Order Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner has approached this Court on rejection of her claim for monetary compensation on 10.9.2010 passed by the respondent-General Manager, BCCL, Gobindpur, Dhanbad. She has also sought for a direction upon the respondents to pay monetary compensation due to her from the date of death of her husband i.e. on 21.1.1997 till the date she attained the age of 60 years in the year 2008. The claim of the petitioner for monetary compensation has been rejected on the grounds that her option was submitted in the year 2010 and she has already attained 60 years of age in the year 2008 itself. Therefore, she would not be entitled for payment of monetary compensation according to the provision of the National Coal Wages Agreement. 3. There is a little background to the whole controversy, which is narrated herein-below for better appreciation of the facts of the case. 4. On the death of her husband on 21.1.1997, the petitioner herself made a claim for compassionate appointment. The respondent vide Annexure-2, dated 6.6.1997, had, however intimated that she was already 49 years of age and she would be entitled to seek monetary compensation in terms of the NCWA for which she was required to submit her option. The petitioner, however, chose to pursue the case of compassionate appointment of her son-in-law, which was not being considered. Therefore, she moved this Court in W.P.(S) No. 5430 of 2004. In the said writ petition through I.A. No. 2184 of 2004 (Annexure-3), she had also made an alternative prayer to be considered in the following terms:- "That the petitioner further prays that in case of denial of appointment of the petitioner's son-in-law on compassionate grounds, the respondents may in alternative be directed to pay to the petitioner the entire arrears and current monthly monetary compensation with suitable interest as per the provisions of Clause 9.5,0 of National Coal Wage Agreement-VI." 5. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, though the claim for compassionate appointment was not entertained and the writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court vide order dated 21.1.2010, Annexure-4 to the writ petition, but this Court observed that the petitioner shall be at liberty to accept the offer for monetary compensation as given by the respondents. Thereafter, on submission of her application, Annexure-5 dated 23.2.2010, the impugned order has been passed. The petitioner has also relied upon the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Etwaria Devi vs. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. reported in 2008(1) JCR 403 (Jhr.) in support of her contention that she is at-least entitled to the monetary compensation on the death of her husband till she attained 60 years of age. 6. The respondents, on their part, have contested the claim taking inter alia following grounds; that option is to be exercised for availing the benefit of monetary compensation by the dependent. The respondents themselves advised her to do so vide Annexure-2 in June, 1997. She filed a writ petition, which was dismissed vide order dated 21.1.2010. In such circumstances, the benefit of monetary compensation is not accruable once the incumbent-Dependant applicant has attained the age of 60 years. The petitioner has reached the age of 60 years in the year 2008 itself, therefore, her claim for monetary compensation has been rejected. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone though the relevant materials on record including the impugned order. It is true that initially the petitioner had made an application for compassionate appointment for herself in June, 1997 itself. She being 49 years of age was advised to opt for monetary compensation by the respondents themselves vide Annexure-2 dated 6.6.1997. However, it is also true that she later on was pursuing a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 5430 of 2004 for compassionate appointment of her son-in-law. In the said writ petition, she made a prayer in I.A. No. 2184 of 2004 for consideration of her case, in the alternative, for the payment of arrears and current monthly monetary compensation with suitable interest as per the provisions of Clause 9.5.0 of the NCWA-VI. Though the writ petition was dismissed vide judgment dated 21.1.2010 by the learned Single Judge of this Court, observation was made at the end that petitioner is at liberty to accept the offer for monetary compensation as given by the respondent. Thereafter, the petitioner made an application on 20.2.2010 obviously after attaining 60 years of age in the year 2008 which has been rejected by the respondents. 8. Thereafter, the petitioner made an application on 20.2.2010 obviously after attaining 60 years of age in the year 2008 which has been rejected by the respondents. 8. Under NCWA, a number of benefits have been given to the dependents of the employees, who are working under the respondents-Coal Company like BCCL depending upon the terms and condition of the circular specified therein. As it would appear from Chapter-9 of the NCWA-VI produced by the counsel for the parties, it deals with Social Security Scheme inter alia containing several provisions for the benefit of the employees or their dependants in case of death or disablement. Clause 9.1.0. provides life cover scheme. Clause 9.2.0 provides for workmen's compensation benefits declaring that the employees covered by the agreement shall be entitled to the benefits admissible under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. Clause 9.3.0. provides employment to one Dependant of workers, who are disabled permanently and also those who die while in service. Clause 9.3.2. inter alia, deals with employment to one dependent of the worker, who dies while in service. In so far as female dependant is concerned, their employment/ payment of monetary compensation would be government by para 9.5.0. Clause 9.4.0. also provides for employment to one dependant of a worker, who is permanently disabled, in his place. Similarly Clause 9.5.0. provides employment/monetary compensation to female dependant of workmen, who die while in service and who are declared medically unfit as per Clause 9.4.0. For better appreciation Clause 9.5.0. is quoted hereinbelow:- "9.5.0 Employment/Monetary compensation to female dependant Provision of employment/monetary compensation to female dependants of workmen who die while in service and who are declared medically unfit as per Clause 9.4.0 above would be regulated as under:- (i) In case of death due to mine accident, the female dependant would have the option to either accept the monetary compensation of Rs. 4,000/- per month or employment irrespective of her age. (ii) In case of death/total permanent disablement due to cause other than mine accident and medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0., if the female dependant is below the age of 45 years she will have the option either to accept the monetary compensation of Rs. 3,000/- per month or employment. In case the female dependant is above 45 years of age she will be entitled only to monetary compensation and not to employment. 3,000/- per month or employment. In case the female dependant is above 45 years of age she will be entitled only to monetary compensation and not to employment. (iii) In case of death either in mine accident or for other reasons or medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0, if no employment has been offered and the male dependant of the concerned worker is 12 years and above in age, he will be kept on a live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skill and qualifications when he attains the age of 18 years. During the period the male dependant is on live roster, the female dependant will be paid monetary compensation as per rates at paras (i) & (ii) above. This will be effective from 1.1.2000. (iv) Monetary compensation wherever applicable, would be paid till the female dependant attains the age of 60 years. (v) The existing rate of monetary compensation will continue. The matter will be further discussed in the Standardisation Committee and finalised." 9. The perusal of the aforesaid provision under Clause 9.5.0 indicates that monetary compensation would be paid till the female dependant attains the age of 60 years. This provision are in the nature of social and economic rights guaranteed under the National Coal Wages Agreement entered into between the workmen and the employer for the benefit of those employees and their dependants, who die or suffer permanent disablement, while in service. They are essentially intended to provide relief to the family of the deceased or disabled employee in time of distress. In the matter of construction of such provision which are in the nature of beneficial provision and conferring social and economic right to such under privileged person, the view which advances the course of justice has to be adopted. If the narrow view intends to defeat the end of justice, the same has to be shunned, while the broader view which enhances the course of justice is to be adopted. 10. This approach has also been reiterated by the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in number of cases. Therefore purposive interpretation needs to be given to such provisions which relates to families in destitution, wife or hapless children on the death of bread earner of the family. In the matter relating to interpretation of provision of Section 125 of the Cr. Therefore purposive interpretation needs to be given to such provisions which relates to families in destitution, wife or hapless children on the death of bread earner of the family. In the matter relating to interpretation of provision of Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. on the meaning of the expression 'wife', the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the cased Badshah vs. Sou. Urmila Badshah Godse & Anr. in Cr. Misc. Petition No. 19530 of 2013 in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 8596 of 2013 vide judgment dated 18.10.2013 have once again emphasized that the Courts have to adopt different approaches in "social justice adjudication", which is also known as "social context adjudication" as mere "adversarial approach" may not be very appropriate. It was found that the provisions of maintenance definitely fall in the said category which aims at empowering the destitute and achieving social justice or equality and dignity of individual. In such circumstances as aforesaid Hon'ble Court observed that if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, should be avoided. We should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. 11. The luminous opinion of the Justice Sikri, J., is expressed in the aforesaid judgment at paragraph nos. 17 to 21, 25 and 27 are being quoted hereinunder:- "17. Thirdly, in such cases, purposive interpretation needs to be given to the provisions of Section 125, Cr.P.C. while dealing with the application of destitute wife or hapless children or parents under this provision, the Court is dealing with the marginalized sections of the society. The purpose is to achieve "social justice" which is the Constitutional vision, enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India. Preamble to the Constitution of India clearly signals that we have chosen the democratic path under rule of law to achieve the goal of securing for all its citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. It specifically highlights achieving their social justice. Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty of the Courts to advance the cause of the social justice. While giving interpretation to a particular provision, the Court is supposed to bridge the gap between the law and society. 18. It specifically highlights achieving their social justice. Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty of the Courts to advance the cause of the social justice. While giving interpretation to a particular provision, the Court is supposed to bridge the gap between the law and society. 18. Of late, in this very direction, it is emphasized that the Courts have to adopt different approaches in "social justice adjudication" which is also known as "social context adjudication" as mere "adversarial approach" may not be very appropriate. There are number of social justice legislations giving special protection and benefits to vulnerable groups in the society. Prof. Madhava Menon describes it eloquently: "It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that "social context judging" is essentially the application of equality jurisprudence as evolved, by Parliament and the Supreme Court is myriad situations presented before Courts where unequal parties are pitted in adversarial proceedings and where courts are called upon to dispense equal justice. Apart from the social-economic inequalities accentuating the disabilities of the poor in an unequal fight the adversarial process itself operates to the disadvantage of the weaker party. In such a situation, the judge has to be not only sensitive to the inequalities of parties involved but also positively inclined to the weaker party if the imbalance were not to result in miscarriage of justice. This result is achieved by what we call social context judging or social justice adjudication" 19. Provision of maintenance would definitely fall in this category which aims at empowering the destitute and achieving social justice or equality and dignity of the individual. While dealing with cases under this provision, drift in the approach from "adversarial" litigation to social context adjudication is the need of the hour. 20. The law regulates relationships between people. It prescribes patterns of behaviour. It reflects the values of society. The role of the Court is to understand the purpose of law in society and to help the law achieve its purpose. But the law of a society is a living organism. It is based on a given factual and social reality that is constantly changing. Sometimes change in law precedes societal change and is even intended to stimulate it. In most cases, however, a change in law is the result of a change in social reality. Indeed, when social reality changes, the law must change too. It is based on a given factual and social reality that is constantly changing. Sometimes change in law precedes societal change and is even intended to stimulate it. In most cases, however, a change in law is the result of a change in social reality. Indeed, when social reality changes, the law must change too. Just as change in social reality is the law of life, responsiveness to change in social reality is the life of the law. It can be said that the history of law is the history of adapting the law to society's changing needs. In both Constitutional and statutory interpretation, the Court is supposed to exercise direction in determining the proper relationship between the subjective and objective purpose of the law. 21. Cardozo acknowledges in his classic "....no system of just scriptum has been able to escape the need of it", and he elaborates: "It is true that Codes and Statutes do not render the Judge superfluous, nor his work perfunctory and mechanical. There are gaps to be filled. There are hardships and wrongs to be mitigated if not avoided. Interpretation is often spoken of as if it were nothing but the search and the discovery of a meaning which, however, obscure and latent, had none the less a real and ascertainable pre-existence in the legislator's mind. The process is, indeed, that at times, but it is often something more. The ascertainment of intention may be the least of a judge's troubles in ascribing meaning to a statute. Says Gray in his lecture "The fact is that the difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the legislature has had no meaning at all; when the question which is raised on the statute never occurred to it; when what the judges have to do is, not to determine that the legislature did mean on a point which was present to its mind, but to guess what it would have intended on a point not present to its mind, if the point had been present." 25. Thus, while interpreting a statute the court may not only take into consideration the purpose for which the statute was enacted, but also the mischief it seeks to suppress. It is this mischief rule, first propounded in Heydon's Case which became the historical source of purposive interpretation. Thus, while interpreting a statute the court may not only take into consideration the purpose for which the statute was enacted, but also the mischief it seeks to suppress. It is this mischief rule, first propounded in Heydon's Case which became the historical source of purposive interpretation. The court would also invoke the legal maxim construction ut res magis valeat guam pereat, in such cases i.e. where alternative constructions are possible the Court must give effect to that which will be responsible for the smooth working of the system for which the statute has been enacted rather than one which will put a road block in its way. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation should be avoided. We should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. If this interpretation is not accepted, it would amount to giving a premium to the husband for defrauding the wife. Therefore, at least for the purpose of claiming maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C., such a woman is to be treated as the legally wedded wife. 27. In taking the aforesaid view, we are also encouraged by the following observations of this Court in Capt. Ramesh Chander Kaushal vs. Veena Kaushal: "The brooding presence of the Constitutional empathy for the weaker sections like women and children must inform interpretation if it has to have social relevance. So viewed, it is possible to be selective in picking out that interpretation out of two alternatives which advances the cause-the cause of the derelicts." 12. In the aforesaid background, therefore, it is imperative to take an approach which advances the course of justice, which confers the benefit conceived under the provision of NCWA to such female dependant under provision of Clause 9.5.0 of the NCWA. Even otherwise also mere looking at the provision contained at clause 9.5.0 would show that it does not support the reasons contained in the impugned order to refuse the claim of the petitioner for monetary compensation in the facts of the present case. 13. Even otherwise also mere looking at the provision contained at clause 9.5.0 would show that it does not support the reasons contained in the impugned order to refuse the claim of the petitioner for monetary compensation in the facts of the present case. 13. In the present case, the petitioner had herself sought for such an alternative relief in the earlier round of litigation by filing interlocutory application being I.A. No. 2184 of 2004 and had expressed her intention to avail the benefits of monetary compensation due to her under Clause 9.5.0 of the NCWA-VI. After disposal of the writ petition, however, she submitted her application for monetary compensation, which has been rejected on technical ground that she has attained 60 years of age prior to that. Such interpretation which would defeat the interest of justice cannot be countenanced. In the circumstances, the impugned order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. It is, accordingly, set aside. 14. The respondents shall give monetary compensation due to the petitioner after the death of her husband till the date she attained 60 years of age as per the provisions of Clause 9.5.0 of the NCWA in vogue along with arrears within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 15. This writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.