, the terminology used was “for Section 13 of the principal Act, the following Section shall be substituted and shall be deemed to have been substituted with effect from 4th day of May, 1961.” The words “shall be deemed to have been substituted with effect from 4th day of May, 1961” are conspicuous by their absence as regards amendment of Section 2(g) (vi) of the old Act. Learned senior counsel also refers to a Division Bench of this Court rendered in the case of Jagir Singh vs. Gram Panchayat village Mirajpur and others, 1989 PLJ 494, to show that it has been held in this judgment that amendment of Section 2(g) (vi) of the old Act was to take effect from the date of the amendment and not from the date of coming into force of the original Act. 12. Learned senior counsel further points out that if the date of amendment is taken to be prospective, findings recorded by the courts below cannot be sustained because in that event, the relevant date for ascertainment of character of the suit land would be the date of amendment of the Act and not that of coming into force of the original Act. 13. It is further contended by learned senior counsel for the appellants that the suit land is excluded from the definition of Shamlat Deh and could not be given by the village panchayat to the respondents under Section 5-A of the Act because in view of the interpretation of Section 2(g)(vi) of the Act as given above, the suit land has to be excluded from the definition of Shamlat Deh in view of the finding of the courts below that evidence available on record has established that at least after 1963-64 the suit land is being used as Gitwar or Khalwara and the amendment came in the year 1981. In defence of the impugned judgments & decrees: 14. In defence of the impugned judgments & decrees: 14. The contentions, however, have been controverted by the learned counsel representing the respondents and it has been argued that the amendment of the Act is retrospective in nature and the relevant date would be the date of commencement of the original Act and the village Panchayat was well within its rights to give the suit land to the respondents under Section 5-A of the Act. Learned counsel also refers to jamabandi for the year 1975-76 (Exhibit D1) and Khasra Girdawari (Exhibit D3) to show that the land in question has been shown to be ownership of panchayat Deh and as such the appellants have no concern therewith. Reference has also been made to the statement of the appellant Chattan Singh, DW1, wherein he is shown to have admitted that before consolidation, the suit land belonged to them but at the time of consolidation when Baras were carved out, they were given double of the land. This according to counsel for the respondents also shows that the appellants have no concern with the suit land. 15. Nothing more has been argued on either side. Findings in Regular Second Appeals: 16. It is the case of the respondents that the suit land was given to them under Section 5-A of the Act. This Section reads as under:- “5-A. Disposal of lands vested or deemed to have been vested in Panchayat.- (1) A Panchayat may gift the land in shamilat deh vested in it under this Act to the members of Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes of the village in which such land is situate on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed. (1A) A Panchayat may, with the previous approval of the State Government, gift the land in shamilat deh vested in it under this Act, for the purposes of hospital, dispensaries or educational or charitable institution or for such other purposes as may be approved by the State Government to be for the benefit of the inhabitants of the village concerned. (2) The gift of land in shamilat deh already made shall be deemed to have been made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A), as the case may be.” 17. (2) The gift of land in shamilat deh already made shall be deemed to have been made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A), as the case may be.” 17. As under Section 5-A (ibid) only land described as Shamlat Deh could be given to the respondents, it is necessary to have a look on Section 2(g)(vi) of the old Act which defines Shamlat Deh. Before amendment of the Act, this section laid down that the Shamlat Deh did not include land which “lies outside the abadi deh and is used as gitwar, bara, manure pit or house or for cottage industry;” and by the amending Act this clause has been substituted to read that the Shamlat Deh does not include land which “lies outside the abadi deh and was being used as gitwar, bara, manure pit, house or for cottage industry, immediately before the commencement of this Act.” 18. Now the question arises whether the words “immediately before the commencement of this Act” mean immediately before the commencement of original Act or immediately before the amendment of the original Act by the amending Act of 1981? To find out an answer to this riddle, it is imperative to ascertain whether amendment of Section 2(g)(vi) of the old Act by the new Act is retrospective or prospective in nature? 19. It may be appropriate to refer here to a Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case of Zile Singh vs. State of Haryana, 2005(2) RCR (Civil) 744, pertaining to the question where amendment of statutes is prospective and where it is retrospective. The Hon’ble Supreme Court answered the controversy in the following terms:- “13. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only ’nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis’ __ a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past. (See : Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, Ninth Edition, 2004 at p.438). (See : Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, Ninth Edition, 2004 at p.438). It is not necessary that an express provision be made to make a statute retrospective and the presumption against retrospectivity may be rebutted by necessary implication especially in a case where the new law is made to cure an acknowledged evil for the benefit of the community as a whole. 14. The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes...... In determining, therefore, the nature of the Act, regard must be had to the substance rather than to the form. If a new Act is ’to explain’ an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospective. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended.........An amending Act may be purely declaratory to clear a meaning of a provision of the principal Act which was already implicit. A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect. 15. Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed and rather there is presumption against retrospectivity, according to Craies (Statute Law, Seventh Edition), it is open for the legislature to enact laws having retrospective operation. This can be achieved by express enactment or by necessary implication from the language employed. If it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective operation, the Courts will give it such an operation. In the absence of a retrospective operation having been expressly given, the Courts may be called upon to construe the provisions and answer the question whether the legislature had sufficiently expressed that intention giving the Statute retrospectivity. Four factors are suggested as relevant: (i) general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what it was the legislature contemplated (p.388). The rule against retrospectivity does not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal, a privilege which did not amount to accrued right . 16. The rule against retrospectivity does not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal, a privilege which did not amount to accrued right . 16. Where a Statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former statute or to ’explain’ a former statute, the subsequent statute has relation back to the time when the prior Act was passed. The rule against retrospectivity is inapplicable to such legislations as are explanatory and declaratory in nature. The classic illustration is the case of Att. Gen. Vs. Pougett ([1816] 2 Price 381, 392). By a Customs Act of 1873 (53 Geo. 3, c. 33) a duty was imposed upon hides of 9s. 4d., but the Act omitted to state that it was to be 9s. 4d. per cwt., and to remedy this omission another Customs Act (53 Geo. 3, c. 105) was passed later in the same year. Between the passing of these two Acts some hides were exported, and it was contended that they were not liable to pay the duty of 9s. 4d. per cwt., but Thomson C.B., in giving judgment for the Attorney- General, said: “The duty in this instance was in fact imposed by the first Act, but the gross mistake of the omission of the weight for which the sum expressed was to have been payable occasioned the amendment made by the subsequent Act, but that had reference to the former statute as soon as it passed, and they must be taken together as if they were one and the same Act.”. 17. Maxwell states in his work on Interpretation of Statutes, (Twelfth Edition) that the rule against retrospective operation is a presumption only, and as such it “may be overcome, not only by express words in the Act but also by circumstances sufficiently strong to displace it.” (p.225). If the dominant intention of the legislature can be clearly and doubtlessly spelt out, the inhibition contained in the rule against perpetuity becomes of doubtful applicability as the “inhibition of the rule” is a matter of degree which would “vary secundum materiam” (p.226). Sometimes, where the sense of the statute demands it or where there has been an obvious mistake in drafting, a court will be prepared to substitute another word or phrase for that which actually appears in the text of the Act. 18. Sometimes, where the sense of the statute demands it or where there has been an obvious mistake in drafting, a court will be prepared to substitute another word or phrase for that which actually appears in the text of the Act. 18. In a recent decision of this Court in National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India Ltd. and another Vs. Union of India and Others, (2003) 5 SCC 23 , it has been held that there is no fixed formula for the expression of legislative intent to give retrospectivity to an enactment. Every legislation whether prospective or retrospective has to be subjected to the question of legislative competence. The retrospectivity is liable to be decided on a few touchstones such as : (i) the words used must expressly provide or clearly imply retrospective operation; (ii) the retrospectivity must be reasonable and not excessive or harsh, otherwise it runs the risk of being struck down as unconstitutional; (iii) where the legislation is introduced to overcome a judicial decision, the power cannot be used to subvert the decision without removing the statutory basis of the decision. There is no fixed formula for the expression of legislative intent to give retrospectivity to an enactment. A validating clause coupled with a substantive statutory change is only one of the methods to leave actions unsustainable under the unamended statute, undisturbed. Consequently, the absence of a validating clause would not by itself affect the retrospective operation of the statutory provision, if such retrospectivity is otherwise apparent. 19. The Constitution Bench in Shyam Sunder & Ors. Vs. Ram Kumar & Anr., (2001) 8 SCC 24 , has held ___ “Ordinarily when an enactment declares the previous law, it requires to be given retroactive effect. The function of a declaratory statute is to supply an omission or explain previous statute and when such an Act is passed, it comes into effect when the previous enactment was passed. The legislative power to enact law includes the power to declare what was the previous law and when such a declaratory Act is passed invariably it has been held to be retrospective. Mere absence of use of word ’declaration’ in an Act explaining what was the law before may not appear to be a declaratory Act but if the Court finds an Act as declaratory or explanatory it has to be construed as retrospective.” 20. Mere absence of use of word ’declaration’ in an Act explaining what was the law before may not appear to be a declaratory Act but if the Court finds an Act as declaratory or explanatory it has to be construed as retrospective.” 20. In The Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., [1955] 2 SCR 603, Heydon’s case (3 Co. Rep.7a; 76 E.R.637) was cited with approval. Their Lordships have said ___ “It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when Heydon’s case was decided that ___” for the sure and true interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered:- 1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.’ 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide., 3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth., and 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico”.” 21. In Allied Motors (P) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income tax, Delhi, (1997) 3 SCC 472 , certain unintended consequences flew from a provision enacted by the Parliament. There was an obvious omission. In order to cure the defect, a proviso was sought to be introduced through an amendment. The Court held that literal construction was liable to be avoided if it defeated the manifest object and purpose of the Act. The rule of reasonable interpretation should apply. There was an obvious omission. In order to cure the defect, a proviso was sought to be introduced through an amendment. The Court held that literal construction was liable to be avoided if it defeated the manifest object and purpose of the Act. The rule of reasonable interpretation should apply. “A proviso which is inserted to remedy unintended consequences and to make the provision workable, a proviso which supplies an obvious omission in the section and is required to be read into the section to give the section a reasonable interpretation, requires to be treated as retrospective in operation so that a reasonable interpretation can be given to the section as a whole.” The question, in fact, has been answered in the case of Jagir Singh vs. Gram Panchayat village Mirajpur (supra) as under:- “6. In the Principal Act Section 2(g)(vi) was as follows:- “2(g)(vi)-”Shamlat deh” or “Charand” includes.............but does not include land which.........lies outside the abadi deh and is used as gitwar, bara, manure pit or house or for cottage industry,” Clause (vi) above-quoted was later substituted by Haryana Act No.2 of 1981 by the following clause : “(vi) lies outside the abadi deh and was being used as gitwar, bara, manure pit or house or for cottage industry, immediately before the commencement of this Act.” According to Section 2(g)(vi) of the Act, as it stood before amendment, land which lay outside the abadi deh and was found to have been used for purposes mentioned in clause (vi), stood excluded from the definition of Shamilat deh, and this was so because of the use of the word ‘is used’. The Principal Act had come into force in the year 1961 but the word ‘is’ has reference to any given point of time, whenever the land outside the abadi deh fell for use of house and other purposes after the enforcement of the Principal Act. The Principal Act was enacted in the erstwhile State of Punjab and had continued to apply to both the States namely the present Punjab and Haryana, which came into force on Ist November, 1966. In Punjab this provision was amended by the Punjab Act No. 19 of 1976 by substituting existing clause (vi) with the clause, which has been substituted by Haryana Act No.2 of 1981. In Punjab this provision was amended by the Punjab Act No. 19 of 1976 by substituting existing clause (vi) with the clause, which has been substituted by Haryana Act No.2 of 1981. Keeping in view the fact that even after the coming into force of the Principal Act, land outside the abadi deh, could be occupied by the villagers for being used as gitwar, bara, manure pit or house or for cottage industry, and from such use the land stood excluded from the purview of Shamilat deh. Since certain villagers had already occupied it, it was not considered proper or feasible to dislodge them and that is why the newly substituted clause was given prospective effect, that is, from the date of coming into force of the Amending Act. 7. In the State of Haryana this matter was noticed later on and they brought similar amendment by Act No.2 of 1981. A reading of the Amending Act shows that it has been made operative from the date of commencement of the Amending Act and saved the land lying outside the abadi deh, which was put to use as gitwar, bara, manure pit or house or for cottage industry. The result of the amendment was that if any villager occupied the land situated outside the abadi deh for any of the aforesaid purposes after coming into force of the Amending Act, the same did not cease to be Shamilat deh and the Panchayat could evict the unauthorized occupant. It is also in consonance with the object contained in the Amending Act. 8. M. R. Sharma,J. in Jagdev Singh vs. The Commissioner, Ambala Division, 1976 PLJ 118, had interpreted unamended clause (vi) and had come to the conclusion that even after the enforcement of the Principal Act of 1961, if land lying outside the abadi deh was occupied by a villager for any of the purposes mentioned in clause (vi) of the Act the same stood excluded from the definition of the Shamilat deh. When amendments were made by the two States, it was mentioned that certain decisions of the High Court had necessitated the amendment and one such High Court decision was the one noticed above. When amendments were made by the two States, it was mentioned that certain decisions of the High Court had necessitated the amendment and one such High Court decision was the one noticed above. Therefore, both on the interpretation of the provisions of the Amending Act, as also in the light of the objects of the Amendment Act, the amendment of clause (vi) is prospective and it saves the land which is outside the abadi deh and was put to use for one of the purposes contained in that clause before the commencement of the Amending Act. 9. There is yet another clinching reason for taking the aforesaid view. While Section 2(g)(vi) has been substituted with effect from the date of the Amending Act, that is, when it was published on 12.2.1981, by virtue of Section 4 of the Amending Act of 1981, for Section 13, new Section 13 was substituted with effect from the 4th day of May, 1961 and similarly by virtue of Section 5 of the Amending Act, for existing Sections 13-A and 13-B new Section 13-A to 13-D were substituted with effect from the 4th day of May, 1961. The amendments which were brought in by virtue of Sections 4 and 5 were made retrospective with effect from 4th of May, 1961, whereas the amendments which have been brought in Section 2 (g)(vi) of the Act, by virtue of Section 2 of the Amending Act, has been made prospective as it has been made operative from the date of the commencement of the Act. Therefore, the matter was clear to the Legislature, wherever they wanted to give retrospective, it was not given. 10. In view of the interpretation made by us on the amending Act, it is clear that if the petitioner had constructed the house before the Amending Act of 1981, the land underneath stood excluded from the definition of Shamilat deh. The case of the petitioner was that the house was built more than 20 years ago, but even if that is not so, the case of the Gram Panchayat never was that the house was built after the enforcement of the Amending Act.” 20. The case of the petitioner was that the house was built more than 20 years ago, but even if that is not so, the case of the Gram Panchayat never was that the house was built after the enforcement of the Amending Act.” 20. In view of the cited judgments there remains nothing to doubt that the amendments which have been brought in Section 2(g) (vi) of the Act by virtue of Section 2 of the amending Act have been made prospective as these have been made operative from the date of commencement of the amending Act. 21. Having understood that the amended Section 2(g)(vi) of the Act is to take effect from the date of the amendment, i.e. from year 1981, it may now be appropriate to notice how the Courts below have proceeded with the controversy. 22. Learned trial Court approached the situation by holding, “Then no evidence has been adduced by the defendants in order to show that before the commencement of this Act in the year 1961 the suit land was being used as Gitwar or Khalwar. Rather the defendants have adduced into evidence khasra-girdawari from 15.10.1971 till 11.10.1985 wherein the suit land has been shown as ghair mumkin gitwar. However, no khasra girdawari prior to 1971 has been adduced into evidence from where it could be inferred that before the commencement of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, the suit land was being used as Gitwar. Thus, I rebut the contention raised by Ld. Counsel for the defendant”. 23. Similarly, the learned first appellate Court observed, “In the instant case, the substituted sub clause (vi) came into existence vide Haryana Act No.2 of 1981 and as the present suits were instituted in April, 1985, they will have to be disposed of in accordance with substituted sub clause (vi). This contention of Shri Sardara Singh learned counsel for the appellants that the crucial date for deciding whether the suit property vested in Gram Panchayat was 12.02.81, and not the date of the original Act No. 18 of 1961 is, therefore, repelled”. 24. Above cited observations of the learned Courts below evidently are contrary to what has been laid down in Zile Singh vs. State of Haryana Gram and Jagir Singh vs. Panchayat village Mirajpur (supra) and, therefore, are liable to be set aside and reversed. 24. Above cited observations of the learned Courts below evidently are contrary to what has been laid down in Zile Singh vs. State of Haryana Gram and Jagir Singh vs. Panchayat village Mirajpur (supra) and, therefore, are liable to be set aside and reversed. In fact, the crucial date to see whether or not the suit land was a gitwar or khalwara is the date of commencement of Haryana Act No. 2 of 1981, i.e. 12.02.1981, and as found by the Courts below, in the khasra-girdawari from 15.10.1971 till 11.10.1985, i.e. immediately before 12.02.1981, the suit land has been shown as ghair mumkin gitwar. In the Jamabandi for the year 1963-64, Exhibit D4, Jamabandi for the year 1975-76, Exhibit D1, the suit land is shown as ghair mumkin khalwara. That being so the suit land is not covered by the definition of Shamlat Deh in terms of substituted subclause (vi) of sub section (g) of Section 2 of the Act and, therefore, could not be given away by the village panchayat to the respondents under Section 5-A of the Act. Therefore, the registered deeds dated 25.8.1976, Exhibits P1, P2, P3, P4 and P5 are held to convey no title in favour of the respondents as regards the suit land and mutations sanctioned on the basis of these deeds also are inconsequential. 25. Learned counsel representing the respondents has not been able to point out any evidence to show possession of the respondents over the suit land at any point of time. 26. As a natural consequence, the appeals succeed, impugned judgment and decree dated 9.10.1987 passed by learned Sub Judge IIIrd Class, Ambala and dated 21.11.1988 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ambala are set aside and are reversed, and suits brought by the respondents for possession of the suit land are dismissed. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case parties are left to bear their own costs. ---------0.B.S.0------------