Laxman Ramchandra Shelke v. Sou. Akkubai Tukaram Dambarke
2013-07-02
R.M.SAVANT
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. Admit, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties heard forthwith. 2. The Appellants herein i.e. the Defendant Nos.1 to 7 are in Appeal against the Judgment and Order dated 29/4/2011 passed by the learned District Judge1, Karad. By the said Judgment and Order, the decree passed by the Trial Court for partition and separate possession has been confirmed. 3. The principal contention urged on behalf of the Appellants herein is the manner in which the Lower Appellate Court has disposed of the said Appeal. 4. The substantial question of law therefore which arises for consideration is, “Whether the Lower Appellate Court has followed the mandate of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure in disposing of the Appeal?” 5. The suit in question has been filed by the Respondent i.e. the original Plaintiff for partition, separate possession and for permanent injunction against the Defendants in respect of the suit properties which are described in Paragraph Nos.1, 1A and 1B of the plaint. The Plaintiff claims share in the suit properties on the ground that she is a daughter of Chandru Naru Shelke and that at present there is no other legal heir to her father Chandru who died in the year 1942. It is her case that in the suit properties her father had 1/4th share and after his death, her mother Anubai had got legal right and interest in the said 1/4th share as per the provisions of Hindu Women's right to Property Act, 1937, and after coming to operation of Hindu Succession Act she had became absolute owner of the said 1/4th share, and after her death, the Plaintiff being her daughter is entitled to the said 1/4th share. 6. The Defendants i.e. the Appellants herein denied the contentions of the Plaintiff. They denied that the Plaintiff is the daughter of the said Chandru and that she was given in marriage to one Tukaram Dambarke. It is their case that the Plaintiff has no concern with the Defendants or Anubai Shelke and that she was never in possession of the suit properties and has no share in the suit properties, and therefore, she is not entitled to the relief of partition and separate possession. 7.
It is their case that the Plaintiff has no concern with the Defendants or Anubai Shelke and that she was never in possession of the suit properties and has no share in the suit properties, and therefore, she is not entitled to the relief of partition and separate possession. 7. The Trial Court on the basis of the pleadings framed the issues as to whether the Plaintiff was the daughter of Chandru Shelke; whether the Plaintiff proves that she has a share in the suit properties, and whether the Plaintiff is entitled to partition. The parties have led evidence in respect of the said issues. The Plaintiff had examined as many as five witnesses whereas the Defendant No.1 adduced evidence on behalf of the Defendants. It is on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence on record that the Trial Court decreed the suit and issued a declaration that the Plaintiff is the daughter of the said Chandru Shelke and she is entitled to 1/4th share which was belonging to the said Chandru Shelke and consequently she is entitled for partition and separate possession of the said share. The decree of the Trial Court is dated 19/10/2004. 8. The Defendants carried the matter in Appeal which Appeal came to be numbered as Regular Civil Appeal No.1 of 2005. In the context of the issues that were framed and answered by the Trial Court, the Lower Appellate Court framed the following 4 issues:- 1. Whether the appellant proves that the Ld. Lower Court has drawn wrong conclusion regarding relationship of plaintiff with deceased Chandru? 2. Whether appellant proves that the Ld. Lower Court has wrongly held that plaintiff have 1/4th share in the suit property? 3. Whether appellant proves that the Ld. Lower Court has drawn wrong conclusion? 4. What order? The Lower Appellate Court has thereafter in one paragraph concluded the Appeal. The Lower Appellate Court, as can be seen from the impugned Judgment and Order, has recorded that the Trial Court seems to have drawn a conclusion on the basis of the evidence led before it, and it seems that there is proper reasoning to the said conclusions drawn by the Lower Court and that the Appellants have failed to satisfy the Lower Appellate Court as to how the Lower Court has drawn wrong conclusion.
The Lower Appellate Court has further observed that since the relationship is established, the Plaintiff is the sole successor to the property of Chandru and she is therefore entitled for partition and separate possession. As indicated above, it is the said Judgment and Order dated 29/04/2011 passed by the Lower Appellate Court, which is taken exception to by way of the above Second Appeal. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. The principal contention of the learned counsel for the Appellants is that the Lower Appellate Court has not followed the mandate of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the Appellants that the Lower Appellate Court ought to have appreciated the facts/evidence on record and thereafter ought to have independently assessed the evidence of the parties and consider the relevant points/issues which arise for adjudication. The learned counsel for the Appellants would contend that the Lower Appellate Court being the last fact finding Court must give reasons for its decision on each point independently to that of the Trial Court. In support of the said contention the learned counsel for the Appellants would rely upon the judgments of the Apex Court in the matter of H Siddiqui v A Ramalingam reported in AIR 2011 SC 1492 ; in the matter of M/s Real Estate Agencies v/s. Govt. of Goa and ors. reported in 2012 AIR SCW 5203; in the matter of B V Nagesh & Anr. V/s. H V Sreenivasa Murthy reported in 2010(6) ALL MR 928; in the matter of Madhukarand ors v/s. Sangram and ors. reported in AIR 2001 SC 2171 . The learned counsel for the Appellants also relied upon the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Khatunbiwd/o Mohammad Sayeed and others v/s. Aminabi w/o Mohammad Sabir reported in 2006(6) Mh.L.J. 759 . 10. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent would support the order passed by the Lower Appellate Court. The learned counsel for the Respondent would contend that when the Lower Appellate Court agrees with view of the Trial Court on evidence it need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate reasons given by the Trial Court.
The learned counsel for the Respondent would contend that when the Lower Appellate Court agrees with view of the Trial Court on evidence it need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate reasons given by the Trial Court. The learned counsel for the Respondent would contend that the expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court, the decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel for the Respondent would rely upon the Judgments of the Apex Court in the matter of Girijanandini Devi V/s. Bijendra Narain Choudhary reported in AIR 1967 SC 1124 and in the matter of Santosh Hazari v/s. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. reported in (2001) 3 SCC 179 . In so far as the judgment in Santosh Hazari's case (supra) is concerned, the learned counsel for the Respondent would contend that the Apex Court has carved out two categories; one wherein the Appellate Court agrees with the findings of the Trial Court, in which case a general agreement with reasoning would suffice, and second category where the Appellate Court does not agree with the findings of the Trial Court, in which case the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the Trial Court must weigh with the Appellate Court and also whilst reversing a finding of fact the Appellate Court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the Trial Court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. The learned counsel for the Respondent would contend that in the facts of the present case where the Lower Appellate Court has agreed with the finding of the Trial Court, the general expression of agreement with the findings of the Trial Court would suffice, and therefore no interference is called for with the impugned Judgment and Order of the Lower Appellate Court. 11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have bestowed by anxious consideration to the rival contentions. The Lower Appellate Court, as can be seen, has framed three issues which have been adverted to herein above. After framing the said three issues, the Lower Appellate Court has, in a cryptic manner, answered the same.
11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have bestowed by anxious consideration to the rival contentions. The Lower Appellate Court, as can be seen, has framed three issues which have been adverted to herein above. After framing the said three issues, the Lower Appellate Court has, in a cryptic manner, answered the same. No doubt, the Lower Appellate Court has expressed an agreement with the finding and conclusion recorded by the Trial Court, however, considering the mandate of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which has been expounded by the Apex Court in the Judgments (supra) as also the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Khantunbi's case (supra) cited on behalf of the Appellants, the Lower Appellate Court could not have disposed of the Appeal in the manner in which it has been done. The relevant extract from Paragraph 17 of the judgment in H.Siddiqui (dead) by Lrs' case (supra) can be gainfully reproduced herein under: “It is mandatory for appellate court to independently assess evidence of parties and consider relevant points which arise for adjudication and bearing of evidence on those points. Being the final Court of fact, the first appellate Court must not record mere general expression of concurrence with the trial Court judgment rather it must give reasons for its decision on each point independently to that of the trial Court. Thus, the entire evidence must be considered and discussed in detail. Such exercise should be done after formulating the points for consideration in terms of the said provisions and the Court must proceed in adherence to the requirements of the said statutory provisions.” The Division Bench of this Court in Khatunbi's case (supra) has also held that compliance of Rule 31 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure is mandatory and that failure to comply with the said provision of law would not be a mere irregularity. As can be seen, the impugned Judgment and Order is bereft of any reasons as to why the evidence which has been adduced by the Plaintiff deserves acceptance as also the reasons why the findings of the Trial Court are acceptable to the Lower Appellate Court.
As can be seen, the impugned Judgment and Order is bereft of any reasons as to why the evidence which has been adduced by the Plaintiff deserves acceptance as also the reasons why the findings of the Trial Court are acceptable to the Lower Appellate Court. The Lower Appellate Court as can be seen in an abrupt manner concluded that both the findings and conclusion reached by the Trial Court cannot be said to be wrong findings or conclusion. In my view, the Lower Appellate Court therefore has not discharged the duty cast upon its as an Appellate Court. 12. In so far as the Judgments cited on behalf of the Respondent herein are concerned, it is required to be noted that the judgment in Girijanandini Devi's case (supra) was considered by the Apex Court in Santosh Hazari's case (supra) though the Apex Court in Santosh Hazari's case had adverted to the ratio laid down in Girijanandini Devi's case that if the Lower Appellate Court agrees with the finding of the Trial Court then general expression of agreement would suffice. However, at the same time, the Apex Court in Paragraph 15 has sounded a note of caution and had observed that same should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. In my view, the judgment of the Apex Court in Girijanandini Devi's case (supra) cannot be relied upon to justify the manner in which the appeal has been disposed of in the instant case. The Lower Appellate Court as can be seen has failed to adhere to the mandate of the Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the impugned Judgment and Order therefore stands vitiated on the said ground. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the impugned Judgment and Order of the Lower Appellate Court would have to be set aside and the matter would have to be relegated back to the Lower Appellate Court for de-novo consideration of the Appeal. The same to be done by the Lower Appellate Court within a period of three months of the parties appearing before it. The Lower Appellate Court on remand would be well advised to record its findings on the issues that are framed by referring to the facts and evidence which has been recorded by the Trial Court.
The same to be done by the Lower Appellate Court within a period of three months of the parties appearing before it. The Lower Appellate Court on remand would be well advised to record its findings on the issues that are framed by referring to the facts and evidence which has been recorded by the Trial Court. The substantial question of law therefore to stand answered accordingly. With the aforesaid directions the above Second Appeal is disposed of. In view of the disposal of the above Second Appeal, the Civil Application No.1257 of 2011 does not survive and the same to accordingly stand disposed of as such.