JUDGMENT Initially the present petition was filed as Original Application before the M.P. Administrative Tribunal, Bench at Jabalpur calling in question the order dated 10-4-2002 by which the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of a penalty, after a departmental enquiry, has been dismissed by the departmental appellate authority. The petitioner has also called in question the order dated 31-3-1999 passed by the Divisional Forest Officer, Khandwa imposing a penalty of compulsory retirement on the petitioner, after reviewing the earlier order dated 10-7-1997. The Original Application was pending when the M.P. Administrative Tribunal was closed and therefore the same was transmitted to this Court and is registered as Writ Petition. 2. The petitioner, who was working on the post of Forester, has contended that he was initially appointed as Coup Guard in the year 1969, was regularized on the post of Forest Guard in the year 1973, was promoted on the post of Forester on 24-3-1984 and was made to work in different places in such capacity. While the petitioner was working as Range Assistant, Battu Range of East Kalibheet (Territorial), he was placed under suspension vide an order dated 25-11-1996 issued by the Divisional Forest Officer (Territorial), Khandwa. The allegations against the petitioner were that he had committed serious financial irregularities and misconduct while distributing the wages to the labours engaged in Jawahar Employment Scheme. The headquarter of the petitioner during the period of suspension was fixed at Moondi Range. A charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on 30-12-1996 levelling the allegations that the petitioner while was working as Range Assistant in the said range w.e.f. 2-5-1995 to 25-11-1996, by preparing the false muster rolls for payment of wages to labours, some of whom were found to have died much earlier, an attempt was made to embezzle the public money. The other charges against the petitioner was that when he was placed under suspension and was required to hand over his charge to another Forest Ranger, the said charge was not delivered by him and thereby a serious misconduct was committed by him. The charge-sheet included a list of documents on the basis of which charges levelled against the petitioner were required to be proved. A list of witnesses to be examined against the petitioner was also annexed containing the name of Shri B.C. Rathore, Dy. The charge-sheet included a list of documents on the basis of which charges levelled against the petitioner were required to be proved. A list of witnesses to be examined against the petitioner was also annexed containing the name of Shri B.C. Rathore, Dy. Divisional Forest Officer (Territorial), East Kalibheet Forest Range as also the names of certain other witnesses. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet categorically contending that he has not committed any misconduct. It was contended by him that in fact the Jawahar Employment Scheme was executed through two contractors duly appointed in this respect and only those two contractors were required to prepare the muster rolls with respect to the payment of wages to the labours and after verification of those muster rolls, the payment of bills of those contractors was done only when the sanction was granted by the competent authority. All those payments were duly certified by the Dy. Divisional Forest Officer and without the verification of such a drawing and disbursing authority, no payment whatsoever was to be made by the petitioner. As far as the other charge is concerned, it was contended that the person, who was directed to take, charge from the petitioner, had refused to accept the charge and therefore the charge was delivered to one Range Clerk by the petitioner. It was thus contended by the petitioner that there was no occasion to commit any embezzlement nor the petitioner has committed any misconduct as alleged in the charge-sheet and therefore the enquiry was liable to be closed. 3. Finding the reply of the petitioner to the charge-sheet not satisfactory by the disciplinary authority, a direction was given to conduct an enquiry. After the departmental enquiry, it appears that a report was obtained. Copy of the same was served on the petitioner. His explanation was called and ultimately a final order was passed against the petitioner on 10-7-1997 dismissing the petitioner from service. Aggrieved by such an order, the petitioner approached the departmental appellate authority, who, after considering the appeal of the petitioner, came to the conclusion that certain important aspects were not looked into by the Divisional Forest Officer while imposing the penalty on the petitioner. The matter was remitted back to the disciplinary authority with a direction to conduct enquiry in respect of certain issues, which were left unattended and to pass a fresh order. The matter was remitted back to the disciplinary authority with a direction to conduct enquiry in respect of certain issues, which were left unattended and to pass a fresh order. After completing the enquiry once again, the final order was passed by the disciplinary authority imposing a penalty of compulsory retirement on the petitioner from the date of order. Against this order, yet another appeal was filed by the petitioner, but since the said appeal was again dismissed, the Original Application was required to be filed. 4. Upon service of the notice of the Original Application, a return was filed by the respondents and they have contended that full opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner in the departmental enquiry which was conducted in terms of the provisions of M.P. Civil services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as 1966 Rules' for short). After holding the enquiry, it was found that serious misconduct was committed by the petitioner and therefore initially a penalty of dismissal from service was imposed on him. While considering the appeal filed by the petitioner, the departmental appellate authority had found that some important aspects were not considered by the disciplinary authority while issuing the order of penalty. The matter was remitted back by the appellate authority. On completion of enquiry on those issues and after granting full opportunity of hearing since the disciplinary authority was of the opinion that instead of dismissing the petitioner from services, a penalty of compulsory retirement should be imposed on him, such an order was passed. In view of these facts, since the disciplinary proceedings have been done in accordance to law and the rules and since the misconduct of the petitioner was serious in nature, hence, the appeal of the petitioner was duly considered in accordance to law and rules and decided properly and no interference in the order of penalty is called for. It is contended by the respondents that this Court will not act as an Appellate Court or the Tribunal would not act as the departmental appellate authority and will not look into the penalty unless it is demonstrated that the enquiry is not conducted in terms of the rules and the procedure is not followed by the departmental authority in appropriate manner or that the punishment is disproportionate in any manner whatsoever. It is further contended that certain facts were found with respect to the misconduct of other employees, decisions were taken by the competent authority and those who were found guilty were accordingly punished by appropriate orders. The order was issued in respect of one Shaikh Gani Ansari who too was found guilty of misconduct in the similar incident and therefore a penalty of reversion was imposed on him by order issued on 19-9-2000. Another Dy. Conservator of Forest Shri B.C. Rathore was also found guilty and therefore opinion was given about imposition of penalty of compulsory retirement on Shri Rathore by the M.P. Public Service Commission. However, before any order could be issued in respect of Shri Rathore, since he died on account of heart attack, the enquiry against him was closed. Thus, it is contended that since the petitioner alone is not singled out, the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order has rightly been decided, there is no scope to interfere in the order of penalty imposed on the petitioner. 5. Shri Vinod Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioner, has vehemently contended that in fact the petitioner was made a scapegoat by those who were actually responsible in committing the misconduct. It is contended by Shri Mehta that in fact when the contract was given to some other persons, the supervision of the execution of such contract was in the hands of the petitioner being the Range Assistant. He was neither the drawing nor disbursing authority and therefore the allegations made in respect to the preparation of the muster rolls, including the names of those who had expired as labours, was totally incorrect. Since the charge-sheet itself was prepared by one Shri B.C. Rathore, who was the Dy. Conservator of Forest and was responsible to look-after the work and was drawing and disbursing authority and was also competent to certify the muster roll and the payment vouchers, therefore, in fact, all attempts were made to save the skin of said Shri B.C. Rathore and this fact is writ large by the conduct of the respondents themselves as even after receiving the opinion of the Public Service Commission long back they did not take any action against the said officer till he died. The opinion was expressed by the Public Service Commission on 8-8-2001. The opinion was expressed by the Public Service Commission on 8-8-2001. The order was passed on 3-11-2001 only when it was reported that said Shri B.C. Rathore had expired on 19-10-2001 because of heart attack. In fact the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner itself contained the name of Shri B.C. Rathore as an important witness to prove the charge No. 1 against the petitioner where the allegations of embezzlement were made against the petitioner. This shows that there was wholehearted attempt to save the interest of such a person and for that the petitioner was made a scapegoat. It is further contended that these aspects were raised by the petitioner from the day one when he filed reply to the charge-sheet. He specifically contended this fact in his plea before the disciplinary authority. He raised a ground in this respect in his appeal before the appellate authority, but none of these authorities have taken note of such a plea raised by the petitioner and therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Bongaigaon Refinery & Petrochemicals Ltd. and others v. Girish Chandra Sarma, (2007) 7 SCC 206 , the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed by him in this writ petition. 6. Per contra it is contended by the learned Dy. Advocate General that if the pleas raised by the petitioner are seen, there was no occasion to contend that the petitioner was made a scapegoat. On the other hand, merely saying that certain certifications of the payments were made by said Shri Rathore, it cannot be said that there was no occasion for the petitioner to embezzle the Government money. The distribution of bills was done by the petitioner and this fact was amply proved by recording the statements of several witnesses. Issues raised by the petitioner were duly examined by the disciplinary authority and a categorical finding was given, therefore, it is incorrect to say that the petitioner was made a scapegoat. It is contended by the learned Dy. Advocate General that in view of the rightful assessment of the evidence, there was no proof of the fact that the petitioner was made a scapegoat and therefore since the enquiry report itself was considered by the disciplinary authority and it was found that the statements of witnesses have gone unrebutted, rightly the petitioner was punished. Advocate General that in view of the rightful assessment of the evidence, there was no proof of the fact that the petitioner was made a scapegoat and therefore since the enquiry report itself was considered by the disciplinary authority and it was found that the statements of witnesses have gone unrebutted, rightly the petitioner was punished. These aspects were scrutinized on occasions when the appeals were presented and therefore it is incorrect to say that the petitioner was illegally punished. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 8. On due consideration of the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, one thing is clear that there were more than one employees involved in the alleged misconduct. From the documents placed on record by the respondents with their return, it is clear that for the same misconduct and for the same charges of the very same period, other officers, who were posted at the same place, were placed under suspension and an enquiry was conducted against them by issuing separate charge-sheet. Though the fact relating to issuance of the charge-sheet to other persons, the names of witnesses and the enquiry against those persons are not clear from the documents available on record, but it appears that in such enquiry also the facts were found that misconduct was committed by those persons and that is why the orders of imposing penalty were issued against them. One of them was reverted to the lower post and one of them was proposed to be compulsorily retired, but because of his untimely death, such a punishment was not imposed on him. This makes it clear that it was a fit case where a joint enquiry should have been conducted against all the persons who were prima facie found guilty of common misconduct. It appears that a criminal prosecution was also initiated against those contractors, their employees as also the petitioner and one Shaikh Gani Ansari for the offences committed under sections 120-B, 409, 467, 468, 471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code in the Court of Judicial Magistrate Class I, Harsood, district Khandwa. It appears that a criminal prosecution was also initiated against those contractors, their employees as also the petitioner and one Shaikh Gani Ansari for the offences committed under sections 120-B, 409, 467, 468, 471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code in the Court of Judicial Magistrate Class I, Harsood, district Khandwa. If some investigation in this respect was conducted and in case it was found that any embezzlement of the Government money is done by those persons, it would have been much better to initiate a joint departmental enquiry against those employees and officers. However, this was not done. Ultimately the JMFC after full dressed trial acquitted the persons like petitioner, Shaik Gani Ansari and others from the charges of embezzlement and fraud alleged against them vide judgment dated 28th September, 2007. All these facts should have been noted down by the disciplinary authority and instead of conducting the separate enquiry, the matter should have been placed before one authority to apply its mind for taking a decision that who was guilty of the misconduct and who was required to be punished. Having failed to do so, it cannot be ruled out that the petitioner was visited with a more severe punishment such as compulsory retirement from service. 9. The other aspect is whether there was a chance of roping the petitioner in a departmental enquiry for such a misconduct or not. If the allegations were made by the petitioner in his reply that in fact he was not the drawing and disbursing authority and he was not responsible to sanction any amount nor was required to prepare the muster rolls for payment of wages to the labours, a scrutiny was required to be done whether petitioner alone could have embezzled the amount sanctioned for the said scheme or whether it was a collateral attempt by those who were involved in prosecution of the said scheme. There is no justification shown as to why an officer was authorized to prepare the charge-sheet against the petitioner, specially when he was to be named as a witness, and was subsequently charge-sheeted for the very same misconduct. There is no justification shown as to why an officer was authorized to prepare the charge-sheet against the petitioner, specially when he was to be named as a witness, and was subsequently charge-sheeted for the very same misconduct. In the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner the name of Shri B.C. Rathore was very categorically mentioned as an important witness because he being the official authority of the State was required to show that the sanctions were granted by the petitioner for disbursement of any payment to the labours. He was also required to show that in fact the amount was disbursed by the petitioner alone. If that was the situation, in view of the law laid down by Apex Court, it would have been much better for the respondent State to cast a common enquiry against the delinquent employees by issuing charge-sheet to them jointly. The Apex Court in the case of Bongaigaon Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd. and others v. Girish Chandra Sarma (supra) has laid down these principles and has considered what would be the effect of such a case and whether could it be said that any bias or prejudice action was taken against a particular employee or not. The findings recorded by the Apex Court in this respect in paragraphs 20 and 21 read thus: “20. The preliminary report submitted by the respondent to the Director (Commercial) was after discussion with the landowner at the cost of Rs. 30 lakhs yet this cannot work as an estoppel against the landowner. May be the landowner at one point of time might have offered the land at Rs. 30 lakhs but that report cannot operate as estoppel against the landowner that she cannot jack up the price for the land. In fact when the Price Negotiation Committee asked for written proposal from the landowner, she quoted it at Rs. 61 lakhs and ultimately the Price Negotiation Committee after taking into consideration all the factors negotiated at Rs. 50.01 lakhs for 5 acres of land. This was the joint decision of the Price Negotiation Committee which was headed by Shri S.C. Goswami, General Manager (Marketing) as the Chairman. Therefore, from the above discussion, we are of opinion that the view taken in these set of facts by the Division Bench cannot be said to be wrong. 21. 50.01 lakhs for 5 acres of land. This was the joint decision of the Price Negotiation Committee which was headed by Shri S.C. Goswami, General Manager (Marketing) as the Chairman. Therefore, from the above discussion, we are of opinion that the view taken in these set of facts by the Division Bench cannot be said to be wrong. 21. So far as the legal proposition as contended by the learned Additional Solicitor General with regard to appreciation of evidence is concerned, there is no quarrel that the Courts cannot sit as appellate authority over the domestic enquiries but in the present case what appears to us is that the respondent has become a scapegoat in order to make someone responsible for no fault of his. He alone was targeted for the simple reason that he submitted preliminary report where the price of the land proposed by the landowner was Rs. 30 lakhs. But this was tentative price given by the landowner and the authorities negotiated with the landowner and she quoted the price at Rs. 61 lakhs and thereafter they again negotiated with her. The background was fully known to Shri S.C. Goswami, General Manager (Marketing) who was the Chairman of the Price Negotiation Committee and even otherwise also just because that one of the officers has submitted a preliminary report intimating the price given by the landowner as Rs. 30 lakhs for 7 acres of land, that does not bind the landowner to sell the land for similar price, later on if she wriggles out, for which the officer of the appellant Company who had inquired from the landowner cannot be found guilty. The respondent cannot be held responsible for the same and more so, in the present case the price has been negotiated by the Price Negotiation Committee. Therefore, simply because a preliminary report was submitted by the respondent and all the three Committees in which he was a member along with others cannot disown their liability. If the respondent is targeted then all the members of the Committees are equally responsible. Therefore, such finding given by the enquiring authority cannot be countenanced. Similarly, so far as the appointment of Shri I. Sharma is concerned, the respondent alone was not responsible. 10. Now to examine whether the aspects were rightly considered by the appellate authority in that respect or not? Therefore, such finding given by the enquiring authority cannot be countenanced. Similarly, so far as the appointment of Shri I. Sharma is concerned, the respondent alone was not responsible. 10. Now to examine whether the aspects were rightly considered by the appellate authority in that respect or not? The final order was passed by the appellate authority in the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 31-1-1999 indicates nothing except that the said appeal of the petitioner was received beyond the limitation prescribed under 1966 Rules and therefore the same was dismissed. No reason whatsoever has been assigned by the appellate authority in rejecting the appeal of the petitioner on merit, though it is said that after due consideration the appeal was rejected. The manner of deciding the appeal preferred under the provisions of 1966 Rules is prescribed in Rule 27 of the said Rules. It is specifically prescribed that the appellate authority will not only examine the grounds raised in the memo of appeal but will also examine the record of enquiry and will record its reasoning for affirming or setting aside the order of the disciplinary authority. The order placed at Annexure A/9 dated 10-4-2002 is absolutely a non-speaking order passed by the appellate authority on second occasion. Even this fact is not examined whether after the remand of the enquiry on first occasion the same was completed by the disciplinary authority in terms of the remand directions or not and whether the order was rightly issued by the disciplinary authority or not. In view of this, the pleas raised by the respondents cannot be accepted that the appellate authority has rightly decided the appeal of the petitioner on second occasion when after the remand the disciplinary authority has passed the order of penalty against the petitioner. 11. Consequently, the petition is allowed in part. While not interfering in the order of disciplinary authority, the order passed by the appellate authority i.e. the Conservator of Forest, Khandwa on 10-4-2002 (Annexure A/9) is hereby quashed. The matter is remitted back to the appellate authority to decide the appeal of the petitioner ignoring the limitation for filing of the appeal on merits giving findings on each and every ground raised by the petitioner. The matter is remitted back to the appellate authority to decide the appeal of the petitioner ignoring the limitation for filing of the appeal on merits giving findings on each and every ground raised by the petitioner. Needless to say, in case it is found necessary, opportunity of hearing be allowed to the petitioner and a fresh order be passed in the appeal of the petitioner within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order passed today. The order so passed in appeal of the petitioner be communicated to the petitioner within the aforesaid period. Needless to say, the appellate authority will not be guided by any observation made by this Court with respect to the conduct of the departmental enquiry, but will examine the correctness of the orders of penalty imposed on the petitioner on the grounds so raised in the memo of appeal. 12. The petition is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. There shall be no order as to costs.